Côte d’Ivoire: Building Peace through a Federal Paradigm

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Abstract:
This paper discusses the protracted crisis in Côte d’Ivoire. It highlights the feasibility of democracy and reconciliation in the country. The article focuses on the spoilers that hinder the peaceful settlement of the conflict that divides the country into two zones controlled by the rebels and the government. Analytical, descriptive, and historical methods form the basis of the methodology. Additionally, content analysis will be used to explain the idiosyncrasies of the stakeholders in the Ivorian political scene. Some researchers and observers of the crisis have argued that the way forward is the organisation of credible elections. However, the main principal thesis of the paper is that the burning issue is how to reconcile the fractionalised society in a divided country as a way to forge national unity and reconciliation among the various ethno-linguistic and religious groups that constitute Côte d’Ivoire. In the final analysis, the paper suggests a new constitutional arrangement that will be based on a legitimate Federal System for the political leaders to speak the language of peace. The present presidential and unitary system of government that favours a “winner takes all” will be extremely difficult to foster reconciliation and avoid the disintegration of Côte d’Ivoire as a political entity carved out by France.

1. Introduction
Côte d’Ivoire, the biggest economy in Francophone West Africa has been battling with crises of governance and unity as a result of accumulated grievances. These dissatisfactions consumed the peaceful coexistence that was the hallmark of the long political stability and a guaranty of the economic strength of the country. The unwillingness of the political actors to successfully implement the key terms of the series of peace agreements has put Côte d’Ivoire under the floodlight of the international community. The pinnacle
of this tyrannical rule was reached with the events that led to the civil conflict and the division of the country into two zones that approximately coincides with a north/south divides.

This paper looks at the problem of governance from a thematic theoretical approach to understand the basis of the grievances of some ethnic groups in Côte d’Ivoire. It also explains the reasons why the peace agreements have not succeeded in bringing peace to the Ivorian state and genuine reconciliation is illusive.

2. Theoretical and Conceptual Considerations

In this section, the paper provides the contextual background by making general descriptive and analytical propositions that form the fulcrum of this disquisition. The backbone of the theoretical framework is federalism. Other concepts are restructuring and income redistribution. The post colonial Ivorian state chose the presidential and unitary systems of government as paradigms. This system of government has endured and was efficient in ruling the country for a long time. It has nevertheless showed its limitations and weaknesses. Especially, since the demise of one party state rule that Félix Houphouët-Boigny incarnated for a protracted period. Although multiparty elections were held after the instauration of democratic elections, the issue of political marginalization is yet to be fully addressed. This has resulted in grievances that took extreme proportions before leading Côte d’Ivoire into civil war on September 19, 2002. This shows the importance of the interface between democracy, sound economic policies and long-lasting peace for political stability in a multicultural and developing country like Côte d’Ivoire.

By advocating a new constitution and paradigm for the country, this article takes into consideration the obvious benefits that can be derived from federalism as mode of political regulation. This is so because the current political impasse and recurring outcry of marginalization by some ethnic groups that are demanding the restructuring of the political system in Côte d’Ivoire. A federal system has been
found to be ideal in addressing the issues of grievances and political alienations which have created north versus south cleavages in the country. These questions have long been at the heart of political dissensions in the country.

Inman and Rubinfeld (1997:53) argue that “[t]he unique contribution of a federal constitution is to allow for multiple tiers of governments, each with a domain of policy responsibilities”. It may be noted that federalism is “a guaranteed division of power between the central government and regional governments” while its attributes are “strong bicameralism, a rigid constitution, and a strong judicial review” (Lijphart, 1999:4). The need for an impartial and efficient judiciary stems from the fact that it plays a prominent role in resolving conflicts that may emerge from the government (Lijphart 1999:4). Moreover, in the Ivorian case the judiciary may work in conjunction with the Cour Constitutionnelle to resolve any conflict that may emerge from the political system. As was the issue of Alassane Dramane Ouattara Ivorian citizenship and his subsequent disqualification to contest presidential elections in 1995 and 2000 (Konaté, 2004; Yéré 2007).

This paper takes a retrospective look at the post-independence Côte d’Ivoire to see how the lack of genuine democracy, the dearth of political tolerance, and especially the failure to accommodate opposing views contributed to the civil conflict. This thematic scrutiny of the political economy answers the failure of the various peace accords. Like most post-colonial African governments, Côte d’Ivoire has not witnessed genuine democracy. Governance was conducted in autocratic manner without giving appropriate consideration to dissenting voices in the political arena. To be sure, high handedness was rather the practice not the exception. It is in this line of argument that I examine how the lack of freedom of expression and periodical elections did significantly affect the growth of democracy. The dearth of civil liberties exacerbated voters’ apathy, ethnic cleavages, and tension that often took xenophobic colorations. The notion of promoting democracy was terribly undermined and resulted in “failed elections”. Gastil (2000:32) argues that the malfunctioning of the electoral processes are rooted in
[underdeveloped public judgments, superficial voters evaluations of candidates and the shallow pool of contestants for elected office. Together these problems thwart attempts at electoral rejection of unrepresentative incumbent, thereby, making officials less accountable for their actions. In addition, public awareness of these problems leads citizens to neglect the political system, worsening the very problems that spark over apathy and cynicism in the first place.

Whereas,

In the ideal election, voters begin with a relatively well-developed sense of self-interest and some conceptions of the public good (Gastil, 2000:32).

The sum-total of the foregoing is that the controversies that are concomitant with such “failed elections” bring to the fore the problems of “legitimate” and “illegitimate” governments. This led to anarchy as the one of the grievances of the rebels was that the political arena was made hermetically closed to the opposition and that generally, the north has been excluded from participating in the presidential elections. This political rumble has been the backbone of the Charte du Grand Nord in rallying northerners to claim that the presidency is exclusively taken for granted by southerners.

The push and pull and other forms of dissensions were regulated by high-handedness by all governments in Côte d'Ivoire to consolidate their grips on the reign of power. It created a culture of violence. In reaction, accumulated frustrations and the crisis of succession in the post-Houphouëtist rule as well as the mismanagement of the unity of the country. It exacerbated tension that took much coloration according to grievances. On this account, violence was used by many governments in order to safeguard the status quo and to maintain peace and order in Côte d'Ivoire.

Leander (2002:7) draws our attention to the fact “violence is
not the foundation of power. It is a threat to power”. And, by and large, violence is used when cracks are evident in the structure of the power of the state which does not automatically mean that the state is always the underwriter nor defender of citizens’ rights as, even, the manipulation of the legal system becomes part of the political and security machinations to harass, frustrate, or even commit judicial murder (Leander, 2002:7).

In Côte d’Ivoire, the wearing away of the power of the state as the only regulator of violence has been seriously challenged with some degrees of relative successes by non-state actors. The events that would lead to anarchy were chronologically the controversial Henri Konan Bédié presidency (1993-1999), the military coup d’etat of 1999 by the junta of General Robert Guéi, the failed presidential election of 2000 that saw the emergence of the incumbent, Laurent Gbagbo which triggered the problem of legitimacy. The issue of legitimacy is more acute when the victory of the incumbent is ‘manufactured’ through controversial elections. The candidate of the *Front populaire ivoirien* (FPI) had to declare himself winner in atmosphere of sectional uprisings with the help of the *Frontistes* and the mob (Banégas and Losch 2002:149-150). Moreover, as events unfolded and since the failed coup of 2002 and the subsequent division of the country between rebel held-zone and government controlled territory, the sensitive question of legitimacy is at the front burner of the power struggle. It is a well-known fact that the international community recognizes only the Gbagbo government as the sole and legal authority. However, the fact still remains that the ex-rebels are still able to conduct a modicum of clandestine international relations.

The question of legitimacy has been central to the political power in Côte d’Ivoire. All post independence Côte d’Ivoire governments used more or less legitimate violence to strengthen their power which is concomitant with authoritarianism and attempt to muzzle up opposition to their rule. In this connection, the mode of regulating legitimate violence and state making are considered as backgrounds and precursors to the civil war and that it is argued that a culture of violence had predated the civil war.
3. The Culture of Violence in Côte d'Ivoire’s Political Arena

I did not become leader when I became the President of my country. I was born a leader (Félix Houphouët-Boigny, 1990).¹

The culture of peace and dialogue that Félix Houphouët-Boigny symbolized and promoted became officially the two elements of national unity that were used for decades to “sell” Côte d’Ivoire to the international economic actors. That policy became the key parameter of the politics of la politique d’ouverture² amid economic prosperity and social development that created a symbiosis with the majority of the population for the first president of Côte d’Ivoire.

In the domestic political arena, President Félix Houphouët–Boigny was able to suppress all forms of political dissensions under the firm grip of the one-party state of the ruling Parti Démocratique de Côte d’Ivoire (PDCI), that was only democratic in name. Houphouët-Boigny borrowed from his early flirtation with the French Communist Party the Stalinian register of “plot” that was freely woven around the occult to muzzle up potential political contenders. Houphouët-Boigny was quoted as saying that “I do not believe that some youth could harm by occult means” (Bayart, 1996:18). On the one hand, it was on the altar one party dictatorship that the vague political ambition of Jean-Christophe Kragbé Gnagbé (from the Bété ethnic group and founder of Le Parti Nationaliste) was accused on the basis of his political ambition and sacrificed. On the other hand, the Agni or Anyi of Sanwi (an Akan group in the South East of Côte d’Ivoire that has extended kingship in neighboring Ghana) self-determination was silenced in violent repressions by government forces. In addition to the phantom coup of 1963 during which some Barons of the political establishment were jailed in order to consolidate Houphouët-Boigny’s political power (Memel-Foté, 1999; Azam, 2001). However, there was no real challenge against
the one party system or any effective contest for Houphouët-Boigny’s personalised rule for two decades (1960-1980). Houphouët-Boigny strode the Ivorian political landscape without putting up with or consenting to any serious opposition for over three decades (Lumumba-Kasongo, 2001:134). He stamped his authority on the gambit of political, military, socio-economic life of Côte d’Ivoire; in short, Houphouët-Boigny was larger than life (Bakary, 1991:57).

More importantly, the management of ethnic diversity by Houphouët-Boigny was significant in giving a sense of belonging to virtually all geo-political ethnic blocs. Apparently; there was a “Political Alliance” between the Baoulé and the Dioula (broadly defined as northerners) or particularly between Houphouët-Boigny and some prominent members of the political class in the north of Côte d’Ivoire. Such ethnic leaders include Mamadou Coulibaly (the number three in the political hierarchy in Houphouët-Boigny’s government), who was until his demise the Chairman of the Conseil Économique et Social (a leading organ in the shaping of Côte d’Ivoire’s economic direction). Likewise, Lanciné Gbon Coulibaly, (a scion of Korhogo Côte d’Ivoire traditional chieftaincy) was an influential member of the PDCI (Dozon, 2000:57).

Table 1: Ethnic Representation in Political Institutions under Houphouët-Boigny, 1980-93.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ETHNIC GROUPS</th>
<th>GOVERNMENT -</th>
<th>NATIONAL ASSEMBLY</th>
<th>ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COUNCIL</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Nov-80 % RR</td>
<td>Jul-86 % RR</td>
<td>Oct-89 % RR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Akan</td>
<td>0.40 1.16</td>
<td>0.41 0.99</td>
<td>0.47 1.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baoulé</td>
<td>0.22 1.20</td>
<td>0.24 1.46</td>
<td>0.20 1.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kru</td>
<td>0.19 1.30</td>
<td>0.20 1.34</td>
<td>0.20 1.37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S. Mandé</td>
<td>0.05 0.51</td>
<td>0.10 0.91</td>
<td>0.13 1.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N. Mandé</td>
<td>0.08 0.51</td>
<td>0.17 1.07</td>
<td>0.13 0.84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voltaic</td>
<td>0.14 0.83</td>
<td>0.10 0.60</td>
<td>0.03 0.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N=37</td>
<td>N=41</td>
<td>N=50</td>
<td>N=23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSM</td>
<td>0.36 0.27</td>
<td>0.46 0.47</td>
<td>0.30 0.22</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Langer (2004:23)
This political alliance was strategic to Houphouët-Boigny's political longevity as he consummated the art of regional representation, or ethnic balancing in the allocation of government appointments (1960-1993). The PDCI served as a basis for ethnic mobilizations in favor of the ruling party. The then Speaker of the Ivorian National Assembly, Mr. Philippe Grégoire Yacé - from the minority Alladian ethnic group- was the Secretary General of the ruling PDCI (1965-1980) and had been for a long time the apparent heir to President Houphouët-Boigny and the Number two citizen before the Ivorian constitution was amended in favor of a vice-president that was never appointed. The former president also created outlets by using ethnic arithmetic as a means to give a fair representation to other ethnic groups. Houphouët-Boigny was a socio-political balancer (Levine 2004:206-209), the guarantor as well as the moral force of the 'Ivorian order'. Azam and Mesnard (2003:456) give a fillip to the above argument when they highlight that

...the late president of Côte d'Ivoire [Houphouët-Boigny]...tried explicitly to build national unity by taxing his own ethnic group, the Akan cocoa and coffee growers, in order to fund visible public investment in infrastructure in the other regions of this ethnically divided country, and some other redistributive public expenditure, with evident success until his death.

To return to the Northern question, when we speak of ethnic balancing, we must carefully distinguish between the ‘Political Alliance’ and Central as well as Northern Côte d'Ivoire. The fact is that there was no “Alliance” between the North and the South, and precisely, Central Côte d'Ivoire. But rather there was a pact between Houphouët-Boigny and some northern leaders (Dozon 2000:58). Therefore, there was during the tail end of the Houphouëtist long reign a clear impulse to northern agenda regarding the desire of its ruling elite to govern at the Centre and also to be more politically
assertive. It was apparent that henceforth, the north would no longer play second fiddle in the Ivorian political arena. The declaration of the “Charte du Grand Nord” in 1992 was unambiguously asking for a transfer of political power to the North (Crook, 1999; Akindès, 2004). In a nutshell, the “Charte” was more or less, a programmed ethnic agenda of separatism; especially, when Alassane Dramane Ouattara (a northerner whose ethnic identity and nationality are subjects of controversies as whether he is an Ivorian from the North or a Burkinabè citizen) became the prime minister of Houphouët-Boigny during the implementation of the Structural Adjustments Programmes (SAPs). This brings to the fore the complexity of the fluidity of ethnic/national identity owing to the artificial ethno-linguistic separations of Africans.

Furthermore, the Ivorian political leader combined the twin strategy of stick and carrot by punishing the recalcitrants and buying support through the affiliation, coalescence and cooptation of the most articulate members of ethnic groups in government as well as siting and spreading high public investments along ethno-regional lines (Crook, 1990; Azam, 2001). He managed ethnic diversity and sustained the ‘social contract’ as pillars of his ethno-economic policy which this study defines as benevolent ethnic clientelism. This was carried out after the era of political repressions in the early years of the Houphouëtist reign. This paper calls it benevolent ethnic clientelism because the redistribution pattern of the spoils or the fallouts from the agrarian economy was mainly done horizontally among and within the ethnic groups in Côte d’Ivoire during the protracted reign of Houphouët-Boigny by co-opting their representatives. Moreover, the application of benevolent ethnic clientelism is functionalist in as much as it aims at systemic adaptation and integration by absorbing new work force that shared in the destiny of Côte d’Ivoire. Houphouët-Boigny gave foreigners (Africans) a quasi status of Ivorian citizenship. This gave the ethnic groups a sense of sharing in the destiny of Côte d’Ivoire as well as keeping the peace mainly by a system of clientelism. French companies
and some expatriates benefited to a large extent from the Ivorian patrimonial and clientelism system (Samir, 1967; Conte 2005). It cannot be denied that this cultural and ethnic interpenetration worked out in favor of Côte d’Ivoire. It boosted the charisma and the paternalistic posture of Houphouët-Boigny’s personal rule. By and large, Houphouët-Boigny exemplified the traits of the rare exceptions of African personal ruler that can develop their country in spite of despotism (Mkandawire 1991; Sandbrook, 1991).

The economic windfalls oiled clientelism and nepatrimonialism through some parastatals and mainly via the Caisse de stabilisation (Caistab) that served as government outlets in the commercialization of the cash crops and timber-pillars of the Ivorian economy-and the instrumentalization of government patronage and rewards (Contamin and Losch, 2000; Banégas and Marshall-Fratani, 2007). Houphouët-Boigny embarked on ambitious socio-economic projects that developed Côte d’Ivoire’s social infrastructure such as low-cost housing schemes, road construction, the provision of pipe borne water. Azam (2001:440) comments thus

Former President Houphouët-Boigny followed a strategy of high visible public investments in the regions peopled by the other ethnic groups. These included the San Pedro port [in the South-west], and the less successful sugar complexes in the Sénoufo country in the north, which probably has a major impact in peacekeeping.

These projects were carried out during the economic boom. Consequently, the economic boom of the 1970s translated into social well being that served as a social shock absorber and prophylaxis that masked the thin veil over ethnic divisions in Ivorian society. Clientelism under Houphouët-Boigny was generally benevolent after consolidating his political power in the early post-
independence era. Houphouët-Boigny skillfully maintained a peaceful ethnic coexistence that gave a semblance of ‘national unity’ and political stability to Côte d’Ivoire and the illusion of forging an “Ivorian nation”. As events after his demise showed.

The Houphouëtist ethno-political method of patronage and rewards were justified by the leitmotiv of the parable of peanut roaster by Félix Houphouët-Boigny “don’t look too closely at the mouth of the peanut roaster” (Banégas and Marshall-Fratani, 2007:88). I now pass the baton of the debate to Akindès (2004:11) who gives an explicit account of the Houphouëtist parable of benevolent ethnic clientelism or the philosophy of the peanut roaster.

This African parable is only meaningful in the context of specific attributes of political power in Africa, in particular Côte d’Ivoire. Roasting peanuts presumes that, at some point in the process, the cook tastes them for salt. Symbolically, the relationship between the act of roasting and tasting relates to the privilege of the roaster in belonging to a select circle of political clientele who benefit from an equal but socially recognized distribution by the mere fact of belonging to this group.

He notes further that essentially,

The mouth refers to the logic of mastication that is present in the social representation of the exercise of political power in Africa. In other words, it is a legitimation of the prevarication and the primitive accumulation specific to Côte d’Ivoire.

The critics of the President seized that opportunity to show that he approved of predation and “Laurent Gbagbo the
incumbent president sarcastically called the barons of the PDCI, “peanut rosters” (Ngoupandé, 2003:139) [My translation]. However, this social contract waned and things began to fall apart with the economic crisis of the 1980s that exposed the structural weaknesses of the Ivorian economy.

The monetary shock at the close of the 1970s engendered the problems that were linked to external debt, which was in a large proportion used to feed clientelism which was then in a full swing while rent from cash crops were dwindling (Conte 2005:221)[My translation].

The backlashes from this financial crisis showed that Côte d’Ivoire was seemingly heading towards a financial and economic cul de sac. Moreover, the “economic miracle” became an “economic mirage” which exposed the limits of the Ivorian economic paradigm (Akindès 2001; Conte, 2005). This financial predicament resulted in the implementation of the SAPs that marked the end of an economic era in Côte d’Ivoire. As adumbrated, the 1980s marked the beginning of a gradual sunset on the “Ivorian economic miracle” as well as the erosion of the system of political regulation and the corrosion of the cladding of socio-political structure. The Ivorian government procrastinated in accepting the terms of the International Financial Institutions (IFIs) owing to the French financial support in bailing out some of its former colonies (Duruflé, 1989) especially those that belong to the pré-carré or “the square meadow”6. The SAPs were used by Houphouët-Boigny as a double-edged sword to deal decisive blows to his traditional opponents (teachers and intellectuals) and also to cripple ambitious politicians’ wings over and also as a pretext to circumvent some aspects of the programmes (Azam 1993 cited in Oussou, Pégatiénan, and Ngaladjo 1993). The application of some facets of these economic austerity measures led to widespread protests that challenged the authority of Houphouët-Boigny and the
stability of the government (Morrison, 1996:11). There were the concomitant negative effects of prolonged economic recession on the Ivorian economy with a steady decline of the terms of trade. Worse still, the debt over-hang and its servicing drastically curtailed the room for maneuver of the ruling party, the PDCI in particular, and the government in general (Campbell, 1995:296). What is more, the debt servicing in an inclement international economic environment exacerbated the domestic hardships for Côte d’Ivoire. These problems were further compounded by ineffective and inauspicious but well trumpeted SAPs that critically deepened the socio-economic crisis with a spate of social unrests organized by civil servants. The governments accepted conditionalities of the IFIs. These clauses

Included putting the former IMF and BCEAO technocrat, Alassane Ouattara, into the position of Prime Minister in effective charge of the economic programme (Crook 1997:219-220).

It is apparent that democratization and the economic slump coincided with the end of Houphouët-Boigny’s long rule. Alassane Dramane Ouattara had executive power. However, there was a palpable tension in government circles after the first multiparty elections (1990) in the country owing to the deteriorating health of Houphouët-Boigny. The political class was divided between the Alassanistes et Bédiéistes. Alassane Dramane Ouattara did not foreclose any prospect to run for the presidential election and this power struggle is encapsulated thus by Crook (1997:224).
Bédié, the constitutional heir-apparent, was clearly the leader of the old guard and the champion of the new generations recruited in 1990 who did not want to see their career prospects ruined prematurely by any manouevre to deny Bédié the presidency. Ouattarra’s support at this time came from the technocracy-those who had benefited or hoped to benefit from the creation of a leaner and fitter public service-a ‘reformist’ group within the PDCI led by Djenny Kobena, a former top civil servant at cabinet level and PDCI National Secretary for external relations.

This feud did not spare the government and Houphouët-Boigny had to intervene in favor of the Prime Minister who embarked upon belt tightening economic policies (which were unpopular) to sanitize the Ivorian economy, and rehabilitate the financial sector. His government also embarked on repressive measures to contain opposition to the implementation of the IMF driven austerity conditions to put Côte d’Ivoire once again on the path of economic recovery and growth (Crook 1997; Banégas and Losch 2002). Alassane Ouattarra’s government jailed Laurent Gbagbo the then leader of the Front patriotique ivoirien (FPI) for six months for taking part in a demonstration against the government in September 1992. The attending result of this political feud was that it exacerbated wranglings within the PDCI, which was divided between the Alassanistes et Bédiéistes. Alassane Dramane Ouattarra did not foreclose any prospect to run for the presidential election as he stated during a television programme that

I have not yet made up my mind but I believe that any Ivorian should be able to play such a role if he knows that he is up to the task (cited in Ngoupandé 2003:181)
The camp of the Speaker (Henri Konan Bédié) really took this statement as a declaration of war (Ngoupandé, 2003: 181). It was in this deleterious atmosphere of mutual suspicion and political uncertainty within the political class that Houphouët-Boigny passed away on December 7, 1993.

4. The Rat Race for Political Succession of the Political Heirs and the Emergence of Henri Konan Bédié

The passing away of the Ivorian president in 1993 revealed an institutional void that became difficult to fill. All the more so because there was a glaring lack of a strong legal disposition and the mechanism of succession was weak. The (mis)interpretation of the constitution led to the war of the political heirs between the then Prime Minister, Alassane Dramane Ouattara and the then Speaker of the Ivorian Parliament, Henri Koran Bédié. While the former insisted on continuity in government by the virtue of the executive power and the management of the economy that was showing timid signs of improvement, the latter, instrumentalized the interpretation of Article 11 that vested the power of the president on the Speaker of the National Assembly. Henri Koran Bédié supported sworn in by the Supreme court (Hugon 2003; Ogunmola and Badmus 2005).

It is worth noting that the said Article had been tampered with many times by Houphouët-Boigny. The cacophony of the political legacy was on the one hand traceable to the fact that the spirit of the constitution was unclear in the mind of the political actors. On the other, Houphouët-Boigny who had not missed any opportunity to draw from the fountain of African tradition as expediency required. He relied on the Akan (his ethnic group) myth of succession, which of course was anachronistic in a modern state. In Akan mythology, no successor is appointed until the demise of the ruling king. For Houphouët-Boigny, having a successor while still alive was an anathema. The war of the
political heirs bred the ferment of institutional instability. On the one hand, the FPI and the Parti Ivoirien du travail (PIT) of Francis Wodié were supportive of the idea of a transitional government rather than allowing Bédié to run the affairs of the state until the expiration of the mandate of Houphouët-Boigny. And on the other Alassane Ouattara was obstinate to continue as the head of government in filling the vacuum (Ogunmola and Badmus, 2005). However, Ngoupandé (2003:184) argues that the Prime Minister made some fundamental mistakes by announcing that the government would call on the Constitutional Council to apply the legal act that was subject to different interpretations and controversy. In the end Henri Konan Bédié emerged as President to complete the mandate of Houphouët-Boigny, thus putting a temporary end to the fight over succession. However, there were many contending forces that wanted to step in the shoes of the former president. There were those who were sidelined in the process of the manipulations of the constitution (Philippe Grégoire Yacé, who had been heir for two decades), those who rely on the traditional matrilineal mode of succession of the Baoulé (Jean Konan Banny, the former Mayor of Yamoussoukro and Defense Minister under Houphouët-Boigny, later Prime Minister of the Government of National Unity (GNU), and a nephew of Félix Houphouët-Boigny), and Northerners, especially the Sénoufo led by the Gbon Coulibaly family (Ngoupandé, 2003:185). Northerners and Houphouët’s political allies felt betrayed because there was a kind of “arrangement” between them and Houphouët-Boigny; who had promised them the Presidency. They were not oblivious of the fact that in the beginning Houphouët-Boigny had not enjoyed the support of the Akan but he rather relied on the support of the Northerners, notably the Gbon Coulibaly and Ouezzin Coulibaly families (Ngoupandé, 2003:185-186).

The PDCI imploded as a break away faction. The Rassemblement Démocratique pour la République (RDR) left the then ruling party (PDCI), because of what the first Secretary General (Djenny Kobena) of the RDR termed the “Baoulization” (Houphouët-Boigny and Henri Konan Bédié’
ethnic group) of the PDCI to create a centrist party that accommodated some of those that felt disenchanted with the leadership style of the ruling PDCI. Alassane Ouattara became the presidential flag bearer of the RDR in the countdown to the 1995 presidential elections. Thus, crystallizing an already frosty relation between Bédié and Ouattara. The Henri Konan Bédié government undertook an effective witchhunting and blacklisting in virtually all the spheres of government of Ouattara loyalists hence worsening the political tension (Crook, 1997:224).

In order to safeguard and consolidate his new position and in preparation for the 1995 presidential election, Henri Konan Bédié erected some constitutional handrails that quickly took ethnic and xenophobic tones. The policy put a question mark on the origin of autochthony as well as the criteria for the Ivorian citizenship whose hallmark was the concept and doctrine of l’ivorité that redefines the Ivorian Code of nationality and citizenship (Losch, 2000; Dozon, 2000). The promulgation of a new Electoral Code that was apparently tailor-made to put Ouattara out of the political contest (Dozon, 2000; Banégas and Marshall-Fratani, 2007. Already, in 1994 the FPI had speculated on Alassane Dramane Ouattara’s nationality and Henri Konan Bédié recycled the term of the nationality (through the ideology of l’ivorité) of the RDR presidential candidate in the countdown to the 1995 elections because the former had held leadership position in the IMF and Banque Centrale des États de l’Afrique de l’Ouest (BCEAO), (the Central Bank of Francophone West African states) as a national of Burkina Faso (Banégas and Losch, 2002; Akindès, 2004). For that reason, the Bédié government considered Alassane Dramane Ouattara as a usurper who seized the opportunity of uncontrolled immigration, particularly along the northern frontiers, the possession of false identity papers by nationals of Mali, Guinea, and Burkina Faso, who were culturally close to the populations of northern Côte d’Ivoire, and
the allegedly illegal claim by an immigrant to govern a host country (Akindès, 2004:20).

The issue of Ivorian citizenship developed into a hydra and a seed of discord after the introduction of the resident’s permit with its excesses against foreign nationals during Alassane Ouattara’s Premiership. This policy made the Prime Minister very unpopular among the teeming population of foreigners owing to the biting economic crisis (Ogunmola and Badmus, 2005:219). In order to thwart Bédié’s political maneuvers, an umbrella body of the opposition to his rule emerged, and accordingly,

In March 1995, the FPI, the RDR and the Union des forces démocratiques (UDF) of Bamba Moriféré announced a formal alliance under the banner of the Front républicain (Crook, 1997:224).

On the economic front, Bédié’s six-year rule was characterized by accumulated executive kleptomania and squandermania that resulted in the misapplication of the meager gains from the economic recovery occasioned by the devaluation of the CFA in 1994 as well as the slightly favorable terms of international trade for its main agricultural exports (Contamin and Losch, 2000:124). Furthermore, it is stated

The lasting financial turnaround of the country was mortgaged by the persistence of predatory behaviour and by the implementation of a policy of white elephant projects (Contamin and Losch, 2000:125)\(^9\).
Why did ethnicity and citizenship become a subject of paramount importance in Côte d’Ivoire? The intensity that ethnicity and citizenship assume in Côte d’Ivoire is ascribable to macro and micro political and socio-economic factors. Ethnicity, with its reckless application and bewildering and billowy backlashes shattered the social cohesion of Côte d’Ivoire. Ethno-politics was also the springboard that propelled Côte d’Ivoire into an unpromising future with dark prospects that coincided with the economic decline of the country.

Furthermore, the agricultural catchments areas of Côte d’Ivoire suffered sustained and damaging blows from the bitter realities of the international trade as the main export crops prices fell dramatically in the international markets. To all intents and purposes, and benefiting from hindsight, it is pertinent to note that given the high percentage of expatriates in a socially tense country that is neck deep in economic crisis that hit hard against the masses, the virtue of African brotherhood that was so dear to the first president of Côte d’Ivoire, was drastically eroding if not corroding. For argument sake, foreigners were derogatorily called ‘bôyörôdjan’\(^\text{10}\). Hence, Houphouëtism or benevolent ethnic clientelism was seen the other way round as one of the sources of the socio-economic crises by those Ivorians that were marginalized. This belief ignited a retroactive hatred that culminated in xenophobia. Ethnic intolerance for foreigners is not a new phenomenon in Côte d’Ivoire\(^\text{11}\).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Group</th>
<th>Target group</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1930</td>
<td>ADACI</td>
<td>Senegalese and Dahomeans</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1958</td>
<td>Ivorians in the colonial civil service</td>
<td>Dahomeans (Beninese)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>National Assembly and PDCI</td>
<td>Upper Volta (Burkina Faso), Niger, and Dahomey nationals</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Ogunmola 2009
The heterogeneous layers of a multi-ethnic nation-state in Africa, if persistently propped up to the paroxysm of national life; can endanger the very corporate existence of the state. The plural character of the Ivorian state that is made-up of over 80 ethnic groups is a ready ferment of ethnic conflicts that are exploited by ethnic political leaders amid enormous socio-economic disparities especially between the south (that is well endowed in economic terms) and the north (that suffers from climatic and ecological conditions). These ethnic leaders exhort their followers to espouse a culture of “the others and us”. The introduction of the ideology of *l’ivoirité* became the open sore of Côte d’Ivoire. The ideology has been having disastrous effect on the Ivorian unity as the modus vivendi and operandi of the Ivorian political class is “divided we stand, united we fall” (Ogunmola, 2007:119). Benefiting from hindsight, it is argued that the windfall from the economic boom era left some segments of the Ivorian population on the fringes of progress Houphouet-Boigny has himself acknowledged that the dividends of the economic wealth of Côte d’Ivoire were not spread evenly and he states that

> If there is a fact that we have always refused to accept and that we will always refuse to acknowledge it is the fact that some few individuals benefited from progress and prosperity\(^{12}\) [My translation].

Moreover, economic issues became acute with the implementation of SAPs. The former opposition that consisted of the FPI and RDR wanted the restructuring of Côte d’Ivoire and redistribution of the national wealth. One faction was pro communist and inspired by the ideals of Désiré Tanoé, the Father of the Ivorian communism. He was the political father of Laurent Gbagbo. The other group was pro RDR or Alassanist.
The two groups had been united and they had the same objective: a peaceful and total revolution; a fair sharing of national wealth. The FPI wanted a radical reform of Côte d’Ivoire. The Frontists want a clean sweep of the country. For the RDR, a fair sharing of the national wealth was inevitable instead of an overhaul of the whole system. Divisions emerged when the two groups tasted power (Interview, Abidjan, December 2008).

There was an air of resentment in the poorest strata of the Côte d’Ivoire especially those that were attracted to the urban areas in the quest to have their share of the dividends (that became so elusive) of the economic miracle (Dumont and Paquet 1991:187-188). It is argued that,

Ultimately, this would explain why the fervour the doctrine and concept of ivoirité finds its flavour and favour with the urban poor, who are a ready pool of recruitment. The concept also gets its ferment from the political discourse in the presidential elections. L’ivoirité is a social hydra and vote-getter that fosters ethnic conflicts and social disharmony rather than peaceful coexistence and integration (Ogunmola, 2007:117-118).

The introduction and the subsequent application of l’ivoirité by the Bédié government has done far-reaching damage to Côte d’Ivoire. In the process, the ideology engenders political animosity not only within the political class but the doctrine also stimulates hatred and social frustration. Taken together, l’ivoirité is an ethnic weapon that contributed to the civil war and has been wrecking
havoc on the social cohesion of Côte d’Ivoire (Ogunmola, 2007:118). It can not be gainsaid that l’ivorité is a concept that contravenes some fundamental human rights. Indeed, it is a flagrant violation of some basic rights as they are unequivocally enunciated in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) as well as in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. The concept created a strong of recriminatory remarks mainly from Northerners, who incidentally have name affinities with Burkinabé, Malians and Guineans who are found in the northern and north-west riparian countries of Côte d’Ivoire.

Flowing from the above, it can be stated that the doctrine shattered the Houphouëtist philosophy of peace and dialogue and replaced it by the twin bellicose concepts of insecurity and intolerance that had fatal consequences for the spirit of common purpose and social cohesion in the country. The coming of power of Henri konan Bédié opened the door to what this study describes as exploitative ethnic clientelism because his policy was selective, peripheral and with the overall aim of promoting absolutely the domination of and preference for his ethnic group (the Akan) in the socio-political and economic spheres as regards the distribution of the spoils.

The failed presidential elections of 1995 which were boycotted by the Front resulted in the election of Henri Konan Bédié and marked the beginning of a crisis of political legitimacy in the post-houphouëtist era. This was a watershed in the descent into deeper decay that culminated in a near civil war situation (Contamin and Losch, 2000:117). The political crisis continued unabated with the clampdown on the opposition until the armed forces overreached its constitutional prerogatives and sacked the Bédié government on the 24th of December 1999. The lid of Bédié’s government was blown off when some young officers and non-commissioned officers who had returned from the United Nations peacekeeping operation in The Central African Republic mutinied over the non-disbursement of their stipends which were in custody of the Ivorian authorities.
General Robert Guéi (rtd) was appointed as the head of state (Contamin and Losch 2000:118). In addition, President Henri Konan Bédié had a sour rapport with the armed forces by sidelining military officers in the administration of the country to Houphouët-Boigny’s policy and cut drastically and continually the budget of the military, in addition to undertaking a systematic promotion of Baoulé officers to the detriment of seniority and ethnic balance in the army as well as the dismissal of the army chief of staff (General Robert Guéi) in 1995 (Contamin and Losch 2000; Kieffer 2000). Ironically; the overthrow of Henri Konan Bédié instead of serving as a cure of the ills that were plaguing Côte d’Ivoire signaled a spiral of political anomalies and violence that typify military regimes in Africa.

Table 3: Ethnic Representation in Political Institutions under Bédié, 1993-1999

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ETHNIC GROUPS</th>
<th>GOVERNMENT</th>
<th>INNER CIRCLE OF POLITICAL POWER</th>
<th>NATION AL ASSEMBLY</th>
<th>ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COUNCIL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Akan</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bao</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Konandé</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S. Manié N</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manié</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voltic N</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ntch</td>
<td>0.47</td>
<td>0.62</td>
<td>0.49</td>
<td>0.49</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Langer 2004:2
6. Praetorianism and the Rise of Anarchy in Côte d’Ivoire: A Post-mortem

From then on, the Comité national de salut public (CNSP) became the supreme body of Côte d’Ivoire. The reasons for keeping the military at bay in Côte d’Ivoire are not single-handedly. The social engineering of President Félix Houphouët-Boigny (who incorporated military officers in the administration of the country). This was also due to his good rapport with the erstwhile colonial French masters and the establishment of a French military base in Abidjan (43ème BIMA) as well as defense pacts that serve as a protective umbrella for the Côte d’Ivoire government (Turkson 2000; Kieffer 2000). This held until the end of the Cold War and the introduction of the “Balladur doctrine” which led to the selective withdrawal of the French protection umbrella in spite of the strings of defense agreements that France had signed with some of his former dominions (Ogunmola 2009:235-236).

The salient factors that motivate the armed forces to intervene in governance in Less Developed Countries (LDCs) are to a great extent related to political and societal issues because

In underdeveloped societies the military are concerned not only with pay and promotion, although they are concerned with that, but also with the distribution of power and status throughout the political system. Their goals are general and diffuse as well as limited and concrete (Huntington 1969:194).

It is also argued that in the New States, the end result of the inherent lack of credible political institutions that can regulate the polity, and modulate conflictual political interests is that various groups become politicized and compete in the political arena (Huntington 1969; Otayek 1997).
The young officers that threw the state stewardship into the lap of General Robert Guéi did not wish to turn out to be outsiders in the political game. These kingmakers tried to be assertive and ostensibly projected an aura of untouchability and even had the temerity to set surveillance structures to monitor the military ruling hierarchy (Keiffer, 2000:28). The factionalization and fractionalization of the Ivorian army turned out to be a real scourge that undermined discipline and eroded *esprit de corps* of the armed forces as loyalty to the leaders of the groups superseded national patriotism (Banégas and Losch 2000:140-144).

The introduction of the opalescent concept of *l’ivoirité* and its selective use recklessly promoted North-South regional schism as well as accentuated the division within the *Forces armées nationales de Côte d’Ivoire* (FANCI). Ethnicity has pervaded virtually all the facets of the Ivorian society. The military are no exception to this. The military coup d’etat had fatal consequences for the cohesion of the FANCI. Northern officers were sidelined within the high hierarchy of the armed forces, especially in the post-Houphouëtist era (Ogunmola and Badmus 2004 a and b). Houphouët-Boigny gave a sense of belonging to northern ethnic groups in the army (Azam 2001: 431).

The Guéi military junta was unable to avoid the plague of ethnicity. General Robert Guéi relied on the ideology of *ivoirité* to persecute and prosecute real or imagined opponents to his regime and to promote his personal ambition. This witch hunting ate deep into the cohesion of the triumvirate of Generals Robert Guéi, Lassana Palenfo and Abdoulaye Coulibali (a personal pilot to the late Félix Houphouët-Boigny). General Guéi became enmeshed in the ethnicization of the Armed forces. The two generals served in the Guéi’s junta from December 1999 to January 2000 and as a sign of things to come the junta had “two governments in five months” (Losch 2000:6).

General Robert Guéi seemingly manipulated the state apparati to persecute the other generals who incidentally are Northerners. It is not impossible that the North-South dichotomy coupled with the personal ambition of General Robert Guéi led eventually to the eviction of his colleagues.
from the military government. The two senior officers were later accused of alleged coup plotting in September 2000 (Banégas and Losch 2002; Dembele 2003). While General Coulibali was acquitted, General Palenfo was sentenced to one year imprisonment by a military tribunal. The incursion of the military into Côte d’Ivoire’s political arena resulted in what Mazrui (1975:429) referred to as “militarised ethnicity”. This exacerbated social tension and prolonged division in Côte d’Ivoire. The consequences of the application of l’ivoirité have two dimensions. On the one hand, l’ivoirité exacerbates ethnic dichotomy between the South and the North, while on the other, it strengthens Northern solidarity, which is predominantly Muslim vis-à-vis the South that is largely home to Christians.

7. The Failure of General Robert Guéi’s Political Transmutation and the Laurent Gbagbo’s Presidency

On the economic scene, no milestone was reached by the junta. The military political headship which was enmeshed in the power struggle had demonstrated strikingly that it had no well defined blueprint to bail Côte d’Ivoire out of the economic crunch. Likewise, its inability to manage cultural diversities successfully featured patently on its score sheet.

From the outset, the disqualification of Alassane Ouattara on the basis of his nationality and the code of citizenship as well as the exclusion of Henri Konan Bédié from the 2000 presidential race showed that General Robert Guéi was re-enacting the script of l’ivoirité or his own version of exploitative ethnic clientelism. The strategy of political exclusion Bédié had used in the 1995 presidential election by adapting a chameleonic metamorphosis of l’ivoirité through an amendment of the constitution by explicitly preventing the candidate of the RDR, Alassane Ouattara, to take part in the election and propped up his ethnic group the southern Mandé in government to his agenda (Langer, 2004:28-29). The concomitant effect of this policy was that major socio-linguistic segments of the Ivorian
society were marginalized from expressing their political rights. Thus feeding the ferment of social disintegration. General Robert Guéi compounded the political situation by participating in the presidential election as a candidate of his political party L’Union pour la démocratie et la paix en Côte d’Ivoire (UPDCI) with his main rival the FPI candidate Laurent Gbagbo.

The political ambition of General Robert Guéi to cling to power through the ballot box proved fatal for him and ignited a whirlwind of political and ethnic violence. General Robert Guéi was outsmarted by Laurent Gbagbo who with the help of northern military officers who fell out of favor from Guéi (Banégas and Losch, 2002:144) who had put General Robert Guéi into power in 2000 seized the spontaneous reaction against him to attack the presidential guard while the FPI “foot soldiers” heated up the street all in an insurrectional ambiance (Le Pape, 2003:37-38). It was in this shaky circumstances for the future of Côte d’Ivoire that Laurent Gbagbo emerged as president; therefore deepening the ramifications of the crisis of legitimacy and legality (Langer, 2004; Ogunmola and Badmus, 2005). The opposition, especially, the RDR insisted new elections be held owing to the manner Laurent Gbagbo came to power.

Table 4: Ethnic Representation in Government under Gueï, 2000

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ETHNIC GROUPS</th>
<th>GOVERNMENT</th>
<th>INNER CIRCLE OF POLITICAL POWER</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Aug-98*</td>
<td>Jan-00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Akan</td>
<td>0.59</td>
<td>1.41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Basoulé</td>
<td>0.31</td>
<td>1.96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kru</td>
<td>0.16</td>
<td>1.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S.Mandé</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>0.63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N.Mandé</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voltaic</td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td>0.71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Langer 2004:2
8. Expanding the Epicentre of the Vortex of Ethnic Violence: The Gbagbo Presidency and the Civil War

These demands were violently quelled in the streets of Abidjan as the FPI with the support of government forces, especially, the *Gendamerie Nationale*, clashed with the RDR adherents. The aftermath of this violence was the discovery of “a mass grave of fifty-seven bodies—all whom were northerners and many of whom had been close to the RDR”, therefore aggravating ethnic tension and deepening further north/south schism (Banégas and Marshal-Fratani 2007:90). The deterioration of ethnic relations was already noticeable since Henri Konan Bédié’s presidency.

Laurent Gbagbo came to power with his own version of *l’ivoirité* by creating a new scheme of identification based on his version of *l’ivoirité* so that the onus still fall on northerners to prove the genuineness of their Ivorian citizenship (Tadjo 2004; Banégas and Marshal-Fratani, 2007). Revisiting the contentious matter of identity cards opened old and fresh wounds, upgraded the policy of exploitative ethnic clientelism, and increased acrimony because

There has been a long-standing polemic in the country over the naturalization of immigrants and their “purported usurpation of identity”, exacerbated by the introduction of national identity cards and resident’s cards for immigrants under the Ouatarra government. The question of national identification grew increasingly contentious during the Bédié and Gueï regimes; through the promulgation of exclusive texts concerning electoral eligibility of, the exclusion of former prime minister Ouatarra on the grounds that he was a Burkinabè, and alarmist press reports concerning the level of immigration and falsification of documents, these regimes attempted to
resolve the question of “real-fake” identity cards (and by extension, “real” and “fake” Ivorians) (Banégas and Marshal-Fratani 2007:87).

President Laurent Gbagbo increased the ethnic tension by fanning the embers of ethnicity instead of promoting appeasement and national unity (Tadjo 2004:3-5). And besides, by making the issuance of new identity cards attached to the ‘village or ancestral roots’ and a link to the ‘genealogy’ of the applicants by creating the Office national d’identification (Banégas and Marshal-Fratani 2007:87).

The introduction of the new method of identification was inconsistent with “a highly urbanized population, where the relations with a “a village of origin” are weak...and where individuals and groups have proved highly mobile, both socially and geographically” (Banégas and Marshal-Fratani 2007:87). The end result of this policy was the marginalization of those Ivorians who could not provide evidence “of the local origins of their national belonging”, and particularly, “those who northern surname does not rhyme with southern villages (Banégas and Marshal-Fratani 2007:87). Ethnicity becomes a potent instrument to achieve the parochial goals of leaders in Côte d’Ivoire. Ethnic militia is appealing to the unemployed youth, especially since the stalemated Ivorian civil war.
Ethnic movements ostensibly an extension of ethnic politics, supersedes (by its violent nature) ethnic traditional politics, which remains so far the private domain of the elders who have consummated the art of ethnic manipulation for political goals (Turton, 1997: 80-81). Therefore, ethno-regional cohesion can cave in. This is true when the hegemonic group can no longer lubricate the machinery of clientelism. When this obtains, realignment or
new alliances across the ethnic divides cannot be ruled out. Minority ethnic groups or those that are dissatisfied will eventually form new alliances still based on ethnic affiliation. Often, the hegemonic group generally considers the new alliances as a pact with the Devil. It shows that ethnicity can also be ferment for collective promotion and the defense of a particular ethnic unit in righting perceived, actual or discernible wrongs. Ethnic politics remain central in Ivorian politics. Ethnic politics simply mean the instrumentalization of ethnicity in the pursuit and the actualization of economic and political goals. A third factor in our analysis is the emergence of ethnic militia movements that are led by the youth in the current impasse in Côte d’Ivoire. These groups are a radical accretion in the quest of socio-economic security, identity preservation as well as the manipulation of non-elite to portray class interests, which are promoted as ethnic or regional interests in a zero-sum-game. These tendencies represent the subjective factors. The ethnic mask becomes the objective factor (Horowitz 1985:101-105).

Paradoxically, ethnicity, which was a unifying factor among northerners, has gradually and steadily become the source of division within the FAFN, Forces Armées des Forces Nouvelles as the ex-rebels army is known. The FAFN and its political wing, the Forces Nouvelles (FN) is yet to purge the “Carnivorous demons” of ethnicity among its own members. There have been bitter rivalries and intermittent violent clashes within the rank and file of the rebellion, the Mouvement Populaire de Côte d’Ivoire (MPCI)-that are mainly northerners- that became later les Forces Nouvelles (FN)[New Forces] with other rebel groups that operated from the south-west. In this connection, this study makes a careful distinction between the ethno-regional division between the north and the south (loosely defined), and ethnic differences within the FN, the ex-rebellion. This angle of the study is a novel dimension and adds to the literature of ethnic conflicts in Côte d’Ivoire.

Figure 1: Linear ethnicity and interregional conflicts
9. Conclusion

Finding a workable and acceptable peace formula to all parties to the conflict has been elusive because of spoilers in the peace processes. Spoilers are those powerful individuals who sign peace agreements but who not honor the accords because of the apprehension of losing ceding what they gained during the war (Stedman, 1997:5). And spoilers are part and parcel of the problem of the implementation of the
“failed” Ivorian peace agreements and the elongation of the crisis. A simplistic explanation is that Ivorian civil war is lucrative for some people. The losers are, of course, the toiling and impoverished masses. It is in the light of the above predicament in resolving the perennial question of marginalization that this paper advocates a federal system of government for Côte d’Ivoire. A three tier model will create avenues to solve most of the grievances in this multiethnic and multicultural. The redistribution of the Ivorian wealth that the FPI and RDR were advocating could best be implemented in a federal structure where there will be true autonomy.
Notes


2. Policy of openness.

3. Je ne crois pas que certains jeunes puissent m’avoir par des fétiches.

4. L’actuel chef de l’état Laurent Gbagbo, qui parlait de “grilleurs d’arachides” pour désigner sarcastiquement les barons du PDCI.

5. Le choc monétariste engendre des problèmes liés à l’endettement externe, largement utilisé pour satisfaire la demande clientéliste en pleine expansion, face a une offre de rente agricole réduite. Plus généralement, le modèle d’accumulation extensive atteint ses limites et le <<miracle>> devient <<mirage>>.

6. One of the corollaries of the politicisation of ethnicity in Africa is for political opponents to cast doubt over the claims to citizenship of some prominent citizens notably former presidents Kenneth Kaunda in Zambia and Mobutu Sésé Séko in the Congo (former Zaïre).


8. Je n’ai pas encore pris ma décision, mais j’estime que tout ivoirien doit pouvoir prétendre jouer un tel rôle s’il estime capable de le faire.

9. Le redressement durable de la situation financière du pays était donc hypothéqué par la persistance de comportements prédateurs et par une politique de grands projets aux retombées très incertaines pour l’économie nationale.

10. Bôyôrôdjàn means literally in Dioula language those who came from very far places (or other lands) and it refers by extrapolation migrants and, foreigners. The term was discriminatory used later to refer to those Ivorians that Ivoirité considers as foreigners according to its selective use.

11. J.P. Dozon notes that there was a first wave of xenophobia that took a violent dimension in1958 against Senegalese and Dahomeans (Beninois) working in the colonial administration and a peaceful form in1966.

12. ‘‘S’il est une réalité que nous avons toujours refusée et que nous refuserons toujours, c’est bien celle d’un progrès et d’une prospérité qui n’appartiennent qu’à quelques-uns’’, Félix Houphouët-Boigny, as cited in J.F.Bayart, A. Mbembe & C. Toulabor, La politique par le bas en Afrique noire : la revanche des sociétés africaines, Karthala, Paris, 1992.
13 Kieffer (2000:30) notes that contrary to the common wisdom that the FANCI had demonstrated signs of rebellion that were contained by Félix Houphouët-Boigny. This wind of protest was led in 1973 by General Bony, in 1975 by colonels Sio and Kouamé in 1975, Martin Yaenlin in 1977 as well as the protest of 1980 due to the application of austerity measures by the International institutions.
References


