Conflict and Conflict Transformation of Religious Fanaticism in Northern Nigeria: A Cultural Theoretical Approach

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Abstract Various scholars have often times analyzed the intrinsic values of religion in most African societies as endemic. But the intricate historical variables that web these realities together to underpin the fecundities of conflicts in these modern African societies have in the most part not received serious contextual analysis. This paper analyzed that a succinct anthropological analysis of these variable of historicity of religion and culture provides a template for understanding and resolving religio-political fanaticism in Northern Nigeria.

1. Introduction

Avruch (1998) analyzing on the pervasive nature of culture, indicated that culture “encompasses not just quasi or pseudo-kinship groupings (tribe, ethnic group, and nation are the usual ones) but also groupings that derive from profession, occupation, class religion, or region” (p.5). For Avruch, identity constructions of individuals often embody a social psychological construct that reflects a cultural import. Needless to reason then, why people exploit the tenets of culture for social and political advantage especially when that serves to galvanize a sense of group perception towards a desired cause. If we take the analysis of Avruch on religion as a modicum of culture seriously, then the exploitation of religion as a cultural uniting force to rally support for a justified or unjustified cause within a national construct, will only serve to illuminate the variables of conflict of discontent especially within a society of multiple faith and culture like Nigeria.

Nigeria gained her independence as an amalgamated country of various independent and varied cultural divide
(Benin Kingdom, (Midwest region) Oyo empire (Yoruba, western region), Hausa Fulani empires (North region) and Ibo cultural groupings (Eastern region)), from its colonial lord (Britain) in 1960 (Ejiogu 2001). The British founding fathers modeled Nigeria social fabric along a secular template of separation of powers between religion and state (Umar, 2002). This political design was arguably carried out constitutionally without the anthropological understanding of the nexus of the cultural identity of the people. Scholars have often indicated that Africans are intrinsically religious such that the divide between governance and religion or cultural beliefs is not easily understood. This assumption further reinforces Avruch’s analysis that religion and culture are intrinsically interwoven.

Various missionary and jihadists adventure in the different regions of Nigeria infiltrated the Nigeria social tapestry at different point of history. Whereas Usman Dan Fodio’s Islamic legacy in the Northern part of Nigeria (Umar, 2002), entrenched Islamic faith within the cultural and political temperature of the North as the template for secular leadership, the southern part of Nigeria was greatly rallied around the pro-western Christian ideology of a separation of powers between church and state. The success of Usman Dan Fodio’s strategy of replacing existing traditional rulers with adherents of Islam did not only shift the concept of social and political order of the Northern hegemony, it equally customized a trend for identity construction and social interventions. The result of this strategy is social construct of Islamic faith as a way of life and an expression of group solidarity. The danger that was never averted was the creation of a balance of power critique that minimalized the Christian minority voices in the North. The tension and political utility of the religion factor among the Northern oligarchy was visibly present even in pre-independence politics of Nigeria especially in the formation of political parties along Islamic ties in the North.

In his book review “Religion and Party Politics,” Umar (2002: 357) indicated that pre-Nigerian independence political parties were formed and orchestrated along the lines of Islamic conservatisms. But the relevance of this multiple cultural constructions has never been examined as a
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possible conflict driver. In recent times, Islamic fanaticism and a subtle introduction of Islam as a state religion in the Northern Nigeria have created series of conflicts, group differentiations, religious/cultural instrumentation and cultural relativisms that have defiled both federal and state resolution. But on a general analytical note, the cultural historical import of Northern social political identity creates a narrative construct for understanding why in the wake of late twentieth century, (1999-2003), Shari’ah penal code or Islamic penal code was introduced as an official state legal system in some Northern Nigerian states. The dilemma therefore should not be on the why, given the historical trajectory of the Northern Oligarchy, but on understanding the cultural theoretical framework of the social structure of the concept of Islam in Northern Nigeria as a conflict resolution theory.

2. Literature Review

In “Theories of Conflict Interaction,” Folger et al (2005: 65) contended, “communication is not so much a product as it is a process that is enacted”. By Folger et al’s analysis, the behavioral pattern of individuals are socially constructed on the basis of preceding behaviors which could be understood as sets of constructed cultural beliefs and traditions. Cultural beliefs are often times not divulged from religious rituals and sentiments that promote group perception of self, identity and differentiations. Thus according to Folger et al (2005: 65), “the interactional perspective emphasizes several questions: “(1) what patterns exists in conflict interaction? (2) What rules or structures do people use to make interpretations and construct social meanings in conflict situations? (3) How do people use messages to accomplish their goals in conflict? (4) Which factors influence how sequences of moves unfold in conflict interaction?.” These communication context based analysis creates a cultural template for engaging the various contentious behavior in Northern Nigerian conflicts. In order words, understanding this communication perspective on inter-group conflict relations could shed more light on social cultural dimension of Christian vs. Muslim conflict in the Northern part of Nigeria. Folger et al’s analysis brings enormous significance
to the role of social meanings in perceptive communication of conflict framing and manifestations in inter-group stalemateing relationships.

Last (2008), analyzed that Muslim interaction with non-Muslims in Northern Nigeria both pre- and during the colonial era had been that of a separatist design. Non-Muslims were not allowed to live within the walls of the Muslim faithful. This system occasioned the introduction of reservation areas (GRA) and the Sabon Gari for non-Muslim foreigners inhabitations. Even though such concepts and settlements are still in the lexicon of northern communities today, it is important to note however, that they do not carry the same power of social interactive connotation they had in the past centuries. For Last, it is a reaction to this interaction change between Muslims and non-Muslims that creates anxiety for restoration among Muslim fanatics. In his Article “The Search for Security in Muslim Northern Nigeria,” Last, indicated “there is a pervasive anxiety among Muslims over their security, both physical and spiritual, in today's northern Nigeria. It is an anxiety partly millenarian, partly political, that seeks to recreate a stronger sense of the 'core north' as dar al-Islam, with notionally 'closed' boundaries—just as it was in the pre-colonial Sokoto Caliphate." (Last, 2008)

Discussing on “Psychological Dimensions of Conflict,” Mitchell (1981: 79), contended that groups in conflicting situation often adopt a cognitive skill of selective inattention, selective perceptions and relative rigidity as a way of rejecting those concepts or behaviors that do not reinforce their chosen beliefs and perception about the social construct of either their environment or other parties they perceived to be the enemy. When we compare and contrast Last’s opinion on Muslim anxieties in the North and their interpretation of their environment in the light of Folger et al’s theories of conflict interaction, the religious and cultural conflicts in northern Nigeria are indicatively justified by Mitchell’s analysis of selective inattention, selective perception and relative rigidity as a cultural factor adopted by warring parties. The justifications come from a consideration of the political dimension to the positions and undercurrent issues resonating within the northern
historical analysis of their political sociology of religion. Bayart (2005: 13), for example, analyzed that groups often climb on the layers of religion and culture to justify their political plot. Peel (1996), in his book review “the Politicization of Religion in Nigeria: Three Studies,” made an implied case for the presence of imbalance of power in the north as one modicum of ideological framework built into religion and cultural perspective of relative rigidity in the north as a bile product of colonial design. For Bayart and Peel religion and culture serves here as political instrument for politicians’ career advancement.

For Peel, religious and cultural conflict in Nigeria goes back to the systemic way the British colonial administration of Nigeria incorporated “Sokoto Caliphate that entrenched the Hausa-Fulani oligarchy whose charter was the jihadist Islam of Sheikh Usman Dan Fodio (d.1817),” with a normative control of political power over both Christians and Muslim groups in the Nigerian larger society.” In the same vein Jega (2000: 31), in his book “Identity Transformation and Identity Politics under Structural Adjustment in Nigeria,” contended that dominant elites in Nigeria especially in the North (emphasis mine) had exploited ethnic vs. religious identity to creatively manipulate the masses to their advantage in order to access and sustain their hold on the state resources and power. Religion and culture therefore, becomes a strategy of divide and rule that serves to promote elitist hegemony in northern Nigeria. In this caveat religion and culture serves an instrumental purpose of promoting power imbalance and a rational choice theory and gaming for political control of the people. Whereas Jega, in his final analysis saw the identity conflict in Nigeria as not reconcilable through community mediation, Ejiogu (2001) in his article: The Roots of Political Instability in an Artificial “Nation-State”: The Case of Nigeria,” proposes “that solution to Nigeria’s political instability lies [sic] first by unraveling its present constitution, and secondly by the evolution of a new entity which accepts a new dialogue that proposes a challenge beyond formal construction of state apparatuses to an active relationship of entrenchment and transformation.” (Ejiogu, 2001: 323)

The shortcomings in Last (2008), Jega (2000) Bayart (2005) and Peel (1996) are that they fail to acknowledge or
analyze the unexamined multiple layers of cultural construction that politicians exploit for their own gain. I found Ejiogu’s analysis more elucidating and consistent with the transformation and elicitive model in mediation theory and practice that engages present cultural context as a paradigm for future interaction in communities (Lederach, 1995). I am of the opinion that what is needed for conflict resolution in northern Nigeria is a mediation theory that will empower parties to the conflicting situation and shift the basis of negotiation from position to interest. In order to engage the historicity of the conflict that is undeniable, Lederach offers the elicitive model that is prescriptive but equally validating of pre-existing cultural heritage of parties while aiming towards cognitive consistency of the group as a source of strength for transformation. (Lederach 1995: 67)

The possibilities of a weakness of face saving and blaming in the problem solving model makes it inconsistent within a cultural and religious conflict that has face saving and power imbalance tactics built into the conflict itself. The self empowering shift from negative contention to interest based negotiation of transformative and elicitive model therefore presents an alternative model for engaging the selective perception, selective inattention, power imbalance and relative rigidity of both Muslims and non-Muslims in the northern Nigeria.

3. Conflict and Conflict Transformation of Religious Fanaticism in Northern Nigeria

Growing up as young innocent boy from a Catholic Christian home in the mid 1970s to early 1980s in the northern Nigeria, peace and respect for individual cultural and religious autonomy was taken for granted. I recall with a deep sense of nostalgia, how we celebrated each other’s religious and cultural festivities with great pump and pageantry. On Fridays, I could walk into the praying ground of my Muslim friend with great acceptance. My entire family moves to our Muslim family friend’s home to mark their Id kefir or Id fitr, or even cook for them in the evenings of their Ramadan as we join them in breaking their daylong fasting.
On their Sala 'at day, our meals were provided for by our Muslim neighbors who take pride in celebrating the festivities of their faith with us the non-Muslims. It was party all day long in the Military barracks where we lived in Rukuba, Plateau State, Nigeria.

We celebrated Easter or Christmas day with great expectations as we anticipate the flooding of our living rooms and bedrooms with our entire Muslim friends. Culture and religious diversity was a phenomenon to be celebrated in those years of my childhood. We had no reason to fear our neighbor for arson or religious intolerance. Respect and communal living was a given. I could not remember any major Muslim feast that I was not given a new set of clothes to visit Muslim families who lavish my Muslim friends and I with gifts and food. I do not remember any instance of discrimination based on my non-Muslim background or non-northern origin. I can not recall any instance at which “Baba,” “Saidi,” and Amina” or “Talatu” my Muslim peers were chased out of my home or fellow Christian homes we visited on Christmas day simply because they were non-Christians. “Baraka de Salat” or “merry Christmas” was equally given as a salute to each other's faith with pride and honesty. Yet, years later, in the same community I once felt comfortable being a Christian child. I could no longer sleep without a gun by my side for fear of my Muslim neighbors who once ate and dine with me on the same plate. Being a Muslim or Christian has become a normative phenomenon for killings and intractable community conflict in northern Nigeria. In a land I was once treated as a proud child of everyone, I woke up from my slumber to suddenly realize that I am no longer welcome because my family have suddenly been discovered to be settlers and not indigenes of the land they had shared a great deal of their life in. The tides of my blissful childhood euphoria or religious and ethnic harmony have long been replaced by a frenzied sentimental atmosphere of religious and cultural or ethnic supremacy battle.

In the February 23, 2006 edition of the British Broadcasting News (BBC/Africa), it was reported that, since the introduction of Shar'ah in 12 northern states of Nigeria between 1999 and February 2006, over 10,000 people have lost their lives to religious protests. Reporting on the high
cost of competing goals between Christians and Muslims in northern Nigeria, Minchakpu (2002) indicated that over 2000 Nigerian died in 2001, 1,211 people died in Kaduna State between February and November 2002, and at least 500 people were killed in Plateau state as at September 2002. (Minchakpu as cited in Christian Today Magazine, accessed November 20, 2009). During these mayhem that have continued through 2009, tens of thousands of lives have been lost, mosques, churches, over 134 villages, and properties worth millions have been razed down across the region (Guthrie, 2002 as cited in Christian Today Magazine, 2009). In Kano State:

30 churches and over 200 houses belonging to Christians have been destroyed while over 90 Christian students were killed at the Bayero University [in] Kano and the Federal College of Education [in] Bichi," reports The Daily Champion, a Nigerian newspaper based in Lagos. "Another six Christian lecturers from the institutions were also allegedly killed." (Olsen, 2004: 1)

Northern states with shari’ah laws include: Bauchi, Gombe, Sokoto, Zamfara, Kaduna, Borno, Yobe, Niger, Jigawa, Katsina, Kano, and Taraba, with high agitations in Plateau state. According to Vriens (2009), the concept of shari’ah evolved after the death of Prophet Mohammed in 632 CE. The concept was based on belief in the virtues of the life and teachings of Prophet Mohammed carefully chronicled by Islamic scholars into a teaching document called hadith. The applications and interpretations of the document vary according to the different schools of thoughts in Islam. Shari’ah is often perceived as:

"Path" in Arabic [...] shari’ah guides all aspects of Muslim life including daily routines, familial and religious obligations, and financial dealings. It is derived primarily from the Quran and the Sunna—the sayings, practices, and teachings of the Prophet Mohammed. Precedents and analogy applied by Muslim scholars are used to address new issues. The
consensus of the Muslim community also plays a role in defining this theological manual (Vriens, 2009).

Historically, pre-independence Nigeria/British administration had allowed the practice of Shari'ah laws in the north but with the exception of criminal laws and capital punishments (Agency French Press, 2009, & Peel, 1996). Omoruyi (2001) in his article “An Appeal to President Olusegun Obasanjo: Nigeria: Neither an Islamic nor Christian Country,” contended that various opportunities were missed to address the position of religious laws in Nigeria during the “creeping Islamization” attempt by General Murtala Mohammed in 1975. President Ibrahim Babangida equally seized opportunities of inactivity to unilaterally induct Nigeria into full membership at the Organization of Islamic Countries from its Observer status in 1986. During the Nigerian Constitution Drafting Committee in 1977 participating non-Muslim Nigerian accommodated the inclusion of shari’ah in the final draft of the federal document, thereby enlisting shari’ah courts as a legitimate concept subject to individual legal interpretations (Ejiogu, 2001).

The question therefore is not whether Nigeria constitution recognizes shari’ah but the interpretations in the concept in the Nigerian constitution. It will be an argument made in absurdity to reason that the concept of a shari’ah legal system was new to the Nigerian legal lexicon. Section 5 of the 1999 constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria including the previous constitutional provisions provided for a shari’ah court in the northern region and a customary court in the southern region. These provisions were apparently informed by the cultural and religious affiliation of the bloc categorizations of Nigeria into north and south. However, these appellant legal provisions of shari’ah and customary courts were exclusive to civil cases of family and land disputes. But what appears to be new in the legal lexicon of Nigeria that exacerbates conflict is the politicization of the concept of shari’ah as a fundamental state penal code trumping all federal constitutional provisions. The 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria prohibits state religion in the form of legislating laws that runs contrary to the secular state identity of Nigeria.
But Section 5 & 6 of the federal documents is not quite explicit on the limits of the power of the shari'ah court in northern Nigeria. Arguably politicians have utilized this legal laxity to advance their political pedigree as a cultural precept. Omoruyi (2001) will argue that Muslim elites unwittingly exploited the vantage position they have in the Nigerian echelons of power to advance Nigeria state as an Islamic State by participating actively in D8 (Organization of eight Islamic Countries: Egypt, Malaysia, Indonesia, Iran, Nigeria, Turkey, Pakistan and Bangladesh) and OIC. Additionally, being a shareholder of D8’ bank gave leverage to these interpretations exploited by the politicians to pursue the political agenda of Muslims in advancing their political ambition and arresting their religious anxiety (Omoruyi, 2001 & Last, 2008).

The opportunities for conflicts around the introduction of shari'ah as a state penal code is rooted in the political imbalance between Christians and Muslims and religious layer of culture in the north especially with majority of public office holders being of the Islamic faith. Group Perceptions are equally operationalized when we consider the fact that majority of the ruling class in Nigeria since its independence have been predominantly Muslim of northern origin. The fight for group identity is further reinforced by the historical antecedents of Muslim leaders employing the weapons of their position of power to introduce Nigeria into the exclusive Organization of Islamic Countries. Mitchell analyzed that when group negative perception around a concept is high, utility of such concept can serve as a trigger for conflict. Within this Caveat, selective perception and relative rigidity around what a group chooses to believe whether true of false could be played as a weapon of conflict. Moreover:

The coding of past, present, or feared future violence as ethnic is not only an analytical but also a practical matter. Violence is regularly accompanied by social struggles to define its meaning and specify its causes, the outcome of which - for example, the labeling of an event as a pogrom, a riot, or a rebellion - may have important consequences (Brass 1996b)
The presence of such consequences great or small could serve as a unique opportunity for mediation. Mediation particularly becomes a good option when the warring parties have reached a stalemate. Let us consider how shari‘ah conflict could be presumed to have reached a stalemate in northern Nigeria. The introduction of shari‘ah penal code was highly embraced by its adherents on two fronts. First, it was perceived as a way out of the culture of corruption that have decimated social fabric of the nation. Secondly, "Caught in the crossfires of moral decay and grinding poverty, many a Muslim who believes in traditional Islam now sees the resurrection of the Shari‘ah as a way out of their disturbing humiliation and low self-esteem." (Nyang as cited in Agency France-Press, ‘AFP’ November 5, 2009).

Apparently these promises of a promise land are perceived largely unrealistic even among its avowed advocates predicated on a sense of return to the status quo years after the introduction of the shari‘ah scheme. According to Abba Koki (2009) an avowed disciple of the program in Kano state who was reported to have quit his government position in protest for the failure of Shari‘ah to deliver the expected dividends:

People are disillusioned with the insincerity, deception and hypocrisy, which characterize the implementation of Shari‘ah.... Self-seeking politicians who hide under the Shari‘ah to promote their personal political interests dashed people’s aspirations for a just and decent society.... The clamor for Shari‘ah was motivated by the people’s ardent desire to do away with injustices, corruption, impunity, immorality and other social ills bedeviling our society...Instead politicians have used this to seek votes and maintain the status quo after winning elections (AFP November 5, 2009)

Koki’s declaration further affirms Bayart’s assertion that people often utilize the weapons of culture and religion to attain their political mileage as it happened in Iran, China, North Korea and else where (Bayarti 2005: 13). The declaration of discontent by a keen advocate of shari‘ah in
northern Nigeria is indicative of a stalemate and therefore creates vast opportunity for mediation. Folger et al. (2005: 200) analyzing “Climate and Conflict Interaction,” contended that understanding the communication shift by parties in talking about their conflict could serve as an outlet for engaging a constructive opportunity for mediation. Stalemate is reached when warring parties have exhausted their tactics and felt cognitive dissonance (Mitchell 1981: 78) with the conflict. In such situation, chances are high that the disputants may be ready for mediation focused on interest rather than position. The fact that shari'ah have not operated or yielded the anticipated results save the lost of lives and property from both sides of the conflict in itself creates an avenue for reinvention of interest that will be mutually serving but equally empowering in the absence of shaming.

4. Proposing a Cultural Theoretical Approach Resolving Religious Conflict in Northern Nigeria

Lederach (1995: 9) contended that knowledge is socially constructed based on people’s experience and interpretations or the shared meanings of the events of their life process. For Lederach, “meaning occurs as people locate themselves and social “things” such as situations, events, and actions in their accumulated knowledge”. The social template for knowledge and meaning constructions are rooted in culture, if we understand culture to mean the sum total of lived experience, beliefs and way of life of a living community. Culture therefore becomes the reference point or index for social experience (Augsburger, 1992). Conflict within multiple or same culture has the synergy of engendering limelight for understanding self or the other.

Augsburger (1992: 16) analyzed that “when conflict situations are fully explored, they reveal that we live simultaneously in multiple frames of reference, multiple realities, -superficial, social, psychic, elemental, and survival realities”. The shari‘ah conflict that decimated and alienated northern Nigerians that had cohabited for centuries in accord only demonstrated the multiple frames, of reference,
multiple realities, superficial, social and psychic, elemental and survival realities that they had entertained without being strategically examined. What the shari’ah conflict did therefore was to force a consideration of these never explored realities. The multiple but shared cultural identity in northern Nigeria engineered conflict because even though the people shared same cultural reality of location and historical template, there still existed a common ground of cultural difference namely, religion. Even though it could be argued that they recognized its presence, the meanings were never subjected to collective interpretations. Thus the mediation opportunity that presents itself here is the skillful facilitation of discussions around this same but different reality of the northern cultural identity.

Bush and Folger (2005: 79) analyzed that disputing parties often abhors their conflict experience of negative feelings and loss. As a result they value transformation from negativity to “reestablish the positive experience of competence and connection that is found in constructive conflict interaction”. When we consider the statistical level of loss from both Muslims and non-Muslims alike (displacement, lost of family members and property worth over two hundred and thirty-nine million dollars ($239m) as at 2002, not counting the other emotional constraints that are incalculable), then the desire for a more constructive interaction for engaging their same but different cultural identity becomes a natural desire as way out of their negative conflict. Lederach, discussing the concept of conscientization in Paulo Freire, indicated that peacemaking embraces:

the challenge of personal transformation, of pursuing awareness, growth, and commitment to change at personal level. In protracted, violent conflicts, this transformation involves grief and trauma work, as well as dealing with deep feelings of fear, anger, and bitterness that accompany accumulated personal and family loss (Lederach 1995: 19-20).

The skillful mediator will need this knowledge of the people's cultural experience and the meaning they construct around their knowledge in order to engage a group
discussion of their past and present experience, in the space of the meanings that such knowledge engenders as a template for future interaction. Augsburger contended that story telling occupies a strategic place of honor especially among high context culture, where oral history serves as the knowledge bank of the people. Such narrative model process will have to be engaged in such a way that it separates the people from the problem. Negotiate on interest rather than on position (Fisher and Ury, 1991).

I will advocate the guiding hand of an elicitive model in engaging the process. The elicitive model teases out the pains of the present in order to create and discover the future. Such a transformative approach does not only serve as empowerment for the participants, it taps on the resources of the cultural context in which mediation occurs (Lederach, 1995: 55) to create the basis future interaction. In this caveat both the Muslims and non-Muslims are engaged to tell the story of their painful experience, acknowledge their loss and hurts, in order to discover and utilize their available cultural resources that had ennobled their harmony in the past. Elicitive model will constructively engage their differences, while intuitively owning or acknowledging their significant same but different cultural interpretation as a constructive resource for transformation rather than sustaining their destructive template of recent history.

5. Conclusion

Religious and cultural conflict in northern Nigeria resonates to many as a conflict in culture and power. But deeper analysis indicates that it goes beyond the case for power contention to meaning making and a call for recognition of pre-existing synergy of same but different identity of the northern communities. It is on the long, a conflict of the cultural of the multiple identity constructed over time that was never effectively appreciated by both Muslim and non-Muslim communities. What appears as religious fanaticism therefore was a call for cultural examination of their sameness and differences. It could be estimated as a conflict calling for social growth and transformation hence a combination of conflict resolution
model of narrative, transformative and elicitive model as already analyzed in this paper is strongly advocated as a resource for engaging the discussion.


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