Comparing the 2006 Military Coup in Thailand and the 2009 Coup in Honduras: Internal Socio-political Similarities and External Normative Differences

published in "Ask the Experts", Academic Herald, (September 6, 2009)

 

Otto F. von Feigenblatt, BS, MA, FRAS,  Nova Southeastern University

 

Abstract: The political circumstances underlying the Military Coups that took place in Thailand and Honduras in September 19, 2006 and June 28, 2009 respectively show some important similarities. Both coups were undertaken by conservative elements in order to remove populist elected leaders from their posts. Moreover, in both cases the populist leaders enjoyed the support of the great majority of the rural population. Nevertheless this paper attempts to explain how different international and regional norms shaped the regional and international reactions to the two coups. In the case of the Thai Coup the norm of non-interference was upheld by the Association of Southeast Asian States as well as by the rest of the International Community while in the Honduran case the norm of “protection of democracy” and “the rule of law” were upheld by the Association of American States and the rest of the International Community. This paper argues that the international community and other regions should learn from the prompt and decisive response to the Coup in Honduras based on a normative shift away from sovereignty as an absolute right and towards sovereignty as responsibility.

 The Post-cold War period was marked by a sharp increase in the rate of democratization in the developing world.i Military regimes in East Asia and Latin America gave ways to democratic regimes based on the rule of law and constitutional order. Moreover, the increasing rate of democratization was propelled by the international mainstreaming of norms such as the ones represented by the Human Rights regime. It seemed as if the realist ethos of the Cold War had given way to a liberal institutionalist order based on liberal democracy.ii

 Southeast Asia and Central America were focal points of crisis during the late years of the Cold War and the early years of the New World Order with conflict flashpoint such as Nicaragua and Cambodia constantly making the headlines.iii Thailand and Honduras seemed to be on the right track towards liberal democracy and development. If one accepts Amartya Sen’s conceptualization of development as an increase in “freedom’ and “capabilities” then both Honduras and Thailand were making great strides toward that goal.iv Thai power politics based on the all pervasive influence of the Military and the Palace was giving way to grassroots democracy under the Thai Rak Thai Party.v Honduras had also managed to shed a history of authoritarianism and political parties were attempting to court the rural vote.vi  The zeitgeist was personified by two great populists, Thaksin Shinawatra, a self-made Media tycoon, and Manuel Zelaya, a wealthy cattle rancher. Both gave voice to the poor rural masses and alienated the conservative elites traditionally in power in their respective countries. The similarities do not end there; both were removed from office by unelected forces while maintaining their popularity. The following sections of this paper provide a brief explanation of the two coups and compare and contrast the reaction of the regional and international communities. Finally, a concluding section deals with the lessons learned from the two Coups and recommends moving parting from a view of sovereignty as an absolute right and instead moving towards a definition of sovereignty as responsibility.

 

 

 

 On the 19 of September 2006 the Military launched a bloodless coup while the Prime Minister was away attending a meeting at the United Nations in New York.vii Tanks and troops quickly took control of the city and the media. Shortly thereafter, coup leaders got the approval of the King to legitimize their de facto rule. The military coup was supported by the conservative Bangkok middle classes, by the Palace, and by some conservative opposition parties. In terms of reasons for the Coup, the reactionary coalition claimed that too much power had been given to the “ignorant rural masses” and that Prime Minister Thaksin had tried to weaken the Monarchy.viii In truth, the coup was simply the surfacing of the perennial class conflict in the conservative Southeast Asian nation. Thaksin’s populist policies had redistributed resources from the center (Bangkok) to the previously ignored periphery (the rural provinces).ix More threatening still to the traditional elites, was that Thaksin “charismatic” legitimacy was overshadowing the elites’ “traditional legitimacy”. Following Max Weber’s seminal typology of the basis of power, one can trace a gradual shift in Thailand away from “traditional legitimacy” and towards a mix of “formal/legal” power and “charismatic” legitimacy.x The result was that the historically independent and conservative Military launched a coup with the tacit agreement of the Palace in order to reserve the tide. Consequently the democratic constitution of 1997 was replaced with a new one in 2007 greatly weakening elected officials vis a vis the courts and other unelected centers of power.xi

 

 

 President Manuel Zelaya, a wealthy rancher, who had increasingly attempted to bring to the fore the needs and interests of the poor rural masses of Honduras was removed by the Military from the Presidential Palace on the 28 of June and send into exile in Costa Rica.xii The culprits were the traditional elites and business interests. Moreover, their motivation was a growing fear of change. Manuel Zelaya had shown support for policies in line with those of President Chavez of Venezuela which if carried out, would entail a massive redistribution of wealth and assets including a long overdue land reform.xiii Needless to say the proposed policies enjoyed the support of the great majority of the impoverished population. Riding on a wave of popularity, Zelaya had attempted to extend his rule through his main source of legitimacy, popular support. A proposed referendum would have allowed Zelaya to run for the reelection. Taking into consideration his popularity the elites were not willing to take a chance and decided to remove him from office through military force. In this case the Supreme Court took the role played in Thailand by the Palace and attempted to legitimize the Coup and the subsequent establishment of the de facto government.

 Both coups were carried out in order to remove popularly elected officials with the blessing of unelected institutions. In addition to that, both coups were supported by coalitions of conservative elements representing traditional elites who would lose power if the populist trends that were prevalent at the time were to continue. Thus, both coups were clearly in favor of re-establishing the status quo ante the rise of grassroots democratization in their respective countries.

 One important and apparently disregarded difference is the reaction of the regional and international communities to the coups. In the Thai case, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) supported the norm of “non-interference” enshrined in the so-called “ASEAN way” of diplomacy and immediately recognized the government imposed by the coup.xiv The international community showed some concern but shortly thereafter recognized the new government without imposing any sanctions. Furthermore, the United States under the Bush Administration immediately supported the new government and did not provide any meaningful diplomatic support to the deposed Prime Minister.xv On the other hand, the Organization of American States (OAS) reacted immediately to the break in constitutional rule in Honduras. Jose Miguel Inzulza, Secretary General of the OAS, condemned the coup and gave the de facto government an ultimatum to reinstate President Zelaya.xvi The OAS was not alone in opposing the coup, the United States also put pressure on the de facto government and threatened sanctions if the President was not returned to power. Another interesting development was the Costa Rican effort to reach a negotiated settlement. Dr. Oscar Arias, Nobel Prize Laureate for his role in brokering a peace deal in Central America during the 1980s, offered his services as a mediator to try to peacefully bring a conclusion to the political crisis in Honduras. xvii

 It is important to note that the OAS carried out its threat to suspend Honduras and that the Obama administration gave its full support to the Arias mediation effort. American military aid to Honduras was suspended and more sanctions were threatened. At the time of writing, no country has recognized the de facto government in Honduras and President Zelaya enjoys the full support of the regional and International communities.xviii While the mediation effort has encountered some obstacles it enjoys the support of the United States and of the OAS.

 It is clear that the international norms that were applied to the two coups vastly differ. In the case of the Thai coup, ASEAN stressed the norm of “non-interference” which is enshrined in the “ASEAN way”.xix This reflects ASEAN’s view that sovereignty is absolute and that any external interference in the internal affairs of a member state should be avoided. The Bush Administration also avoided making any strong statements against the military coup and immediately recognized the new government. A neo-realist foreign policy explains why the Bush administration decided to take a pragmatic course of action rather than risk important security interests.

 The two military coups that were discussed in this paper show important socio-political similarities. However, as was shown in the previous section, the response of the regional and international community was very different in the two cases. The response to the Honduran Coup shows that the OAS is a more advanced and effective regional organization than ASEAN and that the United States under the Obama administration favors a view of sovereignty more attuned to the norms of the Responsibility to Protect and Human Security. Sovereignty as a right is giving way to sovereignty as a responsibility as a pivotal international norm underlying the current world system. It is imperative that other regions learn from the recent political crisis in Honduras and act promptly and decisively in the face of threats to the Human Security and Human Rights of states and most importantly, of their people.

 

 

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