

The South African Transition: A Holistic Approach to the Analysis of the Struggle Leading to the 1994 Elections.

Otto von Feigenblatt, M.A., Nova Southeastern University

Abstract: *This paper deconstructs the conflict leading up to and shortly following the democratic transition in South Africa. A simple instrument is used in order to identify the main components of the conflict. The information gathered by the instrument is then analyzed using three different theories: regime transition theory, norm socialization using the Spiral Model of Socialization developed by Risse and Sikkink (Kollman, 2008, p. 400), and finally a short comparison to John Duckitt and Thobi Mphuthing's attitudinal study of pre- and post- electoral South Africa will be provided (Mphuthing & Duckitt, 1998). The explanations given by the three approaches are then compared and contrasted in order to gain a more holistic understanding of the South African transition.*

1 Introduction

The 1990s were a time of momentous change in South Africa. De Klerk, the State President of the white regime, reopened talks with the previously banned black opposition movements and released important political prisoners. After a tortuous and uncertain period of posturing and negotiation between the major political and social forces in the country, the historic election of 1994 took place. It brought to power a coalition government headed by the African National Congress and including the National Party and the Inkatha Freedom Party, *inter alia*. While the beginnings of this transition can be traced back to decades before the election, this paper will concentrate on the dynamics of conflict for the period leading to the unbanning of the African National Congress and to the breakdown of negotiations in the Second Convention for a Democratic South Africa (CODESA), which took place on March 1992 (Ottaway, 1993, p. 107).

The transition from a white-minority government to black majority rule in South Africa is a process that can be analyzed from a myriad of different perspectives. An

expressive perspective would concentrate on the attitudes of the different groups before and after the transition in relation to feelings of relative deprivation, the perceived legitimacy/illegitimacy of that deprivation, hostility, and perceived social and economic status (Mphuthing, 1998; Pruitt, 2004, p. 19). This perspective differs widely from the one taken by regime transition theory in Political Science. Three weberian ideal types of transition are identified: *transition after regime breakdown*, *transition through extrication*, and finally *transition through transaction* (Giliomee, 1992). This structural approach analyzes transitions according to the relative stability and power of the ruling elite before and during the transition. Johannes Rantete and Hermann Giliomee have applied this theory to the South African transition labeling it as a *transition through transaction* similar to that of Spain after the death of Generalissimo Francisco Franco (1992, p. 515). While this approach provides some elucidating insights at the role of relative power in the transition, it fails to account for some of the unique features of the South African case such as the polarization of society along ethnic lines rather than ideological ones and the role of international norms in limiting the available tactics of the main parties.

Another theory from the margins of International Relations is the constructivist theory of norm socialization. This theory can complement structural theories of transition in that it explains the effects of norms in constraining and encouraging certain behaviors (Kollman, 2008). In the case of South Africa, little research has been carried out regarding the effects of international discourse and norms on issues of human rights, self-determination, and international political economy on the transition process.¹ By adding this layer to our understanding of the South African transition it is possible to fill the gaps of the structural explanation of the effects of international pressure and sanctions on the conflict.

Finally, a basic analytical instrument identifying and describing the main components of the conflict in discussion, serves as a starting point for a more nuanced

¹ See Klotz's analysis of International sanctions on South Africa's transition for a notable exception (1995).

Otto von Feigenblatt, M.A., Nova Southeastern University

analysis and interpretation of the years leading to the South African transition. The instrument commonly called SPITCEROW for the acronym of its main components, will be used as the basic framework of the present paper.

2 Theoretical Framework and Methodology

This paper will deconstruct the conflict(s) involved in process leading up to the 1994 elections through the previously mentioned instrument called SPITCEROW. It stands for: sources, parties, issues, tactics, changes, enlargement, roles of other parties, outcome of the conflict, and identifying the “winner” if there is one. Consequently the information organized by the instrument will then be explained through the use of three different approaches: regime transition theory, norm socialization using the Spiral Model of Socialization developed by Risse and Sikink (Kollman, 2008, p. 400), and finally a short comparison to John Duckitt and Thobi Mphuthing’s attitudinal study of pre- and post- electoral South Africa will be provided (Mphuthing & Duckitt, 1998). The application of three distinct and complementary approaches will provide a more nuanced explanation of a complex and protracted conflict. Due to the emphasis of this paper on the achievement of a general meta-understanding of the underlying mechanisms behind the transition and space constraints, information about the parties and events deemed of secondary importance will be included in the form of an appendix.

3 Basic Components of the Conflict

Sources:

The antagonism between blacks and whites in South Africa is partly a legacy of the colonial period and the racist philosophy that supported it. “White man’s burden” was transformed into “separate development” (apartheid) and later on to “self-determination”. In addition to that, in contrast to the rest of Africa, a large part of the white community in South Africa is made up of the descendents of

Dutch settlers. The Boers settled in South Africa more than three hundred years ago, at the end of the 17th century and were famous for their independent spirit (AWB, 2008; Ottaway, 1993). They founded their own independent states and fought against the mighty British Empire until they were conquered and incorporated into it.

The independent spirit of the Boers was tolerated by the British due to their system of indirect rule. It was under the British that the system of separate development came about. The British administrators respected the rights of traditional authorities and used them to rule their extensive colonies (Manby, 1993, p. 20).¹ Most of the laws giving rise to the semi-independent homelands were originally drafted under the British (Manby, 1993). This guaranteed that the social and political structure of certain groups such as the Zulus would remain largely unchanged until the time of the democratic election in 1994 (IFP, 2008).

An important event in the history of the South African conflict was the moment when the Afrikaner National Party took power in 1948. At the time the Afrikaner population was economically downtrodden and was not as powerful or as educated as English speaking whites (Ottaway, 1993, p. 78). The National Party soon used its control of the state apparatus to distribute jobs and subsidies to Afrikaners. Most of the bureaucracy came to be filled with Afrikaners and their farms received subsidies from the central government. In time, the National Party virtually merged with the state and became a party state with complete control over the security forces and the bureaucracy (Klotz, 1995).

Needless to say most state funds benefitted the white minority while the vast majority of the population lived in extreme poverty. From 1917 to 1980 whites made more than 10 times more in per capita GDP than blacks and 5 times more than Asians and Coloreds (Mphuthing & Duckitt, 1998, p. 810). The developed world coexisted side by side with the third world. Furthermore the division between the two worlds was maintained by the laws of apartheid which divided the country into regions for different statutory racial

¹ One example of this was the Amakhosi Act that gave dictatorial powers to traditional chiefs (Manby, 1993, p. 20).

Otto von Feigenblatt, M.A., Nova Southeastern University

groups. Blacks were not allowed to move from their townships or their homelands into white regions except with a special permission to work there. Education and healthcare were also segregated and the disparity between the services provided to whites and those provided to blacks was stark. It is important to note that black townships and the homelands were so undeveloped that they had to be subsidized by white taxpayers through the central government (Ottaway, 1993). Thus the system was redundant and inefficient and kept most of the country forcefully underdeveloped.

Apartheid denied blacks any representation since they were supposed to be given independence through the creation of homelands. In the case of other groups such as Asians and Coloureds they did not have a homeland and thus were given representation in a tricameral parliament with the constitution of 1983 (Ottaway, 1993, p. 91). The reasoning behind this arrangement was that homelands were being organized so that blacks could rejoin their traditional ethnic groups and regain independence. However, less than 15% of the land was given to the homelands while the best land was kept by whites. Most of the land was far from urban centers and thus most homelands were not financially viable (Manby, 1993).

In summary there are three main sources to the conflict in South Africa: political subjugation, economic inequality, and colonialism (history). The three are interconnected to one another and permeate the entire fabric of South African society.

Parties:

Parties can be divided into those supporting the liberation movement, those supporting the status quo, and other concerned parties. The liberation movement was historically headed by the African National Congress (ANC) which was founded in 1912 and was banned in 1960 (Ottaway, 1993, p. 42). After it was banned the ANC operated as an exiled organization with the support of other black organizations inside South Africa such as the Mass Democratic Movement (MDM) and the United Democratic Front (UDF). The ANC has been historically allied to the

South African Communist Party (SACP) and to the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU). In addition to that it was allied to the Congress of Traditional Leaders of South Africa (CONTRALESA) (Manby, 1993, p. 19; Ottaway, 1993).

The ANC considered itself to be a liberation movement and had a military arm called Umkhoto we Sizwe (MK). In addition to having a small militia, the ANC operated collective farms in Zambia and Tanzania. The administrative structure of the ANC was headed by a National Executive Committee (NEC) that controlled the organization through different departments. While the NEC had complete control over the organization itself, it did not have control over the Mass Democratic Movement and the ANC only had 500,000 registered members by early 1991 (1993, p. 46).

Ideologically the ANC followed African Socialism with a lot of Marxist influence. Nevertheless the ANC was never a monolithic organization and its ideology varied depending on the generation of the leadership.¹ The Freedom charter guided the early years of the organization and represented the ideas of the period, influenced by the anti colonial movement. It stressed the importance of the state in promoting development and favored the nationalization of industry and the redistribution of land (1993, p. 48).

The South African Communist Party was intricately linked with the ANC and many of its leaders were also prominent members of the ANC. It followed a strict version of Marxist Leninism and helped the ANC get the support of the socialist block for many years. It is important to note that the SACP always remained independent and that it considered its cooperation with the ANC to be the first step towards socialism. In 1990 it had 23,000 members (Ottaway, 1993, pp. 52-54).

The true power of the ANC was the support it received from the Mass Democratic Movement. This movement developed inside of South Africa during the 1980s. It was mostly organized around the townships and had a participatory orientation. Most of its leaders were involved with local issues and favored a grassroots approach through mass mobilization. The main members of the MDM were civil organizations in the townships, the United Democratic

¹ See Appendix for a more detailed description of the ANC

Front, COSATU, and student groups. The MDM formally disappeared in February 1990 (1993, p. 55). Nevertheless, the civil organizations that composed it continued to function at the local level. Once again it is important to note that the ANC did not enjoy formal control of the MDM only its support. The United Democratic form was closely allied to the MDM. It was formed as a result of the establishment of the tricameral parliament. It had a participatory approach and disappeared in 1991 (1993, p. 57).

Also in the liberation movement there were other organizations that favored an Africanist ideology. This groups rejected Marxism and favored black power. The Pan Africanist Congress of Azania (PAC) and the Azanian People's Organization (AZAPO) both fall into this group. PAC formed an alliance with the ANC during the time leading to the negotiations but due to friction between the two organizations the alliance was broken (1993, p. 72). The position of PAC was more extreme than that of the ANC regarding land redistribution and the future of white settlers in South Africa. AZAPO was even more extreme in that it refused to negotiate and also subscribed to black power ideology (1993, p. 80).

The homelands or *batustans* also played an important role in the South African transition. While most of them were viewed as apartheid creations that had to be dismantled, some of them were based on strong ethnic identities and were led by strong leaders. This is the case of KwaZulu based on the historic Kingdom of the Zulus. KwaZulu had enjoyed relative autonomy under the British who kept traditional authorities in power and allowed them to control their own affairs (Manby, 1993, p. 20). This practice was continued by the National Party which officially created the homeland of KwaZulu for those of Zulu descent. Prince Buthelezi, nephew of the King of the Zulus, was elected Chief Minister of the Homeland of KwaZulu in 1976 and held that position until the 1994 elections (IFP, 2002). Buthelezi refused independence from South Africa but accepted autonomy for the homeland. KwaZulu's political power is based around the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP). This party was founded in the early 20th century as a cultural organization to preserve traditional Zulu culture. It was not successful at the time and was later on revived by Chief

Minister Buthelezi in 1975 again as a cultural movement. The IFP was originally aligned with the ANC but soon it parted ways due to philosophical differences. Its emphasis on self-help and self-reliance contrasted with the ANC's Marxist approach to development. Moreover, the IFP did not support the armed struggle against the government (IFP, 2008).

The IFP is closely linked to the KwaZulu government and the leadership of the two organizations overlap. Furthermore, Chief Buthelezi is the leader of both and also the traditional Prime Minister of the Zulu Monarchy (IFP, 2002, 2008; Lynch, 1987; Manby, 1993; Ottaway, 1993). It should be noted that KwaZulu controls its own police forces and also armed supporters. Funds from the KwaZulu government have been used to fund IFP activities. The IFP officially became a political party in 1990 with a platform favoring the free market, self-determination, and a federal government (IFP, 2008). The IFP claims to have the support of seven million Zulus and controls the government of the KwaZulu homeland. It did not have many supporters outside of KwaZulu Natal except a few town councilors and Zulu immigrants living in hostels in the townships (Ottaway, 1993, p. 69).¹

In total there were six self-governing homelands and four independent homelands. Three of them supported the ANC and the other three supported a continuation of self-rule (Manby, 1993). The remaining homelands were ambiguous about the South African transition and did not have much support either within their territory or nationally. Nominally independent Bothuthatswana opposed reintegration into South Africa and was relatively independent financially due to revenues from platinum. KwaZulu and Ciskei supported a federal solution devolving power to local governments (IFP, 2002, 2008; Lynch, 1987; Manby, 1993; Ottaway, 1993). On the other hand the Transkei, KaNgwane and Venda favored the ANC (Ottaway, 1993, p. 82).

In between the liberation movement and the white establishment one could find the Indian and Coloured parties in the tricameral parliament and the Churches. The

¹ See appendix for more information about Inkatha and the other parties.

Indian and Coloured parties enjoyed little support but were officially represented in the tricameral parliament and thus had to be taken into consideration for any negotiation regarding the South African transition to proceed (Ottaway, 1993, p. 63). On the other hand the Churches had broad membership bases but were ideologically split. The South African Council of Churches supported the Antiapartheid struggle while some of its member churches were affiliated to Churches that supported apartheid.¹ The Dutch Reformed Churches were split along color lines. A good example of the state of affairs in South African religious life was the stance of the Nederduitse Gereformeerde Kerk (NGK). This church had a coloured affiliate and later on accepted that there was no support for apartheid in scripture. On the other hand the Dutch Reformed Churches also included the conservative Gereformeerde Ker in Suidlike Afrika (the dopper Church) which supported apartheid (1993, p. 58).

The government establishment was represented by the National Party. It came to power in 1948 with a platform of defending the interests of the Afrikaners (Bond, 2004; Giliomee, 1992; Klotz, 1995; Ottaway, 1993; Welsh, 1990). While it received less than 50% of the vote it was able to assume complete control of the government and the bureaucracy. The National Party concentrated on lifting the Afrikaner *volk* from poverty through government employment and subsidies. The bureaucracy and the armed forces were filled from the ranks of Afrikaners, and white farms received subsidies and tariff protection from foreign competition. Afrikaners thrived under the ruled of the National Party and achieved a living standard higher than any other in the continent (Welsh, 1990). Nevertheless the success of the National Party in lifting Afrikaners from poverty came at the price of keeping the majority of the population permanently underdeveloped and living in conditions of poverty and extreme relative deprivation (Bond, 2004).

Through its patronage system, the National Party slowly merged with the state apparatus to become a party-state. An organization called the Afrikaner Broederbond brought together the National Party, Academia, the Bureaucracy, the Security Forces, and the conservative

¹ See appendix for more information about the Churches.

churches. It was founded as a cultural organization in 1918 and served as a think tank and meeting place for the Afrikaner elite. Headed by the Rector of Afrikaans University, Gerrit Viljoenn, the Broederbond provided the intellectual leadership to the party-state and exerted considerable influence over all sectors of state policy (Ottaway, 1993, p. 38).

The National Party historically supported the concept of “separate development”, also known as Apartheid, and followed a statist policy regarding the economy. Nevertheless the National Party slowly realized that apartheid was not working and amended the constitution in 1982. The new constitution included a tricameral parliament giving representation to Asians (mostly Indians) and to Coloureds. This was opposed by the conservative faction of the National Party and led to a split and to the establishment of the Conservative Party led by Dr. Andries Treurnicht (Ottaway, 1993, p. 76). The Conservative Party continued to support the concept of “separate development” but later on started calling it “self-determination”. It became the main opposition party during the final years of the apartheid era and managed to gain considerable support but never enough to seriously challenge the control of the National Party. Nevertheless it overshadowed the small parties of the center like the Democratic Party (p. 81).¹ The Conservative Party refused to join the negotiations leading to the South African transition.

Finally, on the extreme right, there were two groups stressing the right to self-determination for Afrikaners. The Afrikaner Volkswag proposed the establishment of a new Afrikaner State in the Northern Cape that would be called Orania. On the other hand the Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging had the more extreme position of defending the status quo at any cost and has a neo-fascist bend (AWB, 2008; Ottaway, 1993). While the extreme right did not have much support, it gave voice to some of the concerns of the white population and it threatened violence if widespread land redistribution were attempted.

The previous pages have provided a general description of the main parties involved in the South African

¹ See the Appendix for more information about the Democratic Party

Otto von Feigenblatt, M.A., Nova Southeastern University

transition to democracy. While the most important aspects of those parties have been discussed it should be noted that there were myriads of political organizations operating inside of South Africa at the time and that a more detailed description is beyond the scope of this paper. However, more information on the parties has been included in the appendix.

Issues:

The most important issues of the years preceding the democratic transition were the following: dismantling apartheid in all of its forms, economic justice, negotiating a new constitution, the nature of the future South African State (federal, centralized, etc), the land issue (possibility of land redistribution), and the future of the South African economy (AWB, 2008; Bond, 2004; Giliomee, 1992; IFP, 2002, 2008; Klotz, 1995; Lynch, 1987; Magubane, 2002; Manby, 1993, 1995; Mbeki, 2008; Mphuthing & Duckitt, 1998; Ottaway, 1993; Pruitt et Al., 2004; Rostron, 2003; Welsh, 1990)

Each of the issues mentioned in the previous paragraph can be subdivided into secondary issues and most of them are connected to hidden issues as well. For example, dismantling apartheid in all of its forms, involved almost every aspect of social organization in South Africa. It included everything from the desegregation of schools to the integration of the MK into the South African Defense Forces. Negotiating a new constitution was considered to be a way to determine the future power distribution for the involved parties and also a way to protect the interest of their constituencies.

Finally all of those issues were connected to the hidden issue of identity. Would the new South Africa be truly multiracial or would one group simply supplant the other as the dominant one? Would ethnic and linguistic affiliations have a place in the new South Africa? Those were some of the covert issues involved in the South African transition. It is important to note that one issue that did not receive much attention during the negotiations between the ANC and the NP was the economy. The reasons for this omission will be discussed at length in the analysis section of this paper, but

it will suffice to say that the ANC considered political power to be more important to economic power, because it could be converted into economic power in the future. Another factor was that the National Party favored the status quo regarding the economy and thus had a vested interest in avoiding the topic.

Tactics:

The liberation movement used four main tactics: mass mobilization (mass action), armed struggle, international pressure (shaming), and ultimately negotiation. Numbers were the strength of the liberation movement and due to the disenfranchisement of the black population, it made widespread use of mass mobilization. Affiliated unions organized massive walk-outs in order to pressure the government to change, major political rallies were organized, and the MDM told its members to stop paying for public services in order to weaken the NP appointed local governments (Bond, 2004; Giliomee, 1992; Klotz, 1995; Ottaway, 1993).

The goal of the liberation movement was to make the country ungovernable to bring about change. On the other hand the ANC's military arm, the MK, organized a largely ineffective armed struggle (Ottaway, 1993, pp. 50-53). The ANC's diplomatic arm lobbied the international community to set up economic sanctions against the South African Government. In addition to that, the ANC used the tactic of "shaming" the South African government in front of the international community by telling the world about its abuses. This tactic was very effective in isolating South Africa diplomatically and in getting funding for the ANC from the Eastern Block and from the Scandinavian Countries (Klotz, 1995).

The Inkatha Freedom Party used its control of the Homeland government of KwaZulu to increase its political power. Through intimidation of people living in the homeland and its alliance with the traditional chiefs it cemented its control over most aspects of life in KwaZulu. It used the police as a private security force and armed the traditional chiefs with automatic weapons. The IFP also used the financial resources of the homeland to fund its political

Otto von Feigenblatt, M.A., Nova Southeastern University

activities (Lynch, 1987; Manby, 1993; Ottaway, 1993). Most of the violence it used was in the form of police abuse against ANC supporters and of its supporters (armed with traditional weapons plus guns) against ANC supporters in the townships of Natal (Manby, 1993, p. 23). The IFP used some mass mobilization in the form of mass rallies but mostly it concentrated in political maneuvering. Chief Buthelezi tried to balance the power of the ANC by sometimes allying itself with the Conservative Party and other times with the National Party regarding some issues such as self-determination and support for the free market (Manby, 1993, p. 65).

Buthelezi was very active internationally, especially in the West. He travelled several times to meet Western leaders such as Presidents Reagan and Nixon of the United States and Prime Minister Thatcher of the United Kingdom (Manby, 1993, p. 52). His dismissal of violence as a viable option and his support of capitalism made him the favorite representative of South African blacks in the West. Chief Buthelezi also made use of the discourse of self-determination in his defense of group rights and emphasized the importance of protecting traditional culture (IFP, 2002, 2008; Lynch, 1987). Finally, Buthelezi threatened violence if the rights of the Zulu people were not protected in the new South Africa.

The National Party's main source of strength was its control of the state apparatus. It had effective control of the armed forces, of the bureaucracy, of the financial resources of the state, and of parliament. Its main tactics were to repeal apartheid laws on paper, use the language of self-determination and group rights, shame the ANC for its support of an obsolete socialist ideology, use its control of the state to decide when and how to start negotiations, devolve power to local governments before the transition, and privatizing state assets. Other techniques used were covert violence against opponents, covert funding for the IFP, and attempting to split the moderates from the radicals in the ANC.

The National Party wanted to have the upper hand during negotiations and thus it waited until the fall of the socialist block to start talks about negotiations with the ANC (Welsh, 1990). It was also successful in having

economic sanctions removed by repealing apartheid legislation even without taking steps to implement the changes. The NP repealed the apartheid laws at the same time it was accusing the ANC of supporting communism and favoring a statist economic policy. This form of shaming weakened the ANC internationally and strengthened the NP during negotiations. Another form of control exerted by the NP was the demand for the ANC to unarm and to become a political party. This weakened the ANC because it left all coercive power in the hands of the NP and prevented the ANC from receiving as much foreign funding as before (Ottaway, 1993, p. 44). Furthermore, the NP aligned its ideology with that of the West and took advantage of the unipolar moment (Barber, 1996; Chua, 2007; Friedman, 2000; Fukuyama, 1992; Habermas, 2006; Lal, 2004), in order to exert pressure on the ANC to move to the center and to avoid the discussion of economic issues. In summary the NP controlled much of the early process and controlled the timing and context of the negotiations to a large extent.

The NP used a referendum in order to circumvent the opposition from the right and was successful in winning a majority of the votes, 68.7%, in support of continuing negotiations with the liberation camp (Ottaway, 1993, p. 78; Welsh, 1990). Due to the extreme right's refusal to participate in negotiations and its lack of an alternative proposal, the National Party was able to present itself as the only organization able to protect the interests of whites in the inevitable transition that was to come (Bond, 2004; Giliomee, 1992; Klotz, 1995; Ottaway, 1993; Welsh, 1990).

The right refused to participate in the negotiations with the liberation camp and instead concentrated on fear mongering and, its more extreme elements, engaging in petty acts of sabotage (Bond, 2004; Giliomee, 1992; Klotz, 1995; Ottaway, 1993). Some fleeting alliances were built between the Conservative Party, the IFP, and traditional leaders. They were united by their belief in self-determination and their rejection of the concept of majority rule. However, those alliances were short-lived and were not very effective. On the other hand, the extreme right engaged in violent acts. Nevertheless, those acts were usually against the government for proceeding with negotiations and involved very few casualties. Usually the violence was directed at

Otto von Feigenblatt, M.A., Nova Southeastern University

government buildings when no one was working. The acts were meant to be symbolic and never amounted to a very strong opposition to government policies.

Changes:

The two main changes involved in the years leading to the South African transition relate to context and to ideological changes in the National Party. At the contextual level, the international community underwent dramatic changes in the 1980s. The communist block was crumbling and the development community was abandoning its belief in state led development. Keynesianism was abandoned in favor of a Schumpeterian view of capitalism favoring the private sector and warning against government intervention in the economy (Lal, 2004). In addition to that, the sudden implosion of the second world reduced the support available to radical liberation movements. At the ideological level, liberal capitalism had triumphed, and the international financial institutions (IMF, World Bank, etc), started spreading the gospel of free trade (Fukuyama, 1992). The changes in the context of the conflict is very important since when it started, in the early 20th century, state led development and radical liberation movements were the norm. By the end of the 20th century revolutionary movements were on the wane and Marxist ideology was more unpopular than ever.

The National Party also changed during the long struggle. It realized that maintaining the apartheid system was impossible and that change was needed sooner or later. Due to the economic difficulties experienced by South Africa during the late 80s and early 90s, the government started to consider the end of apartheid as an opportunity to rejoin the international community and to improve the economy (Giliomee, 1992; Klotz, 1995; Ottaway, 1993; Welsh, 1990). The abolition of apartheid was also a way of getting rid of the many economic sanctions leveled against it. Thus the National Party reacted to the more favorable international situation to start negotiations with the ANC and also proactively changed with the rise of the reformers within its ranks.

The ANC also changed in response to the new international situation by slowly moving away from its original radical economic philosophy and by giving up the ineffective armed struggle in favor of negotiation. It changed its dream of taking power by force for the possibility of negotiating its way into power. Another important change was that the ANC slowly started to transform into a political party from its origins as a liberation movement.

Enlargement of the Conflict:

Due to the pervasive nature of apartheid in pre-transition South Africa, all sectors of society were involved in one way or another in the transition process. A major social change had to be undertaken in order to transform the highly segregated South Africa of the apartheid era into a multiracial democracy. Due to the nature of the struggle, the parties involved enlarged in order to include more sectors of society. By the time of CODESA almost all sectors of society were involved in the negotiations or in the opposition to them.

The liberation struggle started as a small movement in the early decades of the 20th century. At the time it did not enjoy much active support from the population nor from the international community. This gradually changed and the ANC gained wide international support in the late 60s and early 70s. Supported by the eastern block due to its ties with the South African Communist Party, and by the West due to its fight for human rights, the movement gained momentum and managed to lobby the international community to sanction South Africa economically (Giliomee, 1992; Klotz, 1995; Ottaway, 1993). The banning of the ANC and the rise of the Mass Democratic Movement got the majority of the black population involved in the struggle. A grassroots aspect was added to the hierarchical ANC (Ottaway, 1993). In addition to that, South African society became politicized and organized to defend a varied array of interests. The labor union movement grew and joined the struggle, some homelands fought for their future, and the white population organized to protect their economic dominance. In summary a movement that started with a few radicals asking for political rights for blacks, became a struggle including

Otto von Feigenblatt, M.A., Nova Southeastern University

almost every sector of South African society and almost every aspect of life.

Roles of Other Parties:

Two kinds of parties played important roles in the period leading up to the South African transition, internal and external ones. Some important internal parties were the following: the bureaucracy, the armed forces, and the Democratic Party. Among the most important external actors were the following: The eastern block, Scandinavian countries, the United States, and the international financial institutions.

The bureaucracy was not involved openly in the struggle leading up to the transition but it exerted considerable power over the implementation of the abolishment of apartheid. It mostly delayed the process and strengthened the negotiating position of the National Party to which it owed its prominence. On the other hand, the armed forces played an important role just by the fact that they did not get directly involved in the process. The professional nature of the South African armed forces was a very important factor in avoiding bloodshed and strengthened the bargaining position of the National Party. It was widely believed that only the National Party could control the armed forces and lead them through the uncertain period of transition (Ottaway, 1993, p. 93). Finally, the Democratic Party (DP) tried to serve the role of mediator between the ANC and the National Party. Its liberal chairman, Zach de Beer, proposed a consociational solution to the constitutional problem (p. 81). However, his proposal was rejected by the two major camps and his party did not enjoy enough support to make much of a difference in the negotiations.

At the international level, the eastern block provided the ANC funds and weapons for its military wing. The Scandinavian countries provided much needed funds for the ANC and the United States passed sanctions against South Africa so as to pressure the government to abolish apartheid through the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986 (Klotz, 1995, p. 9; Ottaway, 1993, p. 93; Welsh, 1990). Furthermore, the United States also supported the IFP as a

representative of South African blacks and thus weakened the ANC's claim to speak for all blacks in South Africa (Manby, 1993). Finally the international financial institutions (IMF and World Bank) exerted indirect pressure by recommending neo-liberal prescriptions for economic growth. This affected the thinking of the National Party and ultimately weakened the position of the ANC in terms of land redistribution and nationalization. In summary, the neo-liberal policies of the international financial institutions constrained the options available in the economic domain and ultimately protected the property of whites and the private sector against nationalization and redistribution (Klotz, 1995; Magubane, 2002; Manby, 1995; Welsh, 1990).

Outcome:

The outcome of the South African transition has been covered extensively in the literature (AWB, 2008; Bond, 2004; Magubane, 2002; Manby, 1995; Mbeki, 2008; Mphuthing & Duckitt, 1998; Rostron, 2003). However it is important to note that it was one of the most successful peaceful transitions in African history. The ANC attained power while sharing it with the IFP and the National Party. In addition to that, the armed forces were successfully integrated with the armed wing of the ANC. The resulting constitution provided for proportional representation and provided for considerable local autonomy for the provinces (Manby, 1995).

Finally from an economic perspective, there was little change in terms of economic inequality and land redistribution. Due to the previously discussed constraining factors, the ANC accepted the neo-liberal prescriptions of the international financial institutions and gave up land redistribution and nationalization (Magubane, 2002). In addition to that it accepted that the way to improve the lot of the black majority would be through growth rather than through redistribution. Finally, it avoided social upheaval through the use of subsidies in order to fund social services and other programs for the poor majority. In other words, it redirected the revenues from mineral sales in order to fund a large welfare program to help the poor rather than redistribute land and jobs (Mbeki, 2008). The private sector

Otto von Feigenblatt, M.A., Nova Southeastern University

was left virtually intact and nationalization was abandoned. Thus the outcome was that the white minority lost political power but maintained its economic power. On the other hand, the black majority obtained political power and access to better social services but gave up economic power (Klotz, 1995; Magubane, 2002).

Winner:

It can be argued that the entire population was the winner since major violence was avoided and blacks were given political rights. However it should also be noted that while blacks obtained political power they remained impoverished and that the white majority maintained its economic dominance. In addition to that blacks have not been able to improve their economic lot other than by welfare plans from the government. This raises doubts about the real benefits of the transition for the black majority. Some authors even claim that legal apartheid was followed by economic apartheid (Bond, 2004). On the other hand, the growth that was expected after the transition never took place and the first world that used to coexist next to the third world in South Africa is at risk of joining the third world rather than the third world joining the first. This sentiment is one of the main grievances of the extreme right. The AWB states this position clearly: "Whites are threatened with land occupation if they do not give ground to "homeless" blacks, crime in the country is the highest ever and the value of the Rand falls every time a black politician opens his mouth" (AWB, 2008).

4 Analysis

The following section will analyze the information collected in the previous instrument through the use of three different but complementary approaches: regime transition theory, norm socialization using the Spiral Model of Socialization developed by Risse and Sikkink (Kollman, 2008, p. 400), and finally a short comparison to John Duckitt and Thobi Mphuthing's attitudinal study of pre- and

post- electoral South Africa will be provided (Mphuthing & Duckitt, 1998).

Regime Transition Theory:

Regime Transition Theory states that there are three main ideal types of regime change: *transition through regime collapse*, *through extrication*, and *through transaction* (Giliomee, 1992, p. 515). The first category deals with those instances in which the regime simply collapses and the opposition takes complete control of the state apparatus. This can happen through a democratic election after the collapse and is characterized by very little opposition from the previous regime. Some communist revolutions fall in this category such as the Chinese Revolution and the Russian Revolution. The second category, transition through extrication includes those cases in which the ruling regime still has control over the state apparatus but cannot or does not want to continue ruling the country. Most colonial transitions fall into this category. Finally, *transition through transaction* includes those cases in which the ruling regime has a firm grip on power, has the political will and the resources to continue in power, and has reached a stalemate with the opposition. A good example of this was the Spanish transition after the death of Francisco Franco. This category is also characterized by a division between economic liberalization and political democratization. Usually economic liberalization is undertaken by the ruling regime before the transition and then democratization is undertaken. It should be noted that contrary to the other types of transition there is not clear winner in this type and both the new and the old regime share power. It is called transition through transaction since it happens through negotiation, usually initiated by the ruling regime, and positions are traded between the parties. For example, in the Spanish case, democracy was obtained in exchange for respecting private property and the capitalist system (Roberts, 1997).

Rantete and Giliomee argue that the South African transition falls in the transactive category (Giliomee, 1992). According to this perspective, the ruling National Party had a firm grip on power. It controlled the armed forces and the

Otto von Feigenblatt, M.A., Nova Southeastern University

bureaucracy. The National Party was not about to collapse and it had the power to deal with any threats mounted by the opposition. While the ANC and the MDM were successful in disrupting the economy, they were not strong enough to force the government to step down unilaterally. Also, the NP started to liberalize the economy before holding talks with the ANC and at a much earlier time than any formal negotiations took place. Finally, the inability of the ANC and the liberation movement to deal with economic issues shows that they did not have the upper hand in the negotiations leading to the elections of 1994. The final result was an ANC government in coalition with the IFP and the NP and the adoption of a neo-liberal system constraining nationalization and redistribution. It is also important to note that the fall of the eastern block weakened the MK and that the ANC had to give up the armed struggle in order to hold negotiations, while the NP still controlled the armed forces and the police.

The ANC gave up its dream of having a transition through extrication following the example of other colonial struggles and had to accept a transition through transaction. This model offers a very useful typology to understand the South African transition. It is congruent with the *perceived feasibility model* in that both parties made decisions based on their relative power and taking into consideration what seemed feasible (Pruitt et Al., 2004, p. 47). Regime transition theory assumes that both parties will behave rationally. Regarding the agency vs. structure debate, transition theory takes both into consideration but assumes that structure constraints the rational choices of leaders.

Norm socialization using the Spiral Model of Socialization developed by Risse and Sikkink:




Fig.1. Spiral Model of Socialization developed by Risse and Sikkink and adapted from Kollman (2008, p. 400).

Constructivist scholars in international relations have written widely about the way in which international norms affect behavior (Kollman, 2008; Rublee, 2008). According to constructivist theorists international norms play a very important role in constraining international actors. This is due to the change in the cost/benefit calculation of the parties. A strong international norm can provide social, psychological, and financial incentives for compliance. Complementing those, social psychological processes such as identification and linking can induce actors to follow a norm. Rublee also mentions the wish to avoid cognitive inconsistency when having adopted an international norm at the rhetorical level and then wanting to deviate from it due to realist concerns (Rublee, 2008). This section will apply the Spiral Model of socialization to the South African transition.

The Spiral model of socialization deals with how international norms are internalized by international actors and ultimately achieve compliance. The model consists of six steps: creation of International Norm/Normative Regime, norm violation, denial of norm legitimacy, tactical concessions, prescriptive status of norm, and internalization of norm and rule consistent behavior (Kollman, 2008, pp. 399-400).

Otto von Feigenblatt, M.A., Nova Southeastern University

The civil rights movement of the 1960s and the anti-colonial movement of the 1970s strengthened the norm of equal political rights. While the Charter of the United Nations and the two sets of rights passed by the United Nations included the right to political participation, the norm started to gain momentum in the 1960s (August, 1995). The creation of this norm against discrimination based on race represented the first step in the Spiral Model. At this point in time, the South African government was aware that the international community did not approve the philosophy of apartheid. Through most of the century, the South African government chose to violate the norm and to defy the international community. As pressure mounted in the late 70s and 80s, the South African government chose to deny the legitimacy of the norm basing its argument on self-determination and sovereignty.

The constitution of 1983 and the creation of the tricameral parliament can be viewed as a tactical concession to the norm. By giving representation to coloured and Asians the South African government was recognizing the legitimacy of the international norm against racial discrimination. De Klerk's move to hold talks with Mandela before the unbanning of the ANC also represents an example of tactical concessions. The two previous examples are considered to be tactical concessions because the ruling government did not believe in the norm it was simply bowing down to pressure. By giving token concessions to the norm against apartheid the government was trying to avoid the negative costs of noncompliance, such as economic sanctions and international isolation.

At one point probably in the early 1990s the norm against apartheid reached the level of prescriptive status. De Klerk and the national party dismantled the legal trappings of apartheid and acted according to the norm. Prescriptive status means that the norm rules the behavior of the party even though the party may not agree with the norm. This was certainly the case of the NP at the beginning of negotiations with the ANC. It was forced to follow the norm but did not truly believe in it. Instead the NP was trying to co-opt the discourse of self-determination in order to circumvent the constraints set by the norm against separate development.

Finally, South Africa is currently entering the last face of the process, internalization of norm and rule consistent behavior. This step will probably take several years to be completed since it involves the internalization of the norm. In other words, this will be the moment when South Africans reject apartheid both rhetorical and internally and also behave appropriately. The continuing segregation of cities based on class and voting trends, showing a clear racial divide, shows that this step has not been completed (Klotz, 1995; Magubane, 2002; Rostron, 2003).

Expressive approach (attitudinal change in South Africa):

The two previous theories are both influenced by rational choice theory. Behavior is assumed to be based on a rational cost/benefit calculation. The attitudes and beliefs of the parties are not taken into consideration except as byproducts of the struggle. According to this view, blacks should have felt more relative deprivation in relation to English speaking whites than relative to Afrikaners. This would be based on an objective evaluation of the financial situation of both groups. Before and after the transition, English speaking whites were wealthier than both Afrikaners and blacks. In addition to that according to this view, perceptions of outrage regarding Afrikaners would have drastically decreased after the ANC won the 1994 elections. However both conclusions are incorrect. Mphuthing et Al's longitudinal study of attitudes and perceptions before and after the South African transition show a very different story (1998).

According to the study, blacks' perceptions of relative deprivation before the transition were much greater in relation to Afrikaner whites compared to English speaking whites, even though English speaking whites were wealthier than the Afrikaners. Moreover, that did not change much after the transition with blacks still feeling more relative deprivation towards Afrikaners compared to English speaking whites (Mphuthing & Duckitt, 1998, p. 824). Another interesting finding is that blacks expected Afrikaners to decline economically in the years following the transition while they did not expect the English speaking whites to decline over the same period. Regarding feelings of

Otto von Feigenblatt, M.A., Nova Southeastern University

outrage, blacks continued to hold them even after the transition (1998, p. 825). This is an important finding since the conditions leading to the injustices of the apartheid era were gone, namely the control of the government by Afrikaners, and even after that, blacks continued to feel “outrage” towards Afrikaners. This study shows that attitudinal change takes longer than institutional and political change. It will probably take many years to ease the feelings of blacks towards Afrikaners. Blacks’ more positive attitudes towards English speaking whites may be due to their image as less racist and the perception of their success through equity. In other words, blacks consider that English speaking whites have earned their economic status through hard work rather than through using the state apparatus (Mphuthing & Duckitt, 1998, p. 826).

5 Conclusions

The struggle leading up to the South African transition was a multilayered process. The simple instrument used in the first part of the paper, to map out the components of the conflict served as a starting point. Since the instrument is not a model and thus possesses no explanatory power by itself, the information collected through it was subjected to three different theoretical approaches. Regime transition theory provided a very straight forward explanation of the negotiations between the ANC and the NP. It also gives a satisfactory explanation of why inequality persists in South Africa even after the transition of 1994. However, regime transition theory, is an elite decision making model. This means that it assumes that decisions are made by elites and that constituencies only have a role as part of the cost-benefit calculation. In addition to that, as a realist theory, it discounts the importance of international norms and instead concentrates on more tangible constraints.

The spiral model, that was applied as an example of a constructivist perspective on the South African transition, complements the explanatory power of the regime transition analysis. It explains how the National Party responded to international norms regarding apartheid. Moreover, it shows that the international community played a very important

role in guiding the behavior of the South African government in the period leading to the transition. The very real constraints imposed on the South African government by the international norm against apartheid explain some of the concessions made by the NP and also its rhetorical abandonment of apartheid.

Finally, the two previously mentioned approaches were briefly compared and contrasted with an expressive study of attitudinal change in pre and post transition South Africa. This study shows that some of the conclusions expected from a rational analysis are incorrect and that attitudes change more slowly than economic conditions and political realities. This paper aims to give a more holistic explanation of the struggle leading up to the 1994 South African transition. Since no single approach can explain such a complex process, three different approaches were applied to the South African case. It is the belief of this author that a multidisciplinary approach to the study of conflict provides a more fruitful understanding of this complex social phenomenon and may clear the way to new synergetic theoretical insights.

References

- August, R. (1995). *Public International Law: Text, Cases, and Readings* (Paperback ed.). New Jersey: Prentice Hall.
- AWB. (2008). Origin History of the Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging. Retrieved 9/27, 2008, from http://www.awb.co.za/ontstaans_e.htm
- Barber, B. R. (1996). *Jihad vs. McWorld: How Globalism and Tribalism are Reshaping the World*. New York: Ballantine Books.
- Bond, P. (2004). From Racial to Class Apartheid: South Africa's Frustrating Decade of Freedom. *Monthly Review*, 55(10), 45-59.
- Chua, A. (2007). *Day of Empire: How Hyperpowers Rise to Global Dominance and Why They Fall* (First ed.). New York: Doubleday.
- Friedman, T. L. (2000). *The Lexus and the Olive Tree: Understanding Globalization* (Revised ed.). New York: Farrar Straus Giroux.

Otto von Feigenblatt, M.A., Nova Southeastern University

- Fukuyama, F. (1992). *THE END OF HISTORY AND THE LAST MAN*. New York: The Free Press.
- Giliomee, J. R. a. H. (1992). Transition to Democracy through Transaction?: Bilateral Negotiations between the ANC and NP in South Africa. *African Affairs*, 91(365), 515-542.
- Habermas, J. (2006). *The Divided West* (C. Cronin, Trans.). Padstow: Polity.
- IFP. (2002). Dr. Mangosuthu Buthelezi, MP President of the Inkatha Freedom Party. Retrieved 9/27/2008, from <http://www.ifp.org.za/General/biograph.htm>
- IFP. (2008). Historical Background of the Inkatha Freedom Party. Retrieved 9/27, 2008, from <http://www.ifp.org.za/>
- Klotz, A. (1995). Transforming a Pariah State: International Dimensions of the South African Transition. *Africa Today* 42(1-2), 75-87.
- Kollman, K. (2008). The Regulatory Power of Business Norms: A Call for a New Research Agenda. *International Studies Review*, 10(3), 397-419.
- Lal, D. (2004). *IN PRAISE OF EMPIRES: Globalization and Order* (1st ed.). New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Lynch, E. A. (1987). The KwaZulu/Natal Indaba: A Federalist Proposal for South Africa. *Publius*, 17(3), 231-248.
- Magubane, Z. (2002). Globalization and the South African Transformation: The Impact on Social Policy. *Africa Today*, 49(4), 89-110.
- Manby, B. (1993). "TRADITIONAL" DICTATORSHIP: One Party State in KwaZulu Homeland Threatens Transition to Democracy [Electronic Version]. *Human Rights Watch*, 5, from <http://hrw.org/reports/1993/southafrica2/>
- Manby, B. (1995). THREATS TO A NEW DEMOCRACY Continuing Violence in KwaZulu-Natal [Electronic Version]. *Human Rights Watch*, 7, 1-55. Retrieved September 8, 2008, from <http://www.hrw.org/reports/1995/Safrica.htm>
- Mbeki, M. (2008). The curse of South Africa. *New Statesman*, 137(Ja 21 2008), 28-30.
- Mphuthing, J. D. a. T. (1998). Political Power and Race Relations in South Africa: African Attitudes before and after the Transition. *Political Psychology*, 19(4), 809-832.
- Ottaway, M. (1993). *South Africa: The Struggle for a New Order*. Washington D.C: The Brookings Institution.
- Pruitt, D. a. K., S.H. (2004). *Social Conflict: Escalation, Stalemate and Settlement* (3rd ed.). New York: McGraw Hill.
- Roberts, J. M. (1997). *The Penguin History of Europe* (Paperback ed.). London: Penguin Books.

The South African Transition: A holistic analysis of the 1994 transition

- Rostron, B. (2003). Don't mention the race factor. *New Statesman*, 132(27), 31-32.
- Ruble, M. R. (2008). Taking Stock of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime: Using Social Psychology to Understand Regime Effectiveness. *International Studies Review*, 10(3), 420-450.
- Welsh, D. (1990). F.W. De Klerk and Constitutional Change. *A Journal of Opinion*, 18(2), 6-10.

APPENDIX

PARTIES

NAME	IDEOLOGY	PROMINENT MEMBERS	HISTORY
National Party (NP)	Conservative, formerly supportive of apartheid, self-determination, free market and capitalism	State President Botha State President De Klerk	Afrikaner party that took over the government in 1948. Initiated the transition leading to the 1994 elections
Bureaucracy	Conservative similar to the NP		Filled with Afrikaners after the victory of the NP in 1994
Afrikaner Broederbond	Conservative, formerly supportive of apartheid	President was: Gerrit Viljoenn (rector of Rand Afrikaans University.)	Formed in 1918 as a cultural organization for Afrikaners. Became think tank for Afrikaner elite.
Security Apparatus: - South African Defense Forces - South African Police - National Intelligence Service	Conservative, supportive of the National Party. Very professional		Historically used to suppress insurgents and the liberation movement.
Conservative Party (CP)	Very conservative, supported apartheid and rejected	Founded by: Dr. Andries Treurnicht	Founded in 1982 after splitting the NP over the tricameral

	negotiations		parliament.
The Democratic Party (DP)	Liberal, proposed a consociational solution to the constitutional problem	Chairman Zach de Beer.	Attempted to play a mediating role during CODESA
Nederduitse Gereformeerde Kerk (NGK)	Reformed Dutch Church. Originally supporting apartheid then it changed its stance and claimed that it had no justification in scripture		It was part of the South African Council of Churches and had a coloured affiliate. It published a paper changing its position on apartheid.
African Nederduitse Gereformeerde Kerk in Afrika	Reformed Dutch Church. Coloured	Headed by Allan Boesak (coloured) Supported the ANC	It was part of the South African Council of Churches.
Gereformeerde Kerk in Suidlike Afrika	Dooper Conservative Church (supported apartheid)	Most members of the NP were members	Historically a conservative Afrikaner Church
Anglican Church	Protestant Church that historically rejected apartheid.	Archbishop Desmond Tutu (black)	Fought against apartheid and later on worked in the Truth and Reconciliation Commission
Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging	Extreme right, Afrikaner nationalism, neo-fascist,	Eugene Terre Blanche	Organized marches and its leader gave inflammatory

Otto von Feigenblatt, M.A., Nova Southeastern University

	supported apartheid		speeches.
Afrikaner Volkswag	Extreme right, Afrikaner nationalism, proposed the establishment of a new Afrikaner state.	Carel Boshoff	Proposed a homeland for Afrikaners that would be called Orania located at the North Cape.
African National Congress (ANC)	Liberation Movement Influence by the anti-colonial struggle and Marxism. Later on it moved to the center.	Nelson Mandela Oliver Tambo Chris Hanni Thabo Mbeki	Founded in 1918 and was banned in 1960. Was unbanned in 1990. Had approximately 500,000 members in 1991
Umkhoto we Sizwe (MK)	Radical military wing of the ANC.	Chris Hanni	1200 recruits a year during the 1980s. It was never an effective force. It was integrated in the South African armed forces after the transition.
South African Communist Party (SACP)	Marxism, Stalinist Leninism	Jose Slovo	Allied with the ANC and supported by the Eastern block. 23,000 thousand members in 1991

The South African Transition: A holistic analysis of the 1994 transition

Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU)	Workerism and populism. Allied to the ANC and the SACP		Organized strikes to help the ANC. It lobbied to include economic issues in the negotiations
The Congress of Traditional Leaders of South Africa (CONTRALESA)	Traditional values, allied with the liberation movement and opposed to the homelands		Allied to the ANC tried to give credibility to traditional authorities.
Mass Democratic Movement (MDM)	Liberation movement, grass roots democracy, supported the ANC		Established in the 1980s between: the UDF, COSATU, and 16 other organizations. It disappeared in 1990
United Democratic Front (UDF)	Part of the liberation movement, supported grass roots democracy, was opposed to the tricameral parliament		Established in 1983, banned in 1988, and disbanded in 1991.
Pan Africanist Congress of Azania (PAC)	Black power philosophy. Slogan “one settler, one bullet”.		Split from the ANC in 1956 over alliance with the communists.
Azania People’s Organization (AZAPO)	Black consciousness, believed in redistribution		Around 70,000 members in 1991. It

	of land and resources.		rejected negotiations.
Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP)	Ubuntu: African humanism. Self-determination, development through self-reliance and self-help. Respect for private property and avoidance of violent methods against the government.	Chief Buthelezi: Chief Minister of KwaZulu, President of the IFP, and later on Minister of Home Affairs after the 1994 elections.	Founded as a cultural organization in 1975. Claimed a membership of 1.8 million in 1991 and the support of 7 million Zulus.
Homeland of Transkei	Favored reincorporation and the ANC	Major General Bantu Holomia	A creation of the apartheid era.
Independent Homeland of Bothuthswana	Did not want to reincorporation to South Africa	Independent President Lucas Mangope	Was one of the few financially independent homelands thanks to profits from platinum mining.

Previous table compiled from information from the following sources:

IFP. (2008). Historical Background of the Inkatha Freedom Party.

Retrieved 9/27, 2008, from <http://www.ifp.org.za/>

Ottaway, M. (1993). *South Africa: The Struggle for a New Order*.

Washington D.C: The Brookings Institution.