Russian policy in China and Asia-Pacific

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1. Russian Far East

The economic and political instability in Russia, reducing its capacity to pursue an active military policy led to the fact that Russia’s presence in the Asia-Pacific region, and previously was largely marginal in the 2000s became one more. It seems that the peripheral position of Russia in the Asia-Pacific region can be considered today and in the foreseeable future sustainable reality and in this sense is the original analytical basis of any rational inquiry. For the usual statement: “Russia is a great Pacific power”, of course, there’s at least one good reason.

Geographically, the Russian Far East - two regions (Primorsky and Khabarovsk), four areas (the Amur, Kamchatka, Magadan and Sakhalin), one autonomous republic (Sakha) and one autonomous region (Jewish) with a total area of 6.2 million sq. M. km - 36.4% of the territory of the Russian Federation, and indeed forms the belt (with the possible exception of Yakutia), natural and economic gravitates to the Pacific coast.

However, this fact, as experience shows, is not converted automatically to the strength of the Russian position on the Pacific Ocean. Moreover, these positions were, and remain vulnerable to the force of at least three fundamental factors: severe climatic conditions due to their extremely poor population of Russia’s presence in the areas to the east of Lake Baikal and an acute lack of transport and communication networks connecting the European part of Russia and the Far East.

The combination of these three factors largely determines the economic backwardness of the Far Eastern territories within the concept of rigidly centralized state apparatus, following which the Russian political elite is regarded as one of the main conditions for the survival of the Federation.

90% of the Russian Far East accounted for permafrost. It is not surprising, therefore, that on the area of 6.2 million sq. M. km live (according to 2012) total 8.16 million people.
In comparison, only one in the Chinese province of Heilongjiang (21 in the presence of others and five autonomous regions), bordering the Russian Far Eastern territories, on an area of 469 thousand sq. M. km lived (according to 2014) more than 53 million people.

And 76% of all Russians live in large cities, and 24% - are scattered on a deserted rural area. The main inhabited the southern part of the zone with a relatively favorable for life and Agriculture Climate stretch long and narrow strip along the Russian border with China and Mongolia in the area, adjacent to the old Trans-Siberian railway.

Although the construction of the Baikal-Amur Railway, laid several hundred kilometers north of the Trans-Siberian Railway was completed mainly in 1984, even the times, appeared between the old and new railway line, in fact, remains economically undeveloped.

In the Far Eastern regions of concentrated 98% of the reserves of natural diamonds Federation, 50% gold, 80% tin, 30% of wood. In this part of the country accounts for 58.3% of the total fisheries production. Through Pacific ports passes 50% of the total export of goods traffic.

But this region is poorly provided with energy resources (7.4% of Russian natural gas reserves, coal 5.2%, 3.7% oil) and iron ore (5.5%).

Production of the mining industry is 16.7% nationwide, but the engineering industry - 3.1%, and light industry - 1.2%. The standard of living of the population in this part of the country, according to Russian researchers, 40% below the poverty

2. Peripheral position as a geopolitical reality

These dates are known and repeatedly cited to defend the undisputed seems the thesis of the need to strengthen Pacific policy of Russia.

Without trying to find new arguments in its favor, it is subordinate to the argument more concrete problem - find the parameters of „realistic

minimum” of Russian course - that is moderately conservative line. The summing line destruction of the Soviet foreign policy legacy, would be able to stabilize the position of Russia in the Asia-Pacific region in the based on actual available capacity today. Under the current macroeconomic situation in Russia, the Far Eastern regions are not ready and can not be ready for organic entry into the structure of regional economic integration.

In other words, for all the talk about the benefits of activation Pacific policy, it is impossible to forget that its rational limits severely limited natural and historical circumstances.

The law population of the Russian Far East, the presence there of the demographic vacuum in which the opening of the Far Eastern territories for economic cooperation with neighboring countries accordance with the standards of the Pacific regionalism can border with irreversible qualitative changes in the situation on the ground in the direction of the loss of Moscow's political control over the periphery of the Pacific region.

According the natural and geographical specificity of Russian Far Eastern regions tend not so much to the Pacific Ocean, as a country that controls most developed, climatically and economically favorable areas of the Pacific coast, of which the share of the Russian It accounts for a small and not the best part. Although Pacific perimeter of Russia is huge, really conducive to economic development and strategic deployment is a small sector, attributable to Primorye and Sakhalin.

The rest is the area especially the harsh climate and the coast freezes in the coastal areas of the Bering and Okhotsk seas, of which the second is also a semi-closed water basin.

Direct outputs in Russia itself oceanic zone disproportionately small and uncomfortable compared to the total length of its Pacific coast - from Cape Dezhnev in the North (Chukotka) to about. Hassan in the south (the border with North Korea). This geostrategic factor is determined, which is for the Russian Pacific policy key:

if we consider the whole territory of the Federation, to the east of Lake Baikal as a single area, the implementation of the inherent natural ekonomic and geografic attraction to the basin of the Pacific Ocean really can not directly, but indirectly- through the provision of constant
geographical area enclosed between the Russian border and warm-water ports of the East-Asian coast - through the territory of China and Korea.\(^2\)

The dependence of Pacific Russia's status on the permeability of Korea and northeastern regions of China to the Russian trade flows understood in Russia in the nineteenth century. Not by chance, the Russian government has invested huge funds in the creation of the railway network in Manchuria, because control over which occurs during the first half of the twentieth century, conflicts of Russian and Soviet governments of Japan and China.

These disputes reflect the geopolitical reality - the impossibility of a full-fledged Russian presence in the Pacific without freedom all year round unlimited communicate with the zone coast of the East China and South China Sea, which is closing his together the coast of China, Korea, Japan, Taiwan and Southeast Asian countries, naturally intended to be the economic center of the region. Another thing - how to ensure the permeability. In different historical periods happened differently.

But with the beginning of the Sino-Soviet conflict of the 60s - 80s Northeast China (prov. Heilongjiang, Jilin, Liaoning) permeable to Soviet interests was not. And permeability for Korea has been significantly undermined by a chronic fluctuations in relations with North Korea and a complete lack of contacts with South Korea until the beginning of perestroika\(^5\). The situation has now changed. Firstly, more or less free economic dialogue between Russia and the two Koreas allows it to count on increased access to the Yellow and East China Seas.

Second, the normalization of relations with China in 1989 opened the way for cooperation with China. Political obstacles to it eliminated, and if Moscow and Beijing failed to come to an understanding about the prospects of bilateral relations, the historic task of restoring the permeability of the former Manchurian space for Russian economic interests in the Pacific could be solved.

However, notwithstanding that both perspectives characterize rather the future of Russian interests in the region than their present. Today actual problem does not seem to restoring permeability of the zone to the

south of the Russian Far Eastern borders, and preventing the degradation of Russian positions to the north of them.

The reasons for concern in this regard, at least two - the demographic decline of Russia's presence in the Far Eastern regions and the unresolved issue of the delimitation of powers between Moscow and the local administrations of territories and regions. And then, and another is due to the economic crisis and the social and political situation in the Far East. This area is not very attractive as an object of application of foreign capital, it does not have adequate resources of labor, comparable in skill, discipline, motivation, and low cost to those available in other Pacific countries. In most industries there are only old equipment, production facilities dilapidated. The region is almost universally no modern business infrastructure, communications and transport, etc.

These weaknesses are compounded by additional challenges: the curtailment of federal funding for local social programs; the reduction of the armed forces and the funding of the Army and Navy in the Far Eastern regions; the growth of local business activity, pushing for the development of cross-border links on the background of the destruction of the center-periphery relations in the Federation; the lack of purposeful state policy in the field of transport, which would restrain the periphery of the Russian Far East alienation from its European part. The wave of “sovereignty”, largely reinforced the output of the Russian Union from a Soviet Socialist Republic, led to the erosion of administrative, political and psychological groundwork for attachment of the Russian Far East to European Russia.

In the absence of sufficient expertise on the Western experience in Russian conditions in the bowels of the entourage of President Boris Yeltsin in 1991-1992s. has developed a formula of relations center and the regions, according to which the latter to “take as much power as they can”. The absolutization of the idea and its free interpretation led to the destabilization of relations between subjects of the Federation and served as an excuse for inaction against separatist authorities as the national autonomies, and some Russian regions. Semi-sovereign status of Tatarstan, an attempt to self-proclamation of independence of Chechnya.

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and frustrated the establishment of the Ural republic - manifestation of this trend.

In the Far East the attempts of separatism has not yet been, although the psychological background for such exists if only because of distinct historical memories of the Far Eastern Republic (1920-1922s.) The boundaries of which, however, did not coincide with the modern understanding of the Russian Far East, as it was not part of Yakutia, but was part of the Chita region. Anyway, the acuteness of the problem of territorial integrity of Russia and felt in the east. The attempts of separatism at the same time a possible split in three axes - political (liberal-right center – Communist-Left peripherals); ethnic (Russian European-Siberian) and regional (capital - the province).

A special role is played here by the economic motivation of the Far Eastern territories, their natural desire to survive in the conditions of a sharp reduction in financial support to local budgets from Moscow. This mixed understandable desire administrations of territories and regions to increase the income from the transferred on a commercial basis with the center, to find alternative markets for Far Eastern raw materials overseas and to provide themselves with a reliable source of food, consumer goods and partly industrial equipment - that is, products, usually come to the Far East of the European part of the country.

From the standpoint of economic profitability of the local authorities have started to expand direct trade and economic links with neighboring countries in East Asia - China, South Korea, Singapore, Japan, which is quite natural was associated with increased economic presence of the state in the Russian Far East. Playing stimulating economic development of the Far Eastern territories of the role, the foreign penetration of established and political problems, the most painful of which was associated with a rapid increase in the number of arrivals the Chinese citizens in Russia, most of them using legal and illegal means, settles in the most economically developed areas of the Russian Amur region and Primorye.

In a short time from 2012 to 2014, the Chinese population in Russia has grown, according to some estimates, up to 2 million people and exceeding the number of such large by Russian standards, “the title of minorities” of Federation as Bashkirs, Chuvash and Mordvinians. The massive Chinese penetration into the territory of Siberia and the Far East that such indicators as the number, formed in the semi-legal Russian
Chinese community is already theoretically could claim the status of a national minority⁴. The feeling of anxiety is enhanced when compared with the observation A.D.Voskresensky already mentioned Harvard publication of Yasheng Huang, which is assessing the prospects of the domestic situation in terms of growth gap in socio-economic conditions of individual regions of the PRC, emphasizes stabilizing - China - role increasing migration flows, the management of which has become an important element of state policy in Beijing.⁵

Author prudently avoids in its work relating to international and political aspects of the problem of Chinese migration, perhaps, given the negative reaction of US frequent cases of illegal entry to the US territory of more or less large groups of illegal immigrants from China. However, it is difficult not to admit that the Chinese government, and today quite tolerant of growing drain of its people abroad can try using this type of migration overcome by their neighbors of the problems such as the chronic overpopulation provinces bordering Russia and the lack of jobs.

Not to mention the fact that much more liberal than in the China, political and economic regimes in the Russian Federation itself is attractive to the eyes of many Chinese people. Demographic onslaught of China to the Russian Far East is contradictory reactions of the local authorities. On the one hand, the influx of Chinese products meet the needs of a significant proportion of the local population, and the “Chinese economic boom” can significantly replenish local budgets through taxes.

On the other - the Chinese community and create a criminogenic environment are often beyond the control of the local Russian administration does not have adequate powers to ensure internal order. Growing fears of a “creeping Chinese colonization” of the Russian territory. Such feelings are amplified due to the reduction of the Russian Armed Forces in the Far Eastern regions.

⁵ Yasheng Huang. Is China Going to Break up after Deng? P. 14.
Their numbers, according to Western sources, fell from 326,000 people in 1989 to about 200,000. In 1993 can agree with the economic and military-strategic rationale for these cuts. But it is not necessary to forget about their political and psychological aspect - concerns of the local population increased vulnerability of the Far Eastern territories in the face of peaceful economic and demographic expansion of China, which grows to Russia in a difficult, indeed a historic, geopolitical problem, comparable in its potential value to the massive penetration of Mongol Turkic element in the cultural, political and economic oecumene Russia in the Middle Ages.

The political situation in the Russian Far East is largely determined by the interaction of old prejudices and new suspicions about China, on the one hand, and the objective interest of the local territories and regions in economic cooperation with Chinese capital - including in its own territory. China factor, thus, acts as a stimulus, and the economic and psychological reorientation of the Far East with the European part of Russia to the outside East Asia and also as a source of anxiety, objectively pushes local authorities to understand the importance of consolidation of the Russian Federation as a condition to ensure real security of the Far Eastern regions.

a. National interest in regional politics

It is clear that the stability of the regional situation is crucially dependent on the ability of federal and regional authorities to find a mutually acceptable formula for the relationship, which confirmed the unlimited powers of Moscow on issues of defense, security and foreign policy, would allow the economic empowerment of local areas to the maximum level possible, limited only by the need to ensure national security interests. Judging by what is happening in the economic life of the region, Moscow’s policy in relation to the Far Eastern territories coexist, at least four different concepts. Creation in the region of one or more “contact economic zones” such as existing in coastal areas of China. Formally, one such area is formed in Nakhodka, but without relying on preferential legislation begins to spontaneously develop another - mostly along the Russian border with China on the basis of the expanding Chinese presence.

Preservation of the Far Eastern territories as raw material-exporting enclave with the modernization of primary industries, diversification of export opportunities and capacity of transportation, including transit, on
the basis of the formation of larger units of air and rail transport in Khabarovsk and sea transport in Vladivostok. Preservation of the region as a national, ecological and raw reserve, and the development of the urban infrastructure, the creation of centers of tourism and banking.

Modernization of strategic infrastructure, including manufacturing, in its preservation and development in conjunction with the creation of an enabling environment for international banking and business. None of these concepts do not have the status of an official state program, they are largely contradictory. But it is characteristic that they do not provide for re-industrialization of the Far East and it is hardly possible. East Asian experience shows that the creation of a modern industry base is not real unless it is provided with sufficient human resources. To solve such a problem in the Far Eastern regions of these resources can only be brought from abroad. Therefore, we should not overestimate the chance of the Far East to independently integrate into Pacific Economic Zone. Real appears indirect connection to regional integration and through the transformation of the southern areas of the Far Eastern territories of Russia on the outskirts of the Chinese integration field and putting them on the role as subcontractors of Chinese manufacturers.

In other words, Russia will not be able to „enter“ in the Pacific regional integration, but it can „let this integration to themselves.“ Reflecting on this, however, is fully aware that such integration is likely to be „Chinese“ face. Perhaps it would be economically feasible to adopt such a perspective - but only with a clear understanding of its unpredictable political consequences. It is worth to keep in mind in assessing the prospects for attracting the Far East foreign capital. The most active and prospective investors in the Asia-Pacific region is now Taiwan, Japan, Singapore, Hong Kong and South Korea. Three of them are nothing more than the Chinese state. Japan does not invest in the Russian economy due to political bias. Thus, in fact the partnership free of belonging to the „China factor“ may, in fact, only with Seoul, which makes a more realistic look at the prospects for a comprehensive and effective cooperation with the outside world through software investments.

Does this mean that Russia is destined to remain a margin of Asian-Pacific region? In the near term, probably yes. However, it is hardly to

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focus only on the negative side of this statement. The peripheral position of Russia, besides the cons can find ration content, for example, in the light of the hypothesis of neo-bipolarity, which was discussed in the previous chapter. As mentioned, the main structure and the role of the Atlantic and in Pacific as a possible future global geo-economic poles begin to play integration trends. But at the same time in Europe, the integration covers mainly continental masses, and in Asia - mainly coastal island areas. By virtue of geographic compactness of the European area and the relative homogeneity of its parts integration process in Europe was gradually but uniformly within each phase of the expansion area of integration: if the country goes in, it generally means that the integration trends covered all its territory.  

In East Asia state, separated by vast maritime areas, scattered over several times larger area realize their integration capabilities for different scheme. The integration centers in the Asia-Pacific region can be both individual countries and groups (ASEAN), as well as areas within a single country - the coastal areas of China. A feature of European integration is that it appeals inland, the specificity of the Pacific - to expand it to the sea. Coastal insular nature of the integration process in East Asia are well combined with geopolitical data concerning smaller and endowed with vast landlocked country, but inevitably create problems for large countries with vast areas of continental formations - such as Russia and China. In particular, as already mentioned, the deep continental regions of China is almost not involved in the Pacific process, while the rate of inclusion of coastal zones is increasing.

And the more successful China get used to the Pacific integration system, the greater the tension between its coastal and deep zones. Theoretically as logical to assume based on the central position of China, it may find itself in an extremely difficult position if through its territory to really stretch geoeconomically dividing axis between North American-Asian sphere of economic permeability and East Eurasian area due to various reasons unable to fit into the Pacific integration process. East Eurasian area included: fragments of Eurasia (continental province of the Peoples Republic of China, northern India, eastern territories of Russia, China).

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the new states of Central Asia as well as Afghanistan and Iran). China, in this case may be the threat of geo-economic and political collapse. Leaders of the People's Republic of China is trying to control events, contributing to the modernization of the inland areas and at the same time restraining the pace of integration of coast region. Interests of national consolidation pushed China to a slowdown in regional processes for adapting to the Chinese periphery, and the growing interest of other countries in the region in the development of economic interaction forces them to promote the speedy integration of the Chinese coast region. Thus, the growing potential of the regional instability caused by the growing threat of the collapse of China, and possible differences between China and other countries on the Pacific cooperation. Comparing with China allows the findings of nervousness over the failure of Russia to become a full part of regional integration. Federation outskirts position in the APR, cost being its weak spot, politically it can protect against the threat of collapse. China to overcome this danger can be difficult not only because of its centering position in the regional structure, but also its incomparably greater involvement in regional integration processes. In other words, the probability of separatism of the Russian Far Eastern regions under the pressure of geo-economic circumstances can be directly proportional to the degree of its involvement in the Pacific integration. This probability seems low to the extent that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the Russian Far East in the foreseeable future will remain a „zone of stable unclaimed” And this apparently can be “positive factor” of the regional situation in the international political sense, reducing the threat its destabilization, which is the disintegration of Russia would be inevitable. This does not mean that Russia should not seek to regional cooperation. Rather, it is necessary to recognize that the pace and form of inclusion in the economic life of the region, it would be advisable to relate to the need to eliminate the threat of territorial disintegration of Russia under the pressure of the external economic circumstances.

The idea of forced integration in the Asia-Pacific region, which began in 2006, V. Putin, and which continues to follow Moscow, at the present stage may conflict with the interests of the territorial consolidation of the Russian Federation. The inclusion of the Russian Far East in the Asia-Pacific economy is necessary, but may be counterproductive if it is not
balanced by an adequate increment of relations between European and Far Eastern parts of Russia. The strategic objective of Russian policy today seems not to include Russia in the economic and political cooperation with the states of the Asia-Pacific, but in making large government measures to strengthen the physical presence of the Russans in the Far East regions as the basic conditions for ensuring the compatibility of economic integration with the interests of ensuring stability in the Russian Far East and East Asia as a whole. It needs to submit the adoption of the federal program to support population of the Russian Far East, without which Russia's loss of effective control over the territory may be predetermined ¹⁰.

b. Russian policy in the regional context

The main problem of Russia's policy in East Asia was and still is the lack of clear to Russia and its partners, received ideas about what kind of a positive function could be performed by Russia in the post-confrontational regional environment. The design concept of the Pacific policy, which would be of a complex character, apparently, the Russian government has not developed, but diplomacy is still rather reacts to events than can be able to play on their lead ¹¹.


¹¹ Речь Путина на Саммите АПЕК в 2012 году
In the absence of the official doctrine of the Pacific researchers have attempted on the basis of the analysis of the practical steps of the Russian Federation to identify patterns to trace the logic of motivation and thus “reconstruct” the Russian doctrine in Asian Pacific, that in the United States and other countries are usually clearly formulated. In articles published in foreign scientific journals, it was suggested that the Pacific policy of V.Putin in fact built on the basis of “the concept of compensating opportunities”, and the meaning can be described as the doctrine of “rational Compression”. In the first case, it meant a persistent desire of Russia to reduce its military presence in the Asia-Pacific region, offsetting its increasing economic and political presence. That is almost a curious fact that the two publications on the doctrinal foundations of the Russian politicians are not able to go to the Russian press and were published abroad, indirectly indicates a minimum of confusion as the official Russian circles and the media in connection with the need to evaluate, so to say, the macro sense of Moscow’s policy in the Pacific.

12 S 2 po 8 sentjabrja 2012 goda sammit ATJeS prohodil v Rossii, vo Vladivostoke na ostrove Russkij.
However, the reactivity of the policy - it is not a unique feature of Russian diplomacy.

Not at all or to a lesser extent, it is peculiar and American - with the only significant difference is that the United States generally retain their position in the region and can afford to delay, and Russia is losing its position in this respect, in dire need of clear orientations. To determine them, it is important to understand what the region is to be feared in the first place. At the risk of repeating, first among them, we have to re-call Russia's inability to ensure economic and social conditions for eliminating or at least reducing the vacuum their demographic presence in the Far East. A kind of vicious circle: to attract settlers to the region is not possible due to the harsh climatic conditions, are not compensated with adequate facilities to obtaining housing, securing wage, basic commodities and increased comfort of life in comparison with the European part of the country. And find local financial resources to fund such benefits is not possible without the creation of human resources for the development of industry in the region and production base as the basis of self-financing. Of course, the problem of raising funds for the initial investment is relevant in all of Russia, the Far East, but it is particularly acute due to the political coloring and strategic concerns.

The remoteness of the area, its relative isolation (exacerbated by imperfections of the transport and communication networks and the high cost of transport), the prevalence of both in the Russian Far East, and especially beyond the thesis of the objective capacity of the region to the independent from Moscow existence (subject to greater openness and orientation in the Pacific area) - all of this highlights the issue of strengthening the unity of the European and Far East Russia. It seems no less important and urgent than, for example, the compromise with Tatarstan or warning of separatism of North Caucasus republics. Apparently, none of the actual Russian parts of the Federation today is not in need of such attention and support as the Far East - to the extent that none of them is faced with such a strong temptation to turn to separatism, taking advantage of the geographical location and endowment in natural resources.

The decision of problems of the Far East can hardly be particularly rely on foreign investment. Undoubtedly, helping to overcome some of the economic difficulties in the region, they will eventually, by its very nature can not promote the growth of “pro-Pacific” economic orientation of the
local areas that may soon enough be transformed into a political gravity - if the growth of foreign economic presence is not balanced by a sufficient increase Russian investment (federal and private) sector in the Far East.

It, therefore, is not about to give up cooperation with foreign countries, but that is not to give him to replace the mutually beneficial relations between the western and eastern parts of Russia. Do not indulge in panic and suspicion still worth bearing in mind that the experts in the United States, Japan, Southeast Asian countries, and almost everywhere in the West have long been regarded as a problem of overpopulation in China, the importance of which goes far beyond the regional framework. Radical solutions it is not expected, and the greater concern of the outside world about China's demographic weapon.\textsuperscript{13} In this regard, at the level of the academic community is quite close, although very carefully study the possibility of reducing the pressure of the Chinese factor. Redirect the excess population for a peaceful and evolutionary development of underpopulation areas of the Far East in the context of the development of economic cooperation between China and Russia.

Basically, as far as can be judged from the available materials, such views are still on the way to the level of open publications. But they have confided discussed at seminars and in private conversations, experts and representatives of the scientific world. Summarizing the delicate notes of Western colleagues or tone (but not yet the wording) of their articles and books, it can be concluded that the opinion of the appropriateness for Moscow (and usefulness to the world) to admit China to the development of the Russian Far East are pushing them:

1) psychological incompatibility of the Russian population and the inherent model of economic behavior with the type of management that is effective in the natural environment of the Far East, which is manifested in the inability of settlers from Russia (including Cossacks) to organize production on the very land where up to them quite successfully manage Chinese and Koreans:

2) unnaturalness of ownership of Russia originally alien to it in respect of the territory of civilization; 3) lack of investment opportunities in Moscow in order to overcome the crisis in the Far East economy.\textsuperscript{14}

It should be noted, however, that in view of the desirability of “concessions” - in economic terms - Russian Far East to China tend not all Western experts. They readily agree with the argument, consisting in the fact that the stability of the situation in the Asia-Pacific region Russia's loss of control over their part of the Far East could be catastrophic, at least for two reasons. Firstly, it is the weakening of the Russian Federation would increase China to totally unacceptable levels for the West; secondly, it could be a real international crisis over the fate of Russian strategic missile submarines in the Sea of Okhotsk, which in this case would be “orphaned” or be the subject of political disputes and conflicts, not to mention the fact that it was not clear who would have to fund the Pacific fleet and provide a minimum level of safety.

Thus, the second after the demographic vacuum, a potential threat to the stability of the Russian Far East, as well as the Asia-Pacific region as a whole, can be considered a loss or crisis handling stationed in this part of the country's strategic forces as a result of politically unfavorable development of the local situation, or any kind of accidents and malfunctions associated with inadequate provision of technical state of warships and nuclear weapons directly. It should be borne in mind that in the prevention of such danger is a parallel interest in several, in addition to the Russia, the countries - the United States first and foremost.

Excessive weakness of the Russian position can cause great anxiety in Washington so that in the US there is an active debate on the future international role of China and the prospects for US-China relations, especially in the context of the unresolved issue of Taiwan. USA refuses to ignore the silent policy of weakening Moscow’s ability to play a strategic role in the Asia-Pacific region and is forced to think about the way in which to find an opportunity for “positive engagement” of Russia in the region in view of the circumstances, that “the Russian Far East, weak or strong, will remain a major factor in the regional strategic balance”.

\textsuperscript{14} Arbatov A. Voenno-strategicheskij paritet i politika SShA. M.: Politizdat, 1984. 318 s.
China with its huge population and the 4,300-kilometer border with the Federation, without being a real threat to the Russian Far East today, the potential remains appear to source the most serious geopolitical threat to Russia. The peculiarity of the Chinese challenge is that in a peaceful international environment and good relations between Moscow and Beijing, as at present, it may be more formidable than if these relations were cool. Because it is a peaceful Chinese penetration in the Russian Far East, the most difficult to resist and it is on this type of exposure, the Russian side has no experience to respond effectively - without resorting to harsh measures of power (just as was the custom during the Sino-Soviet confrontation). This, however, concerns not exhausted. According to Western and Russian press continues to develop Russian-Chinese trade in weapons and technology.

In 1993, after a nearly 35-year hiatus, has been renewed cooperation between Russia and China in peaceful use of nuclear energy to break agreements which at the end of the 50s began the escalation of the Sino-Soviet conflict. Under the new agreement, the Russian side pledged to provide assistance in the construction of China in Liaoning nuclear reactor with a capacity of 1,000 MW. It reported the interest of China to attract personnel and technology for development of missile guidance systems, management of submarines and missile tests. Based on the Japanese data, US experts believe that the increase in China's budget in 1993 to 13.5% was mainly due to the increase in purchases of Russian weapon.

Working in the US Chinese expert Shulong Chu, has long taught at the Chinese Air Force College and comprised staff of the Chinese Institute of Contemporary International Relations, in 1994, published in English work specifically analyzing the theoretical views Chinese strategists. It is subdivided into three schools - the northern, eastern and south-east, calling first as a major. As the author notes, typical for this school is still considered Russia a source of potential threat to China, appealing not to the ability of Moscow real risk to China today and its intentions toward China in the long term, that the North school theorists regard as threatening. Do not reject the thesis about the “Russian threat” and two other schools, but their representatives believe that the main threat to China may hang in the south - in connection with the conflict over the Spratly archipelago, a collision with Taiwan or taking on Japan to supply
the United States security functions vast maritime areas in the Eastern Asian zone\textsuperscript{15}.

As far as reasonably assist Russia in China's modernization of its defense capabilities in the light of the above? From the standpoint of rational analysis, this line seems wrong, because for the sake of immediate commercial gains from arms exports to China are put into question the military and technological advantages of Russia, the importance of preserving them can hardly be in doubt. Geopolitically, China is first and foremost rival of Russia, and from this point of view, the peaceful cooperation and good neighborly relations with them can not pass a certain point beyond which they can undermine Russia's ability, if necessary, with sufficient strategic and technical superiority to carry out in respect of the China is not provoked but strong policy. Allowing the possibility of cooperation between Moscow and Beijing in combating Islamic extremism seems rather extravagant than relevant, since the Russian Federation is not equivalent to the USSR and the Islamic challenge for her is substantially different than the Soviet Union, the geopolitical configuration.

The threat of Islamist extremism lurks Federation mainly in the Caucasus and the Volga region, while Islamic extremism, which is worried about China, based on the Uygurstan and Kashgar, which is closely adjacent to the new states of Central Asia, but is now separated from Russia rather extensive formation of their territory.\textsuperscript{16} This conclusion is contrary to the views of a sufficiently large number of Russian experts, including leading and influential. It is, in fact, is that in the sub-sector knowledge of the Pacific region in Russia coexist several directions, different relating to the prospects of Russian-Chinese relations. The main today submitted for enthusiasts of Russian-Chinese cooperation. The underlying idea of this group of authors is that relations between Russia and China do not have anything that would organically predetermined conflict of their relationship.\textsuperscript{17}

\textsuperscript{16} N. Namatov “Religious Extremism” 2012
\textsuperscript{17} K.V. Pleshakov “China and Russia are objectively geopolitical allies in Central Asian”.
This research school is inclined to interpret the rapprochement with China as a potentially effective counterweight to excessive Russian-American rapprochement\textsuperscript{18}.

The second area could be called pragmatic, his representatives sufficiently attentive to geopolitical circumstances, specifying the potential of Russian-Chinese conflict over control over the territory. However, based on the correct thesis of the unacceptability of Russia's conflict with China, they prefer to emphasize the need to combine flexibility with respect to the study of Chinese opportunities to enhance Russia's ability to cope with the Chinese challenge in the future, if it acquires a disturbing shape.\textsuperscript{19} Third, for it would be appropriate to call “enjoying the protection”. Its members tend to take particularly alarming to the Chinese penetration of the Russian Far East and the Chinese believe the challenge is already a reality, not a prospect. Consistent with that, they are focused on a more active search for opportunities to keep the Chinese pressure, or at least learn how to guide it into a non-hazardous for the Russian direction. Apparently, it is natural that the school tends to arguments about the need for Russia to find potential partners for collaboration in connection with the possible consequences of the unfavorable development of the situation in the PRC. So, on the one hand, the existence of a potential threat to Russia from China is very strongly indicates very critically evaluate US policy some researchers recommending Russia the “score points” by playing on the contradictions between the US and China.\textsuperscript{20}

On the other hand, the reality of the strategic risks that may turn out to Russia the Chinese military power in 10-15 years, clearly warns known as an expert on the Russian military-political problems A.G.\textsuperscript{21}

\textsuperscript{18} С.Л.Тихвинского, М.Л.Титаренко, М.С.Капицы, А.Г.Яковлева
\textsuperscript{19} В.С.Мясников, Л.П.Делюсин, А.Д.Воскресенский, С.Н.Гончаров, П.М.Иванов, С.М.Труш.
\textsuperscript{21} Otto von Feigenblatt „Kazakhstan and ASEAN“
Danger from the Central Asian area of Russia can indeed come, but its possible dyed Islam, most likely, will be of secondary importance. Determining more likely may be the actual geopolitical contradictions embodied, for example, in disputes over access to Kazakh oil.

According to Western experts, in 10-15 years, China may face an acute shortage of raw materials, coupled with increasing domestic consumption and the depletion of old fields. Even today, the country developed the richest deposits of this raw material, although the acute problem of its removal. The fact that Kazakhstan would like to export oil to the West but due to the inability of the political obstacles to the construction of missing sections of railway transport it south to the sea lanes of the Indian Ocean and the Persian Gulf, through Afghanistan and Iran, navigate accounted for by exports to the west - to the Black Sea and through Russian pipelines. The acquisition of the Chinese market can dramatically change the situation, as the transportation of oil to China convenient and profitable than exports through Russia. In this situation, we can predict friction between Russia and China over influence on Kazakhstan. This, of course, does not rule out a bitter conflict if Islamic
people in Xinjiang, home and Kazakh minority, really take the path of armed struggle with their government and at the same time - most importantly - will be able to secure the support of the political forces in Kazakhstan powerful enough that they can provoke the country's involvement in a possible confrontation in Xinjiang.

In this case, you can not exclude the possibility of involvement in the Sino-Kazakh clash of Russia relating to Kazakhstan bilateral strategic commitments. A potential threat to Russia may be the conflict in Korea. In this case, the contours of the call may be determined first of all scale of the threat of radioactive contamination of the Russian territory in the event of failure of one or more nuclear installations of the DPRK and the Republic of Korea, if they were hit as a result of which opened between the military conflict. One of the possible measurements of the inter-crisis could turn out to be a mass exodus to the Russian territory of North Korean refugees, which in this case could destabilize the Russian Primorye.

c. The foreign policy objectives

In essence, the key problem of foreign policy in East Asia is the choice of orientation. Variants of it, appears to be at least three: retreat to the upgraded version of preferential relations with China; simulation carried out by China in 1982 (XII Congress of the CPC) line of “equidistance”; and finally, the search for opportunities to combine national interests of Russia and its entry into the East Asian security, “aligned” under the leadership of the United States. The first scenario - focus on closer rapprochement with China was not sufficiently substantiated. The fact that the current liberal-authoritarian Chinese leadership can not be considered
openly hostile to Russia, can not overshadow the geopolitical stating. The country, which is characterized by the existence of a conflict superposed spatial gravity burdened to the same set of „historical injustice“, are more likely to be in conflict with each other than the state from such conflict-free gravities. For today's Russia can be considered gravity to the outlet to the Pacific Ocean and the tendency of the China to the return in the zone their original cultural and economic dominance in the Amur region and Primorye.

The presence or absence of direct contact between the spatial countries may generally be respectively conflict-forming or alternatively, soothing factor their relationship. For decades, the Soviet Union and Poland were “geopolitically unfriendly” countries - but only until the moment when the Soviet Union ceased to exist, after which his role was almost automatically attributed to the Ukraine, causing suspicion in Warsaw today as well as before their generating Moscow. The rapid improvement in relations between Russia and Germany, as far as can be judged, too, was not without connection with the change in the configuration of the German spatial gravitation (rather, economic and psychological - Today), which turned out to be a pole of Poland. Consequently, quite a profound change in the type of relationships and mutual perception is somehow rigidly associated with geopolitical shifts - change of borders, first and foremost. However, it is clear that Russia and China, countries historically mutually conflicting geopolitical shifts have occurred. Consistent with what was left untouched geopolitical potential of conflict.

Of course, the liberalization of the political systems of the two countries, increasing the level of maturity of their ruling elites led to this potential under control, preventing a fatal collision is inevitable. But being able to prevent a direct conflict, the efforts of the political elites are unlikely to be able to ask deep enough motivated orientation of the two countries on the alliance remained unchanged in spite of the potential geopolitical contradictions. Skepticism about the justification for targeting China encourages to apply to the second variant of Russian politics - the line of equidistance.

As the consideration of the first scenario, it is appropriate to remain within the framework of geopolitical analysis, adding to its structural. The equidistance is “policy of balance of power,” which includes attempts to construct and maintain the force balance between multiple leading to the region powers that are ten times demonstrated experience in equilibrium.
as a long time to be still can not. Some of them, because of some internal factors, having succeeded in the development, makes you stronger, and in response, other countries are beginning to experience fear, taken together locked except as to weaken the towering power. As a result, the general tracking of all, blocking all against each and widespread desire to guess and do not miss a moment of their own and their allies superiority over his opponent and his allies, the general conflict inevitably arises. Since the basic premise of this work is a conscious preference for a structured, hierarchical ordering between the limited responsibilities of the leaders before the general anarchy oppositions based on the power of comparability. The equidistance will make excessive uncertainty in regional subsystems and thus will contribute to its destabilization.

This policy seems all the less acceptable that Russia for any scenario will not be able in the foreseeable future to serve the Asia-Pacific “on equal terms”, as it is objectively possible to be in the complex are not comparable with those of other leaders. This situation will best meet the interests of experiencing the rise of China, which is not satisfied with its position in the region and would like to implement their ideas about the future prospects of their improvement. Turn Moscow in policy of equidistance not only serve as a justification of China's desire to maintain a free hand in regional affairs, but would weaken Russia's position in the face of China. Moreover, the Russian policy of equidistance with respect to China and the United States in principle seems geopolitical absurd as “remove” Moscow can only by the US and its partners in East Asia, while China will be under all circumstances dominate in the Russian Far East.

In such a scenario, policy of equidistance would amount to a one-sided focus on China and the rejection of alternatives depending on him in matters of security. Thus, a closer look reveals that both of the first option is actually two versions of the course, Moscow cannot afford to alienate freely in relations with China. The scope of the “economical expansion of China” and the vulnerability of Russia before their face, of course, dictate the need for good-neighborly and constructive Russian-Chinese relations and in principle, which snaps the Far East of Russia's policy towards China, orienting it to seek an understanding with China. In such a policy, of course, there is a rational content. The most important condition for their support seems speedy resolution of all outstanding issues of border demarcation (talking about the sites in the zone p. Amur), even if this had come to terms with economic losses and the risk of encroaching upon the interests of local territorial and regional elites and the local population.
The logic of choice in this case is determined that any material losses of the Russian citizens can be somehow compensated by the federal government.

And while the risk of abandonment in the hands of China's occasion to present Russia's territorial claims in the future will be virtually impossible to block any counter-measures, taking into account changing the ratio of capacity at the level of regional geopolitical and geoeconomic balance sheets is not in favor of the Russian Federation. Complaints by local authorities for the right to a decisive voice in the territorial settlement with China worth quite hard for them to respond as national security, and we are talking about it is the exclusive prerogative of Moscow and it should remain. Apparently, it would be a mistake and give up the possibilities of micro-stabilization of the local economy and improve the well-being of the Russian citizens living there, which might be associated with the development at all levels of the Russian-Chinese economic cooperation and trade.

The advent of Chinese goods allows local people to solve many social problems (by providing clothing and appliances to supplement the family income revenue from the resale of Chinese goods) quickly and as far as can be judged more effective than through the development of commercial and business activity with the European part of the country. Attempts to deprive Russian citizens of these gains could generate discontent directly to the relevant results of voting. At the same time, maintaining a relatively liberal regime for small private businesses Russian citizens with entrepreneurs from China, it would probably be appropriate to consider measures to prevent the reorientation in China the medium and large Russian companies. Necessary seems to develop formal and informal code of conduct for the Far Eastern Russian businessmen in relation to the Chinese partners, which would include measures against possible attempts to determine the position of the last purchase in the local economy in the same way as the Chinese become the dominant force element, for example, in the economy of Indonesia, Malasia, Singapur and Philippines.

Huaqiao problem in Russia is becoming a reality, and perhaps to be expected that the natural reaction to it will be “economic nationalism” of Russans. The task of the federal government would be to be to intelligently guide it by controlling the situation and, where possible, avoiding the inevitable displacement of contradictions to the official level.
However, ignoring the possibility of informal regulation of Chinese penetration would be a delusion. In this sense, the need to coordinate efforts of federal agencies - the Ministry of Foreign Affairs with business organizations and the local administration. The development of cooperation with China, given the ease with which it is able to realize its economic advantage over Russia in a peaceful international environment, it is hardly possible to forget about the need to work out alternatives Russian policy, restricting the ability of China to influence the situation in the Far Eastern regions of Federation.

Regional stability is essential to the good neighborly relations between Russia and China as much as the possibility of acquisition of ways to influence the foreign policy behavior of China to the extent sufficient to keep it in a non-threatening for Russia parameters, or at least for the early detection of the turn, which may be to talk about the threat and occurrence. Anyway, we have to think about Russia's ability to conduct, if necessary, a policy of “soft containment”; find ways to connect Russia to the American strategic system in Asia Pacific and no return to direct power confrontation with China; participation in system would not have a direct anti-China focus, but indirectly would be addressed Beijing signal about the ability of Moscow with the need to rely on the support of the US and its partners. In the end, the only advantage for Russia than with China in the years since the beginning of Gorbachev period is relatively more trusting relationship between Moscow and the West.

It would be foolish to neglect this advantage of Russian diplomacy, especially if you take into account the obvious economic weakness of Russia towards China and impossibility for the foreseeable future to compensate for its excellence with something else without having to build a military force but to improve political relations with the United States. The problem however, is seen to make its participation in the partnership with the United States is really a functional, rather than purely passive, as it was until now, put that Russia “simply” meekly gave up trying to play at least some role in the region and has given way to all other positions - the US and China. In such a scenario develop, in particular, the events in Indochina and Korea, where Russian influence remained almost symbolic, while the authority of China in both Koreas has grown significantly, and the Vietnam glasses are quickly gaining the ASEAN countries, Taiwan, Japan, and after recovery July 1995 US-Vietnam diplomatic relations - and even the United States. In other words, comes, after all, it is time to move from the nearly 10-year failure of demonstrations in Moscow
against attacks on the role of a regional hegemony to acquire some so to speak, legally recognized regional community features to ensure their regional interests.

To those, it seems worthwhile to include: assist in the formation, together with other Asia-Pacific countries flexible structure of informal relations that could, if necessary, be transformed into a formal agreement that would allow the Russian coalition support in the event of a repetition of the Russian-Chinese exclusion; a strengthen mutual understanding with the United States on the need to strengthen the Russian presence in the South East Asia (Vietnam), giving it a non-threatening nature of the small countries; assistance in this regard, the improvement of relations with Vietnam small Southeast Asian countries while improving relations with them to provide an additional channel to strengthen the partnership between Russia and ASEAN; a finding ways to compromise resolution of the territorial dispute with Japan as a means to increase the chances of cooperation with Japan and the US, which, like Russia, may be interested in a moderate aspirations of the PRC;

The contribute to the preservation of the status quo in the Taiwan Strait while avoiding open political and diplomatic confrontation with China, but also in the firm refusal to support China's efforts to isolate and weaken Taiwan; The restoration of Russian influence in North Korea and use for prevention of avalanche united of North Korea with South Korea while strengthening political and other relations with Seoul. The use of the growth of political interest of Southeast Asian countries in improving relations with Russia for their support on accession to the economic cooperation in the region. At the end of the 2010-15s the regional situation is so secretly and more recently determined by individual countries and regional community as a whole about the chances, in the words of US experts, transformation of Asia Pacific region in Rax Sinica („Chinese world“) and its ability to resist or maybe contribute to such a prospect. It seems that rising around her fears and concerns are not free from exaggeration, although they are based - objective distrust weaker countries to strengthen the neighboring state, the experience of foreign policy behavior which gives reason to fear renewed his attempts to use the purchased power to the detriment of others.

Russia is developing cooperation with China in many areas, and therefore prefers not to emphasize those natural fears that since the emergence of the Chinese atomic bomb, and the conflict in 1969 on the island Damansky, in fact, never disappeared in the society with regard to China. But even refraining from foretold of „the Chinese economical tiger“officially, Moscow can hardly miss the chance to use the fears of China, who quite openly expressed ASEAN countries. Russia is beneficial to stop further „erosion“ of its position in Asia and at the same time it is important to try not to miss the opportunity of benefits from joining the regional economic cooperation. Do not indulge in excessive optimism, one could still simplify the solution of these problems through support to the growing desire of ASEAN to see Russia as a counterbalance to China and maintain its presence in the region as part of a conditional equilibrium. Obviously, the strategic power, the former for many years an obstacle to enhancing the role of Russia in the Asia-Pacific region, have reconfigured and become more accessible to influence its direction, can be embedded in a “positive context” of regional life.

The only important thing is not to scare the ASEAN, but at the same time not to lose the reputation of power, capable of fulfilling their natural role of a counterweight to China, and in the eyes of ASEAN and Japan. Small countries do not refuse to put forward in 1971 plan to create a Zone of Peace and Neutrality in Southeast Asia, was built firstly in the idea of „self-help“ (ie, preferred self-reliance and cooperation within ASEAN) and the maintenance of political stability through welfare. Secondly, to ensure recognition and respect for the neutrality of the local major external powers - the United States, Russia, Japan and China. Obviously guarantees from Moscow did not seem superfluous Southeast Asian countries in the new regional context. Characteristic in this sense, the statement appears to the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Singapore, Wong Kan Seng, said: „We recognize that Russia has legitimate interests and the role it could play in the Asia-Pacific region“24. It is significant that ASEAN states sympathetic to Vietnam, adopted in January 1993 the decision to invite Russia to maintain its presence at the naval base in Cam

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Russian policy in China and Asia-Pacific

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Ranh at no charge - despite the fact that the cost of the lease of the base is estimated at 350 thousand dollars per year.

Meanwhile, Hanoi in July 1992, officially joined the ASEAN Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia of 1976 and since then is preparing for full membership in the organization. Saving the base of Russian-Vietnamese strategic partnership could mean in the long term indirect connection to the gradually emerging Russian system of military-political partnership with the ASEAN foreign powers. Such a prospect would also mean an indirect connection to the American strategic system in the Asia-Pacific region, which would be purchased from this greater rigor and completeness of proportionality structurally greater rigor and moderation and neutrality in the political.

However, it would be the second step in the direction of Russia. The first was the signing in November 1992 of the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation with South Korea, offending structured regional subsystem of the principle of separation of all the blocks in the bilateral relations „pro-Moscow” and „pro-American”, which are automatically considered „anti-Moscow”- and those were actually. Today Russian-South Korean agreement remains the only treaty-legal „anchor” of Russian policy in the region, which no evidence of the strength and stability of its position in East Asia. If the normalization of relations with the South was an asset of the Russian policy, then freeze relations with the North - its obvious miscalculation. The deterioration of relations with North Korea led to the expulsion of Moscow from the Korean process and seize of the initiative by the United States, China and even Japan.

Moreover, outline shortly after the conclusion of the Russian-South Korean contract frustration due to the rapid fall in interest in South Korean economic cooperation with Moscow too was largely the result that the Seoul found that Russia actually lost the ability to influence the regime of Kim Ir Sen, while the payment for the use of this effect in the interests of the South was one of the main incentives for movement toward normalization of relations with Moscow. It seems that the change in leadership in North Korea, at least, gives rise to activation of Russian policy towards this country in order to restore as much as possible in her political positions. In this respect, high priority would be the conclusion of a new political agreement with Pyongyang, which, except for the automatic involvement of Russia in a possible conflict on the side of North Korea. And at the same time could give the North Korean regime of
reasonable political guarantees for its security against, for example, disturbing his attempts to force to overthrow the outside.

Reasonable limits is immediately on this issue has long been exhausted. Security agreement between North Korea, on the one hand, and China and Russia, on the other hand, connected in system of the existing bilateral relations subsystems security in East Asia. The agreement with North Korea could play a constructive role in the future, especially if they could be a safety of confidence building measures, which might have been able to agree to the resumption of dialogue between North and South and the North and the USA. Improved relations with the two Koreas at quite possibly advance cooperation with the South would, though only partly compensate for the lack of constructive relations between Russia and Japan, the dissatisfaction that cannot, of course, to isolate Russia from the Asia-Pacific region, but it is able to prevent her buy positive policy – military role in regional subsystem partnership with the USA. More specifically, if you take the opportunity to cooling of Russian-Chinese relations in a realistic perspective, the normalization of relations with Japan will be created as an urgent necessity.

Due to geopolitical and just political circumstances, natural partners of Russia in the region can only be USA and Japan. Japan to cooperate with Russia will be more difficult than the voltage will remain Russian-Japanese relations. In other words, the question of the settlement of the dispute with Tokyo for almost 40 years, it seemed important, but not a prerequisite for regional stability, can now for Moscow to represent the more important. The increase in economic power of China, combined with the growth of its national self-assessments by imposing on China's geopolitical advantages, can provide “a resonant explosion” in the area of foreign policy activity of the country. The issue of the strategic importance of the four areas in the southern part of the Kuril Islands, which are claimed by Tokyo (Habomai, Shikotan, Kunashir and Iturup) different foreign researchers estimated. For the need to preserve them as part of Russia is usually given two arguments: ensuring freedom of outlet to the Pacific Fleet and the need to have a defensive barrier against undetectable penetration of foreign States Navy in the Sea of Okhotsk and the physical protection of carriers out there fighting watch Russian strategic submarines.

At the same time on the first thesis of a famous American expert Edward Olsen notes that the control of the Kuril straits hardly facilitates
Russian warships out in the open ocean, as all of these passages are inconvenient for the passage of ships because of its noncommittal and strong currents, the presence of ice and fogs in winter. A radical solution to the problem he sees only in the relocation of the fleet on the east coast of Kamchatka, where, thanks to the warm Kuroshio Sea, are ice-free harbor, comfortable for the home. In the current conditions, the position of the Russian Pacific Fleet in the Sea of Japan in the technical sense similar to that Russian Navy in the Sea of Black and in the Sea of Baltic. All of them are locked up its own surrounding territory.  

Commenting on the second argument, another American researcher, Robert Burton, believes that national security future of Russia's relations with the US and Japan will largely depend on what decision it will take on the future seat of the strategic nuclear submarines, now cruising in the Sea of Okhotsk. If the submarine will remain, the need to maintain a protective barrier for them will determine the continuation of the current tensions. If they will be transferred somewhere else, say, in the Arctic, it will be possible to agree on a security regime in the Okhotsk Sea, then there will be a different situation with far-reaching consequences for the US Pacific Fleet and defense policy of Japan. Thus, leaving aside the analysis of the specific arguments of western colleagues and realistic assessment of the proposals can be summarized that the strategic importance of the territory of Russia as a whole is beyond doubt. Probably the rights F. Fukuyama, said: „The so-called northern territories had a significant symbolic, but little military value until the nuclear submarine launched ballistic missiles, and then access to the Sea of Okhotsk to the zones of combat duty proved strategically important for Russia“.

It should be noted that in 2014-2015, Japan's position in the territorial issue has become less intransigent than it was in 1991-1993., when Tokyo insisted not to compromise in accordance with the Declaration of 1956 (the transfer of the two islands after the conclusion of a peace treaty), and the assignment of all four areas simultaneously (“Once all and only once”). This was due to the fact that the Japanese side was convinced of the impossibility of solving the problem in an unstable political situation in Russia and strong public opposition to the transfer of the islands. At the same time the Japanese government to take into account views of the NATO countries that did not want to complicate the already difficult position of President Boris Yeltsin, considered it appropriate to postpone the decision on the future of the territorial problem. Library of Congress expert Richard Cronin spoke on this subject with sufficient candor: „Under strong pressure from the US, Germany, Japan and France reluctantly pushed aside the territorial dispute and its coldness in relations
with Moscow for the sake of broader objectives. Moreover, Tokyo agreed with the arguments of the West in favor of the need to provide economic support to Russia.

Describing the logic resorted to in this case the Government of Japan, the retired general Self-Defense Forces of Japan Toshiyuki Sikata said: „In Japan, wondered, what is worse - illegal presence on the islands of Russian divisions or economically broken Russian? Russian, restored conservatives and striving for hegemony?” Some psychological importance was the unwillingness of the Japanese leadership to detect too apparent discrepancy his point of view with the position of a clear majority of Western countries. As a result, today the question is actually preserved. During Boris Yeltsin's visit to Tokyo on 11-13 October 1993, following his talks with Prime Minister M.Hosokava it signed a new joint Russian-Japanese Declaration, which refers to the determination of the parties to continue their efforts to conclude a peace treaty by solving the territorial issue, based on the historical and legal facts. The text also states that all treaties and other international agreements concluded between the USSR and Japan, remain in force and continue. Thus, the Russian side has indirectly recognized its obligations in accordance with the agreements in 1956.

Thus, the Russian-Japanese relations does not aim at the expectation in the foreseeable future trouble-free development. However, this does not mean that the Russian side can afford to endlessly delay in the issue of normalization of the situation around the islands. As far as can be judged, the start time is not in favor of Russia. The growth of the Chinese call forces to return to the issue of potential allies in the Asia-Pacific. In this respect, noteworthy is the fact that after 10 years of silence about the decline of the Russian presence in the Pacific, some American experts began to write, albeit cautiously, about the need to „enable Russia to play a constructive role in ensuring security” in the Asia-Pacific region. In this context the improvement of relations with Tokyo becomes important.

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as a condition for precautionary connection if necessary Russia to the structures of regional partnership, one of the main meanings of which, as far as can be judged, in the foreseeable perspective can be in one form or another containment of China.