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The Relation of Strategic Human Resource Practices with Firm Performance: Considering the Mediating Role of Resource Based View

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Abstract: This paper is a conceptual study exploring the relationship of strategic human resource management (SHRM) practices (those tools used to manage the human capital pool) and firm performance behaving the resource based view (RBV) approach in the firm. In this field, the mediating role of organizational culture is also taken into account (Bowen and Ostroff, 2004). However, the role of resource-based view has not received much attention. SHRM practices classification of this paper is a new development that makes it more convenient for the organizations to evaluate their practices. It elaborates that the non-financial measurements are as important as the financial ones in the process of evaluating firm performance.

Keywords: strategic human resource management (SHRM), resource-based view of firm, innovativeness, performance measurements, strategic human resource practices

Introduction

What makes a firm perform in the contemporary 21st century setting? Literature coined financial factors such as turnover (Mao and Gu, 2008; Chen, Liaw and Chen, 2001), profit, market share as well as ranking in the industry. Nonetheless, with the current evolutionary focus on technology renewal and new sources of growth, there is a critical inclination of firms to view innovativeness and competitiveness as pertinent factors to measure firm performance (Lee and Lee (2007), Darroch (2005); Sawang
and Unsworth, 2006). This study aims at exploring this issue.

The authors posit that both theories of Resource-based View (RBV) and Strategic Human Resource Management (SHRM) as the twin forces that stimulate firms' innovativeness and competitiveness. The investigation of strategic human resource management has shown that SHRM is not born with resource-based view of the firm (Dunford, Snell y Wright, 2001). It has been debated that the human resource function has consistently faced a battle in justifying its position in organizations (Drucker, 1954; Stewart, 1996). Therefore, the questions whether the resource-based view in a firm will justify the importance of SHRM implementation and whether the practice of SHRM will heightened if the human resource managers rationalize the role of human capital in firm performance remain unanswered.

When discussing human capital and firm performance, the resource-based view presents an influential framework for understanding strategic management. Sustained competitive advantage derived from the resources and capabilities a firm controls that are valuable, rare, imperfectly imitable, and not substitutable. These resources and capabilities can be viewed as bundles of tangible and intangible assets, including firms' management skills, its organizational processes and routines alongside the information and knowledge it controls (Barney, 1991).

The emphasis on people as strategically important to a firm's success has contributed to the interaction and convergence of strategy and human resource management issues. Similarly, concepts such as knowledge (Argote and Ingram, 2000; Grant, 1996; Leibeskind, 1996), dynamic capability (Eisenhardt and Martin, 2000; Teece, Pisano and Schuen, 1997), learning organizations (Fiol and Lyles, 1985; Fisher and White, 2000), and leadership (Finkelstein and Hambrick, 1996; Norburn and Birley, 1988; Thomas, 1988), as sources of competitive advantage have captured attention toward the intersection of strategy and HR issues. Specifically, these models of SHRM assume that (a) different business strategies demand a different set of behaviors and attitudes from employees and (b) certain human resource policies produce a unique set of responses from employees.
Wright et al. (1994) distinguished between a firm’s human resources (i.e. the human capital pool) and human resource practices (those tools used to manage the human capital pool).

With its emphasis on internal firm resources as sources of sustained competitive advantage (SCA) (Barney, 2001), the popularity of RBV in the SHRM literature is no exception. There has been considerable debate over whether human resource practices can provide SCA. Individual human resource practices may be imitable but human resource systems and routines, which develop over time, may be unique to a particular firm and contribute to the creation of specific human capital skills.

Resource-based view of a firm has shifted the emphasis in the strategy literature away from external factors (such as industry position) toward internal firm resources as sources of competitive advantage (Hoskisson, Hitt, Wan and Yiu, 1999). Internally, the managers can maneuver more as the external elements are beyond their control. Growing acceptance of internal resources as sources of competitive advantage brought legitimacy to the assertion that people are strategically important to firm success. In this way, firms are currently more toward gaining or building those resources that sustain competitive advantage. Much of this literature focuses on the role of dynamic capabilities, that is, specific processes firms use to alter their resource base, as sources of competitive advantage (Eisenhardt and Martin, 2000). Prahalad and Hamel (1990) certainly popularized the core competency concept within the strategy literature. They stated that core competencies are the collective learning in the organization, especially how to coordinate diverse production skills and integrate multiple streams of technologies, and that they involve multi levels of people functions. For example, competencies or capabilities refer to organizational processes, engaged in by people, resulting in superior products, and generally these must endure over time as employees flow in, through and out of the firm. Numerous researchers within the strategy field have focused on firm competencies (e.g. King, Fowler and Zeithaml, 2001; Leonard-Barton, 1992 and 1995).
Extending the concept of resource-based view, strategists who embrace RBV point out that competitive advantage (via core competence) comes from aligning skills, motives, etc. with organizational systems, structures, and processes (Hamel and Prahalad, 1994; Peteraf, 1993; Teece, Pisano and Shuen, 1997). This synchronization should achieve capabilities at the organizational level in order to sustain competitive advantage. In a broader sense, the RBV has influenced the field of human resource management (HRM) in two important ways. First, the RBV’s influence has been instrumental in establishing a macro perspective in the field of HRM research (Snell, 1991). This macro view has provided complimentary depth to a historically micro discipline rooted in psychology. A second major contribution of the RBV is the theoretical and contextual grounding that it has provided to a field that has often been criticized for being theoretical and excessively applied in nature (Snell, 1991).

In the field of RBV, two developments that have not been easily predicted have emerged over the past ten years. First, the popularity of the RBV within the SHRM literature as a foundation for both theoretical and empirical examinations has probably far surpassed what anyone expected (McMahan, Virick and Wright, 1999). Second, the applications and implications of the RBV within the strategy literature have led to an increasing convergence between the fields of strategic management and SHRM (Snell, Shadur and Wright, 2001). This study hopes to further contribute. We intend to investigate RBV relationship with firm innovativeness, as a non-financial measurement to evaluate firm performance. This role of RBV has been supported in previous studies to provide the creativity and ambiguity for the intangible resources of a firm (Colbert, 2004). In the similar stream, Penrose (1959, p.85) mentions about the resources capability in bringing a firm to competitive edge and makes it more innovative and that: “the availability of unused productive services within it creates the productive opportunity of a given firm. Unused productive services are, for the enterprising firm, at the same time a challenge to innovate, an incentive to expand, and a source of competitive advantage”.
The purpose of this paper is to study the SHRM practices in relation to firm performance. In this study develops a framework by which the RBV is treated as a mediator. It also elaborates on innovativeness as one of the non-financial measurements for measuring firm performance.

Literature Review on RBV

Value of resources, Penrose (1959) argues that firms can create economic value not due to mere possession of resources, but due to effective and innovative management of resources. He also mentioned that there was a causal links between resources and the generation of productive opportunities for growth and innovation.

Later on the resource-based view of the firm was coined by Birger Wernerfelt in 1984 and a hint of the richness that lays in this approach is evident in his description of the article as a "first cut at a huge can of worms" (Wernerfelt 1984). Empirical research examining performance found differences, not only between firms in the same industry (Cubbin 1988; Hansen and Wernerfelt 1989) but also within the narrower confines of strategic groups within industries (Cool and Schendel 1988; Lewis and Thomas 1990). This resulted in increased interest in firm-specific variables and the number of contributions claiming to adopt a "resource-based perspective" mushroomed.

RBV then became firmly grounded in early economic models of monopolistic competition (Chamberlin, 1933) and its focus on firm heterogeneity departs from neo-classical microeconomics and Bain/Mason industrial organization, which characterize the behavior of the representative firm (Hill and Deeds 1996).

In the development of resource-based view, Barney (1991) proposed that advantage-creating resources must meet four conditions, namely, value, rareness, inimitability and non-substitutability. Grant (1991) argues that levels of durability, transparency, transferability and replicability are important determinants. They must meet five criteria namely inimitability, durability, appropriability,
The Relation of Strategic Human Resource Practices with Firm Performance

substitutability and competitive superiority (Collis and Montgomery, 1995). Amit and Schoemaker (1993) went even further, producing a list of eight criteria including complementarily, scarcity, low tradability, inimitability, limited substitutability, appropriability, durability and overlap with strategic industry factors. In the interests of parsimony, these various conditions and characteristics are considered under the headings of value, barriers to duplication and appropriability. Therefore, for a resource to be a potential source of competitive advantage, it must be valuable or enable the creation of value. RBV has become by far, the theory most often used within SHRM, both in the development of theory and the rationale for empirical research (McMahan, Virick and Wright, 1999).

Wright et al. (1994) distinguished between the firm’s human resources (i.e., the human capital pool) and HR practices (those HR tools used to manage the human capital pool). They mentioned that the organization should not merely focus on the uniqueness of their HR practices because as much as unique they are, they can be copied by other organizations. They have to focus on the motivation of their human capital and effectively manage them. This is the situation, which the companies are now facing, and their effort is more toward the innovativeness.

Lado and Wilson (1994) also mentioned that a firm’s HR practices could provide a source of sustainable competitive advantage. Coming from the perspective of exploring the role of HR in influencing the competencies of the firm, they suggested that HR systems (as opposed to individual practices) could be unique, causally ambiguous and synergistic in how they enhance firm competencies, and thus could be inimitable.

The RBV’s influence has been instrumental in establishing a macro perspective in the field of HRM research (Snell et al, in press). The current paper contributes to the literature by using RBV as a mediating process in this relationship.

Early Development of SHRM Practices

Human resource practices (HR practices) are the primary means by which firms can influence and shape the
skills, attitudes, and behavior of individuals to do their work and thus achieve organizational goals (Collins and Clark, 2003; Martinsons, 1995). Previous literature have paid attentions to the link of HR practices and organizational outcomes such as productivity, flexibility, and financial performance (e.g. MacDuffie, 1995; Ichniowski, 1997; Youndt et al., 1996; Delery and Doty, 1996; Pfeffer, 1998; Mendelson and Pillai, 1999; Collins and Clark, 2003). Yet, the understanding needs to be extended to encompass innovation performance (Laursen and Foss, 2003). In the recent trend, Chen and Huang (2009) have focused on the SHRM practices and firm’s innovation performance by considering the mediating role of knowledge management (KM) capacity. Accordingly, strategic HR practices can be conducive to innovative activities because strategic HR practices may allow firms to discover and utilize knowledge and expertise in the organization (Scarborough, 2003).

Owing to the increasing importance of HR practices to the competitive advantages of firms in the rapidly changing knowledge-based economy, some scholars have paid attentions to examine the determinants on the adoption of HR practices (e.g. Tannenbaum and Dupuree-Bruno, 1994) and their effects on organizational outcomes, such as productivity and efficiency (e.g. MacDuffie, 1995; Ichniowski, 1997; Youndt, 1996) as well as financial performance (e.g. Delery and Doty, 1996; Pfeffer, 1998; Mendelson and Pillai, 1999; Collins and Clark, 2003). Some other scholars such as Tannenbaum and Dupuree-Bruno (1994) explore the relationships between organizational and environmental factors and the use of “innovative human resource practices”.

In the debate of relation of SHRM practices and firm’s performance, Youndt et al. (1996) indicate that an HR practices system is directly related to multiple dimensions of operational performance. Subsequent analysis reveals that manufacturing strategies moderate this main effect. In addition, Collins and Clark (2003) explore the black box between “strategic human resource practices”, which include training, performance assessment, rewards, and firm performance from a field study with seventy-three high-tech firms. Even though prior research has paid attentions to the
impacts of HR practices on organizational outcomes, few studies explore the impact of HR practices on knowledge management (e.g. Currie and Kerrin, 2003) and on innovation performance (e.g. Laursen and Foss, 2003). These prior research term HR practices differently, such as strategic human resource practices (e.g. Youndt et al., 1996; Collins and Clark, 2003; Currie and Kerrin, 2003; Collins and Clark, 2003), innovative work or human resource practices (e.g. Tannenbaum and Dupuree-Bruno, 1994; MacDuffie, 1995; Ichniowski et al., 1997), new human resource practices (e.g. Laursen and Foss, 2003), and characteristics of information on organizations’ age (e.g. Mendelson and Pillai, 1999). The previous studies argue that strategic HR practices would play a critical role in affecting innovation performance (Chen and Huang, 2009).

In the process of developing innovative activities in firms, there is this necessity of creative employees who are flexible, risk taking, and tolerant of uncertainty and ambiguity (Madsen and Ulhoi, 2005). This is because they encounter relatively greater uncertainty and variability in the innovation process (Atuahene-Gima, 1996). Therefore, firms must use creative capabilities and innovative characteristics as hiring and selection criteria. Reasonably, this would lead their employees to develop diversity of ideas and commit to more innovation behaviors (Brockbank, 1999; Atuahene-Gima, 1996). Through effective staffing, employees become important sources of new ideas in the firm’s innovative process. With regard to training, it would facilitate employees’ exposure to variety of knowledge and openness to innovative ideas (Brockbank, 1999; Beatty and Schneider, 1997; Jaw and Liu, 2003).

In addition, innovation requires a high level of involvement and participation from employees (Damanpour, 1991; Hurley and Hult, 1998). Firms may elicit employees’ involvement and participation by granting them to solve problems and to participate in decision-making that affects their work (Damanpour, 1991; Glynn, 1996). A high level of participation would create the conditions to encourage employees to bring new ideas and exchange knowledge in the ongoing innovation process and, in turn, enhance innovative outcomes (Jiménez-Jiménez and Sanz-Valle, 2005; Tsai, 2002).
Performance appraisals and compensation are the primary strategic HR practices that firms can use to reinforce employees' behaviors and induce them to comply with organizational goals (Collins and Clark, 2003; Scarbrough, 2003). In terms of performance appraisal, if firms want to elicit desired behaviors from employees, they must provide feedback and incentives that reinforce the desired behaviors (Collins and Clark, 2003).

Drawing upon previous researches (e.g., Youndt et al., 1996; Collins and Clark, 2003; MacDuffie, 1995; Tannenbaum and Dupuree-Bruno, 1994), the current study adapts three aspects: 1) recruitment/selection, training, performance management as administrative, 2) strategic human resource practices and knowledge management, 3) leadership and change agent role of managers as instrumental SHRM practices. This classification is reviewed in the next section of the study.

Classification of SHRM Practices

There are different debates in the classification of SHRM practices. In this section the study investigates the important ones. In the universalistic perspective, (Pfeffer 1994-1995; Pfeffer and Veiga, 1999) a universal set of HRM best practices can be employed to attain and sustain competitive advantage. HR practices cannot by themselves be a source of sustained competitive advantage, as it is virtually impossible for HR practices to be rare, inimitable, and non-substitutable. SHRM authors who ascribe to the universalistic perspective advocate a best practice approach to SHRM and propose that some HR practices are always better than others and that all organizations should adopt these practices (Brockbank, 1995; Fitz-enz, 1997; Geringer, Frayne and Milliman, 2002; Hitt, Hoskisson, Harrison, and Summers, 1994; Huselid, 1995; Martin and Beaumont, 1998; Pfeffer, 1994, 1994b, 1995; Pfeffer and Veiga, 1999; Terpstra, 1994; Truss, 2001). In addition, the necessity of environment and mindset is necessary in the organization that RBV is capable of providing it.

Within the body of HR research, there is significant empirical evidence linking certain HR practices to firm
The Relation of Strategic Human Resource Practices with Firm Performance

performance and recent research suggests that bundles, or systems, of HR practices are more influential than individual practices working in isolation (Arthur, 1994; Huselid, 1995; MacDuffie, 1995; Youndt et al., 1996). Arthur (1994) found that HR practices that focused on enhancing employee commitment (e.g., decentralized decision making, comprehensive training, salaried compensation, employee participation) were related to higher performance. In a similar study, Huselid (1995) found that investments in HR activities such as incentive compensation, selective staffing techniques, and employee participation, developed employee skills and motivation resulted in reduced turnover, increased productivity, and increased firm performance (Youndt, 1996). Further empirical studies support the links between HR practices and firm performance (Boselie, Paauwe, and Jansen, 2001; Boxall and Steeneveld, 1999; Fey, Bjorkman, and Pavlovskaya, 2000; Gratton, Hope-Hailey, Stiles, and Truss, 1999; Huang, 2000; Huselid, Jackson, and Schuler, 1997; Richard and Johnson, 2001; Sanz-Valle, 1999; Truss, 2001).

Following the previous studies mentioned in this section, we classify SHRM practices as both instrumental and administrative. Instrumental practices are those that can lead the organization to achieve strategic vision and mission (Lado and Wilson, 1994). We include knowledge management, leadership and change agent role of the managers. The administrative SHRM practices are the tools to achieve SHRM implementation. We focus on recruitment/selection, training, performance and rewards management.

Financial vs. Non-financial Measurement of Business Performance

The goal of performance measurement system is to evaluate whether the allocation of the resources has been in line to achieve the organizational strategic goals. As a response to increasing competition and the changing operating environment, firms extend the range of performance dimensions monitored. For instance, a recent
study on Italian manufacturing firms (Cinquini, Collini, Marelli and Quagli, 1999) evidences an increasing interest in the use of instruments (other than those related to cost accounting) based on a wider set of performance measures, including non-financial ones (Cinquini, Giannetti, and Tenucci, 2008).

Competitive strategy of firms’ human capital has significant effects on their financial performance. Additionally, market performance is positively influenced by HRM flexibility and negatively influenced by HRM control (Wright, 1998; Kaplan and Norton, 1996). Way and Johnson (2005) proposed a different framework for examining the impact of SHRM. They asserted that organizational outcomes are a product of the interaction between the actual behaviors of human resources (HR outcomes) and the other functional resources and inputs deployed and used by the organization.

While financial accounting is suited to the tracking of physical assets such as manufacturing equipment and inventory, it is less capable of providing useful reports in environments with a large intangible asset base. As intangible assets constitute an ever-increasing proportion of a company’s market value, there is an increase in the need for measures that better report such assets as loyal customers, proprietary, processes and high-skilled staff (Net MBA, 2002-2007).

In the non-financial aspect, the approach has been more toward using the balanced score card, rather than other items that are more vital for the organizations (Ittner and Larcker, 2003). In investigating the effect of SHRM practices, the great plethora of interest goes back to the financial one. There is a shortcoming in the non-financial measurement (Ittner and Larcker, 2003). However, over the past two decades, a great deal of attention has been paid to the development and use of non-financial measure of performance, which can be used to both motivate and report on the performance of business (Otley, 2003).

Via this paper, we posit the use of non-financial performance by which managers can generate mindful forecasts of the business’s progress in advance of financial decisions and investment allocation. Employees can receive better information on the specific actions needed to achieve strategic objectives. Investors can also have a better sense of
the company’s overall performance, since non-financial indicators usually reflect realms of intangible values, such as research and development productivity, that accounting rules refuse to recognize as assets.

**Mediating Effect of RBV**

Proactive corporate environmental strategies that go beyond regulatory compliance have a positive effect on firm performance when mediated by valuable organizational capabilities (Galdeano-Gomez et al., 2008; Russo and Fouts, 1997; Sharma and Vredenburg, 1998; Wagner, 2005). Moreover, Judge and Elenkov (2005) indicate that the higher the organization’s capacity for change, the more likely its environmental performance is to be high. Therefore, we propose to use firm resources as a mediator variable. A proactive attitude on the part of the firm towards the natural environment will probably favor the development of new resources and capabilities, which may in turn help to achieve competitive advantages (Russo and Fouts, 1997).

Galdeano-Gomez et al. (2008) and Sharma and Vredenburg (1998) studied the mediating role of the resource based view in the relationship between environmental protection (proactive environmental management and environmental performance) and competitive advantage. They found that investment in proactive pollution practices and environmental performance improvement contributes to the development of valuable capabilities, which increase the competitiveness of the firm.

Moreover, Judge and Elenkov (2005) indicate that the higher the organization’s capacity for change, the more likely its environmental performance is to be high. Another study proposes the use of firm resources as a mediator variable. It has proposed to consider firm resources and competitive advantages as mediator variables between proactive environmental management and financial performance (Lopez, Molina and Claver, 2009). In this relationship, firm resources should be considered as a mediator variable (Aragón-Correa and Sharma (2003); Christmann (2000), Sharma and Vredenburg (1998) and Wagner (2005) identify the importance of developing superior firm resources based
on the firm’s relationship with the natural environment as a source of competitive advantage. Therefore, recent research findings indicate that an increased financial investment in advanced technologies or innovation is, in itself, not sufficient.

Approach Toward Innovation

Innovation is vital for long–term growth and performance of organizations. As markets become increasingly globalized and competitive and the pace of technological change grows, organizations have to compete not only in terms of quality and cost, but also in terms of time-to-market and innovativeness of their products (Dougherty and Hardy, 1996; Mavondo, Chimhanzi and Stewart, 2005). Top management attention was formerly directed toward cost reduction, delivery time reduction and quality in order to become and remain competitive on the market. By extension, new criteria are emerging to successfully face competitors. One of those is innovation. The ability of companies to meet consumer expectations depends deeply on their ability to innovate and deliver new products at competitive prices. Innovation is a key driver to achieve sustainable competitive advantages and, more particularly, becomes one of the key challenges for small and medium enterprises (SMEs) (O’Regan et al., 2006).

In their review of relevant literatures, de Leede and Looise (2005), found that most approaches to innovation and its management in an organizational setting entail an important role for HRM. Further, while there has been a significant amount of attention directed by innovation management scholars to such issues (e.g. human resource development, rewards, career management and team building), HRM researchers have tended to ignore innovation, particularly at the project level. Top executives in business organizations are aware of that. In a recent survey (Manso, 2007), approximately seventy eight percent of the 540 CEOs interviewed said that刺激uating innovation, creativity, and enabling entrepreneurship is a top priority of their organizations to gain the competitive advantage for their businesses.
Motivating innovation remains, however, a challenge for most organizations. The difficulty arises because innovation results from the exploration of new untested approaches that are likely to fail. Thus, standard pay–for–performance schemes that punish failures with low wages and termination may have adverse effects on innovation. However, some disciplines can be applied by the organization. For instance, excessive continuation may be optimal to motivate innovation since the threat of termination may prevent the agent from exploring new untested approaches. Finally, commitment to a long–term compensation plan and timely feedback on performance are also essential ingredients to motivate innovation. Empirical research in economics has found a great deal of evidence supporting the thesis that people work harder and are more productive when they are paid for performance (Prendergast, 1999). Restricting the use of incentives may thus have adverse effects on innovation (Manso, 2007).

In this regard, innovation needs accurate measurement. Authors such as Miller and Friesen (1983), Capon et al. (1992), Avlonitis et al. (1994), Guimaraes and Langley (1994), Subramanian and Nilakanta (1996), Hurley and Hult (1998), Lyon et al. (2000) and North and Smallbone (2000), address the concern of measuring organizational innovativeness effectively. Additionally, a prime interest in the existing literature is to investigate innovation activities and their associations, where adoption of one or more innovations is examined as the dependent variable and linked to attributes of the organization, the individual respondent, and the innovation itself (Gallivan, 2001). One important reason of the substantial research in innovation is the presence of valid and reliable measures of key innovation characteristics, such as radical, incremental, or disruptive innovation (Cheng and Shiu, 2008). Table 1 shows the evolution of innovation metrics.
Table 1. Evolution of innovation metrics by generation (Example)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1st Generation Input Indicators (1950-60s)</th>
<th>2nd Generation output Indicators(1970-80s)</th>
<th>3rd Generation Innovation Indicators(1900)</th>
<th>4th Generation Process Indicators (2000+emerging focus)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>R&amp;D expenditures</td>
<td>Patents</td>
<td>Innovation surveys</td>
<td>Knowledge</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S&amp;T Personnel</td>
<td>Publications</td>
<td>Indexing</td>
<td>Intangibles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capital</td>
<td>Products</td>
<td>Benchmarking innovation capacity</td>
<td>Networks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tech intensity</td>
<td>Quality Change</td>
<td>Demand</td>
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<td>Source: Vonortas National Innovation Initiative 21st Century Innovation Working Group Chair, Nicholas M. Donofrio IBM Corporation</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

As it shows, the first generation (1950s-60s) of metrics reflected a linear conception of innovation focusing on inputs such as R&D investment, education expenditure, capital expenditure, research personnel, university graduates, technological intensity, and the like. The second generation complemented input indicators by accounting for the intermediate outputs of science and technology (S&T) activities. Typical examples include patent counts, scientific publications, counts of new products and processes, high-tech trade (Milbergs and Vonortas, 2004).

The third generation is focused on a richer set of innovation indicators and indexes based on surveys and integration of publicly available data. The primary focus is on benchmarking and rank ordering a nation’s capacity to innovate. A main difficulty now is the validity of international data comparisons and incorporating service sector innovations (where the process is the product) into the surveys. Relevant fourth generation metrics currently at an embryonic stage include: knowledge indicators. It accounts for the knowledge that underlies their creation and the ways it is developed and diffused (Milbergs and Vonortas, 2004).
Composite indicators that may include composite knowledge investment indicators and composite performance indicators, however, can only capture a multi-layered concept like knowledge. Networks are a striking feature of contemporary innovation is that hardly any organization can innovate alone. Most innovations involve a multitude of organizations. This is especially the case for the most knowledge-intensive, complex technologies. Networks are not just regional, but also national and global (Milbergs and Vonortas, 2004).

Conditions for innovation consist of economic demand, public policy environment, infrastructure conditions, social attitudes and cultural factors are critical for successful innovation. What is called for here is building systemic innovation metrics that capture the context in which organizations form and match expectations and capabilities to innovate. Hundreds of such indicators could be imagined, of course, but what is called for primarily are indicators that ‘intelligently’ (a) describe the main characteristics of the innovation system and its dynamics and (b) look forward in anticipation of likely broad developments (e.g., balanced scorecards, mapping of general purpose technologies, monitoring demand shifts and global innovation patterns, and technology option accounting).

In order to successfully innovate, a firm will combine different innovation activities. These innovative activities need to support the corporate strategies. Therefore, it has to be inserted in strategic decision-making. This innovative strategy has to combine different knowledge sources. To do so, firms typically are engaged in the trading of knowledge on the technology market and cooperate actively in R&D with other firms and research organizations. Most of the literature based on transaction costs concentrates on the choice between internal and external sourcing for individual transactions, as substitute modes for generating innovation (Williamson, 1985; Pisano, 1990). In response to competitive pressure, firms increasingly use R&D alliances to complement in house R&D efforts. As time passes, competition among firms turns on whether firms can create and commercialize knowledge in a timely and cost efficient manner. Although the availability of external technology may substitute for own research investment by receiver firms,
there are also arguments to stress the complementarily between in-house R&D and external know-how (Arora and Gambardella, 1994; Cockburn and Henderson, 1998; Granstrand et al., 1992). Own R&D activities allow the firm to better scan the environment for existing technology. Once a suitable technology is located, the firm with in-house R&D capabilities is better able to evaluate the technology. In terms of external sources, when the firm decides to buy the technology, its own R&D operations allow it to better integrate the technology because external knowledge sources do not automatically find their way into the firm’s innovation process.

The notion of ‘absorptive capacity’ introduced by Cohen and Levinthal (1989), and further developed by Kamien and Zang (2000), stresses the importance of a stock of prior knowledge to effectively absorb external know-how. At the same time, access to external know-how may leverage the productivity of the internal R&D activities, at least when the organization exhibits a willingness to take on external ideas (Veugelers, 1997). An important task in innovation management, therefore, is to optimally integrate internal and external knowledge within the firm’s innovation process, to be able to benefit from the positive effects each innovative activity has on the other. The resource-based view of the firm relates the profitability of the firm to resources of the firm that are exploited through the activities of the firm (Ghemawat and Pisano, 1999; Teece 1997). These resources are scarce and hard to replicate. The capability to manage a complex innovation strategy might be such a resource. The existence of such an innovation management capability actually provides an explanation for the observed complementarily between innovation activities because the combination of different innovation activities allows to better capitalize on this capability.

Any attempts to measure innovativeness have been ad hoc at best with the exception of Wang and Ahmed (2004). They conceptualize a multi-dimensional construct of innovation. Another study by Hult et. al. (2004) confirmed innovativeness as an important antecedent of business performance. The vast majority of researchers consider organizational innovativeness as a uni-dimensional subject (Wilson et al., 1999). Multi-dimensional measures are
certainly more consistent with a balanced organizational manifestation of innovation. The prevailing conclusion is that a market-oriented culture seems to underlie organizational innovativeness (Hult et al., 2004). The total trend toward measuring innovation has been to classify the innovation indicators into outputs of innovation and the inputs to the innovation process. Both output and input measures are useful for the different process of quantifying the overall extent of innovation. The key output of innovative activity is the success. The firm success can be proxied by profits, revenue growth, share performance, market capitalization or productivity among others indicators (Roger, 1998). The input measures can be investigated by: the level of R&D, intellectual property statistics, acquisition of technology from other expenditures (e.g., patents, licenses), on tolling up industrial engineering and manufacturing start up associated with new products/processes, intangible assets, marketing expenditure and managerial and organizational change. In similar line as Dobni (2008), Rejab, Guimaraes and Boly (2008), focused their study on measuring innovation best practices. Their study has shown that evaluation approaches help to clarify outstanding activities and allow accurate research for better innovation management practices to be pursued. Boly (2004) also illustrates that innovation processes practices are measurable only if they are expressed in terms of directly observable innovation measurement sub-practices.

The inability to manage these innovations and capture the improvement effectively also contributes to the wide competitive gap between the organizations and their competitors (Davis, 1989). Empirical evidence indicates that using a proper performance measurement system is critical to capture performance (Chiesa, P. Coughlan, 1996. Griffin and A. L.Page, 1993, M. Hudson, A. Smart, and M. Bourne, 2001. A. Verhaeghe and R. Kfir, 2002). In this way, innovativeness is referred as the non-financial measures met for the firm’s performance. The framework of the current paper studies the relationship of SHRM practices on innovativeness of a firm with mediating effect of resource based view. The framework investigates one of the non-financial items on the business performance, which is
innovativeness. It helps the organizations to evaluate their SHRM practices in two main categories: instrumental and administrative. As mentioned before in this paper, the instrumental practices include: knowledge management, leadership and change agent role of managers and administrative practices include recruitment/selection, training and performance management.

Figure 1: Conceptual framework on the relation of SHRM practices and firms performance (with mediating role of RBV)

Conclusion

This paper presents different debates on the relationship of SHRM practices and innovativeness in a firm, as one of the non-financial measure to evaluate firm performance. Basically, it studies the relationship of SHRM practices on the innovativeness of a firm by considering the mediating role of resource based view in a firm. In this evaluation, the financial and in-financial perspective have been taken into account and the study has come to this understanding that non-financial measurement plays important role in SHRM implementation in the firm. Based on the mentioned points we developed a framework to conceptualize the relationship of SHRM practices on innovativeness of a firm by considering the role of RBV as a mediator.
It is recommended that future studies work on the investigation of this framework in different industries. Firms could utilize this framework to develop their implementation of SHRM practices. They can explore and profile an effective set of SHRM practices that support to achieve the desired degree of innovativeness. In addition, the other non-financial measurement factors such as productivity and competitiveness can be used in the place of innovativeness.

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New Wine in Old Bottle: An Analysis of Community Forest Management in South India (Andhra Pradesh), Colonial and Post-colonial Period

V.M. Ravi Kumar, Babasaheb Bhimrao Ambedkar University, Lucknow

Abstract: Participatory approach in forest management emerged as most preferred policy option in most of the developing countries. Participation of communities in forest management has been perceived as panacea for reduction of poverty in forest based economies. In this backdrop, robust reform process by making community a centre for forest management programmes was initiated in India. After two decades of inception, community based forest management could not achieve envisaged results. This situation necessitated for serious revamp of existing policy formulations. In this context, a comparative analysis of community forest management (CFM) in colonial and post-colonial India is useful to trace the micro and macro level dynamics of the policy process. By examining CFM in colonial and post colonial Andhra Pradesh (AP), this paper proposes that community centered forest management in India had strong colonial legacy consequent upon which the policy initiatives could not delivered expected results.

Keywords: India, Development, Natural Resource Management, Forestry

Introduction

Participatory approach in forest management emerged as most preferred policy option in most of the developing countries. Participation of communities in forest management has been perceived as panacea for reduction of poverty in forest based economies. In this backdrop, robust reform process by making community a centre for forest management programmes was initiated in India. After two decades of inception, community based forest management could not achieve envisaged results. This situation

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necessitated for serious revamp of existing policy formulations. In this context, a comparative analysis of community forest management (CFM) in colonial and post-colonial India is useful to trace the micro and macro level dynamics of the policy process. By examining CFM in colonial and post colonial Andhra Pradesh (AP), this paper proposes that community centered forest management in India had strong colonial legacy consequent upon which the policy initiatives could not delivered expected results.

This paper is organised into four sections. First section narrates the approach, methodology, and a brief review of literature. A second section traces the historical roots of CFM in South India in general and AP region in particular. Third section deals with forest policy in independent India with particular reference to community centered forest management in AP. And final section proposes conclusion and summery of the article.

**Context of the Study**

The issue of poverty emerged as critical factor which posed serious threat to the legitimacy of nation states in the developing countries of Africa and Asia. India has been recognised as one of the fast growing economies of the globe along with China. The criticism on India’s development pattern is its concentration in urban areas. Rural poverty had become a critical imperative which forced nation states to initiate strategies to tackle poverty. In the hierarchy of rural poverty, forest dependent people stand at the bottom. Greatest poverty is experienced among the people in forest-based economies. It is estimated that 84% tribal population live in forested areas ((Sunderlin, e al, 2005). After 1990, robust reform process was initiated in forestry sector to evolve efficient governance by making people as partners. These schemes were known as joint forest or community forest management programmes. At present 27% of the national forest areas across 27 states are managed by 85,000 village committees (World Bank 2006). CFM initiatives were perceived by officials and civil society as
panacea for eradication of rural poverty in frost regions. After twenty years of implementation process of the schemes, envisaged results remained to be unachieved. This article proposes that the concept of CFM in the contemporary India had originated in British colonial rule in a particular context which is similar to that of neo-liberal policy paradigm which India had adopted. A comparative study of CMF in colonial and post colonial periods useful to understand not only the underlying policy dynamics of community forest policies in India but also changes in rural India broadly.

Methodology

For analysis of CFM in AP, comparative analysis of historical and contemporary periods employed in this article. This helps tracing the socio-economic and political dynamics of CFM in India. This also useful to have a long term trajectory of CFM which enable predict the direction of policy and incorporate necessary changes to make to more efficient. For documentation of CFM policy process in British colonial period, sources are mainly drawn from state archives of Tamil Nadu and Andhra Pradesh. These sources mainly provide details on correspondence of state bureaucracy, working plans and annual administrative reports of forest department. For study of CFM in the contemporary period, empirical observations are drawn from nine village forest protection committees scattered in different bio-physical regions of AP. The information from the field studies is collected in the form of focussed group discussions with different stake holders, records of village forest protection committees etc., (Table-I).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>District</th>
<th>VSS Villages</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Pandhirlodhhi</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Community Forest Management an Academic Discourse

Ascendancy of neoliberal economic policies initiated pervasive discourse of development wherein local communities are perceived as potential agencies to execute developmental projects. This discourse of developmentalism according to some studies a renovated version of colonial modernity articulated in the name of economic development (Prakesh 2000). The process of scaling down of state responsibility and enabling active citizen participation in development process is referred to as inclusive, participatory, sustainable development and decentralised development. Forestry sector was brought under a massive participatory policy package after 1990. This process is referred to as joint, community and participatory forest management. Initially Indian government claimed the community forestry as a shift in forest policy from state centric to peoples’ centric (Government of AP, 2002). Several academic and activists studies hailed this as most appropriate policy option for striking a judicious balance between livelihood requirement and conservation of forests (Mayers and Morison 2000).

After two decades of implementation process, community forestry could not achieve envisaged results. Several critical studies on different regions of Indian sub-continent highlighted the lukewarm performance of community forestry (Samata 2005, Kumar 2005, Reddy et al,)
These studies mainly highlighted two points: inability of CFM to generate tangible economic gains and failure to evolve efficient institutional structure for inclusive participation of all stakeholders of community. These studies perceive policy dynamics and socio-economic and political context as categories free from the burden of the past. It never means to say that historical dynamics of community forestry unaddressed in India. Some studies did attempt to analyze historical dynamics of CFM (Sunder, 1999, Sunder, et al 2001, Reddy et al, 2006). But these studies present a reductionist version on historical roots of CFM. The main argument proposed in these studies is that half-hearted policy initiatives on communal forests were initiated by colonial state in response to the peoples' struggle during national movement and the reform process in forest sector in independent India is an attempt to rectify the lacuna of colonial policy. However, an attempt has been done on comparative analysis of socio-political context of colonial and post colonial periods in Uttarakhand region (Agrwal 2006). But South India, wherein robust policy intervention was initiated in colonial and post-colonial periods has not yet been explored. This article addresses this gap.

The main hypothesis this study is that CFM in South India initiated by colonial state mainly due to two reasons: firstly maintenance costs of village commons exceeded the revenue derived from them after 1910; secondly, colonial state attempted introduce self governance in rural areas by the way of drawing village elite communities into local governance process which expected to provide legitimacy to the imperial government which was consistently troubled by emerging urban bourgeois and rural landed gentry. Cooperative society movement, water users associations, local educational bodies are some of the manifestations of this process. Similarly, communities popularly known as forest panchyats were created for management of forests. Forest communities in colonial period were products of colonial state’s attempt to strike a compromise between state revenue considerations and political demands of rural communities. The concept of deregulation in forestry was a global phenomenon in 1920s wherein community cantered
forest management was introduced in several countries of South Asia and Africa. In this process state power in the countryside was expected to be carried by local elite who were bestowed immense control over local resources. It means colonial modernity rediscovered and consolidated the rural inequalities by the way of drawing village elite into colonial political and economic process. It means that pattern and client relation in India not rooted in the pre-colonial past rather products of colonial rule.

In independent India if not the same but similar trend continued. Agrarian peasantry was drawn into political process and in fact most of the states in Indian union are ruled by chief ministers who project the image of countryside as helm of their governance. Colonial modernity which consolidated the inequalities on caste, class line in rural India are further crystallised in independent India in general and adoption of neo-liberal policies in particular. This article attempts to construct long term trajectory of community forest management spanning from pre-colonial, colonial and independent India.

Community Forest Management in Colonial South India

Some studies argue that pre-colonial period experienced a perfect balance between needs of people and regeneration capacity of forests (Guha, 1992, Murali 1995). These studies tried to create an image of merry India with happy village communities. These studies did not recognise class/caste dynamics and operation of power relations for accessing forests. In fact, studies on ecological history of India propose that caste system facilitated for adoption of sustainable resource utilisation patterns (Gadgil and 1992, Guha, 1994). Recent studies demonstrate that dominant class/caste control the forests and village commons in pre-colonial Andhra region (Talbot, 2005, Babu, 2005). Colonial state did not initiate any significant departure from pre-colonial practices and in fact, strengthen the control of dominant village communities control over forests and commons. Scientific forestry initiated by colonial state mainly aimed at timber supply for various infrastructural
projects but also generation of revenue. This led to unprecedented intervention of state apparatus in the customary dependency of forest dependent communities. However, to avoid confrontation with communities, colonial policy makers proposed for involvement of local communities in forest management. Dr. Brandis, father of Indian forestry commented on the need for involvement of local communities in the following quote:

Village forests are for the benefit of village communities or groups of villages, and to arrange for their protection and management by the community under the control of the State. Not only will these forests yield a permanent supply of wood and fodder to the people without any material expense to the State, but, if well managed, they will contribute much towards the healthy development of municipal institutions and of local self government (Brandis, 1994: 80)

Brandis’ reflection shows that involvement of communities in forest management is imperative for forest policy. But colonial policy makers did not properly understood the complexities of Indian social fabric which determines the access to resources. Consequently colonial imagination of community consists of village elite or dominant peasant communities who control entire village affairs. It was this elite community which was brought under colonial governance process as agents of its rule. The nexus between dominant agrarian communities and colonial rule has been brought by some studies (Stain, 1989, Ludden, 2005). But this investigation confined to agriculture and forestry yet to be explored. This article demonstrates the way forests and village commons went into the control of dominant peasant communities by the way of excluding the customary access of rural artisans, untouchables, and pastoralists.

The Madras Forest Act of 1882 was the first systematic forest legislation in South India. This act proposed provisions for formation of communal forests known as
village forests. The CMF was experimented under two names i.e., village forests and panchayat forests. While the former was experimented from 1915-1950 and later was implemented from 1885-1890. Systematic policy on village forests was pronounced in 1884 and implemented in the next year. Nilgiri was the first district to implemented village forests. Village forest is defined as 'the free supply to the indigenous villagers (Badagas, Kothas, Todas, Irulars and Kurumbers) of wood for building or agricultural purpose, fuel, grass, fruits and similar produce, as well as grazing for domestic cattle wherever possible. The uses of village forests will, as a rule, be enjoyed solely by the indigenous inhabitants of the village within such forests are situated'.

The following restrictions were imposed on the peoples' access in village forests.

1) Full-grown trees may be cut with the permission of the Monigar, after he had inspected and marked the trees.

2) No person shall graze or permit to be grazed in any village forests.

3) No person shall be allowed to cut more wood, or gather more fuel, grass, fruit, &c., than permitted for his domestic use;

4) Selling of any wood, fuel and grass, &c., gathered in a village is forbidden, except to persons entitled to cut or gather such wood, fuel, grass, &c., under these rules.

5) All disputes amongst villagers regarding the produce of village forests settled by the village punchayet consisting of the Monigar, Curram and three of the principal ryots of the village not concerned in the dispute or the matter in appeal.

The form of governance instituted for management of village forests shows the nature of communal forests created
by colonial state. The controlling authority was vested to local village chiefs, and three principle ryots, who invariably belong to dominant class/caste. Apart from Nelighiri, village forests experiment was also introduced in Cudapah and Kurnool districts. Village forests here were created under the rule 10 of the section 26 the Madras forest act. The village forests here consist of all unreserved lands of the village. The following regulations were proposed for management of village forests:

**Access to Forests without Permit**

- Grazing of cattle except goats
- Collecting and removing dead-wood, in head-loads only, as fuel
- Collecting and removing for manure leaves of 4th-class trees
- Collecting and removing thrones for fencing
- Taking the bark of creepers for fibre
- Collecting minor fruits.

Village forests experiment was continued only for five years. The reason claimed by the Madras government was that village forests became an obstacle for creation of reserved forests for scientific management of forests and grazing grounds. This measure was justified with the argument that ‘The idea of village forests must be altogether abandoned, that it is desirable to have the sources of fuel and fodder supply under the Government control and to have the reserves in fairly large locks’. The intention for appropriation of village commons was driven by handsome revenue derived on grazing. The following statistics on grazing revenue shows the reason why village forests were incorporated into reserved forests.

**Table: 2. Revenue on grazing fees from Reserve Forests in Madras Presidency**
### New Wine in Old Bottle: An Analysis of Community Forest Management in South India

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Revenue from Grazing (In rupees)</th>
<th>Total forest revenue</th>
<th>% of grazing share in total forest revenue</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1886-87</td>
<td>81,203</td>
<td>12,46,738</td>
<td>6.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1887-88</td>
<td>1,05811</td>
<td>13,74,920</td>
<td>7.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1888-89</td>
<td>1,29,855</td>
<td>15,15,006</td>
<td>8.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1889-90</td>
<td>1,43,845</td>
<td>15,57,627</td>
<td>9.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1890-91</td>
<td>92,621</td>
<td>17,95,408</td>
<td>5.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1891-92</td>
<td>1,15,794</td>
<td>16,94,215</td>
<td>6.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1892-93</td>
<td>1,75,589</td>
<td>15,77,212</td>
<td>11.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1893-94</td>
<td>2,66,891</td>
<td>19,43,75</td>
<td>13.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1894-95</td>
<td>3,28,293</td>
<td>N.A</td>
<td>N.A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1895-96</td>
<td>3,40,496</td>
<td>21,67,630</td>
<td>15.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1896-97</td>
<td>3,76,354</td>
<td>21,88,917</td>
<td>17.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1897-98</td>
<td>3,63,905</td>
<td>21,51,144</td>
<td>16.91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1898-99</td>
<td>3,76,354</td>
<td>20,75,254</td>
<td>18.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1899-00</td>
<td>4,89,765</td>
<td>23,13,507</td>
<td>21.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1900-01</td>
<td>5,10,451</td>
<td>24,43,773</td>
<td>20.88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1901-02</td>
<td>5,40,068</td>
<td>24,96,494</td>
<td>21.63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1902-03</td>
<td>5,78,500</td>
<td>25,92,779</td>
<td>22.31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1903-04</td>
<td>6,07,400</td>
<td>26,90,571</td>
<td>22.57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1904-05</td>
<td>6,27,474</td>
<td>28,30,542</td>
<td>22.61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1905-06</td>
<td>6,62,837</td>
<td>30,36,892</td>
<td>21.82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1906-07</td>
<td>6,78,537</td>
<td>34,50,733</td>
<td>19.66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1907-08</td>
<td>7,27,343</td>
<td>38,58,026</td>
<td>18.85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1908-09</td>
<td>7,82,510</td>
<td>38,86,296</td>
<td>20.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1909-00</td>
<td>7,69,770</td>
<td>41,84,633</td>
<td>18.39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1910-11</td>
<td>6,31,643</td>
<td>N.A</td>
<td>N.A</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source:** Compiled from Annual Administrative reports of Forest department for relevant years.
Extraction of revenue from grazing by the way of converting village commons into reserve forests became difficult after 1910 as people violated forest rules at will. In the context of national movement, violation of forest laws was perceived as expression of patriotism. However, the forms of resistance are differing from among different social groups. While dominant sections of peasants put forwarded an organized defence, small peasants, pastoralists, communities depends upon of forests as a main source of occupation and agricultural labour resorted to violation of forest rules. The following table shows the crime reported due to trespass into reserved forests.

**Forests: 3. Forest crime reported in Madras Presidency**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Number of cases</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Number of cases</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1885-86</td>
<td>2,269</td>
<td>1903-04</td>
<td>21,883</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1886-87</td>
<td>2,443</td>
<td>1904-05</td>
<td>21,930</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1887-88</td>
<td>3,358</td>
<td>1905-06</td>
<td>23,021</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1888-89</td>
<td>3,377</td>
<td>1906-07</td>
<td>23,141</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1889-90</td>
<td>3,088</td>
<td>1907-08</td>
<td>24,453</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1890-91</td>
<td>5,577</td>
<td>1908-09</td>
<td>25,470</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1891-92</td>
<td>8,124</td>
<td>1909-10</td>
<td>25,277</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1892-93</td>
<td>10,905</td>
<td>1910-11</td>
<td>26,489</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1893-94</td>
<td>10,007</td>
<td>1911-12</td>
<td>28,995</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1894-95</td>
<td>9,883</td>
<td>1912-13</td>
<td>29,892</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1895-96</td>
<td>9,610</td>
<td>1913-14</td>
<td>31,177</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1896-97</td>
<td>11,638</td>
<td>1914-15</td>
<td>32,541</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1877-98</td>
<td>14,993</td>
<td>1915-16</td>
<td>30,885</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1898-99</td>
<td>18,295</td>
<td>1916-17</td>
<td>28,087</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1899-00</td>
<td>20,450</td>
<td>1917-18</td>
<td>27,091</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1900-01</td>
<td>22,130</td>
<td>1918-19</td>
<td>26,160</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1901-02</td>
<td>23,750</td>
<td>1919-20</td>
<td>27,537</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1902-03</td>
<td>23,125</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Sources:** Compiled from the annual administrative reports of forest department of relevant years.
Demand for Communal Forests

Though there was no violence fight against forest policies, one could see a hectic resistance by all sections of the people in the countryside. While tribes, rural artisans and labour resorted to sporadic violation of forest rules dominant peasant communities put forwarded a systematic critique of forest policy and demanded for creation of communal forests. This alignment of dominant peasant community with the Indian National Congress and other political association provided a platform for them to negotiate with colonial state for communal forests.

The narratives of the dominant communities attempted to ascribe great antiquity to their customary rights over forests. Patttabhi Ramireddi complained that: ‘From the time of Adam and Eve we have been using the forests. I do not know why the Forest Department should come in and fix a fee’. Constant attempt was made to historicize their claims so as to force colonial state recognise their claims over village commons and grazing grounds. Naveen Reddy, who owns 200 acres of land, asserted that: ‘before reserves were constituted all lands were common lands’. Thus, dominant caste/class evolved the notion of communes around forests resources and advocated for creation of communal forests as remedy to grievances of people due to forest policies.

The native press emerged as an important agency and documented grievances due to forest policies. The editor of the Suedeshimitran, a Tamil newspaper, reported that prior to the implementation of forest policies plenty of forest and wastelands were attached to villages and the people enjoyed the access without restrictions. He suggested a viable remedy for problems due to forest policies in the following quote ‘the waste lands adjoining villages should be planted with trees and given to villagers who should be made
responsible for the cost of planting and maintaining trees on those lands, in return for their labour, the villagers should enjoy free of tax or on payment of an easy tax on the produce of these forests. They should be allowed to take timber from the forest and other products as well, in such quantity as they require but a penalty should be imposed on those who wantedly destroy the forests’.

The strong anti-colonial feelings in the countryside due to forest policies forced the political association to take a note of them. In 1885, the congress working committee appointed a commission to enquire into the grievances of agricultural population due to forest policies in Bombay. The Madras Mahajansabha and the Karala Mahajanasabha collaboratively conducted an enquiry into the operation of forests policies and demanded for relaxation of forest rules. Entry of political organizations into the struggle against forest policies resulted in emergence of new political discourse. This discourse articulated a systematic critique of forest policies and proposed for revival of native communal forest management. The district level associations also took up the issue of forest policies. In 1894 the Guntur District Association, adopted a resolution on protest against reservation of porombobokes in villages.

Venkatappaiah, leader of the Congress in Guntur district suggested two models of communal forests. Firstly forests/grazing grounds for each village and secondly allotment of forests/garaging for a group of village. Krishan Rao, joint secretary of the Nellore district congress proposed for revival of the Kancha system in which highest bidder acquires control over grazing grounds. For him, communal forests should be supervised by the intelligent ryots of villages as custodians. The reason he explains that ‘the poorer ryots did not actually take part in the Conference. Generally the intelligent part of the community and persons who have been in a position to understand these matters attended. There were poorer persons whose demands were not properly represented’. This shows the nature of political discourse on communal forests for mainly concerned the requirements of dominant sections of agrarian communities.
In the three agricultural conferences held from 1909-1911 resolutions were passed on forceful demand for communal forests under the supervision of village panchayats.

The lobby of dominant agricultural class persuaded colonial state to appoint a committee consists of two native officers to suggest remedy for grievances related to forests. This committee after extensive enquiry recommended for communal forests under the management of village panchayats. In the name of accepting the demands of the people colonial state undertook the process of creation of communal forests to trim down the administrative burden at one level and minimising the financial costs of managing degraded forests. This situation was coupled with the attempt of forest department to focus on commercial exploitation of timber. It was in this context that Madras government the policy of creating communal forests. Some of the important proposals of the committee on forest panchayats as follow:

**Duties of and powers of Panchayats**

1) To regulate the number of cattle to be grazed, prohibition of goats and management of grazing rotation.
2) To prevent the denudation of the grazing grounds and specially for collecting the grazing revenue.
3) To admit or exclude any cattle of their own village from the grazing grounds, or where limitations ordered, to decide what cattle are to be admitted. This will include the powers to exclude the cattle of any person who is found cutting or doing other harm to the forest without permission, or who fails to pay his share of the revenue or who refuses to obey the legitimate orders of the panchayats.
4) To impound cattle which graze without permission.

The recommendations of the Madras forest committee were implemented in some districts in 1914. But the
momentum of this policy picked up after the Retrenchment Committee dealing with the reorganization of forest department suggested for creation of ‘ryots forests’ in 1923. It was proposed that the forests required for every-day needs of agricultural population may be managed as communal forests. For management of ryots forests, the committee recommended for creation of panchayats (Boag, 1933: 61). Forest panchayats are defined as small committees consisting of 5-9 members elected by the general body of cattle owners in the village. These committees are entrusted with the responsibility of managing neighbouring forests and authorized to issue grazing permits, collection of tax and protection of forests. Forest panchayats were created after 1918 in districts such as Bellary, Guntur, Western Cuddapah, Cherlapali, Anantapur and Chittore. Special staff was created for general administration of forest panchayats in 1922. The forests brought under the management of forest panchayats were transferred to the land revenue department in 1st July 1924. By 1930s 3,303.78 square miles of forests were transferred to forest panchayats.

Election Process of Forest Panchayats

In 1931, the Madras government promulgated an order, which resembles the joint forest management adopted by the government of India. The election process of panchayats was conducted by a divisional officer personally or with the help of deputy thasildar. For selection of forest panchayats, a general body consisting of all villagers was created. The members of general body should possess a permit in reserved forests. All general body members elect management committee consist of 5-9 members. The following members are not allegeable to become forest panchayat:

1). Is not a British subject; 2). Is a female; 3). Having been a legal practitioner has been dismissed or is under suspension from practicing as such by order of any competent court; 4). Is of unsound mind; 5). Is under 25 years of age; 6). Is an insolvent; 7). Is a deaf-mute; 8). Is a leper; 9). Has been sentenced by a criminal court to transportation or to
imprisonment for a period of more than six months. The membership criteria of forest panachayat show the nature of forest panchayats. These are mainly created to meet the trim down the administrative burden of non-economical units and at the same incorporating the demands of dominant peasant sections who involved in national movement. Important stake holders of forests and grazing grounds such as women are excluded.

The everyday functional aspects of forest panchayats are difficult to tract, but we do have a general picture on the routine affairs. Mostly chronic degraded forests are allotted forest panchayats. The regeneration potential of these forests was less and at the same time forest officials did not take interest in their management. Forest panchayats were mainly controlled by dominant class/caste of village by excluding customary access of stake holders such as women, untouchables, pastoralists and artisans. This is the reason why the crime rate related to breach of forest rule continued to exist even after introduction forest panchayats.

**Table: 4. Forest Crimes during the National Movement in the Madras Presidency**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Cases Reported during the year</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1920-21</td>
<td>23,947</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1921-22</td>
<td>29,040</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1922-23</td>
<td>32,874</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1923-24</td>
<td>31,706</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1924-25</td>
<td>32,164</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1925-26</td>
<td>30,224</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1926-27</td>
<td>25,321</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1927-28</td>
<td>25,976</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1928-29</td>
<td>*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1929-30</td>
<td>23,345</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
V.M. Ravi Kumar, Babasaheb Bhimrao Ambedkar University

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Number of Cattle</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1930-31</td>
<td>24,798</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1931-32</td>
<td>23,876</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1932-33</td>
<td>29,471</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1933-34</td>
<td>18,699</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1934-35</td>
<td>28,242</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1935-36</td>
<td>28,936</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Compiled from the Annual Administrative reports of Forest Department in the Madras Presidency and the Proceedings of Chief Conservator of Forests of relevant years. * Details are not available.

The main reason for the ill-functioning of forest panchayats according to Janardhana Rao, a forest officer was ‘The revenue officials neither had sufficient time to properly supervise the work of these panchayats nor could they enforce the adoption of the technical principle of forestry of these panchayats. Consequently, the forests suffered particularly from enormous illicit grazing especially by goats, over grazing by cattle and indiscriminate lopping of trees for manure leaf etc. Some of these panchayats exercised no control whatsoever either due to their inefficiency or due to factions among themselves.’ This deplorable state of forests allotted for panchayats forced the government to initiate a policy shift. The independent government transformed the control of panchayats forests to the forest department on 26th April 1948. Again village commons became part of forest department. Post colonial state attempted to justify the takeover of village commons with the programmes such as social forestry and waste land development wherein afforestation schemes are implemented. However, globalisation and adoption of new liberal policies brought back the policy debate on community forest management.

Community Forest Management in Independent Period
Serious confrontation between state forestry and people in independent India surfaced in mid-1980s. The Chipko movement is an organised reflection of peoples’ struggle for restoration of customary access to forests (Weber 1988, Rangan, 2000). The Apiko movement in Karnataka is a manifestation of local peoples’ attempt to resist the intervention of outsiders. Besides this the following factors necessitated a policy shift toward community centered forest management: gradual fall in income from forest sector; introduction of neo-liberal policies which scale down the role of the state in developmental projects; and emergence of regional political parties and aggressive populism which seek to create loyal local cadre in forest areas. PFM was introduced in AP as JFM in 1992 and converted the same as CFM in 2002. Under CFM, 5000 villages, spread over 14 districts and covering 13,79,862 hectares of forests were covered. It is funded by the World Bank with total outlay of Rs. 652 crores for the period of five years. The CFM targeted to benefit 55,000 families living in below poverty line (Andhra Pradesh Government 2002).

Table: 5: Major Policy dynamics of community forest management

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>JFM</th>
<th>CFM</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Management Committee</strong></td>
<td><strong>Management Committee</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1) Total members 10</td>
<td>1) Total members 15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2) Women membership 30%</td>
<td>2) Women membership more than 50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3) No specific number on presence of women in management committee.</td>
<td>3) 50% women should be represented in management committee.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4) Tenure two years</td>
<td>4) Tenure three years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5) Surparch and forest officials were members of MC committee.</td>
<td>5) Only elected members consist of MC committee.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Financial transactions</strong></td>
<td><strong>Financial transactions</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
1). One account called joint account was provided.

**Micro Plan Preparation**

Micro plans in JFM are prepared by MC and Range Officer.

**Role of FD**

FD played crucial role as a partner in guiding VSS in forest management

Forest advisory committee existed in village level

**Usufruct Rights**

NTFPs were divided into reserved and unreserved, and communities have rights only on selected items. Initially share was 50% to FD and 50% to VSS, on forest products excluding the NRFP items for GCC (Girijan Cooperative Corporation) monopoly.

---

1). Dual account system i.e. joint account and VSS account were created.

**Micro Plain Preparation**

In CFM micro plains are prepared by MC and in consultation with VSS members and NOG. No official interference was sought.

**Role of FD**

FD is a facilitator and technical adviser

Forest advisory committee from village to state level, elaborative advisory committee, were mentioned

**Usufruct Rights**

All NTFPs, (100%) and 100% incremental volume of timber.

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**Sources:** Government of Andhra Pradesh Orders issued from 1992 to 2004.

**Implementation Process of PFM**
Conceptually joint or community forest management is similar to that of forest panchyats introduced by the British in 1930s. However, at the policy level several innovative aspects were introduced to ensure the inclusive participation of all stakeholders of village. The implementation process of CFM in AP demonstrates the explicit continuation of colonial legacy in CFM which is dominated by village dominant class/caste by excluding majority of stakeholders in village.

**Election or Nomination**

The essential component of CFM is that open membership to all villagers in forest protection committee known as Vana Samrakshina Samiti. This is called general body (GB) which elects management committee (MC). But the process of electing executive body mostly not in democratic nature as envisaged by the policy. Rather it was nomination of village elites by forest officials. In all sample villages chairpersons/vice-chairpersons are from dominant families of village. The election of MC is mainly influenced by FD officials. This trend led to perpetual fight between village elite families, consequent upon which the functioning of FPC got effected.

PFM envisages ideal notion of community wherein all stakeholders are expected to involve in management of forests. But at ground level, FPCs became battle ground among dominant caste/class families in village (table-5).

**Table: 6. Conflicts for Management posts**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of the VSS</th>
<th>Name of the District</th>
<th>Is there any conflict</th>
<th>Nature of Conflict</th>
<th>Conflicts</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pandhirlodhhi</td>
<td>Adilabad</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Fight between</td>
<td>two rival</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Eight out of nine sample VSS have experienced conflicts for leadership in CFM (table 5). The reasons for these conflicts are financial gains, provision of wage employment and bringing infrastructure to village are not only perceived as a prestige symbol, but also became a means to patronize group members to enhance political status.

**Decision Making Process in VSS Management**

Decision-making process by GB/MC is an important aspect in institutionalization of PFM process. In the operational process of CFM, FD acquired immense power as it control the funding process of VSS. At the same time, PFM have different meaning to different people. While village elite...
wanted to maximise their financial benefits, majority members of GB want wage employment. Majority members of GB members did not involve in constructive activity in GB/MC decision making process. This led to prioritisation of FD and dominant class/caste families' choices in decision-making process in VSS management.

MC is executive body, elected for management of VSS. In all sample village chairpersons and FD dominated in decision-making process. MC meetings were often a close door affair for GB/MC members. In Visakhapatnam district, women members were sidelined from MC meetings. In Adilabad and Kadapa villages MC members unaware of MC meeting took place. One of the women members of MC in Kadapa district informed that she was not invited for MC meetings. In SR Palem of Kadapa, and Heerapur of Adilabad district, BC community members were not called for MC meetings.

Table: 7. Decision making pattern in Management Committee meetings

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ASPECTS/issues</th>
<th>CP/VCP</th>
<th>OTHER MC MEMBERS</th>
<th>WOMEN</th>
<th>FD</th>
<th>NGOS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 Species selection</td>
<td>√</td>
<td>√</td>
<td>√</td>
<td>√</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Identification of Works</td>
<td>√</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Nature of allocation of funds to works</td>
<td>√</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>√</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Harvesting sharing</td>
<td>√</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 Sharing forest products within VSS</td>
<td>√</td>
<td>√</td>
<td>√</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**V.M. Ravi Kumar, Babasaheb Bhimrao Ambedkar University**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>members</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>6 Selection of NFFP, value addition.</td>
<td>√</td>
<td></td>
<td>√</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 Marketing of harvesting products</td>
<td></td>
<td>√</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 Wage rates in VSS works</td>
<td>√</td>
<td>√</td>
<td>√</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 Imposition of fines</td>
<td>√</td>
<td>√</td>
<td>√</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 Estimating costs</td>
<td>√</td>
<td></td>
<td>√</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*CP=Chairperson, VCP= Vice-chairperson.

The decision-making process in MC is dominated by chairperson and FD (table 8). In important decisions like species selection, identification of works, allocation of funds for works was dominated by FD in MC meetings. Important stake holders such as women were not allowed to participate in decision-making process. Marketing of VSS harvesting products is dominated by FD and VSS chairperson. In most occasions, GB members are not informed of the revenue from forest products sold by MC. In Adilabad, MC members were not consulted at the time selling teak timber removed from VSS areas. Thus, the democratic space for wider participation of people in forest management was undermined.

**Conflicts within Communities**

Conflicts within the communities were mainly aroused due to competition for MC posts. But these conflicts are not of the nature of vertical patron-client link, but ‘conflict within an oligarchy’ (Sunder, et. al., 2000). In other words, conflicts took place mainly between dominant class/caste families within village. These communities are less dependent on forests so take little interests in forest management, but they compete to control MC due to money
involved in the scheme. In CFP implementation process medium and large farmers have been major beneficiaries (Khare, et. al., 2000; 36). This led to conflicts between MC and other stake holders of GB (Table-9). However, in all sample villages, different forms of conflicts emerged.

**Table. 8. Nature of Conflicts within village**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of the VSS</th>
<th>Name of the District</th>
<th>Is there any conflict</th>
<th>Nature of Conflicts</th>
<th>Consequence of it</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pandhirlodhhi</td>
<td>Adilabad</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>****</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heerapur</td>
<td></td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Between BC and ST regarding positions in MC committee</td>
<td>STs don’t abide MC rules and send cattle and get forest predicts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sainagar Thanda</td>
<td></td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Case booked against some MC members for killing wild animals</td>
<td>For one year VSS works are halted</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ramachandrapuram</td>
<td>Kadapa</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Chaperon post is dominated by single family</td>
<td>Some families did not participate in VSS management process</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sri Rangaraju Palem</td>
<td></td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Caste conflicts between BCs and STs over MC positions</td>
<td>BC send goats and cut longs and fuel wood from VSS area</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mudireddy Palley</td>
<td></td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Sub-caste conflicts within</td>
<td>One section of sub-caste remove trees</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Inter-village Conflicts

Implementation of FPM created rigid forest boundaries to be managed by FPC. Before PFM, the boundaries of forests were not defined and generally accessed by members of several villages. Creation of usufruct rights to villagers over neighbouring forests led to continuous conflicts among villages.

Table 9. Nature of Inter Village Conflicts

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of the VSS</th>
<th>Name of the District</th>
<th>Is there any conflict</th>
<th>Nature of Conflicts</th>
<th>Consequence of it</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pandhirlodhhi</td>
<td>Adilabad</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Neighbouring villagers send goats and cattle</td>
<td>In spite of vigilance, goats of neighbouring village enter into VSS area and destroy young plants and other trees.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heerapur</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Neighbouring villagers send goats and cattle</td>
<td>Neighbouring villagers forcefully enter for collection of</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**New Wine in Old Bottle: An Analysis of Community Forest Management in South India**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>District</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Action Description</th>
<th>Outcome Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ramachandrapuram</td>
<td>Kadapa</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Neighbouring villagers collect dead and green wood</td>
<td>Qural</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sri Rangaraju Palem</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Neighbouring villagers collect dead and green wood</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mudireddy Palley</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Upper caste neighbors send cattle to VSS areas</td>
<td>Upper caste send cattle to VSS area, resulted in destruction of young Usiri and destruction of trees for leaves for goats</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sobhakota</td>
<td>Visakhapatnam</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Neighbouring villagers enter into VSS area and collect NTFPs</td>
<td>At the time of collection of plate leaves and broom grass villagers frequently enter in conflicts with neighbouring villagers, resulted in loss of valuable NTFPs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gudlamveedi</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nandivalasa</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Neighbouring villagers often taken NTFPs</td>
<td>Due to constant entry of neighbouring villagers, NTFPs availability became scare.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Out of nine VSSs, five VSSs had frequent problems with
neighbouring villagers (table 10). Though CFM demarcated forest landscape for each village, particularly during agricultural lean season, MCs found it difficult to control neighbouring villagers’ entry into forest areas allotted for VSS management. At the same time, FD does not take any concrete step to mitigate this problem due to fear of conflicts. Consequently, CFM remained as wage employment scheme wherein villagers involved in forest management when fund arrives and rest of time they do not take interests as forests could not yield any tangible financial returns.

**Decision Making Process in Shedule Caste Village**

Social stratification plays an important role in determining outcomes of developmental scheme. Stratification within communities in terms of caste, class, and majority and minority had perceptible impact on decision making process in management of forests. Murriddey Pelly SC colony in Kadapa district represents conflicts among sub-castes of Scheduled Caste (SC) community at one level and conflicts between SC and upper castes of neighbour village. Sub caste within SCs consists of Madigas and Malas fought for chairperson post. The demand for categorisation within SC community on the one hand and the upper caste domination in VSS management affairs on the other undermined the performance of PFM. Madiga community is numerically larger and economically and socially backward and Mala community is numerically smaller but economically advanced and socially vibrant. The Malas occupied chairperson posts with the help of FD and local politicians. Important decision related to VSS management such as selection of species, conservation works to be undertaken in VSS are taken by chairperson a women belong to Mala caste. In fact Madiga caste people were not only prevented from VSS wage works but also prohibited from raring goats and collection of forest products which are important sources of livelihoods. With regard to upper caste domination, even after formation of VSS Reddy caste send cattle, collect wood and other forest products. Due to these conflicts, VSS conservation works derailed and poorest among SC community, women, and old people who
live by selling minor forest products became victims of the scheme (Fig. 3).

**Fig.1. Decision making process and social exclusion in SC village**

Exclusion in Multi Caste Village

Heeraur village in Adilabad district represent caste conflicts within community. Social groups belong to backward caste and schedule tribe involved in continuous fight to control VSS management. In this village BC population constitutes 68% population and rest of the population belongs to ST community. As a result most of the membership and important positions in MC like chairperson and vice chairperson are captured by BC social groups by virtue of majority. BCs are economically advanced and possessed land as assets and do not depend upon for forest for survival. They wanted to convert the forest land allocated for management of VSS into mono plantation mainly of teak as it gives handsome income in the long run. STs opposed this measure as their dependency on forests would be restricted if forest were converted into mono plantations. However in spite of this opposition, VSS MC dominated by BCs opted for teak plantation. Hence, tribes’ dependency on forests for broom stick, dry wood, tendu leave, muhva flower and wild fruits severely affected by restrictions. In fact many old
women deepened upon minor forest products lot lost livelihoods potions. In the absence of possession agriculture land tribes were severely affected excluded from livelihood dependency and governance.

**Figure. No:2  Process of conflict multi caste village**

Exclusion of Women

Discourse on eco-femininism proposes for the involvement of women in PFM because of their everyday proximity to forests (Shiva, 1988). Community forest management in colonial India did not provide any provision of involvement of women. Community forest management in independent India envisages active participation of women. CFM policy proposed 50% membership for women in GB/MC. Besides either VSS chairperson or vice-chairperson post is reserved for women. In spite of this mechanism for women empowerment in CFM, women, and mostly poor vulnerable women are excluded from the process of PFM scheme.

Though the CFM rules ensure the membership for women in GB/MC, women participation in VSS activities was undermined by three factors: first FD staff exclusively
consist of men dominate women chairpersons and on the other, women members could not interact with FD staff due to social inhibitions; second is lack of information on GB/MC meetings and VSS works. Most of the times women do not participate in meetings of VSS, if they participate remain to be passive participants. For instance, a women member from Mudireddy Pally SC colony felt that “we hardly know when the management committee meetings take place. In fact, many members of the management committee do not know what decisions were taken in meetings. Forest officials and NGO members come to village and talk to Chairperson and launch the works. We are informed about VSS works only after the decision was taken”.

In tribal village of Visakapatnam district, it is evident that women in MC do not participate and unaware of any decision being taken by MC. The egalitarian ethics of tribes are fading due to development interventions such as CFM. The customary dependency of women on forests was restricted by VSS conservation works. At the same time, the wage employment that was promised of was not fulfilled by the government. Consequently women always attempted to breach the rules of VSS and resorted to everyday form of resistance against VSS management.

Conclusion

Comparative analysis of CFM in colonial and post colonial periods show the context in which CFM is introduced. CFM in India is a product of circumstance wherein state delegated the economically non-viable forests for the management of local communities. This process is articulated as state benevolence in colonial period and empowerment of forest dependent communities in post colonial India. No better substitute for involvement of communities in forest management exists, but both colonial and post-colonial state regimes could not create congenial circumstances for inclusive participation of all stakeholders in forest management. CFM is primarily a temporary policy adjustment invoked by the state as factor of legitimacy in
response to the crisis in socio-economic and political fabric of society. The essential factors for success of CFM such as tenure security, training and capacity building for community, identification of customary stake holders and entrusting tenure security to them are not being paid adequate attentions. Consequently, CFM remained to be an unsuccessful development intervention in the series of interventions in forest sector in colonial and post colonial periods. This mainly due to the fact that benefits of CFM are enjoyed by dominant class/caste groups by excluding majority stake holders’ claims. The article with comparative analysis of CFM in colonial and post-colonial situation demonstrates this trend. The task before state and civil society at present is to initiate a systematic long terms policy framework instead of temporary policy adjustment.

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Coping with Uncertainty in Japanese Defense: Analytical Eclecticism, Nonlinearity, and the Lockwood Method as Approaches to Defense Policy Futures

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Abstract: This essay will examine how three overlooked methods/approaches—analytical eclecticism, the Lockwood Analytical Method for Prediction (LAMP), and nonlinear analysis—can contribute to re-seeing the trajectory of Japanese security politics. While these three research tools differ in their origins, each privileges the creation of a big picture gestalt of complex problems over the creation of parsimonious predictions. Given the complexity involved in understanding how external stimuli (nuclear missile tests, defense build-ups, rhetorical aggression) are processed through the filters of domestic policy, this essay argues that methods that contribute to a coarse graining of political analysis can augment conclusions from parsimonious approaches. After describing each of the approaches briefly, I will then demonstrate what insights these method/approaches can provide on the issue. Though current scholarship has effectively demonstrated how Japanese defense transformation purposely hedges among three different (but not mutually exclusive) policies of US alliance maintenance, military modernization, and regional integration, forecasters of Japanese defense policy need to keep in mind the potential impact of focal events ranging from a financial meltdown, to US abandonment, to continued nuclear bullying by North Korea.

Keywords: Japanese defense policy; complexity analysis; Lockwood Analytical Method for Prediction; analytical eclecticism; nonlinearity; prediction

1 An earlier working draft of this paper appeared on the Lockwood Analytical Method for Prediction website: [http://www.lamp-method.org/3.html](http://www.lamp-method.org/3.html). I would like to thank Thomas Chambers for his feedback on this earlier draft. Some of the ideas in this paper were also explored in an essay currently under review at the Electronic Journal of Contemporary Japanese Studies, though the overlap between the two essays is minimal. I would also like to thank Lorna Simons for her help editing and proofreading this paper. Any mistakes and/or oversights are, of course, my own.
Introduction: Japan in the Complex World

The issue of complexity in international affairs is a problem that continues to attract scholarly attention both in International Relations (IR) and the field of security studies. To what extent should complex systems like states or regional security complexes be simplified to help analysts distinguish the important details from background “noise”? How can scholars and analysts draw meaningful distinctions between data that should be collected and analyzed and data that should be ignored? What analytical structures should be used to guide analysts and scholars in their investigations? As proponents of analytical eclecticism (Katzenstein and Okawara 2004; Katzenstein and Sil 2004; Carson and Suh 2004; Sil and Katzenstein 2005) argue, the traditions of parsimony and linearity greatly inhibit how analysts relate to their object of study. Kerbel’s (2004) insight that the commitment to linearity and parsimony is “unrecognized, deeply ingrained, and enduring” (paragraph 2) applies equally to both defense analysis and mainstream IR studies. In terms of academic literature, commitments to parsimony and established theoretical foundations have entrenched explanations in isolated conceptual paradigms, hindering comparison and synthesis with explanations in other traditions. In this vein Sato and Hirata (2008) contend that current dialogue on Japanese foreign policy is driven by “paradigm competition” and thus “many scholars talk past each other and engage only in mutually exclusive paradigm-based monologues” (3).

While it is true that the academic literature on Japanese foreign policy often fractures along thematic lines, with different theoretical perspectives often over-emphasizing the issues of power (in the case of realism), efficiency (in the case of liberalism), or identity (in the case of constructivism and some forms of liberalism) (Katzenstein and Sil 2004), recent explorations of Japanese defense politics have actually been fairly eclectic. Even when, for example, “reluctant realist” explanations focus on the socializing influence of rising Chinese capabilities and a belligerent North Korea (Green 2001, 2009; see also, Kliman 2006), they also acknowledge the moderating impact of domestic anti-militarism and regional history. When constructivist scholars
focus on the influence of the domestic security identity (Berger 1998; Oros 2008), they also nonetheless acknowledge the quandaries of the security dilemma in East Asia. The problem is that this eclecticism is often tacit—recognition of the many complex interactions that influence Japanese defense politics is often used as a backdrop for focusing on a narrower set of explanatory variables.

By using recent movements in both the field of academic IR and security studies that deal with complexity—particularly IR and security studies’s engagement with innovations in chaos theory—this essay will re-evaluate the issue of Japanese defense politics. The point of this exercise is to open up the subject of Japanese security politics in ways that demonstrate unacknowledged or under-acknowledged linkages, highlights new avenues for exploration, and also, appreciate our limitations for knowing the future. This essay will focus on three underutilized approaches to alternative analysis: analytical eclecticism, nonlinear analysis, and the Lockwood Analytical Method for Prediction (LAMP). Though each of these three literatures is distinct in its approach, they nonetheless share a common understanding of state and interstate behavior as a “chaotic system of systems” that requires creative heuristics to keep problems open to discovery.

As I will demonstrate, each of these three methodologies can help re-evaluate the complexity of Japanese security politics. Though analytical eclecticism has been criticized for being permissive, offering few defenses against bias, proponents have demonstrated the usefulness of this approach for denaturalizing assumptions and opening up new paths for inquiry. As Katzenstein and Sil argue, analytical eclecticism serves to bridge the gap between the social sciences and other sciences’ progress in the study of complexity (2004: 17). As proponents of analytical eclecticism argue, detaching, comparing, and synthesizing competing explanatory sketches is a pragmatic way of negotiating competing analytical claims in what are otherwise discrete research programs. LAMP, on the other hand, is a method for prediction largely utilized in the field of defense analysis. The method asks the analyst to consider all possible future choices from the perspective of the relevant actors (Lockwood and Lockwood 1993; Tanner 1996).
Though LAMP retains some commitment to "parsimony" in that its process guides the analyst toward a conclusion about which scenario is most likely to occur, it also shares the "crude look at the whole" (Czerwinski 1998; Kerbel 2004) aspect that nonlinear and analytically eclectic perspectives share. As Lockwood and Lockwood (1993) write, LAMP--with its emphasis on the autonomy of actors, free will, and the impact of nonlinearities, or focal events--is "probability theory's answer to "chaos theory"" (Lockwood and Lockwood 1993: 91-92). Even though the analyst chooses a most likely future, this conclusion never amounts to an instance of analytical closure; the analyst must come back to his/ her conclusion to account for new data and forecast indicators that point to possible focal events that would change the likelihood of all possible futures. In this way, the LAMP method opens up a crucial space for examining areas of ripeness, reinforcement, and resistance (Czerwinski 1998; Beyerchen 1992; Kerbel 2004) that may lead to unexpected results. Nonlinear approaches, on the other hand, often emphasize the benefit of forming a "fuzzy" or "blurry" big picture. Often the emphasis in this tool box approach is on coping with uncertainty in highly complex system (or systems of systems).

The essay will begin with a brief sketch of recent developments in Japanese security politics. It will then move on to explore each of the methods described above and their possible contributions for re-evaluating the future trajectory of policy. Finally, the essay will conclude by explaining some of the synergies that can be developed between these approaches for future alternative analyses of Japanese defense politics. As my preliminary results using these approaches show, perhaps it is best to think of Japan's defense future not as a single trajectory, but rather as at least three highly constrained trajectories being pursued by different domestic actors (bureaucratic, political, and ideological) in domestic politics. Understanding the future of these trajectories will mean also continuing to consider how focal events—conflict on the Korean peninsula, entanglement in US military operations, or prolonged economic decline, to name a few—impact the balance between domestic actors and their preferences.
A Brief Sketch of Japan’s Defense Politics

Currently, Japan is at an impasse regarding future defense transformation. On the one hand, the rising threats of a nuclear North Korea, an assertive China, and the fear of abandonment from the US creates a pull toward so-called military "normalization," often defined in terms of conventional rearmament and a more autonomous defense posture. As several authors note, the idea that Japan must increase military spending, reform its pacifist constitution, and rely less on the US bilateral security treaty has gained an increasingly ardent following, especially among policy elites in the right wing of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) (Envall 2008; Middlebrooks 2008) and to some extent the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ). On the other hand, the very current and reoccurring regional and domestic politics of Japan’s militarist past tend to push Japanese foreign policy toward a middle power path that emphasizes the country’s role as a civilian humanitarian power, framed as a continuation of its UN-centered diplomacy, regional order-building, and economic leadership through its official development assistance (ODA) (Soeya 2004, 2005). The domestic debate over the course of future defense policy takes place in the context of a domestic Japanese politics that privileges informal bargaining, consensus, and incremental change over decisive change.

Though a “low stance” on defense policy--defined as a combination of low defense expenditures and a reliance on US protection--has been a basic characteristic of Japanese foreign policy since the foundation of the Yoshida Doctrine, the trauma of the first Gulf War (when Japan was labeled a “pay check ally”) has spurred Japanese politicians to rethink basic issues of foreign policy. This activism has resulted in a host of new legislation allowing for a greater use of the JSDF overseas, stronger central control in the Prime Minister’s office during times of emergency, and de facto collective defense arrangements with US forces. In addition, Japan has dispatched forces with regularity for peacekeeping missions, has shown greater interoperability with US forces, and has embraced a military modernization program that includes Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD). This increased activism, however, has yet to overturn some of the most important
aspects of the Yoshida consensus: the limit on defense spending (pegged at one percent of GDP), the US bilateral security treaty, the three non-nuclear principles (not to possess, manufacture, or permit the introduction of nuclear weapons onto Japanese territory), and Article 9 of the constitution which denies Japan its sovereign right to wage war (see Stockwin 2008).

Among the political parties, policy orientation is divided: the LDP is united in its support for the US, but divided on how to deal with Asia; while the DPJ is united on its multilateralist agenda for Asia, but divided on the US alliance (Samuels 2007, 2007a). On another level, there is a fundamental disagreement about how much the US alliance should cost and whether it should consist of Japan becoming a “normal” nation (Samuels 2007: 127). In addition, several authors have noted resurgent and aggressive nationalist tendencies in the LDP—a tendency that could lead to a nascent Gaullist security policy (Enval 2008; Rapp 2004; Samuels 2007, 2007a). Given the right opportunity structure—a heightened threat from North Korea, a belligerent China, and/or a sense of abandonment by the US—this nascent Gaullism might become very potent. Though the Koizumi administration (2001-2006) was characterized by greater attention to issues of alliance maintenance and deteriorating relations with China, since that time Japanese politics has become more unstable. Relations with China have improved gradually, but relations with the US have become more unstable, punctuated by the issue of the Futenma airbase on Okinawa.

The rise of the DPJ as a ruling power has created even more uncertainty. Though the early rhetoric of the DPJ focused on the creation of an East Asian community and a more “equal” and “independent” partnership with the US (including the prospect of re-evaluating Host Nation Support and the Status of Force Agreement), Prime Minister Hatoyama Yukio’s bungling of the Futenma airbase issue and the loss of DPJ power in the upper house during the summer of 2010 elections means that at least for the moment, politicians are wary of taking bold risks on defense issues, especially with regards to the US alliance. In the face of a continuous economic decline the utility of the US alliance (and the extended deterrence it offers) as a method
of “cheap riding” has become even more essential. Both the US and Japan, however, will need to recommit to working through the gritty details of realigning US forces in Japan. Though the government of Japan committed itself to the plan agreed upon in 2006 for relocating the Futenma airbase to a less populated area of Okinawa, the thorny problem of implementing the plan still remains. As has been demonstrated on numerous occasions, the local base politics of Okinawa continues to present numerous issues for alliance managers both in Washington and Tokyo.

New Approaches to Japanese Defense

Analytical Eclecticism

Proponents of analytical eclecticism build their case by emphasizing that none of the major theoretical paradigms (realism, liberalism, or constructivism) can capture the complex interplay among material power, concerns over efficiency in international politics, and the effects of identity. Though each of these theoretical paradigms often construct their explanations in ways that are coherent and identifiable within their own research traditions, theoretical coherence often takes place through a process of highlighting one aspect of political reality while relegating other issues to second order priorities. Thus, while realism emphasizes relative state capabilities and its impact on the security dilemma, it proves less useful in examining the basis for cooperation or ideational influences. Liberalism, for its part, is often productive in demonstrating the role of institutions in mitigating international anarchy and producing efficiencies that benefit multiple parties in positive sum relationships. However, liberal approaches often fail to address issues of relative capability, the security dilemma, or the strong effects of identity. Constructivism, meanwhile, tends to highlight issues of identity and normative influences, while neglecting issues of relative material power and the material efficiencies produced through cooperation (Katzenstein and Okawara 2004: 98; Dobson 2003: 7-25). In this way, constructivist approaches often ignore the “facilitating [material] conditions” that underpin the construction of security concerns by actors (Buzan et al
1998: 17; Buzan and Waever 2003). In short, while realist and liberal institutionalism approaches, rooted in rational-materialist foundations, tell us much about basic motivations and material restraints, they tell us very little about how states exercise agency in environments characterized by risk and uncertainty. For an explanation of this, we need soft liberal and constructionist approaches that consider ideational and historical socialization processes.

In terms of the analytical sketches these perspectives have generated for East Asian security issues, each theoretical paradigm has demonstrated limitations. Though realist theories predict competition and balancing behavior based on a regional security dilemma, current theories are indeterminate as to whether Japan will balance with China against the US, or vice versa. By focusing merely on capabilities, realism misses just how important issues such as the history of Japanese militancy have been in undermining cooperation or the incipient multilateralism that is developing in the East Asian region. In terms of liberalism, its focus on institutional efficiencies, information sharing, and converging identities, misses the role domestic identity politics plays against greater cooperation in the region. In the case of Japan, the problem of history has been a continuous barrier against greater cooperation with China and even South Korea, despite sharing a commitment to democracy with the latter. Constructivist approaches to Japanese defense policy, meanwhile, often overlook just how young institutions such as the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) are and the limited impact they have had in helping to shape common understandings in the region over defense issues (Katzenstein and Okawara 2004: 110-116).

For these reasons, proponents of analytical eclecticism espouse the use of multiple approaches to uncover the rich structures that underlie foreign policy-making. Rather than conclusions nested firmly in the ontological, epistemological, and methodological approaches of a research paradigm, what analysts should focus on are the “analytical sketches” that these research programs generate. These detached analytical sketches can then be compared and contrasted with each other to demonstrate lingering problems in the subject matter. In this way, the analytically eclectic
approach espoused by Katzenstein and Sil (2004) works within the larger tradition of “coping with complexity” that is occurring not only in defense analysis, but also in other sciences. As a pragmatic approach to Japanese defense issues, analytical eclecticism views realism, liberalism, and constructivism less as paradigms and more as tools for understanding.

Thus, one way to engage the issue of Japan’s defense trajectory through eclecticism is to nest realist and liberal ideas within a constructivist ontology that sees motivations as subject to negotiation through social processes. While typically realist perspectives have emphasized issues of national insecurity, zero-sum competition, and self-help in international anarchy, liberal perspectives have emphasized the possibility of positive sum gains, the mitigating factor of institutions for anarchy and self-help, and the possibilities of cooperation within anarchy. One might start by investigating the relative distribution of ideas within Japanese society (see for example, Samuels 2007, 2007a) regarding the importance of security from outside threats versus prosperity through trade and savings on defense spending. As this approach would demonstrate, the distribution of realist ideas (both US-centric forms and Gaullist) and liberal ideas (what others call liberal internationalists or civilian power supporters) cuts across parties in a way that makes aggregation of ideological power difficult. This approach could then be supplemented by a more materialist domestic political approach that looks at how domestic issues create constituencies and political alliances in ways that prevent cooperation among politicians who are ideologically like-minded on defense issues. As numerous Japan specialists have pointed out, defense policy lacks a strong domestic constituency (though one may be in the making). For this reason, continuity may be the norm, even when there are compelling reasons to abandon the status quo.

Nesting theoretical approaches in the ontology of other approaches is but one of the ways to practice analytical eclecticism, and the approach outlined above should not be seen as the last word on the matter. Other approaches can combine traditions in different ways with similar results. For example using an approach developed by Suh (2004) for South Korea defense policy, an analyst might use liberal...
understandings of “asset specificity” to understand how realist images of “threat” are constructed. This approach would help explain the persistence of the US-Japan alliance after the cold war despite the disappearance of the Soviet threat. This approach would highlight how both Washington and Tokyo sought new common roles to fit existing assets and institutions, but also how the specific material presence of these assets (for example the position of military bases) limited what options could be considered. In addition, this approach would highlight how entrenched domestic interests on both sides of the alliance (career alliance managers; those in the defense industry) contributed to the intellectual process of finding new roles. As several authors have suggested (see Hughes 2009; Samuels 2007a), if a North Korea threat had not existed, US and Japanese defense professionals would surely have wished to create one in order to justify the continuation of the alliance and pushes toward Japanese military normalization.

Nonlinearity

Just as analytical eclecticism seeks to destabilize unquestioned assumptions in entrenched theoretical paradigms, nonlinear approaches seek to unsettle linear approaches to complex phenomena. Much of western science is based on the premises of linearity. Linear analysis assumes that systems are characterized by proportionality, additivity, replication, and demonstrable cause and effect. Systems are proportional when small inputs produce small outputs and large inputs produce large outputs. Systems are additive when they can be broken up into smaller pieces, analyzed, and then reconstructed to make up a larger whole. Nonlinear modes of analysis, on the other hand, work from the premise that many phenomena are not amenable to reductive analysis, and thus, must be supplemented with methods that help to develop a “crude look at the whole.” Systems that are not amenable to linear analysis are often characterized as unstable, irregular, and inconsistent; they have synergistic relationships, feedback loops, trigger effects,
delays, or are subject to abrupt qualitative shifts. Nonlinear approaches, then, take into consideration the possibility that small changes can have large effects or even qualitatively change the system altogether (Beyerchen 1993: 61-63; Czerwinski 1998; Kerbel 2004).

For predictive analysis, linear conceptions of state trajectories can often prove dangerously simplistic. The future is often considered a continuation of the past, and thus the analyst is blinded to data points that indicate potentials for acceleration, resistance to change, or even system shifts (Doran 1999). Frequently, subjects of study demonstrate the characteristics of both linear and nonlinear systems. Even as analysts go about mapping in detail the important characteristics of the phenomena under study, no matter how great the detail or how well the parts seem to fit, there is always the possibility, hidden within the data, that something important has been missed or that the relationships between data points are not as straightforward as they initially appear. For these reasons, analysts must find ways to “cope” with the unknown. Nonlinear methods of coarse graining (or taking a “crude look at the whole”) and actively searching for areas of ripeness, resistance, and reinforcement serve as important supplements to linear reductionist techniques. These imaginative approaches help to guide analysts away from the pitfalls of idealized sketches that are well-behaved.

As much of the literature makes explicit, approaches that interrogate nonlinearity should be a supplement to linear approaches, not a substitute. As Czerwinski (1998) writes, most issues are subject to the 80/20 rule. Twenty percent of the effort will help you understand eighty percent of a given phenomenon, but the other eighty percent is needed to understand the remaining twenty percent. The literature on Japan’s current defense trajectory has done much to give us about an eighty percent understanding of where Japan is currently headed. Samuels’s (2007, 2007a) study of the balance of power among different ideological groups—neo-autonomists, normal nationalists, civilian power advocates, and pacifists—effectively demonstrates the validity of his “Goldilocks consensus” theory. According to Samuels (2007a), Japanese policy will be neither too Americanist nor too Asianist, too militarist nor too anti-
militarist. Similarly, Green’s (2001, 2009) notion of reluctant realism effectively demonstrates the way external threats and domestic contexts interact to create a slow-motion trajectory toward a more “normal” attitude towards military power. These approaches simplify the complex interactions involved in defense politics in ways that create coherent stories. In this sense, eighty percent (perhaps more) of the work has already been done well.

However, alternative perspectives such as devil’s advocate, the alternative scenarios approach, and backwards thinking can help to blur our thinking on the subject in productive ways. For example, while most mainstream literature on Japan’s defense trajectory allows for a degree of independence from the US as a hedge against abandonment, little of that literature predicts a wholesale break in the relationship. One very recent study, however, uses the alternative scenario approach to think backwards about what events would lead to the end of the bilateral alliance (Gottwald et al 2010). The point of the study is to identify indicators that would allow analysts to know when this scenario is becoming more likely. The authors conclude that the most plausible reason for abrogating the security treaty is some kind of “big bang” (what Lockwood and Lockwood (1993) refer to as a “focal event”), which could include a US conflict with China over Taiwan, a clash between Japan and China over disputed territories, or a North Korean attack on Japan. In each of these cases, the authors suggest that the alliance could fray when one or both of the parties’ expectations about the level of support from the other is upended (a more intensified version, for example, of the first Gulf War or the North Korea nuclear crisis during the 90s). In addition, cost sharing issues under economic constraints could also contribute to the gradual erosion of cooperation and the failure of one or both parties to meet expectations (Gottwald et al 2010: 9-18). Interestingly, one of the models that the authors suggest is the US alliance with New Zealand. In 1984, the US and New Zealand terminated their alliance when the government of New Zealand forbade US nuclear powered and nuclear armed ships to enter ports (Gottwald et al 2010: 15). Indeed such a scenario, where the US military presence is seen as a hazard to public welfare is extremely plausible, especially in the context of a Japanese
public that is acutely sensitive to such issues. For example, following the September 11, 2001 attacks on the US, tourism to Okinawa sharply declined as the presence of US troops was seen as making the island a likely target for terrorists (Hook and Siddle 2003). The US adoption yet again of a robust unilateralist stance (in the style of the Bush II administration) might put enormous pressure on the Tokyo government to limit Japan’s liabilities within the alliance. In such a context, a renewed political push for an “independent” Japan might find a receptive audience.

Another way to think through Japanese defense politics in a way that destabilizes our certainty on the subject is to look for small events that may have large effects. Two especially “ripe” areas are in Okinawan base politics and the overseas deployment of the Japan Self Defense Forces (JSDF) for peacekeeping operations. In terms of Okinawa base politics, popular forms of activism, including mass protest and semi-structured violence, have the potential to radically change the relationship among Okinawa, Washington, and Tokyo. These forms of activism serve as outlets for popular anger and reassert Okinawan agency in ways that resonate with Japanese popular sympathy, thus threatening Washington and Tokyo’s control over the situation. One incident on par with the 1995 incident in which US soldiers gang raped a young Okinawan girl may be enough to put the situation out of either Washington or Tokyo’s control. Another small incident that may have a large effect would be the death of a JSDF soldier on either a peacekeeping mission or while assisting in support of US operations. Thus far, Japan’s expanded use of the JSDF overseas has progressed without casualties. This has been partly due to careful management by politicians and JSDF officials and the overt decision to avoid areas and missions that have high potentials for violence. However, luck has also played an important role. Though alliance exigencies and a desire for “international contribution” have helped push Japan out of its anti-militarist shell, it is important to keep in mind that the death of a soldier (especially if brutal pictures were to reach the media) might reignite submerged pacifist sentiments. Where the New Zealand incident served as a useful metaphor for the possible breakup of the US-Japan alliance, here one might
want to consider a Japanese equivalent of the US’s experience with peacekeeping and humanitarian relief in Somalia in 1993. While it is unlikely that Tokyo would even allow deployment to areas with this level of danger, it is also important to realize that a less drastic outcome and less visceral media presentation would be sufficient to reignite public sentiment against JSDF deployment overseas.

As we will see in the next section, The LAMP method actively encourages the use of the alternative scenario approach as a supplement to in-depth qualitative research to help generate an understanding of areas of ripeness, reinforcement, and resistance to change. By actively incorporating an element to unsettle the analyst’s earlier results, I believe LAMP represents a good example for other studies on how to keep the spirit of inquiry and continuous reflection alive.

**LAMP**

**A Pragmatic Method of Prediction**

The Lockwood Analytical Method for Prediction (LAMP) is a qualitative prediction method based on the idea that the future is “nothing more than the sum total of all possible interactions of “free will”” (Lockwood and Lockwood 1993: 24-25). In order to predict the future, an analyst must decide who (or what) the relevant actors are and understand how those actors view their options. For this reason, qualitative research into each actor’s perspective is the main focus of the analyst’s time and expertise. One of the main points that Lockwood and Lockwood stress is that analysts should do their best to avoid “mirror-imaging” (substituting one’s own rationality for that of the actor) (1993: 30-31). No assumptions are made about the preferences of the actors (whether they value prosperity, security from external factors, or some other form of utility). Thus, LAMP shares the pragmatist foundation of analytical eclecticism.

Unlike quantitatively based methods of forecasting that ask the analyst to assign percentages to various
outcomes, LAMP asks the analyst through a series of pairwise comparisons only to distinguish between relative probabilities. In addition, by asking the analyst to engage in creative exercises—such as brainstorming on possible focal events that would change the likelihood of relative probabilities and by thinking of how the most likely futures can transition into less likely futures—the method provides countermeasures against satisficing and provides a platform for developing a more nuanced gestalt of the problem.

The steps in LAMP are as follows:

Step 1: Determine the issue for which you are trying to predict the most likely future.
Step 2: Identify the actors involved.
Step 3: Perform an in-depth study of how each actor perceives the issue in question.
Step 4: Specify all possible courses of action for each actor.
Step 5: Determine the major scenarios within which you will compare the alternative futures.
Step 6: Calculate the total number of permutations of possible “alternative futures” for each scenario.
Step 7: Perform pairwise comparisons with each one receiving a vote or a nonvote.
Step 8: Rank the system by the number of votes received.
Step 9: Pick the future that is most likely to occur and examine it for its consequence on the issue at hand.
Step 10: State the possibility of a future event to transition into another future event.
Step 11: Determine the “focal events” that must occur in our present in order to bring about a given alternative.
Step 12: Develop indicators for the focal events.

The LAMP method is not without its issues. The most conspicuous problem (and one that Lockwood and Lockwood (1993) make explicit) is that any question of inquiry must be defined in such a way as to limit the number of relevant actors and choices available to these actors. Since in LAMP the number of all alternative futures is the sum of all possible interactions of “free will” among actors, the analyst must limit both the number of actors considered and the
number of choices each actor has in order to keep the number of options to be examined and the total number of possible futures to be compared manageable. This encourages the analyst to: one, limit the actors in any given scenario to what seems reasonable to that scenario; two, aggregate actors into large units at one scale of analysis; and thus, three, to regard other “marginal” actors and actors at different scales as exogenous to the system that it considers.

In scenarios at the regional or interstate level of analysis, then, the analyst is encouraged to analyze each state as a unitary actor rather than as a composite state or dispersed groupings of self-interested parties each with their own perspective. When the LAMP method is adapted for use within the state (as this issue of Japanese defense politics would seem to demand), the analyst is likely to examine the future as the net outcome of the free will of organizations at the political party and bureaucracy level, rather than as a composite of smaller sublevel units or individuals, such as interest groups, civic organizations, or powerful personalities (a variation of the Bureaucratic Politics Model developed by Allison (1971) and Halperin (1974)). Thus, the analyst is blinded to the potential impact of these smaller groupings and powerful individuals. In other words, an analyst might choose to look at units that seem structurally similar while ignoring unlike units that may nevertheless have similar or even greater capabilities to impact change (a subject that Lockwood and Lockwood (1993) neglect).

One defense against this bias is to take the effects of these smaller units into account when doing qualitative research on the similar aggregated units. Another defense that LAMP provides against these blind spots is in Steps 10 and 11, where these smaller groupings can be imagined as exogenous shocks to what are otherwise stable interactions of free will on the part of organizations at the same level. An even more ambitious approach by the analyst would be to push beyond the bias for examining structurally similar units, and instead to look (creatively) for units that have roughly similar capabilities, even if these units are radically different in terms of their structure.

There is a third problem with the LAMP method, no less significant than the two addressed above. As a method, LAMP allows the analyst a great deal of freedom to determine
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which data are important in assessing the perspective of the actors in Step 3. As a method LAMP works to guard against the problems (frequently encountered in defense analysis) of mirror-imaging (Heuer 1999: 70-71; Lockwood and Lockwood 1993). Instead of substituting the analyst’s own rationality for that of the actor's, LAMP puts a premium on exploring the logic of the actors under study. Though Lockwood and Lockwood (1993) suggest that analysts use different kinds of qualitative data to unearth this perspective--ranging from survey research, to history study, to detailed linguistic analysis--they fail to specify how one can create a comprehensive understanding of an actor’s perspective.

Although LAMP as a defense intelligence methodology is evolutionarily discrete from theoretical debates in IR, the method does not escape the issues these theories address. For example, in order to determine which actors matter in any given scenario (Step 2) the analyst must first examine the international structure and the capabilities of the actors involved—both key issues of concern for realism. However, when the analyst analyzes the perspective of each actor there is a sense in which aspects of liberalism and constructivism take over (though realism never disappears, as actors’ perceptions often reflect realist concerns). Rather than an examination of nations as generic units (as neorealist analysis suggests), the analyst must reach beyond thick rational-actor perspectives and assume that actors have unique forms of agency in deciding how they view the issue. In doing so, the analyst (it is assumed) will most likely take into consideration how actors’ perspectives form within their individual histories and contexts, including the interactions between agents or through commonalities in politics and culture (again forms of liberal and constructivist analysis).

Implementing LAMP: Examining Key Actors

In the area of Japanese defense, several actors stand out as discrete, interested, and efficacious in deciding the nature of the policy debate. These actors can be aggregated
Into both bureaucracies and political parties. The relevant political parties would be: The Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), the once dominant party which now makes up the main opposition; and the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ), the currently ruling party. Some attention might also be placed on the role that could be played by minority parties such as the Komeito (NKP), the Japanese Communist Party (JCP), the Social Democratic Party (SDP), the People’s New Party (PNP), the Sunrise Party (SPJ), and/or Your Party (YP) in future alliances with either party. Which minority parties deserve the attention of the analyst depends greatly on which ones are in alliance with the ruling party.

In terms of the relevant bureaucracies, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) has long been the most influential bureau in foreign policy; in addition, since the Koizumi administration the former Japanese Defense Agency, now the Ministry of Defense (MOD), has risen to the level of a full policy ministry; the super-bureaucracy the Ministry of Finance (MOF) would also need to be taken into account since this bureaucracy exerts such strong influence over each of the other bureaucracies through its power over budgets; in addition, some attention might be warranted toward the Ministry of Economy, Technology, and Industry (METI) on certain issues, such as the defense industry and decisions having to do with the arms export ban. The Cabinet Legislation Bureau (CLB) would also warrant some attention since its legal rulings on issues dealing with the constitutionality of the use of force are considered authoritative. Finally, the Japanese economic confederacy the Keidanren (along with the role of the defense industry) warrants some attention specifically regarding its interest in easing the ban on arms exports and expanding the Japanese defense budget over the one percent of GDP restriction.

Drawing boundaries around which actors count in Japanese politics can be a dangerous proposition because of the possibilities of overlay and penetration by groups and individuals at different scales. Often bureaucracies and ministries will make decisions with inputs from other bureaucracies and even subgroups like interest groups and industry committees. In addition, powerful personalities such as the prime minister, party heads, or even industry leaders can play a substantial role in shaping policy that
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overrides functional organizational flow charts. If we frame the premise of discrete actors as problematic, then the focus of our qualitative research takes on a much different character. Depending on which defense issue we are concerned with, then, we might direct our data collection efforts at the prime minister and individuals and parties that are able to influence his opinion or members of the Diet. Because LAMP does not readily accommodate or structure analysis across multiple scales or across actor boundaries, adjustments need to be made to accommodate the particular characteristics of Japanese domestic politics. In addition to the discrete actors listed above, an analyst must simultaneously study informal deal making between relevant organizations as well as forms of politics that overlay and interpenetrate relevant organizations. Also, one needs to be sensitive to how individual personalities may shape agendas across organizational lines.

The other issue to contend with is what to make of the larger voting public. The LAMP method encourages the analyst to regard constituencies among voters as part of the political party, as an exogenesis context, or as a separate “actor” for analysis. Because a majority of Japanese voters are currently unaffiliated, it is difficult to conflate their influence with that of the political parties. However, considering the voting public as a homogenous group could lead to some dangerous simplifications. For this reason, the large number of unaffiliated voters is one potential source of either ripeness or resistance in Japanese politics that will need to be accounted for.

For all of these reasons, an analyst who uses LAMP to predict the future trajectory of policy might want to conduct analyses at two scales: at the domestic and national levels. At one level, the analyst should perform an in-depth analysis of each of the relevant actors, articulate their options, and do a pairwise comparison of the policy preference of each actor. At this scale, one should keep in mind that not all actors have the same choices, and that choices will depend greatly on which issue is under analysis. For example, while the ruling party might have the option of exploring initiatives in a number of different areas of defense policy from constitutional revision to the lifting of the arms export ban, the MOF will likely have a much more limited influence,
typically only exercising influence over budgetary issues. The LAMP process at the domestic level should then inform a LAMP investigation of Japan’s security policy preference at the national level. At this level, inputs from the LAMP process at the domestic level will be combined with an understanding of each actor’s relative position within the security policy apparatus and the influence of overlaying and interpenetrating actors and individual personalities. Though domestic theories of political power will be helpful in understanding the relationship of actors to one another, these relationships will also be highly context-driven. Thus in some scenarios, such as in the context of large degrees of public support, one could predict that political parties or the prime minister will have more agency than the bureaucracies. However, in situations where domestic support for the ruling party wanes, or where weak coalition governments or intra-party rivalries persist, the initiative may pass to the bureaucracies who will then most likely become caretakers of the status quo.

Conclusion: Towards a Rigorous Study of Continuity and Change in Japanese Defense Policy

As the above sketches demonstrate, each of the three approaches shares a commitment to coping with uncertainty in a complex world. This commitment to seeing nonlinearities should not be seen as a substitute for linear social sciences, but rather as a useful supplement that helps to create more nuanced intellectual hedges and keep intellectual problems fresh for re-examination. One can also see how each of the different approaches overlaps and creates inputs for the other. While LAMP provides the backbone for the study of future trajectories, inputs from analytical eclecticism and the literature on nonlinearity supplement this approach by informing the analyst of the limits of forecasting and the necessity of keeping a “fuzzy” gestalt of the phenomena under study. Though LAMP gives
the analyst a method for deciding the most likely option, the final product never amounts to a straightforward single outcome prediction. Each prediction is always compared and contrasted with other likely outcomes in an environment of possible focal events and transitions to other futures.

These approaches, however, are not without their issues. In a sense, creative approaches to seeing complexity are opposed to the “science” in the social sciences. By keeping the problem alive, analysts are encouraged to avoid parsimony and to engage in speculative practices that are not subject to replication. In addition, there is also the problem of mastering the language of theoretical eclecticism. As Katzenstein and Sil (2004) state, “theoretical multilingualism” may “tax an individual researcher’s stock of knowledge and array of skills while introducing more “noise” into the established channels of [scholarly] communication” (Katzenstein and Sil 2004: 30). In addition, an analyst’s attempt to write on a subject across theoretical boundaries may lead to inconsistency, or worse, incoherence. For these reasons, some eclectic approaches have been dismissed as undisciplined, “flabby” appeals for pluralism that ignore the deep conceptual inconsistencies that are important between research paradigms (Johnson 2002: 245).

As a response to these critics, proponents of analytical eclecticism have demonstrated quite effectively that in the case of the analysis of security dynamics theoretical parsimony can at times produce costly silences. Thus, proponents note that the commitment to analytical eclecticism is founded on a deep pragmatism: analytical eclecticism is a more efficient analytical tool for finding persistent problems and guarding against premature analytical closure (Carson and Suh 2004; Katzenstein and Okawara 2005; Sil and Katzenstein 2005). A commitment to analytical eclecticism—the use of explanatory methods in different theoretical traditions without their paradigmatic baggage—means being able to speak the language of power, efficiency, and identity in ways that open up new spaces for inquiry.

While my research on Japanese defense politics is still in its early stages, my preliminary results using the integrated methodologies outlined above has given me a picture of Japan’s trajectory that can be described as both
nuanced and pragmatically unclear. One can see Japan’s defense transformation as actually constituting three different, but not mutually exclusive, trajectories with different actors acting as stewards. Japan as a national actor simultaneously pursues policies of normalcy (defined in terms of expanded capabilities, expanded executive leadership over the military, and a gradual inclusion of military personnel into defense policymaking), equality (defined as a Japanese foreign policy more resistant to US pressure), and humanity (defined as diplomatic initiatives to promote human security, nuclear disarmament, and international society) with all three of these initiatives constrained by an acute sensitivity to the cost of defense and a desire to cheap ride on US extended deterrence capabilities. As research so far has demonstrated, we can see these multiple trajectories as the choices of multiple actors at different levels enacting their understanding of security.

While the MOD and the JSDF continue to improve their capabilities in ways that allow them to contend with rising external threats and the demands of both US alliance managers and Japanese politicians, actors in MOFA, the Japanese International Cooperation Agency (JICA), and civil society (see for example, the anti-nuclear efforts of cities like Nagasaki and Hiroshima) continue to emphasize human security, anti-nuclear diplomacy, and other civilian leadership initiatives (though MOFA will still retain a great deal of influence on US alliance issues as well). In addition, while adherents of pacifism may have irreparably damaged their prospects as a legitimate political movement, they nevertheless continue to embed themselves in politics in ways that allow them important leverage over politicians and to create an important brake on moves toward re-militarization and overt collective security arrangements. In addition, politicians and bureaucrats (most notably MOF) worry that any break in the US-Japan alliance will mean an end to cheap riding and the expansion of the military budget. The fear of losing the US extended deterrent is acute in an environment of expanding government debt, a stagnant economic situation, and greater demands for social welfare protection. Though the discourse of an “independent” Japan, equal to the US, is not promoted by any major discrete organizational actors, the nationalist sentiment that these
ideas evoke has found an increasingly wide audience that cuts across organizational lines. Adherents can be found in the JSDF, DPJ, LDP, minority parties, civil society, popular media personalities, civic groups in Okinawa, and increasingly even in universities. This group will continue to highlight issues of slighted Japanese honor, represented by the periodic cases of US military crimes like rape in Okinawa, the extraterritorial privilege of the US, and limited Japanese sovereignty. It remains to be seen, however, whether this group can achieve the political consensus necessary to overtake party and bureaucratic agendas.

In order to move our understanding of Japanese defense politics forward, we need to understand not only how these actors continue to pursue their initiatives within overlapping domestic and political contexts, but also how interactions among groups pursuing their preferences could help Japan transition into futures that are currently considered unlikely. By doing so, we will have maintained a big picture view of Japan’s trajectory that mixes parsimony with elements of coarse graining or crudeness that help us cope with our own cognitive boundaries.
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Managing Foreign Workers in Southeast Asian Countries

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Abstract: Countries such as Philippine and Indonesia are not only become the contributors in foreign workers in Southeast Asia region but to the other parts of the world. For that, governments of both countries are always encouraging their citizen to migrate to another country in order to stabilize the economy by reducing the unemployment and remittance send by their citizen that working at overseas. Malaysia and Thailand are among main importers of semi skilled and unskilled foreign workers especially from regional countries. Meanwhile, Singapore is more on importing skilled workers and put on high requirement in engaging semi skilled or unskilled workers. This paper will look through the phenomenon of foreign workers in Southeast Asia countries such as Indonesia, Philippine, Malaysia, Thailand and Singapore especially in administrative and regulation aspect on those countries.

Keywords: Public Administration, Public Policy, Foreign Workers, Southeast Asia

Introduction

Migration was occurred in the early history of mankind, even though, migration terminology was introduced in government policy when the existing modern
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country put on serious focus towards delimitation, security and welfare of people (Kurus, 2004; 331). The movement of people from one country to another has become a common social development process particularly in the structural of world economic. The development gives indirect impact in the context of economy especially to individual, exporter countries and foreign workers importer countries. This movement also considered as migration either in the context of international, regional and internal. The form of migration also occurred in many forms like permanent, labour and temporary migration (Mohd Na’eim Ajis et.al, 2009: 313; Ramasamy, 2004: 208)). According to United Nation (2002), population in Southeast Asian was increasing after the World War II from 178 million in 1950 to 522 million people in year 2000. The growth is connected to various aspects such as increasing of birth rate, decreasing of death and also development of migration process to Southeast Asia. During European occupation in Southeast Asia, Chinese immigrants have dominated most of the regions compared to immigrants from Arab, India and Persian. The presence of Chinese cannot be avoided and they were concentrated in cities and harbors. Meanwhile, the greatest growth in Asian international migration has involved the nonpermanent movement of people for contract labour. Temporary labour migration has its historical roots in ‘contract coolie’ systems initiated by colonial powers during the 19th century (Hugo, 2004; 30-32).

Migration factor always related to economical aspects such as high rate of poverty and unemployment, but in some cases the migration occurred because of factors such as wars, natural disasters and internal political turbulence in source country (ILO, 1998). Foreign workers are the important work force in economy development whether to importer or to foreign work force exporter country. This is because their contribution is not only give an impact to importer country economy development but also give a huge contribution to their home country economic welfare especially in preventing unemployment problem. Besides, political stability will be occurred, when people enjoying better economic welfare. Southeast Asia countries like Philippine and Indonesia were so desperate to send their
people to find a job overseas especially in Southeast Asia region. Because of that, both countries are always established a policy or regulation to encourage the migration of their people to get a job at overseas. Roles play by Southeast Asia countries such as Thailand, Singapore and Malaysia are more focus as importer country especially among semi skilled and unskilled foreign workers. But for Singapore, hiring foreign workers is more focused on professional or skilled workers and they will be considered as asset of the country. That is why that republic is willing to offer citizenship to that group for them to live in the country and help to boost domestic economy and solve the insufficiency of people in Singapore. Moreover, because of economic factor and the development of education in those countries, most of their people have no interest to involve in certain sectors and they made the decision to migrate to another country. By that, the contribution of foreign workers especially semi and unskilled workers from those three countries have the characteristic of substitutes, they have been hired to replace the empty space that have been left by local people because they are not interested in certain sectors and not for something permanent. As a result, foreign workers role in Southeast Asia countries is to give significance economic impact especially to make sure the successful of planned economy activities of by importer countries and at the same time it will help to prosper the economy of their home country.

The Concept of Labor Migration

Asian countries were considered as the major contributors of foreign immigrants especially in employment sector in this world. Generally, the admission of foreign workers has always related to three assumptions: there is economic liberalization, unequal to economy opportunity and ineffective border enforcement. Therefore, foreign workers can be considered as a social process that has correlation with issues such as market economy situation, transnational labour supply, alteration policy of importer countries and an act of foreign workers right (Motoko Shuto, 2006: 205-206).
Goss and Linquist (1995) contended that people will make a decision to maximize their income. They will choose to migrate to another country and normally they will get a better job especially in salary aspect compared to their own country. Hence, unequal payment and economic development in regional countries will stimulate and enhance the migration of labour to another country in the region. According to Hicks (1932) in *Wage Differential Theory*, migration happened because of the different payment in region and there is a different in supply and demand of labour between countries. It indicates the country that has high level of labour supply relatively has low level of wage; meanwhile the country that has low level of labour supply has high level of wage. As a result, the migration occurred from country that has low level of wage especially Third World Countries to Developed Countries or from rural areas to urban areas within a country.

Meanwhile, Harris & Todaro (1970) stated that rationally it is a high priority for a man to put on action to migrate because of the different of salary and job opportunity in one country, even though the truth is unknown. This is because most of Asia countries always encourage their local people to migrate to another country so they can increase the economy of certain country through remittance (Massey *et. al*, 1993). According to Davanzo (1981), a reason for a people to migrate because they believe the benefit they will get from the cost they spend to migrate. It is included directly or indirectly costs such as transportation, cost for finding a job, health, family, friends and etc. Besides, migration of labour in not only limited to semi skilled and unskilled workers, but it involved of skill transmission from one country to another country. Amin (1974) stated that migration can be considered as a transmission of existing positive values from a worker especially skilled worker to another country. This is because the migrated workers possessed higher productivity and education from developing countries. As a specialist from oversea, they can influence the working environment and strengthen the level of economic of importer country.
In 1906, a group of first Filipino workers landed in Hawaii Archipelagos to work in sugarcane and pineapple farms. At that moment, Filipinos did not encountered any difficulty to enter United States because in 18th century Philippine is still their colony. Because of that, more Filipinos migrated to California, Washington, Oregon and Alaska to work as agricultural labour. When the changing of season happened where agricultural industry has to stop, the particular foreign workers will shift to another job offer in the city such as waiter and bus driver (Asis, 2006). Since 1970s, Philippine encountered the migration involving high skilled group such as physician, teacher, sea captain, mechanic, engineer and more. This phenomenon was motivated by a high demand of labour from Middle East countries and brings to the existent of contract foreign workers. With a legitimate migration law and encouragement from Philippine’s government, total sum of Overseas Filipino workers (OFW) has increased dramatically from 214,590 people in 1980 to 791,000 in 1998. In 1990s technology and communication booming has triggered the migration of workers from Philippine in electronic, computerization and design (Alburo and Abella, 2002).

In 1970s, record for per capita income of Filipinos was overtaken by Thailand, meanwhile in 1980s Philippine was overtaken by Indonesia. Philippine has less developed economy among the countries in ASEAN region. Among the factors that caused the instability of economy were political crisis that happened in the country including the incident of Aquino assassination in 1983 and the sacked of Marcos in 1986. This matter has brought the biggest economic shrink in Philippine history, where GDP per capita has dropped almost 20 percent in 1985 to 1986. The political turbulence has brought Philippine to the worst economic crisis and need to recover slowly. In 1990s, Philippine economic development was back on track under Ramos administration.
such as ban on import was abolished and reduction of tariff was implemented in Philippine free trade pattern. Even though Philippine has succeeded in manage its monetary crisis, but the economy performance was still unsatisfied as result of slow and loose political environment. To recover the failure of economic policy, Philippine government has taken a step to encourage their people to migrate. This particular action successfully help the economic growth with the total sum of remittance almost USD10 billion in 2005, that is 10 percent of Philippine GDP (Hafer and Kutan, 2003).

Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) has classified Filipinos migration into two conditions whether seabased or landbased. For landbased workers covered all kinds of jobs including housemaid to manager. Meanwhile, seabased workers mainly involved ship operation such as navigation, engineering and equipment. In late 1970s and early 1980s, Middle East became major destination for Overseas Filipino Workers (OFW). The main reason for this situation was the fast growth of construction sector and it was assisted by oil industry that already generated high income for that region. At the end of 1980s and 1990s almost 90 percent of Filipino workers have worked in Middle East and Asia. In 1987, 71.2% OFW worked in Middle East and 23.7% to Asia. Because migration has become the major contributor for Philippine economic development, government has introduced Republic Act 8042 or the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act 1995 to provide benefit protection to Filipino workers overseas including those families that have been left behind. This act will provide protection to OFW that was exploited or abused overseas and their right as a worker will be protected (Ogena, 2004:297-300). In year 2004, there were about 8.1 million people, less than 10 percent from 85 million Filipinos working in at least 200 countries. Since 30 years ago, ‘migration culture’ has developed among Filipino to work overseas. A survey has been conducted in year 2002 stated one out of five Filipino has a tendency to migrate overseas (Asis, 2006). Research in year 1998 showed the migration among Filipinos occurred whether permanently or temporarily way. The places where Filipinos choose to migrate permanently are North America (United States of
America and Canada) and Oceania (Australia), while migration in Middle East and Asia are temporarily (Aburo and Abella, 2002).

Among the major factors that encourage Filipinos to migrate to other countries is limited job opportunity within the country. Research found most of the migrated workers are among graduates. Oil crisis that happened in year 1973 was the reason of high volume of labour migration with high scale from Philippine to another country. At that time, Philippine economic status was unable to develop according to development of population in the country and as a result, unequal between labour supply and demand occurred and then the unbalance of wage rate. Unsustainable economic development, instability of economic between the territories, increasing population, increasing of unemployment and low rate of salary in the market are the reasons Philippine government encourage its citizen to migrate oversea. At the beginning, this encouragement was only for temporary period, but at the same time when the demand in Middle East and East Asia were high, this situation continued (Asis, 2006).

Thailand

For centuries, migration has become a common thing in Thailand. Thailand is an exporter and an importer country in Southeast Asia. This situation occurred when foreigners came to Thailand and at the same time local people took the decision to leave their hometown. Among the bigger groups of migration came to Thailand were businessmen and labours from China during 18th and 19th century. In year 1909, around 162,505 Chinese were migrated to Bangkok to set up business and involved with offered job. Besides, there were several minor ethnics migrated to Thailand for trade and tried to avoid natural disasters and as the result, this circumstances made them shared the same elements of religion and culture with locals. Moreover, during that period, there was no borderline to limit their territories in each state, so there was free movement along the borderline (Chalamwong, 2004).
Before this, Thailand was among the rich natural resources countries and this was the reason why there were less local people migrate to another country. But, slow response by the locals to participate in certain sectors such as agricultural, mining and construction were the undeniable reason for foreign workers inflow. This situation continued until early 20th century and when the foreign workers seems to dominate all the jobs in Thailand, in 1907, King Rama V has introduced an act called Qualities Immigrants Act to cancel numbers of immigrants admission especially from China from entering the country. As a result, the number of immigrants was dropped dramatically from 10,000 people coming to Thailand to 200 people annually (Sonthisakyothin, 2000).

Thailand has their Immigration Act since 1950 and Foreign Workers Act since 1978. Those acts have put a line only for professional workers from another country to get the jobs without the limitation, while semi skilled and unskilled workers are not allowed because of national security reason. Since the war in neighbor countries occurred, Thailand becomes the destination for refugees especially from Indochina. Furthermore, this situation has increased the number of undocumented foreign workers and unskilled workers. Moreover, in late 1980s and early 1990s, Thailand economic performance showed a very encourage development and the successful of high educational policy made the locals uninterested to work in ‘cheap’ jobs. This situation made most of Thailand businessmen to hire illegal immigrants from Myanmar, Laos and Cambodia to cover the empty space especially in agricultural and fishing sectors (Chalamwong, 1998 & 2004). Since 1970s there were Thai people to migrate overseas looking for a job. The immigrants were among the professional who wanted to try their luck to get a job in United States of America as it is said it will offer them a sufficient amount of payment. Meanwhile, in 1980s the migration of Thais was focused to Middle East because of high economic development of that region during that particular moment (www.unesco.org/shs/most).

As a result, most of the rural people especially in agricultural based as their economy activity will face
seasonal unemployment and high in labour supply and it created poverty. In early 1960s, almost 60% of Thailand population lives below the poverty line. But, this situation decreased in late 1960s to 40%, 27% in 1990 and 13% in 1998 (Soonthorndhada, 2001). While in 2004, estimated about 10% of people in Thailand were under extreme level in poverty line. High number of poverty has become a main pressure for youth to migrate to overseas and looking for a job. In year 1993, Department of Job Recruitment has recorded 137,950 Thais have signed their contracts overseas (Tamagno E., 2008).

At the beginning, Thai migration workers only focused in Middle East and there were estimated more than 95 percent of migration happened in year 1980 and 1982. Then, the number fall around 10 percent or about 20 thousand people in 1995 compare to 1982 in about 114 thousand. As a result, most of them migrated to East Asia and Southeast Asia countries. But then, after the economic depression in the middle of 1980s and because of monetary crisis, most of the countries like Japan, Taiwan and Hong Kong firms were preferred to hire cheap labour. This situation has made Thai semi skilled and unskilled workers to involve in 3D job such as dirty, dangerous and difficult in those countries. Among the major receivers of Thai workers after 1988 were Singapore, Brunei and Taiwan that showed higher increase of number up to 89 percent in 1995 and 1997 (Tsai and Tsay, 2004).

**Indonesia**

Indonesia is one of the main exporters for work force in the world other than Mexico, Philippine, China and India. In 1969 until 1994, around one million Indonesian have left their country to find a job in foreign country. Countries like Saudi Arabia, Malaysia and Singapore have become popular destination for almost 90 percent of migrated Indonesian because of wage factor, destination and cultural similarities (Shela Morgan, 2006). But the official data about overseas Indonesian workers was not accurate because most of them preferred to use illegal channel. For example in year 1997, statistic showed their overseas workers were about 305,774
people, meanwhile Indonesia illegal immigrants in Malaysia were estimated around one million people (Tsai and Tsay, 2004). Economic slowdown, unemployment and poverty were among the factors contributed to Indonesian to migrate overseas. According to Suyanto (2004), between 1997 till 2004 total of unemployment was increased from 4.18 million to 11.35 million people and most of them involving young generation.

The flow of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) into a country will be profitable to a country especially in development aspects and then it will stimulate the economic growth. The experience from countries like South Korea, Malaysia, Thailand and China showed the presence of FDI will give positive impacts for a country. For that, after 1966 the government of the republic has done a research on the existence of priority within economic and political aspects. Other than needs of foreign capital and technology expertise along with attempted to recover the credibility of republic, government has tried to give support by providing the facilities in existing FDI policy. As a result, in 1967, Indonesian government has introduced Foreign Investment Law (FIL) containing multiple incentives for investors to get their support to invest in Indonesia. Without FIL, Indonesia under Suharto leadership which was called New Order (1968 – 1998) will unable to recover their country weak economic performance. For that, foreign financial support and flexibility on foreign investors will become important factors for country economic recovery (Balasubramania, Salisu, and Sapsford, 1996).

Indonesia was the second largest country that received FDI in ASEAN after Singapore. According to Gamatmeltoft (2002) in between 1990 – 1999 total international resources coming into Indonesia were FDI (30 %), international aid (24 %), remittance (8 %) and private capital flow (38 %). But since the last four decades, inconsistency of government attitude towards FDI has worsened the economy of Indonesia. The attitude of inconsistency to the domestic economy and oil income has caused unstable FDI policy that is between liberal and tight. As the result from this inconsistency policy, the foreign capital flow was dropped
dramatically especially in 1970s that was USD$542.4 million in 1974 to USD$221 million in 1976 and continued to drop to 167 million in 1977 (Tsai and Tsay, 2004). In additional, unequal between supply and worst spending aggregate during world economic depression especially at the end of 1970s, middle of 1980s and at the end of 1997 had caused the increasing number of unemployment. This situation was occurred when there was no foreign investors came to Indonesia to create job opportunities for their high population. For that, in year 1998 and 1999, the situation has forced the Indonesian government to accept loan offered by International Monetary Fund (IMF) to get the access to Extended Fund Facility (EFF) to support that republic economic activities caused by the crisis (Andreas Limongan, 2001).

Besides, Indonesian government has encouraged the migration among its citizen to overseas in order to settle the imbalance between labour demand and supply in that country. The high population with imbalanced economic growth in their home country was the reason why this group had to find another alternative in order to survive. Migrate or try to grab the available job in the region such as Malaysia, Singapore, Brunei and other countries in another region like Middle East was the easiest way to solve Indonesia problem. Unemployment is one of the major causes that have created political and social instability. This matter has been considered in 1997 during worldwide monetary crisis so it can lighten up the burden carried by the country (Azizah Kassim, 1986). Actually there were two reasons to send Indonesian workers overseas: to overcome unemployment and to get foreign exchange through remittance. These two reasons were important because it can help them to recover from economic depression and it will bring stability to Indonesian politic. After the economic crisis in 1997, Department of Indonesia Manpower (TKI) has recorded total amount of unemployment in 1999 was 36 million or 38 percent of total Indonesian labours (Firdausy, 2001).

Indonesia government realized the importance of locallabours migration especially to get high scale income
through remittance. But then, if we studied from total Indonesian workers migration aspect there are lots of problems occurred. This because the low quality of Indonesian labours and the difficulties to get competitive wage in importer country among the problems the government should solve. So to give a significance impact to economy of the country, Indonesian government acted by set a policy and law to increase the quality of labours and then will produce skilled workers. Various skill programs have been carried out by the government to ensure the labours will have specific skill before send them out. Step taken by the government has gained support and good cooperation from importer country to hire foreign labours from Indonesia. As a result, government always gives their support to local people to find a job overseas so it can give an income to government and then give an impact to the living standard among locals (Adi Rianto, 1995). With that, the government action to export the labour was appropriate action because it will reduce high domestic labour supply and increasing living standard. For example a labour from Indonesia working in Malaysia will increase his country’s economy by sending the remittance back to Indonesia. High income from overseas can manage their living standard compared to life as unemployment back in their country. This will bring benefit to Indonesia government to reduce the gap of income among their citizen between rural and urban areas.

Malaysia

The Malaysian economy is showed it encouraging development in 1990 to 1997 that is before Asia financial crisis. With the concerned steps taken by the government such as pegged the currency was the reason in Malaysia economic recovery and continued at the full employment level. This encouragement in economic growth has increased the need of employment in various sectors and indirectly led to admission of foreign labours from different countries to Malaysia. This phenomenon can be monitored when total of foreign workers in 1997 was 627, 426 people and in 1998 it was dropped to 395, 140 people because of economic depression. But after 1998, number of admissions of foreign increased in 1999 (409, 660), 2000 (807, 096), 2001(849,
829) and 2002(1,067,529). This situation showed that Malaysia has recovered from crisis and caused many sectors to offer jobs in Malaysia. Among the economic sectors that facing the insufficient of labours are agricultural, construction, services and manufacturing (Jabatan Imigresen Malaysia, 2008; Hidayat Purnama, 2002).

The admission of foreign workers into Malaysia is generally using two ways: legal admission through registered foreign workers agencies under Malaysian Immigration Department and illegal admission through unregistered illegal agencies. According to International Labour Organisation (ILO), Malaysia has critical admission of illegal immigrations among ASEAN countries. This phenomenon happened because of the country strategic geographic location through sea and close to other ASEAN countries (Labour and Man Power Report, 1984). Foreign labours in Malaysia been divided into three groups that are: First, non residents group contains multi ethnics that stay in Malaysia and possessed red identification card. Under Employment Restriction Act 1968, this group unable to work unless they have the work permit produced by Labour Ministry. Second, foreign skilled workers contain professionals in technical and administration fields. Third, foreign labours entered the country illegally. This group also known as Pendatang Asing Tanpa Izin (PATI) and most of them working in agricultural and construction sectors (Jamal Ali, 2003).

In 1960s, there was no mechanism and clear structure on how to employ unskilled or semi skilled workers to Malaysia. At the same time, employers were allowed to hire foreign workers informally using middlemen or agents from countries like Indonesia and Thailand. By that, regional migration system was more on tight cultural and religion relationship between source country and importer country (Kaur, 2008). In 1969, new regulation about employment was introduced and was known as Employment Act 1969 (Restriction and Work Permit). It used to give permit to foreign workers and stay in Malaysia in flexible way. But most of the employers, foreign workers and their family had misused the act by stayed illegally in Malaysia. This situation continued until 1970s where government did not
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care about them because they have been considered as temporary stay and they will definitely return to their home country (Abdul Zehadul Karim et al; 1996). At that moment, there was shortage of workers especially in agricultural, and government has taken steps to identify the admission of foreign workers to Malaysia. Since then, law on foreign workers kept changing from time to time whether became loose or tight according to circumstances and manpower sector need by the country. For that, the changing policy can be considered as a tool used by government to control the admission of foreign workers to Malaysia (Kaur, 2008).

In 1981, government has announced an act about law in formation of foreign workers agency. This act was to speed up the foreign worker employment process, where employer did not have to go to source country to get the employee. Besides, in 1984 Medan Agreement was signed between Malaysia – Indonesia government in setting up a mechanism and labour supply to Malaysia. In this agreement, Indonesia agreed to supply labour in 6 categories that Malaysia need especially in farming sector and housemaid. After that agreement, Malaysian government has signed several agreements with countries in the region such as Philippine for housemaid, while Thailand and Bangladesh for workers in construction and agricultural sectors (Azizah, 1998; Atukorala, 2006; Kanapathy, 2004).

Policy of foreign workers employment that has been practiced by Malaysia during 1990s was to solve insufficient semi skilled and unskilled workers problem in certain sectors. Because of Malaysia fast growth economic situation at that time, even making a step in signing the agreements were unable to stop the admission of PATI to Malaysia. For that, in 1991 government has introduced new regulation called Legalization Process or proses pengampunan. Under this new act, every employer that hired illegal immigrant need to register and validate their status in 6 months or they will face legal action and will be fined RM 10 thousand for each illegal immigrant they hired. But this process was too complex because to validate PATI status, employer needs to send them back to their home country and hired them through proper channel. This situation will bring difficulties
and increased employer cost especially to manage a big scale of foreign workers (Kanapathy, 2004).

Singapore

Industrial rapid development based on export at the end of 1960s and 1970s has caused high demand for foreign labours increased in Singapore. From 1974 to 1984 total jobs are 114 thousand compared to 1984 to 1994 only 74,400 jobs stated. Because of that, from 1970 to 1980 total admission of foreign workers to Singapore has increased from 21 thousand (3.2 %) to 80 thousand people (7.4 %). According to Statistic Department of the country, non resident population has increased from 131,820 in 1980 to 331, and 264 in 1990. Meanwhile in year 2000 the number is doubled to 754,524 people and in 2009 there estimated one million people. In 1980 they estimated at 46 % foreign workers in manufacturing sectors, 20 % in construction sectors and 9 % in domestic sector. From year 1980 to 1990, estimated around 85 % of unskilled foreign workers was hired in construction, manufacturing, community services and social. But, steps in regionalizing and relocated operation of local and multinational companies in overseas have increased the retrenchment of manpower especially in manufacturing sector. Besides, with the improvement in manufacturing operation, it has managed to increase the demands of high skilled labours compared to semi skilled or unskilled (Yen ad Piper, 2009 & Hui, 1997).

In foreign workers policy, Singapore government seems to use selective approach in order to gain economy, social and politic goals of the country. Basically, the policy will allow hiring skilled and professional workers, and not semi and unskilled foreign workers. But the pressured from various parties especially employers to the need of semi and unskilled foreign workers in moving the economic activities have made the government to review and amend few times the policy. In year 1965 to 1968, migration was allowed only to gather the family and no semi and unskilled workers were allowed to work. This is because the government found that the local labour forces were enough to support domestic demands. In addition, in Singapore economy in year 1960s
was categorized as slow developed, low payment rate and political unstable. So, more Singaporean migrated to overseas to grab better job opportunities. From 1968 until end of 1970s era, unskilled foreign workers recruited especially from Peninsular of Malaysia to encounter the shortage of manpower especially in construction and manufacturing sector. At the end of 1970s, because of Malaysian unskilled workers were hard to get, the employers were allowed to hire foreign workers from untraditional sources such as Indonesia, Bangladesh, India, Sri Lanka and Thailand (Pang, 1994).

But then, in 1981 the government has suggested to terminate the unskilled manpower service except in housemaid, construction and shipping sectors. Government stated that high dependency to unskilled foreign workers will affect productivity of developments and technology in domestic manufacturing sectors. The policy has given successful boost to Singapore economy, even with limited foreign resources. This situation has given a confident to the government to introduce innovative immigration policy that is price mechanism combination with employment quota in managing foreign workers. Because of that, in 1987, Singapore government has introduced new policy to manage the admission of foreign workers that matched to local labours demand. To realizing this policy, government has used two main approaches that are monthly levy and setting the quota of employment for employers in allowed sectors. Levy will allowed the employers to get foreign workers with the same price as local workers. For example in foreign housemaid sector, employers need to pay around S$200-S$295 to government every month. This situation will protect the local workers right because the employers need to pay high sum of money in order to hire foreign workers. Employment quota moved smoothly whereas employers can hired foreign workers if the post was unable to fill in by local people (Yenn and Piper, 2009; Athukorala, 2006), but the policy cannot resist the high demands of foreign workers among Singapore employers when in 1995, 300 thousand blue collar foreign workers were hired to work in Singapore job market (Business Time, January 5 1996). In addition, there were 50 thousand foreign workers involved in high
level field such as supervising, management and professional posts. In 2000, Singapore has opened 607 thousand job opportunities for skilled foreign workers (Abella, 2004).

Since independence in 1965, Singapore has seen to maintain its liberal policy in order to get skilled foreign workers that can integrate with local society. A skilled worker with certain amount of income is allowed to marry local woman or can bring his family to migrate to Singapore. Foreign workers salary act that been categorized as skilled workers faced several amendment that was in 1996 is S$1,500 but after May of 1996 it was increased to S$2,000 and now S$2,500. For them under 50 years old, they can apply for Permanent Residency (PR) including their family after 6 months. Meanwhile, for those that have possessed bachelor degree can apply for citizenship after 2 years of PR and for those that did not have bachelor degree but they have skill needed by the country, they can apply for citizenship after 5 years of PR. After July of 1989, this liberal policy was widening up when more migration especially from China and Hong Kong have came to Singapore after the Tiananmen Square incident. By that, new regulation was introduced to set the new requirement need to be fulfilled in order to receive grant of permanent resident there are at least possessed secondary education, minimum S$1,500 of monthly income and 5 years working experience. Businessman that invests S$1 million can apply for PR or less than S$1 million but the project has received approval by Economic Development Board (EDB) (Hui, 1997).

For that, in August 2006, Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loon during his speech in Independence Day of the country declared that Singapore will continually depends on foreign workers by motivate them to work or live in this republic. This statement is made after the government worried about lacked of child birth rate and effect on country future especially in economic and social aspect. As a result, prime minister generally suggested migration approach can be used to solve the insufficient of birth rate in long term and not only focused on insufficient of labours. In Singapore, ‘foreign people’ has two different meanings, whether it is
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professional workers and have high income or students from foreign country. Government will produced Working Pass for foreign people that earned minimum pay of S$2,500 monthly. In Singapore they are included in this category and considered as foreign talent or *bakat asing* and in 2006, 65 thousand foreigners were in this category. In differ, ‘foreign workers’ in Singapore was referred as semi skilled or unskilled foreign workers. For that particular reason, government will grant Employment Permit to employers to hire foreigners to work in Singapore. In 2006, 135 thousand male foreign workers were hired in construction sectors. Meanwhile, 160 female foreign workers were hired to work as housemaids. By that, in 2006 there were 580 thousand Employment Permit holders produced by the government and there is 9 times more than Employment Pass holders (Yenn & Piper, 2009).

**Discussion and Conclusion**

Migration development in Southeast Asia was started after World War II, where the population in Southeast Asia has rapidly increase because of European occupation and the economic activities run by the colonials. In addition, the migration happened at that time especially from China, Arab, India and other South Asia countries has made Southeast Asia becoming multiracial region. Most of the migration happened among ASEAN countries involving with the group of semi skilled or unskilled workers. The group migration occurred because of several factors such as lacked of job opportunity, unstable condition of home country, high payment of salary injection in foreign country and migration policy of certain countries. Every country in ASEAN will have positive or negative impact from the admission of foreign workers. For ASEAN country like Thailand, Singapore and Malaysia, the admission of unskilled workers is required in order to replace insufficient of local manpower that has not interested in certain job fields. This admission was motivated by economic in enhancing the development and create the prosperity in the countries.

Role of ASEAN countries towards the development of labour migration is showed in two forms that are as source country or foreign worker exporter (Indonesia, Philippine,
Myanmar, Vietnam and Cambodia) and importer countries of foreign workers such as Singapore, Malaysia and Thailand. But most of the foreign workers exported by those countries are from group of professional workers. This group migration always happened as individual initiative to gain better income. Men or labours always been considered as one of the factors besides capital and technology in the free market. By that, they will try to grab something that can give them better reward according to their contributions. According to Harris & Todaro (1970) a person rationally will migrate if they believed they will get better pay and benefits more than their can get in their home country. This is why most of the Asia countries will motivate their citizen to migrate and bring home a remittance as a source of family income.

In foreign workers management aspect, most of the Southeast Asia countries have implemented several of policies and regulations. Those policies are connected to the role of the particular country in migration issue whether they are exporter or importer country or both. Countries like Philippine and Indonesia is using liberal approaches and always encourages their citizen to migrate outside the country. For example, Philippine, the government has introduced Republic Act 8042 or Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act 1995 to prepare interest protection to the Filipinos working in overseas including their family in Philippine. This condition has showed how serious the government to encourage their citizen to migrate so they can help the government to maintain their economic stability and to solve problem like unemployment. Moreover, most of the foreign workers will send remittance to their home country and indirectly will help the country to enhance domestic economic activities from household expenditure using the money. For this reason, it is not surprising if both countries are always encourage their citizen to migrate to other countries in order to get a job and solving the uncertainty of source countries.

Countries like Thailand, Malaysia and Singapore are playing a role of foreign workers importer country in
Southeast Asia region in order to move their planned economic activities. Thailand and Malaysia have the tendency to hire semi skilled and unskilled foreign workers, while Singapore is more focused on foreign professional or skilled workers. Apart of being importer country for foreign workers, some of the citizens from those particular countries have migrated to another country which they believe will give the higher return. Besides, the development of education and demand of high salary are among the major factors for migration of local people to other countries. Because of that, government in these three countries did not have a choice unless they have to hire foreign workers for certain sectors such as manufacturing, services, farming, construction and housemaids to ensure the economic will not affected. To make sure there is no shortage in certain sectors, the government from particular countries has created cooperation between regional source countries such as Medan Agreement that was signed in 1984 between Malaysia and Indonesia. Besides for economy purposes, migration can be connected to improve a population in a country so it can stimulate economic and social activities. For that, government of Singapore has voiced out to attract group professional foreign workers to live in that country. That is clear for us that foreign workers migration phenomenon is difficult to avoid especially when most of the country in the world today are more focus to maximize their economic development. Even the world is getting hi-tech, but roles of human resources are still important especially in particular sectors and traditional. Shortage of human resources in a country will cause the development of foreign resources in order to cater domestic employment demands.

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EIL in the Primary Classroom: Exploration and Innovation using DVDs for Communication

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Abstract: In order for Thailand’s tertiary education establishments to produce top quality graduates to compete in the international workplace, Thailand’s students need to communicate in English in a meaningful way in the classroom. English is taught from the first year of primary school; however, teachers continually complain of a lack of resources and teaching materials in addition to their lack of training. By following the Thai foreign languages curriculum and making dialogues out of O Net and N Net test books available on the market, it was possible to make a series of six non-commercial DVDs for each year of primary school that can be used communicatively; allowing students to use English as authentically as possible in the classroom whilst still following the national curriculum. The positive feedback received so far has encouraged participating teachers and administrators to believe that they have found a pathway to EIL (English as an International Language) for Thailand’s young learners.

Keywords: English Learning, Thai Education, Language Instruction, EIL, International Workplace

Introduction

There is considerable debate within academia as to the best time to start teaching children a second language. Gika and Superfine (1998) cite how Freudenstein (1990) advocates that earlier is better as these children will develop improved verbal and non verbal behaviour, whilst Singleton and Lengyel (1995) counter that learning a second language at an early age does not increase competence in grammar, syntax, multi-competence or pronunciation and accent. Furthermore, Brumfit, Moon and Tongue (1995) are cited as stating that the only bad results from teaching pupils early

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would be if they were taught by untrained teachers, which is particularly relevant in the Thai context.

Whether you hold the views of structuralism and Piaget (1971), the more social constructivism of Vygotsky (1986), or the framework for multiple intelligences of Gardner (2006), one indisputable fact that remains evident today is that English is required learning from the first grade (Prathom one) in Thailand. To compound the dilemma further, in rural areas such as Isaan in the north east of Thailand, the Isaan language (Laos) is spoken at home which in turn affects the development of the child’s L1, in this case the Thai language. The less L1 language a child has initially, the less chance it has to think about it and play with it in a conscious way (Pinter 2006).

For Thailand to obtain a position of significance within ASEAN and the rest of the world, the general public as well as the Thai government have to understand how important English is in relation to globalisation and technology (Foley 2005). For this to happen, Foley indicates that there has to be an overhaul in materials, methods and teaching. The general quality of teaching staff is low and at primary level, teachers are unqualified to teach English, class sizes are too big and the teaching focuses on comprehension tests and memorisation (Mackenzie 2002). Thailand is stuck in the “Second Way” as detailed by Hargreaves and Shirley (2009), where top-down governmental goals, performances and targets are squashing parental choice, market competition, training, resources and most important for this study, materials; making bottom-up support by and for teachers almost impossible. The curriculum dictates that a disproportionate amount of time is spent on subjects that are not conducive to preparing students to compete in the global marketplace once they have graduated from school or university (von Feigenblatt, Suttichujit, Shuib, Keling and Ajis 2010) which is constantly demonstrated by low student results in national tests (Graham 2008).

Notwithstanding these difficulties, there are still many who enter the teaching profession to teach English for a variety of differing reasons. There has not been much
research in this area; however, Hayes (2008) details a study into teachers’ lives and the reasons for becoming Thai teachers of English. In this small study five teachers actively pursued the profession whilst two chose the career for materialistic reasons, one drifted into it by accident and one was forced into teaching by family pressure. For whatever reason a person decides to become an English teacher, it is evident that there is a need for training, materials development and scaffolding to enable these hard pressed educators, especially in rural areas to achieve their goals and the extravagant and sometimes unrealistic aims of the Ministry of Education. Williams (1992) identifies two areas of concern related to the Thai EFL context. The first is the teaching of communicative skills and the second is socio-cultural competence. As English is an international commodity, it is being used by people from different countries and backgrounds. By creating a set of DVDs based on the Thai national curriculum for foreign languages, students are able to see and hear how they are to act and behave in a given context, whilst they use English as an international language.

**Procedure for the Production of DVDs**

The development of these teaching materials was in accordance with Tomlinson (2010) who states that materials should:

- Expose the learners to authentic language in use
- Assist learners to concentrate on authentic input
- Use the target language for communicative purposes
- Encourage feedback
- Arouse and sustain the learners’ attention and curiosity
- Stimulate artistic, visual and intellectual involvement

It was also important to have materials that were engaging for the students which they could see as relevant to their daily lives (Senior 2010). Rather than have a “cross section of stakeholders” involved in the design of materials
as suggested by Hayes (2000), the author decided to use the national curriculum as a motivator and selling point to stakeholders and promote the fact that dialogues and conversations were developed from test questions available from a series of O-Net and N-Net (National Test) commercial test books on sale at local bookshops. The initial test book used was “Prepare for Examinations – Prathom One” by Modern Academic Center and retailed for 135 baht. The use of conversational exchanges was chosen to encourage students to physically speak and also to take into account the “maxims of quantity or manner” of a conversation (Clark and Amaral 2010) that students will find difficult as they do not possess enough language at the initial stages of their learning.

Initially, conversations and dialogues were constructed from the Prathom one book in order to make a CD just for listening tasks; however, one of the teachers, Ms. Pranee Boonsaeng expressed concerns during a feedback session conducted as a result of teacher training that was taking place at Bantatprachanukoon School in Ban Phue district, Udon Thani province (Graham 2009a). This project was based on the concept of “Scaling up for Change” where innovation taking place in a single classroom or school can be implemented on a wider scale (Kantamara, Hallinger and Jatiket 2006).

This Prathom one teacher was worried that as she played the CD on the DVD player, with the sound coming out of the television speakers, the students were staring attentively at the television screen and could only see the track numbers of the CD being played. What she wanted was something for them to watch too. Lotto and Holt (2010) emphasise how important vision is compared to audition in their research into the psychology of auditory perception. Subtitles in English were also requested as she thought that it would enhance the learning process for her students. The conversations and dialogues for the Prathom one CD are contained at the Appendix to Graham (2009a).

Having listened to the feedback Ms. Pranee Boonsaeng had put forward, a decision was made to produce the
Prathom two material as a DVD with fixed subtitles in English. There was no need for removable subtitles as a conscious effort was made to try to have the students read the subtitles, even though this restricted certain learning opportunities (O’Hagan 2007).

This was also the case for Prathom three and then the initial Prathom one material was revised and produced as a DVD to reflect that there was going to be only two characters talking in the conversations. Bank and Noi feature in the DVDs played by two bi-lingual teenagers who have distinctly different ways of speaking English, giving those listening a variety of models to aim for. This proved important as there were many occasions when teachers expressed concern that their students were not able to mimic exactly the stress and intonation of Bank and Noi (Jewitt 2002). It was explained that as long as the speaker was understood, then the aim of the exercise had been achieved, which proved reassuring for those concerned. Care was taken to give the best examples of English pronunciation: however, when the opportunity arose, different types of pronunciation were used by the two characters portrayed on the DVD.

The Prathom one book has nine units with 19 tests. It was impossible to include everything that is in the test book; however, all units were covered with scope to conduct vocabulary substitution and extension activities at the discretion of the teacher. An example of how the text from the test books was adapted into dialogue can be seen below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Greeting</th>
<th>Introduce oneself</th>
<th>Ask someone’s name</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hello!</td>
<td>My name is</td>
<td>What is your name?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hi!</td>
<td>........................</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Good morning.</td>
<td>I am</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Good afternoon.</td>
<td>........................</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Good evening. Prepare for Examinations – Prathom One by Modern Academic Center
Dialogue from the first page of Prathom one was adapted from the above to show the conversation below:

Hello. My name is Bank. What is your name?

Hi. My name is Noi. Pleased to meet you.

Nice to meet you too. Goodbye Noi.

Goodbye Bank.

The words that have been underlined are suggestions for word substitution later once students have become confident in using the new language structure. Students role-play Bank and Noi at first and then progress to their real names later. Good morning, good evening etc. are introduced in subsequent activities. Fisher, Gertner, Scott and Yuan (2010) indicate that a form of syntactic bootstrapping takes place as children map nouns in sentences onto roles in events, making the structures of sentences meaningful to the students. Later, verbs show meaning by their behaviour in given sentences.

The second page of Prathom one is based on a very short dialogue.

What is this?

This is a pencil. What is that?

That is a ruler.

These simple deictic expressions may seem problematic when you consider that in Thai, there are three areas to consider; nee (here), nan (there) and noon (far over there). Taking the Isaan dialect into account complicates things further as there is pee (here), nan (there) and phoonah (far over there). However, even though Foley (2005) explains that there is a need for a subtle understanding of how a language is used in Thai and global contexts, the children
who have taken part in the trials seem to grasp certain pragmatics by accepting that in English you do it one way and in Thai you do it a different way.

This can also be said for other language areas; to quote a five year old school child, “Daddy, in English we say football, in Thai we say footbarn.” For some children a clear distinction can be made between English and Thai. As the levels progressed through the Prathom years, the dialogues became more difficult to construct as the Thai foreign language curriculum focuses increasingly on grammar; however, where possible, conversations took place between Bank and Noi. Where it was not possible, monologues took place showing examples of grammar in context. Subjects were curriculum based including food, sports, hobbies, local culture and nationalities. In addition, making the DVDs gave the opportunity to focus on morals and ethics, a major part of Thailand’s basic education curriculum, concerning subjects such as listening to what parents say, being a good student, timely completion of homework, going to bed early on school days and washing hands before eating healthy food. Good manners were displayed throughout the scenes as an example of how to behave when using English as an international language.

The logistics proved difficult as the dialogues were written initially for linguistic reasons without any thought for the production of a set of DVDs; however, by breaking down the props page by page, scene by scene, it was possible to shoot approximately 12 to 15 pages a day. Each Prathom level contains about 30 pages and filming took around nine days for each of the three year periods of education that were shot during two consecutive summer holiday breaks. Further days were needed to re-shoot scenes that needed certain subtle changes.

The DVDs were shot at a local music and education center in Udon Thani called Chorus Line (Graham 2010a). Rates were discounted for the two periods during the successive summer breaks to make Prathoms 1-3 and 4-6 and shooting involved using a Sony Mini DV Handycam DRC-TRV25E for the video by Miss Panida Phiwdee. Sound
was recorded separately using Adobe Audition 3, Creative Wavestudio 7 and Ulead Media Sound Pro 8 for editing purposes. Finally, Adobe Premiere 6.5 was used to marry the video and sound tracks together by Mr Sarun Rattanatoowan. Post production went smoothly the first year; however, there were severe difficulties for the second as Chorus Line was flooded several times during the rainy season and there were also technical difficulties with the synchronisation of video and sound components.

Once the DVDs were complete, a painstaking process of proofreading took place to check that sound matched pictures, subtitles were spelt correctly, superimposed pictures were correct and for anything else that would detract from the learning process. The end result of the first three years of basic education (Prathoms 1-3) went online in June 2009 at www.steves-english-zone.com and has attracted thousands of downloads. WinZip files can be downloaded which contain a Windows Media file showing the video, an MP3 file which has just the audio and a Microsoft Word document that has the script. The next batch, Prathoms 4-6 went online in November 2010.

Hundreds of DVDs have been given away to teachers at training days to ensure that as many schools in the four districts covered by Educational Service Area Office 4, Udon Thani province (Kutchap, Nayung, Namsom and Ban Phue) have access to these materials. In turn, these DVDs have been copied by the teachers and given to friends and relatives.

Application in the Classroom

The majority of Thai teachers of English are experienced teachers who work under stressful conditions with heavy workloads and up until now, a small salary; however, it is important to realise that even though many have not been trained to teach using communicative activities in a learner-centred way, it does not take long for them to adapt as long as there is sufficient scaffolding. The
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ethos behind the initial teacher training project was for teachers to carry on teaching the way they were used to, but to try out communicative activities as an add-on, somewhere in their lesson. The use of DVDs in the classroom was possible because many rural schools have access to DVD players and televisions (Gaikwad, Paruthi and Thies 2010), furthermore many schools have this equipment in all their classrooms, due in part to the low cost of purchasing these items (approximately $100) and its popularity (Castleberry and Evers 2010) despite there not being many studies into the exposure of children to television (Anderson and Pempek 2005) and DVD.

The Smooth Transitions DVDs can be used in many ways, to introduce, to practice, to confirm and even to test; however, it is important to allow the Thai teachers of English the freedom to experiment with their own imagination and ideas in order to build up their confidence, whilst assisting teachers and students to understand the “sociological perspective outside the classroom” (Bingham and Hernandez 2009) as they make mistakes and laugh at their attempts to role-play. The DVDs have the ability to “contextualise in the moment both spatially and temporally while conveying a sense of motion” (Murray 2009).

Notwithstanding this, some basic procedures were suggested for those teachers that needed the extra scaffolding. If a school has a course-book that follows the national curriculum, for example, “Gogo Loves English” by Longman, then it is relatively easy to supplement the book by using the DVD to enhance related topics and themes, making them more communicative. Teachers were advised to show the section of the DVD that was relevant to a specific part of the curriculum that they were teaching and repeat it as many times as the students wanted. Then, the teacher would pause the DVD at convenient points to explain in Thai what was being said so that the students understood the meaning of what was being articulated in English (Gill 2005).

Next, the teacher would have all the boys say the Bank dialogues and the girls would repeat what was said by Noi. Having completed that task, the teacher would ask for a
volunteer from the class to simulate the scene with the teacher, pausing the DVD after each small segment (Rigg 1976) to make it easier for the students to understand and follow. It is very important at this stage for students to actually understand what they are saying compared to just copying it parrot fashion (Tkaczyk 2010). Finally, students would come out to the front of the class in pairs and act as Bank and Noi (Buggey 2007). It is important to say at this stage that all students need to be involved in these activities (Higginbotham 2009), regardless of how shy they may appear to be and because the activities are varied, there is little chance of students becoming bored (Richards 2005).

Throughout the whole procedure, students are encouraged to read the subtitles on the paused DVD. Whilst it is true that many of the young learners are not really reading; by going through this process, they soon become familiar with the words they see as they are recycled in many future dialogues and activities leading to comprehensible input (Krashen 1997).

These suggested procedures were transmitted by way of workshops and training days given to specific schools which were part of the initial implementation project as well as teachers that took part in localised training in the four districts covered by Educational Service Area Office 4, Udon Thani province (Graham 2010b). Moreover, teachers were encouraged to use the DVDs to prepare for their lessons and practice their own language skills. Once the teachers were confident with their own performance in the classroom, they were encouraged to deviate from the prescribed procedures and use the materials as they saw fit.

Trials have taken place in several schools to see how the Smooth Transitions materials are being accepted by students and teachers resulting in a large amount of data being collected by videoing teachers teaching in their classrooms; in addition to feedback sessions organised to motivate and encourage those participating in the various projects that were running at the time.
A video showing two students from Wat Muangkwak School, Amphur Muang, Lamphun completing their first attempt at Prathom one, page two can be seen at: http://www.steves-english-zone.com/primary-school-english-language-teachers.html

Implications for Future Development

Katchen (2004) asks what types of new innovations there will be with the advent of the computer in relation to classroom dynamics. By having dialogues and conversation that are relevant to the curriculum, it means that a teacher with a good imagination can innovate their teaching with new ideas. The same material that has been used for the Smooth Transitions DVDs has been used in conjunction with SpeaKIT speech recognition software and is undergoing a trial at a rural ERIC Center (English Resources Instruction Center) in Bantatprachanukoon School which started in October 2010 (Graham 2010c).

This longitudinal study has been instigated to investigate the benefits of integrating video with speech recognition software to enhance the learning experience of primary school learners of English in Thailand. By having this project take place in an ERIC Center, it is hoped that there will be maximum coverage of the local area, as well as allowing different schools, clusters and districts, including other ERIC Centers to use the equipment and take part in the research.

The difference with this software compared to others used for education is that the computer tracks the way the speaker speaks and then assesses the speaker. Most other software products leave it up to the speaker to decide if their pronunciation is acceptable or not. Early indications are that students and teachers are positive about the concept of integrating the use of multimedia and information technology into the Thai foreign language classroom.
In addition, for the last year a series of trials using comics have been conducted at the Demonstration School, Udon Thani Rajabhat University; Wat Muangkwak School, Amphur Muang, Lamphun and Bantatprachanukoon School, Ban Phue district, Udon Thani. Once again the same conversations and dialogues were used; however, this time to make gap-fill activities and encourage the students to read and write.

The comics are made using a website by Bill Zimmerman called MakeBeliefsComix and can be found at: http://www.makebeliefscomix.com/ allowing the production of the “Smooth Transitions” dialogues and conversations to be input in comic form and then published. The trials have been extremely successful and the students have been very quick to pick up the procedure in the classroom. Once the gap-fills have been completed, students can colour the characters and then have the opportunity to write the dialogues on lined paper. It was interesting to note that even though some students in the trial had never written English before, they were able to cope with an easy lesson from Prathom one. These comics have proved to be a motivating force for the students acting as a conduit for reading other types of text (Krashen 1993).

Slideshows and video showing the use of comics can be viewed at:
http://www.steves-english-zone.com/p-english.html and 
http://www.steves-english-zone.com/bantatprachanukoon-school.html

Bill Zimmerman has agreed to allow the gap-fill and completed “Smooth Transitions” comics to be uploaded onto the internet for free download by teachers. This is a project that will take a considerable amount of time to achieve; however, it is anticipated that work will begin in February 2011 to have all six years of primary school comics ready for download by the end of 2011.
Conclusions

Pilot projects for “Smooth Transitions” have taken place in rural areas taking into account that the majority of students in Thailand live outside of Bangkok and other large cities and also to try to address, educationally, the problems that poverty and food insecurity have on education that hinders academic achievement, not just in Thailand, but throughout the world (Coles 2010). The level of English is very low in these areas, so the slightest intervention results in a massive improvement in the use of English. It has been accepted that one of the failings of this study is that there is no formal assessment and evaluation criteria; however, at conception, the intention of the project was to just “try to do some good and see where it takes us.” Having been successful informally and anecdotally, more formal assessment and evaluation will take place in the future using narrative enquiry based on ten feedback sessions with teachers from Bantatprachanukoon School.

It is important to note that as the name suggests, the “Smooth Transitions” DVDs have been designed to help teachers of English in primary schools adapt to the demands of the transition to student-centred communicative activities in line with the 1999 Education Act and the more recent demands of Curriculum 51. Having been educated in a teacher-centred environment themselves and then teaching for such a long time in that same style as they were taught themselves (Hayes 1995), a smooth transition is needed to give them the materials and support needed to find a pathway to EIL for Thailand’s young learners one step at a time.

These DVDs were made for a fraction of the budget that professional film-makers would have charged with their expertise and resources (Berman 2010); however, although they would be expected to produce a better quality DVD, it is debateable as to whether this would have made a difference to the students’ performance in the classroom. It is context and graded items following the curriculum that make the DVDs appealing to both students and teachers.
Having spent so much time working with Thai teachers of English in a rural context, the author finds himself calling into question the description of the Thai value system by Komin (1990), which has ego orientation as the leading value and achievement-task orientation as the last. These teachers who have attempted to change from teacher-centred to learner-centred teaching have demonstrated a reversal of these orientations which, because they have turned out to be successful in their new teaching habits and styles, has subsequently led to an increase in status for those involved (Graham 2009b).

Thai teachers of English have responded positively with approximately 25,000 enquiries for downloads for the Prathom one to three DVDs on an Educational Service Area Office 4, Udon Thani province blog http://www.sornor.org/?p=24 maintained by one of the supervisors Channarong Rachbuanoy, an original member of the first project team from Bantatprachanukoon School. If it was possible for MTV to be accepted in China (Fung 2006), then there is no reason why the use of “Smooth Transitions” English language DVDs should not be accepted in Thailand’s primary school classrooms in order to expose students to language used appropriately to support and contextualise their learning (Keene 2006). Only time will tell whether the Ministry of Education will be willing to investigate the possibility of using these resources in Thailand’s classrooms on a larger scale than at present.

The use of DVDs in the classroom is nothing new; however, what appears to be unravelling as a consequence of the various projects under the umbrella of “Smooth Transitions” is a series of innovations that uses English as an International Language whilst keeping to the national curriculum and making the context local, in order to keep the attention and interest of all concerned.

The aim for the future is to amalgamate all these materials as they are based on the national curriculum and use them in conjunction with a course book that follows the same content, such as Gogo Loves English. The materials have been designed for rural teachers in Thailand that have
not had the necessary training to teach English to use as a pathway to EIL for Thailand’s young learners. Furthermore, trials will be undertaken over the coming years in other countries as it is believed that this experience can be used as a model for Asian neighbours who are looking for more personalised communicative English language teaching materials that are curriculum based in a context that students and teachers can relate to.

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Human Trafficking in Burma and the Solutions Which Have Never Reached

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Abstract: Since the 1980s, the problem of human rights and trafficking in persons in Burma has become one of the prominent matters on the agendas at various levels of international forums. However, this article argues that even if enormous efforts have been put into democratizing the political-economic system, which would ultimately alleviate the issue, none were effective due to the discrepancies of strategic-oriented foreign policies of the key actors involved. First, despite its rules-based mechanisms under the ASEAN Charter, the way ASEAN members act in response to the problem in Burma still depends mainly on the normative foundations of the ASEAN Way, emphasizing the non-interference in the internal affairs of each other. Burma is also becoming an important geopolitical concern of both China and India because of its energy sources needed for economic growth. The economic and military assistance to the SPDC in exchange for that demand is thus provided with less concern over human rights situation. The above two issues have also devalued the measure of economic sanction imposed by the U.S. and the EU. In addition, even if the EU humanitarian aid is aimed at improving Burma’s social and human security, it is by no means the way to solve the problems of migration and human trafficking in Burma as the authoritarian rule still continued.

Keywords: Burma’s Ruling Junta, Ethnic Minorities, Human Rights, Human Trafficking, Migration

Introduction

“Trafficking in persons shall mean the recruitment, transportation, transfer, harboring or receipt of persons, by means of the threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of deception,
of the abuse of power or of a position of vulnerability or of the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over another person, for the purpose of exploitation. Exploitation shall include, at a minimum, the exploitation of the prostitution of others or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labor or services, slavery or practices similar to slavery, servitude or the removal of organs” (United Nations, 2000).

By reference to the definition mentioned above, human trafficking is thus perceived as a non-traditional security issue and is widely recognized as a kind of transnational crime. However, the determinant factors causing trafficking in persons are varied depending on both national and regional political, economic, and social circumstances. In particular, the appropriate measures that should be manipulated to address such issues are still much in debate. Especially in the case of Burma, the problem of human trafficking has proved notoriously difficult to remedy. It has been argued that there have been various factors which are influential forces behind the problem.

The first emerged as the consequence of internal political turmoil and despotic politics. In view of the first military coup led by General Ne Win in 1962 followed by the second coup in 1988 that resulted in the establishment of a new ruling military junta, which is now known as the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC), all spheres of Burma’s domestic affairs have been placed under the central control of the ruling junta. Even though the 1990 parliamentary election resulted in a landslide victory of the National League for Democracy (NLD) led by Aung San Suu Kyi, the SPDC continued its authoritarian rule to dominate their population, especially over ethnic minorities in the eastern border zones. This problem has led the United States, the European Union (EU), and some other Western countries to become directly engaged in Burma’s domestic affairs by imposing a range of economic sanctions and related measures against the military regime.

The second factor, as closely related to the former, concerns the accession of Burma as a member of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in July
1997. The SPDC can use the status of being a member of ASEAN to guarantee its internal political power, and to ensure that the other parties will respect commitments already made. That is because, according to the statement of the 1967 ASEAN Declaration, whatever the posture of such states will be, it left membership in the organization open to all states in the Southeast Asia region subscribing to the aims, principles, and purposes of ASEAN (ASEAN Secretariat, 1967). In addition, neither the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC) in Southeast Asia nor any other agreements requires ASEAN members to change their political regimes (ASEAN Secretariat, 1976). Instead, they advocated the so-called network-style of cooperation by making use of interpersonal and informal relations to pursue what they referred to as an Asian-style of cooperation. This might also be in accordance with what they promoted as the ASEAN Way. At this point, even though attempts were launched to alleviate the problem of human trafficking in Burma, limitations on the role of ASEAN institutions and its mechanisms were a matter of controversy. At the same time, as ASEAN's partners like China and India have developed close political, military, and economic relations with Burma, these could also improve the bargaining power of the SPDC to against the sanction measures imposed by the West.

Besides the political pressure, the third factor concerns the deepening of economic disparities among ASEAN member states. To get a better standard of living, millions of ethnic minorities such as Shans, Karens and Kachins have migrated from Burma. The number of Burmese people leaving their country has grown to one of the largest migration flows in the Southeast Asia region. Unfortunately, a large number of them have been trafficked to Thailand, China, India, Pakistan, Malaysia, and South Korea for commercial sexual exploitation, domestic servitude, and forced labor. Burmese children are subjected to conditions of forced labor in Thailand as hawkers, beggars, and for work in shops, agricultural, fish processing, and small-scale

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1 The ASEAN Way is a method of interaction and a decision-making process which seeks to reach corporate decision through consultation and consensus building. When common decision cannot be reached, they agree to go their separate ways. As ASEAN evolved, the organization has developed formula that allowed it to adopt positions without unanimity, see Narine (2005).
industries. In parallel, Burmese women are largely trafficked for commercial sexual exploitation to Malaysia and China, and some other trafficking victims transit Burma from Bangladesh to Malaysia and from China to Thailand (Aronowitz, 2009; Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons, 2009).

In view of the national and regional circumstances mentioned above, even though ASEAN leaders and some major players outside the region made various attempts at developing measures which would ultimately quell the problem of human trafficking in Burma, none were effective. However, in recent years, there have been important changes at both regional and international levels which might pave the way to the changing of democratization process in Burma in general, and human rights and trafficking in persons in particular. The first is the development of an ASEAN Charter which would give ASEAN a more rules-based organization, while the second is the U.S.’s high-level engagement with Burma’s military leaders and the EU’s humanitarian aid programs. With these events in view, the emphasis of this article falls on the role of ASEAN member states and its newly rules-based mechanisms of the ASEAN Charter, as well as the influences of key players outside the region in responding to the human trafficking situation in Burma.

To clarify these matters, the first issue of exploration is that even if many treaties and agreements related to the case of human trafficking were signed, and some ASEAN member states have seemingly been affected by the illegal migration of Burmese people, question remains on whether each ASEAN member can change its quiet diplomacy and the rejection of adversarial posturing in negotiations under the principles of the ASEAN Way into a proactive role in promoting human rights and democracy in Burma. In addition, as the ASEAN leaders signed the Kuala Lumpur Declaration in ratifying the establishment of the ASEAN Charter at the 11th ASEAN Summit, a landmark constitutional document for ASEAN regional cooperation which was to come into effect on December 15, 2008, the analysis is also placed upon whether ASEAN members can create any effective rules-based mechanisms for supervisory purposes (ASEAN Secretariat, 2010).
Also involved is the question of whether ASEAN will take a more consideration on how to cope with any potential challenges that arise from external powers, especially from the two competing economic powers like China and India which have close relations with the SPDC. Therefore, the second issue is to explore the impact of China’s and India’s strategic foreign policies might have upon human trafficking situation in Burma, and the role of ASEAN in dealing with it. At the same time, while economic sanction is still manipulated, diplomatic pressures through both multilateral consultations and high-level official meetings are also encouraged. However, actions taken by each key player seem to have different objectives, as the EU provides humanitarian aid for social security while the U.S. mainly stimulates high-level engagement in democratization process. Therefore, the third issue is to explore the potential impact such two different approaches might provide crucial change for the human rights and human trafficking situation in Burma.

The Human Trafficking Situation in Burma

In regard to the theoretical perspective, a great deal of the world’s ethnic and nationalist tension can be explained in terms of people who are forced to live in an unrepresentative political system that they have not chosen (Paribatra and Samudavanija, 1986). During the Cold War, even if social unification and creation of a nation-state were the main purposes for central governments, many ethnic minorities put enormous efforts into their struggles for self-determination that would free them from the control of the central government. Efforts at self-determination could be understood by the fact that most developing countries were controlled by one-party rule or military governments. In particular, such regimes were highly undemocratic and brutally used political and military power to govern their population, although political and military leaders there believed it to be justified and necessary.

For Burma, after achieving independence in 1948, the major domestic problem was that the majority ethnic group, so-called “the Burman,” was split into many rival political
groups as well as the fact that there were long-established rivalries between the majority of the population of Burma and other ethnic groups. Those ethnic groups live primarily in the Tanintharyi Division, an administrative region of Burma covering the long narrow southern part of the country, and in the Shan, Mon, Kayah, and Kayin States in the east, where ethnically-based armed opposition groups have been fighting against the Tatmadaw (the Burma Armed Forces) (Amnesty International, 2001; Case, 2002). Such ethnic groups have sought to gain greater autonomy, or in some cases, independence from the dominant ethnic Burman majority.

Even though the 1947 Panglong Agreement resulted in some ceasefires between the Tatmadaw and armed ethnic groups,\footnote{The Panglong Agreement was first signed between General Aung San and leaders of the Chin, Kachin, and Shan ethnic groups in February 1947. Since 1989, around 19 armed ethnic groups have agreed to ceasefires with the SPDC. The agreement basically guarantees self-determination of the ethnic minorities and offered a large measure of autonomy, including independent legislature, judiciary, and administrative powers, see Walton (2008).} confrontations among them still continued and even intensified as a result of the SPDC’s plan to transform armed opposition groups into Tatmadaw-Commanded Border Guard Forces before the 2010 election (Amnesty International, 2010).\footnote{According to the blueprint of the Border Guard Forces (BGF), it plans to give a greater control of ethnic armed groups to the Tatmadaw by putting all ethnic armies under the command of the commander-in-chief, currently General Than Shwe, head of the SPDC. The BGF plan is authorized under the military-backed 2008 constitution. The commander-in-chief of the Tatmadaw can assign duties relating to security and border affairs in self-administered zones or among ethnic armed group-controlled areas, see also in Amnesty International (2010).} In parallel, as part of the “four cuts strategy” (an attempt to cut off food, funds, intelligence, and recruits to the insurgents), the Tatmadaw has perpetrated widespread violations of economic, social, and cultural rights, including the deprivation of means of livelihood, the destruction of houses, excessive taxation, and coercion. It is also argued that the Tatmadaw has often used force against the innocent people who live in ethnic minority-dominated areas far in excess of the level necessary for its military operations. Under these circumstances, the ethnic minorities are obviously treated unequal as compared with the Burman, or even, in some cases, are not recognized as the
citizen of Burma.\footnote{Basically, all people should have identity card (ID card) when they are 18 years old. But in Burma’s rural areas, most of the members of ethnic minorities have no proof of identification. For example, Kachin is Kachin, he or she is not Burman. Without ID card, they cannot travel legally outside of their hometown.} They are inevitably forced to flee their homes. Displacement and other state-sponsored coercive measures such as forced labor and land confiscation have also been manipulated, thereby as a consequence causing massive refugee outflow (International Displacement Monitoring Center, 2010).

What should also be taken into account is the failure of state-formed agencies whose primary function is to promote basic human rights for all people, especially for women and children. Indeed, it was hoped that the problems of human rights abuse and trafficking in persons in Burma would be alleviated when the SPDC made some progress by establishing some new independent organizations to work for women and children such as the Myanmar Maternal and Child Welfare Association (MMCWA), Myanmar Women Entrepreneurs’ Association (MWEA), and Myanmar Women Sports Federation (MWSF) since the 1990s (Women’s League of Burma, 2005). They were established with the aims of upholding the welfare and advancement of Burmese women and children, as well as promoting the participation of women and children in all kinds of social activities. But none of them was effective. Rather, it is surprising that despite all such organizations tried to work upon the problems, the ruling junta continued its offensive campaigns particularly in the eastern ethnic areas, thereby causing various problems such as forced relocation, destruction of homes and property, and extra-judicial killing.

On the basis of what have been discussed above, ethnic minorities feel not only marginalized economically, but also that their social and cultural rights are being suppressed. This kind of circumstance is in accordance with what the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) has referred to as the threat to human security, especially in terms of personal security stressing the protection of basic human rights of all people and the absence of physical violence (United Nations Development Program, 1994). In addition, according to the U.S. State Department in its 10th
annual trafficking in persons report in 2010, Burma falls among the 13 countries that fail to meet the U.S.’s minimum standards in fighting the crime of human trafficking (Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons, 2010). As a result, this political pressure has a destabilizing influence resulting in the large number of refugees, economic migrants, and drugs flowing out of the country.

Since the early 1990s, an estimated 3 million people—especially those from ethnic minorities along the borderline—have been leaving Burma with the hope for economic opportunities in neighboring countries (International Displacement Monitoring Center, 2010). Evidence for this is the fact that GDP per capita in Burma increased just from US$198.4 million in 2005 to US$419.5 million in 2009, while those of Thailand, Malaysia, and Singapore increased from 2,708.8, 5,280.6, and 27,342.9 million U.S. dollars to 3,950.8, 6,822.1, and 36,631.2 million U.S. dollars in the same period (ASEAN Finance and Macroeconomic Surveillance Unit, 2010). Nevertheless, most of them have been subjugated to the conditions of involuntary servitude in the low-skilled works. For example, the Burmese migrants are allowed to work in the areas that the Thai workers do not want to do such as commercial seafood and fishing industries, as well as construction sites and domestic work sectors. Especially in the case of women and children, they have been trafficked into situations of forced labor and commercial sex industry. Therefore, what followed from the inflows of migrants and refugees are the smuggling of illicit drugs and the epidemic of HIV/AIDS as a result.

As discussed above, even though the reason for the migration of Burmese people is simply because of the poverty, but the main factor behind such movements is political discrimination. Additionally, there have many arguments concerning the reasons for the existence of the problems. Even though enormous efforts have been put into promoting the law enforcement, serious problems remain because the SPDC is not complying with minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking in persons. Instead, it allows military and civilian officials remain involved in forced labor. Although the government agencies tried to protect the victims of cross-border human trafficking, but it revealed limited attention to protect victims
of internal sex trafficking existing within its borders. With these in view, it can be argued that the existence of laws that prohibit sexual offenses and provide strong punishments does not mean they are adequately, or perhaps really, enforced.

**ASEAN and its Institutional Mechanisms**

Similar to the issues of the 1997 economic crisis and the bloodshed in East Timor during the course of its separation from Indonesia, which were drawn into the forum for top-level political discussion, ASEAN members have—since the 1st ASEAN Conference on Transnational Crime held in Manila in December 1997—called for firm measures to combat transnational crime and trafficking in women and children particularly in Burma (ASEAN Secretariat, 1997). Change in regard to the norm of non-interference in the internal affairs of each other was also taken into account. At that time, Thai Foreign Minister Surin Pitsuwan, who is now the Secretary General of ASEAN, openly said that it was time for ASEAN to review its non-intervention doctrine such that it is modified to allow it to play a constructive role in preventing or resolving domestic issues with regional implications. To make the grouping more effective, Surin has urged that when a matter of domestic concern poses a threat to regional stability and security, a does of peer pressure or friendly advice at the right time can be helpful (Acharya, 1999).

Indeed, many treaties and agreements related to transnational crime and human trafficking were signed since 1997. For example, part of the Hanoi Plan of Action (HPA) declared in December 1998 clearly defined the implementation of the ASEAN Plan of Action for Children, providing a framework for ensuring the survival, protection, and development of children, and for strengthening the collaborative action in combating the trafficking in, and the crimes of violence against, women and children (ASEAN Secretariat, 1998). These campaigns were also reiterated in a continuing action plan, the Vientiane Action Program (VAT).
which was proclaimed during the 10th ASEAN Summit held in Laos in November 2004 (ASEAN Secretariat, 2004).

The expectation for real change concerning the trafficking in persons was increased when ASEAN leaders—at the 11th ASEAN Summit held in Kuala Lumpur in December 2005—formally signed the Kuala Lumpur Declaration in ratifying the establishment of an ASEAN Charter, which became effective in December 2008. The development of the ASEAN Charter would not only give ASEAN a more rules-based organization, but also would serve to reduce the destabilizing effects of intra-regional conflicts (ASEAN Secretariat, 2010). Nevertheless, a remarkable point is that this charter could more or less affect the concept of the ASEAN Way in which informal and non-legalistic procedures of cooperation have always been promoted by all ASEAN member states.

Also included is the establishment of independent agencies aimed at dealing with the problem of human rights violation and trafficking in persons such as ASEAN Human Rights Body and the Working Group for an ASEAN Human Rights Mechanism. ¹ Surprisingly, during the Working Group’s deliberations, some diplomats expressed the opinion that the new human rights body should not intervene in domestic human rights issues such as the current crisis in Burma at all, but instead should protect countries from foreign meddling (The Irrawaddy, 2009). They also proposed that the primary task of the nascent human rights body should be to promote and protect human rights, which in its view include raising awareness, advising and sharing information, and advocating, but not to pass judgment regarding human rights in any member states.

With these in view, even if attempts between ASEAN members have been made to the issue of anti-trafficking, a growing perception among related parties to such attempts is that ASEAN members fail to deal adequately with trans-border migration in general, and they lack the same degree of law enforcement at the national level in particular. This

¹ ASEAN members agreed upon the terms for the human rights body stipulated in the ASEAN Charter, to be known as the Asian Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights (AICHR), in July 2009. However, no one is sure what effect, if any, the AICHR will have upon the human rights situation in Burma.
means that the criminal justice in response to trafficking in persons is typically structured and generally only operated within the state’s realm of jurisdiction. Additionally, while regional organizations and forums attended by delegates from ten member states are already playing a role fostering transnational network, they have yet to become policy-making institutions as they should be.

Theoretically, regional cooperation does not come about unless the governments and peoples of each state within a given region want it. By analogy with this statement, ASEAN leaders did not develop a joint policy on the issue of large-scale migrant labor because each member has never seen eye-to-eye on the problem. Instead, in hindsight, ASEAN being guided by a national rather than a supranational approach of its members is evidently even much further away from the development of social policies on anti-trafficking in persons at the ASEAN level. Although the policy was formulated to appear as a helping hand to Burma, it was, not surprisingly, a policy that from the outset was meant to benefit ASEAN’s members first and foremost. At this point, it can be argued that the Southeast Asian governments focus mainly on economic cooperation, which they believe can bridge the economic development gap among member states and pave the way to closer ASEAN regional cooperation, but with little or no attention being given to how to cope with the issues of cross-border migration and human trafficking (Pimoljinda, 2010). Under the surface of this is the fact that both legal and illegal migrants have provided the rich member states a desirable pool of cheap labor.

Also involved in this regard is that ASEAN members and related local agencies who are working on trafficking in persons have not considered the problem in a holistic perspective, and are unable to deal with it in a synergistic approach. Wherever the country of origin or destination might be, they have segregated the issues of migration and human trafficking into different areas which reveal a lack of understanding about the problem. In addition, they did not think of the matter of transnational crime in connection with the social aspects of human trafficking or vice versa. An interesting point followed is that whether the existing ASEAN institutions combining a search for regional order mainly
through a legally binding agreement of the ASEAN Charter can improve the human trafficking situation in the region, especially within Burma.

It is believed that this charter is significant as it provides a legal framework for ASEAN regional cooperation after its forty years of institutionalization, turning the group from an *ad hoc* body to a rules-based organization with clearer structures and mechanisms of cooperation. Some important political commitments prescribed in the document also stress that ASEAN members will share commitment and collective responsibility in enhancing regional peace, security, and prosperity by taking all necessary measures, including consultations on matters seriously affecting the common interests of ASEAN, to effectively implement the provisions of this charter and to comply with all obligations of membership. Nevertheless, in line with what were discussed above, together what is referred to as the ASEAN Way, ASEAN members undoubtedly still preferred informal and non-legalistic procedures rather than rigid institutional mechanisms.

Admittedly, ASEAN members seemingly reject the idea that regional institutions require a pooling of the sovereignty of their component states. Instead, under the aegis of the ASEAN Way, they believe that regional institutions should more or less enhance the national sovereignty of them all. Furthermore, in the case of non-intervention approach, it is difficult to change because many ASEAN members are not democratic country in which some of them still face the problem of human rights violation. In this regard, the existing institutional mechanisms might be put into implementation if all member states agreed to allow for a greater interference in each other’s domestic affairs. It can be said that help is possible, but intervention is difficult. In this regard, even if efforts among ASEAN members to promote and protect the rights of women, children, and migrant workers have been made, these are seemingly far away from what should be done so as to prevent internal problems stemmed from undemocratic rule and centralized economic policies.
Interface of the Problems: China and India

Apart from what was discussed above, the challenges of external powers over human trafficking in Burma must be taken into account. As Burma is placed at the front lines of the geo-political and geo-economic strategies between China and India, any potential influences upon the policy choices of the military junta, especially toward the issue of human trafficking, should thus be explored. While the rise of China and India as Asian economic centers provides opportunities for ASEAN members in opening up their national and regional economies to the global dimension, it becomes the potential challenge to the ASEAN regional cooperation in retaining its solidarity. At the same time, as these two countries are the major military suppliers of the SPDC, such military assistance could more or less intensify the situation of human rights violation in Burma as well. As a result, of concern is the impact these relations might have upon the social security and human rights situation in Burma, on the one hand, and how they affect ASEAN’s collective action toward the issue of trafficking in persons in Burma on the other.

The relationships Burma has with China and India run deep, including expanding trade links. The reason that Beijing and New Delhi have supported the SPDC over recent years is grounded on the fact that the stability of Burma serves the interests of both sides or vice versa. Even if foreign direct investment flowing into Burma is among the lowest of the ASEAN members, China’s trade with Burma has been increasing. The bilateral trade between the two countries reached US$2.9 billion in 2009 (People’s Daily Online, 2010). Besides the sixty-year long diplomatic relations, the China-Burma corridor projects serve as an important facilitator of the burgeoning bilateral trade between them. The construction of gas and oil pipelines connecting to China from Arakan State in Burma began recently at Madae Island off the Arakan Coast. It starts on Madae Island in Kyauk Pru Township on the western coast of Burma, and enters China at the border city of Ruili in China’s Yunnan Province. It will then be extended by an
additional 1,700 kilometers from Yunnan to Guizhou and Guangxi Provinces, moving 12 billion cubic meters of gas (Arakan Oil Watch, 2009).

In addition, during a two-day visit in June 2010, Prime Minister Wen Jiabao signed 15 cooperation documents, including oil and gas pipeline projects with Burma (China Daily, 2010). However, human rights abuses and environmental damages occurring due to China’s investments in Burma were being neglected from the agenda of the discussion. At the same time, Beijing wants to improve its security capabilities by expanding its access to military assistance in Burma both through supplying the SPDC with some military equipment and providing diplomatic support in the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). In parallel, as the world’s largest democracy, India has provided important military and financial assistance that helps to keep the SPDC in power. After China, India is perceived as a major power that has the best relations with Burma’s ruling junta. There have been a number of high level visits between the leaders of the two countries. To improve the connectivity with Burma, India has taken up a number of construction projects (Asian Tribune, 2010).

Recently, as a result of a five-day visit of General Than Shwe to India in July 2010, New Delhi agreed to help Burma in developmental activities covering information technology, industry, and infrastructure. Among other things, the issue of investment in natural resources is the main emphasis. Indeed, in February 2010, India’s Cabinet committee on Economic Affairs had approved a US$1.35 billion investment in gas projects in Burma, including financing for the construction of the Shwe pipeline (The Huffington Post, 2010). It might be said that such relations are guided by national economic and political interests rather than human rights and social development. Specifically, under the surface of these overt investments are the geo-strategic and geo-economic moves in response to China’s expansion westward into Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, and Burma. In this regard, when it comes to human rights and democracy in Burma, both Beijing and New Delhi choose to remain silent as they look forward to maintaining a good relationship with the SPDC.
Supporting this notion is the evidence that Beijing has paid little attention to stop the flow of Burmese women particularly those from Kachin and Shan States being sold into forced marriage with Chinese men (Network for Human Rights Documentation-Burma, 2010). At the same time, while the most significant investment of India is in the massive Shwe gas project, which is expected to provide Burma on an average of US$580 million per year, an estimated 100,000 Burmese refugees residing in India are still forced to work in low wage industries, and many Shin women have been forced into commercial sex industry (Refugees International, 2009). With these in view, the presence of China and India concerning non-intervention to interstate relations and their rejection regarding international sanctions against Burma may allow the SPDC to increase its political and economic leverage at home and abroad on the one hand, and deteriorate human security and trafficking situation on the other. Also, it could be possible that Burma itself will make use of its geo-strategic position dovetail with the influence of its partners like China and India to against the rest of the world, and even the ASEAN countries if the possible future sanctions upon it are manipulated.

Exogenous Pressures

During the Vietnam War, the authoritarian governments were encouraged by Western powers so long as they promoted political stability and anti-communism. However, after the end of the Cold War, U.S. foreign policy toward the Southeast Asia region has been reoriented as a result of the changing patterns of new great power rivalries, particularly in the case of China and India. Besides ASEAN leaders, U.S. policymakers and analysts have become increasingly concerned by the potential impact of China’s and India’s more proactive foreign policies toward Burma. While keeping sanctions in place, in line with President Barack Obama’s policies, a major policy shift of the U.S. toward Burma involves high-level engagement with the ruling junta (Steinberg, 2010). Key to this policy is the emphasis placed upon a return to constitutional democracy,
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implementation of the rule of law, and restoration of human
rights, as well as combating trafficking in persons.

As observed, U.S. interests are not only placed upon
political change in Burma, but also various security
concerns emitting from Burma, including the outflow of
narcotics, rampant human rights abuses, and large refugee
populations in neighboring countries (Asia Times Online,
2009). However, it is argued that sanctions are rarely
culminated in an expected outcome because of the refusal of
ASEAN, China, and India to support it. Especially in the case
of ASEAN, they might think that a policy of isolation and
pressure on the SPDC would only heighten its domestic
insecurity, leading to even more brutal repression within the
country. Importantly, economic sanctions would have run
counter the policy of non-interference in domestic affairs.
These circumstances have made Burma insensitive to the
U.S.’s unilateral economic pressure as a result.

In parallel, soon after Burma was admitted as an Asia-
Europe Meeting (ASEM) member state in 2004, the
authoritarian rule of the junta and its atrocious human
rights record provoked severe criticism from the EU. Indeed,
since the early 1990s, the EU has maintained a set of
sanctions on Burma that has been strengthened over time.
The sanctions comprise a travel ban on junta leaders,
members of the judiciary, and political figures associated
with the junta, including assets freeze, a ban on the export
of regime-linked entities working in the industries of woods,
metals, and construction materials. Even at the 18th
ASEAN-EU Ministerial Meeting held in Madrid on May 26,
2010, the EU called on Burma’s rulers to ensure that this
year’s planned election is credible, transparent, and
democratic. Nevertheless, unlike the U.S., the EU and
ASEAN ministers agreed to continue their dialogue on
Burma, including on how to step up assistance aimed at
improving Burma’s social and economic conditions (The
Irrawaddy, 2010).

An estimated 17.25 million euros humanitarian aid
provided through the European Commission’s Humanitarian
Aid Department (ECHO) is expected to improve the standard
of living of the ethnic groups living along Burma’s borderline
and refugee camps in Thailand (NEUROPE, 2010).
However, it is provided to the ethnic groups without any
measures that can ensure their protection from being abused and exploited by the SPDC. More importantly, it is doubtful that whether such humanitarian aid scenarios provided would conversely make the SPDC fewer concerns about the problem of human rights and trafficking in persons. With these in view, besides economic and military assistance provided by China and India, the discrepancy existed between the EU’s and the U.S.’s policy choices can also reduce the impact of sanctions upon Burma.

**Conclusion**

Although the causes of human trafficking in Burma are quite similar to what have been happened elsewhere, but key actors involved and their influences make it difficult to resolve. First of all, even though the ASEAN Charter became effective in December 2008, it remains the case that whether its emphasis on human rights and trafficking in persons are adequately comprehensive. In order to alleviate such problems and uphold social security, the issues of human rights and trafficking in persons should not only be viewed as a threat affecting social stability of each, but should also be recognized as an important challenge diminishing the regional security and development as a whole. In view of this, it should helpful for ASEAN members to raise this issue on their national agenda, and in particular on the regional forum for top-level political and economic discussion. In doing so, individual members of ASEAN must relinquish some of their autonomous power in order to develop common decision-making and settlement of issue. They should also be concerned about the specific code of conduct or legal-based settlement for any potential problems occurring in each member state that may affect internal and regional security rather than adopt the diplomatic or negotiation approach under the principles of the ASEAN Way.

Parallel to this is the repositioning of the diplomatic or strategic approach toward Burma’s partners outside the region. Multilateral consultations between ASEAN members and China and India as to what should be done—specifically on the basis of the ASEAN Charter and its legally binding
dispute settlement mechanisms—so as to upgrade human rights record in Burma should be addressed. In regard to the role of the U.S. and the EU, unilateral sanctions and condemnations against Burma and multilateral efforts made at the international forums have proved impossible to change the policy direction of the SPDC, or even leading to the changing of political regime. That is because sanctions are not focused directly on human trafficking situation, but democratization process and human rights in general. At the same time, not only this policy choice has a far-reaching effect upon Burma’s national economy, but also it has profound effect upon social conditions and human security by putting the poor at risk of being trafficked. Relevant to this is the issue of rapid economic development of China and India. It is not only altering the global balance of power, but it is also increasing Burma’s resistance to the pressures of the international community.

At this point, if the U.S. and the EU want to solve the problem of human trafficking in Burma, a new direction of their policy choices will require a greater cooperation with key regional players in order to succeed. They should hold bilateral talk on the matter of the problem with ASEAN members, and do so with China and India, either formally or informally, or both. Specifically, as India and some other East Asian countries such as Japan, Singapore and South Korea are its major allies in Asia, Washington should make use of its well relationship with these Asian countries in pressing Beijing to take a more active role in responding to the problem of human rights and trafficking in persons in Burma.

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Problematizing ‘Ethnicity’ in Informal Preferencing in Civil Service: Cases from Kupang, Eastern Indonesia

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Abstract In an increasingly interconnected, globalized, world a paradoxical preoccupation with ‘belonging’ draws scholarly attention. This concern with belonging has most dramatically come to the fore in post-Suharto Indonesia in the form of various communal conflicts. Less violent in character, the importance of ‘belonging’ is also voiced in the state-dependent Eastern Indonesian town of Kupang as suspicions regarding informal favoring in local civil service. Informal preferencing in civil service is assumed to be based on ethnic favoring. Reflecting a popular social discourse for marking differences rather than a social reality, however, a focus on ethnicity is more obscuring than helpful in analyzing how informal favoring takes place. This article therefore aims to address the usefulness of ethnicity as an analytical concept. Drawing on several ethnographic examples this article argues that social capital -if necessary complemented with other forms of capital- instead of ‘ethnicity’ facilitates informal preferencing in Kupang’s service.

Keywords: civil service, informal favoring, ethnicity

Introduction

During my fieldwork in city-level government offices in the Eastern Indonesian town of Kupang I often noted suspicions concerning informal favoring in civil servant recruitment. That informal selection procedures exist alongside formal ones was never questioned, but what facilitated one in getting ahead in this informal competition was subject to debate. Oftentimes it was supposed that somehow ‘ethnicity’ had something to do with it, meaning that jobs were given out informally based on ethnic favoring. It is not surprising that ‘ethnicity’(suku) has become the social marker of difference suspected to be at the base of informal favoring in Kupang. Although located on the island of Timor, Kupang’s almost 300,000 residents originate from
all islands of the East Nusa Tenggara Province and beyond. According to estimates by Dagang (2004), the original Timorese inhabitants only form a slight majority. Second are those that trace their origins to the nearby island of Rote, followed—at a slight distance—by those that trace their roots to the island of Savu. Other immigrant groups from East Nusa Tenggara—such as those from Flores, Alor and Sumba—are present in far fewer numbers, as are migrants from outside the province. In short, being an immigration town historically ‘ethnicity’, as implying ties to an island or region of origin, is an obvious marker of difference in social discourse.1

Kupang’s ethnic and religious heterogeneity has not always made for a peaceful melting pot, as the ‘Kupang incident’ that took place on the 30th of November 1999 exemplifies (Human Rights Watch 1999; Tule 2000: 95). Despite contestation from researchers that happened to be in the area at the time of the incident, in Kupang it has popularly been explained as proof of inter-ethnic and inter-religious tensions. The Kupang incident and local understandings of what happened only fuel suspicions of inter-ethnic competition in informal favoring in local civil service. When looking at Indonesia as whole, the Kupang incident was far from an isolated occurrence. In fact, Indonesia’s transitional period from New Order rule to post-Suharto era has been marked by an upsurge in conflicts that appeared to revolve around ‘communal’ identities, such as the ones that took place in Ambon, West-Kalimantan, North-Maluku and Central Kalimantan, roughly between 1997 and 2002.

In an interesting analysis of these instances of communal violence, Gerry van Klinken counters the popular conception of religious or ethnic frictions underlying these conflicts in two ways (Van Klinken 2005; 2007). Firstly he shows that that all these occurrences of violence in some way involved an opening up of opportunities connected to the state on a very local scale facilitated by recent processes

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1 For a more elaborate historical overview of migration to Kupang see Boxer (1947) or Fox (1977).
of decentralization and democratization (Van Klinken 2005: 82-99). Religion or ethnicity in short formed useful tools for local middle classes to compete for profitable local political and administrative positions that became available in the post-Suharto era. Furthermore, the towns where these conflicts took place were middle-sized outer island towns, characterized by relative high levels of deagrarianization and state-dependency. The most unstable places of 1999 had deagrarianized most rapidly, causing an influx of state-dependent migrants into towns, that –due to lack of industrialization- were dependent on state-related sources of income, which proved to lead to high susceptibility to communal conflicts (Van Klinken 2007: 38-44). By discerning structural factors that set the stage for the eruption of these occurrences of violence Van Klinken convincingly deconstructs the naturalness or self-evidence of ‘ethnicity’ and ‘religion’ in these conflicts.

Tania Li (2000) similarly shows how communal identity –in her case ‘tribal’ or ‘indigenous’- have risen to prominence in post-Suharto Indonesia, albeit in less violent circumstances. Li addresses the articulation of collective indigenous identity in post-Suharto Indonesia by comparing two in many respects comparable locations in Central Sulawesi in an attempt to answer why one of her communities ‘see themselves in the “indigenous peoples” slot’ (Li 2000: 151) whereas the other does. A certain historical trajectory, state programs, NGO activity and moments of opportunity all form a conjuncture at which a positioning and articulation of self-identification as tribal becomes possible. Tribal or indigenous identity is therefore not self-evident, but rather a contingent yet ambiguous outcome of various seemingly unconnected global and local flows that collide and suddenly make ‘belonging’ prominent. Both Van Klinken and Li thus show a post-Suharto preoccupation with belonging, that is nevertheless all but ‘natural’ or self-evident. This preoccupation with ‘belonging’ however is not just limited to post-Suharto Indonesia in a conjuncture of neo-liberal flows of decentralization, democratization, an opening up of opportunities connected to local state, NGO influences, media influences. This understanding of ‘local’ forms of belonging as a global
conjuncture has proven to be useful in other regions as well. Peter Geschiere (2009) for instance uses it to explain the appeal of the notion of ‘autochtony’ -to be ‘born of the soil’- in both Cameroon and the Netherlands. Decentralization, democratization and the tenacity of the nation state converge in Western Africa in a way that makes the question of who ‘really belongs’ prominent, whereas historical construction and political manipulation facilitate the autochtony discourse in the Netherlands.

One paradoxical occurrence in a globalizing world of increased interconnectedness thus seems to be an increased obsession with ‘belonging’. That globalization is far from being a homogenizing force from the ‘West’ to the ‘rest’ and that there are all sorts of intricate dialectics between the global and the local is a gratifying pool of research and thought for anthropologists (Robertson 1995; Cooper 2005; Xavier Inda & Rosaldo 2008). The examples described above show how belonging or identity as paradoxical outcomes of globalization have been deconstructed and contextualized by scholars. While scholars impressively discern the conjunctural nature of various forms of belonging (ethnicity, tribal, indigenous, religious), this does not mean that such forms of belonging feel any less ‘real’ to those to whom autochtony or ethnicity has become a crucial part of thinking about differences.

This article therefore aims to move beyond a deconstruction of ethnicity as a form of belonging and instead focuses on ethnicity as a concept and its use as a category of analysis. The main question I wish to address in this paper is whether informal favoring in Kupang’s civil service is based on ethnic preferencing. This requires considering what ‘ethnicity’ means in Kupang, why it is such a popular social and political discourse for difference there, and in which (political) situations it plays a role. After critically considering ethnicity as a analytical concept, this paper discusses the effects of Kupang’s heterogeneity on everyday ethnic joking and stereotyping. Consequently the article moves from the realms of joking into the more serious ones of local lay and scholarly presumptions of the role of ethnic preferencing in informal favoring in civil service.
Contrary to these local lay and scholarly claims I argue that social capital, if necessary complemented with other forms of capital, instead of 'ethnicity' facilitates informal preferencing in Kupang's lower-level civil service. This finding will be contrasted with a discussion of the 2008 East Nusa Tenggara gubernatorial elections, in which ethnic solidarity did seem decisive in voters' behavior. Again I claim that a focus on ethnicity is more obscuring than analytically helpful. Ethnicity is thus not a social reality, but a social-political discourse, a way of thinking and talking about differences.

Ethnicity as a Concept

The examples described previously show how in various places across the globe issues of identity and belonging have become important. One danger in analyzing such occurrences is resorting to 'identity' (ethnic or else) as natural or self-evident, something not uncommon in everyday talk or popular media. Van Klinken, Li and Geschiere among others show one approach to counter this tendency by focusing on the conjunctural nature, the convergence of various 'flows' –local and global, of belonging. The question remains however what, after all caveat and contextualization, is left of these forms of identity that often constitute such powerful popular local discourses of difference, and consequently, how to analyze such identities.

In my case of Kupang it is somewhat ironic that while 'ethnicity' has gained increased explanatory power in local lay and scholarly accounts, a growing unease has surrounded the concept in anthropology. As Gerd Baumann (1995) aptly notes, as long ago as 1912 Weber already proposed to dismiss ethnicity as a topic of analysis finding it, 'unsuitable for a really rigorous analysis' (Weber 1978: 395). However, dismissing 'ethnicity' as an analytical topic has become difficult since it has left the realms of social science and has been, 'styled into a “fact of life” ... that appeals to supposedly “natural” distinctions, such as ethnos or descent, to explain “cultural” differences' (Baumann 1995:...
3). In other words, ‘ethnicity’ has been subjected to processes of reification, giving a guise of naturalness to social differences. A response to this popular reification in the 1990s was to de-essentialize ethnicity (see for instance Barth 1994; Sahlins 1994; Turner 1993). However, in order not to get caught up in a spiral of ‘mutual reifications’ in which both social scientists and their informants use ethnicity as a marker for certain collectives in relation to some Other Baumann proposes to de-essentialize ethnicity against the well-known anthropological agendas of social cohesion, collective commitments, and the comparative project (Baumann 1995: 3-4). Important to an approach to ethnicity as an analytical topic is a processual view on ethnic cohesion, recognition of the cross-cutting nature of social identities and the role of renegotiation in ethnic categorizations (Ibid.: 5).

Despite being greatly helpful in countering a conception of ethnicity as reifying social differences, the question remains if there is anything left of ‘ethnicity’ to carry out analytical work. This is a question Brubaker and Cooper (2000) pose as well in relation to the broader concept of identity. Similar to Baumann they caution against what they call too ‘strong’ or essentializing uses of the concept. However, they are also critical of too ‘weak’ constructivist approaches to the concepts that Baumann seems to lean towards when he emphasizes the processual and cross-cutting aspects of ethnicity. Although the concept reviewed in this article is ethnicity and not identity, insights from Brubaker and Cooper might nevertheless be useful in critically looking at ethnicity as an analytical category. Constructivists’ attempts at ridding the concept of the notion that identity is something all people or groups have even when unaware of it –despite still important-, has made it into a fragmented, multivalent, contingent, constructed and so forth notion. This makes it unsure why that which is constructed is still ‘identity’ and furthermore renders the concept too weak for useful theoretical work (Brubaker & Cooper 2000: 10). A second problem is the use of identity as both a category of practice, meaning categories of everyday social experience, and categories of analysis as used by social analysts. Even though everyday identity talk and even
identity politics are ‘real’ phenomena, this does not necessarily require its use as a category of analysis. In line with Baumann’s cautions, Brubaker and Cooper call for analysts to account for this process of reification instead of reproducing this reification themselves by uncritically adopting categories of practice as categories of analysis (Ibid.: 4-5). Due to the ambivalence of the concept of identity they propose three alternative terms that can do the work identity is supposed to do without its confusing and contradictory connotations (Ibid.: 14). First of all identification and categorization are processual, active terms that can focus on the process of identifying and on possible identifiers without assuming this will result in some ‘identity’. Secondly, selfunderstanding and social location can be used to focus on particularistic understandings of self and social interests, as a situated subjectivity. Thirdly, commonality, connectedness, and groupness can cover the emotionally laden sense of belonging to a distinctive and bounded group, and the felt solidarity with that group and felt difference with certain outsiders (Ibid.: 14-21).

In my opinion it would be useful to translate these insights on identity to the way ethnicity is being used in Kupang for analytical purposes. Identification and categorization (ethnification?) are useful when looking at ethnic joking and stereotyping to see who is doing the ethnification, how ethnicities are shaped, without assuming this will result in or is based on actual ethnicity. A focus on self-understanding and social location might not be useful to do ‘ethnic work’ in Kupang but could give insights into other important identity-like terms that influence preferencing in some way, such as gender or class. Commonality, connectedness and groupness become very useful when looking at upper-level intra-office power games as well as political manipulation of ethnicity. In short, I wish to suggest that Brubaker and Cooper have offered a useful way to study ‘the work that ethnicity is supposed to do’ in analyzing informal preferencing in Kupang’s civil service. This is especially so since attempts to study ethnicity in Kupang have led to an uncritically reification of a category of practice than to a questioning of this concept. The advantage of using suggested terms instead of ‘ethnicity’ is that it opens
up all sorts of other possibilities of looking at inter-group relations and specifically informal preferencing in offices.

Stereotypes and Ethnic Favoring

That ‘ethnicity’ is a useful analytical category is not often questioned by scholars focusing on Kupang. If anything, the outburst of ‘communal’ violence that took place in November 1998 following the Ketapang tragedy in Jakarta, only brought the importance of ethnicity to the fore. Years before the Kupang incident, current dean of the Faculty of Social and Political Sciences of Kupang’s Nusa cendana University Alo Liliweri (1994) already measured the effectiveness of inter-ethnic communication in Kupang, and concluded that this inter-ethnic communication is influenced by social prejudice resulting from ethnocentrism present in all ethnic groups. Social prejudice is exemplified by the ethnic composition of neighborhoods –where there is usually a certain ethnic majority–, the concentration of particular ethnic groups in certain occupational fields, ethnically segregated boarding houses and social organizations, and finally, latent ethnic competition (especially for civil service jobs) (Liliweri 1994: 4-5). Due to social ethnic prejudices all ethnic groups have a high sense of discrimination against other groups –with the exception of the Alorese and Sumbanese who tend to incorporate all ‘others’ as kin or members of their social groups–. Of all ethnic groups, the Rotinese tend to be discriminated against most (ibid.: 16). Tule (2004) in contrast modifies Liliweri’s view on inter-ethnic relations as problematic and frictional, by stressing the ability of local kinship cultures built up around a cult house to incorporate various people into a tolerant and harmonious society. Whereas Liliweri sees ethnocentrism negatively influencing inter-ethnic communication, Tule views kinship as a unifying force in interaction (Tule 2000: 105). Commenting on the Kupang incident a few years earlier, Tule asserts that this and other instances of communal violence in Indonesia had nothing to do with inherent social friction, because they ran counter to the ‘traditionally tolerant culture of Indonesia’, but were instead the result of political manipulation (ibid.: 105).
What is striking about these accounts of inter-ethnic relations (with Tule focusing more on religious differences than Liliweri) is the uncritical acceptance of problematic analytical concepts. Liliweri nowhere questions the added value of using the concept of ethnicity. His entire conclusion concerning how social prejudice stemming from ethnocentrism influences inter-ethnic communication, is based on the a-priori assumption that it is useful to use ‘ethnicity’ for categorization. Such an uncritical use of a concept used in everyday practice for analytical purposes is not without hazard. As Elcid Li (2000) notes, it remains unclear how the process of social prejudicing is shaped. Without attention to this, social prejudice becomes somewhat of a belief. Ironically, perceptions of social prejudice based on inter-group generalizations are turned into something ‘true’ and as a basis for communication, without any confirmation to purify this prejudice. Equally, Tule’s conception of Indonesian culture as inherently tolerant and incorporating also does nothing to understand why occurrences of conflict and friction take place, how processes of social prejudice are shaped, and –specific to this article- what underlies suspicions that ethnic favoring takes place within Kupang’s civil service. As Brubaker and Cooper noted in relation to ‘identity’, the use of ethnicity generates more confusion than analytical clarity.

The appeal of ethnicity however not only seduces scholars focusing on Kupang but also by Kupangese themselves, judging from the many ethnic jokes and stereotypes I encountered during fieldwork. For instance, while trying to access political parties’ campaign teams during the 2008 East Nusa Tenggara’s gubernatorial elections I hung out one afternoon at one of political party PDIP’s offices from which they coordinated their grass-root campaigning. Discussing the various candidates for the positions of governor and vice-governor, the conversation quickly turned to the ethnic backgrounds of the candidates. Chris, the head of this campaign team, asked me if I knew what to do when walking in a forest and suddenly encountering both a snake and a Rotenese: who or what would I kill? Having heard this joke many times before I
knew the answer: of course I would kill the Rotenese, because they are far more licik (tricky, sneaky, slimy) than snakes! Chris then asked me if I knew why this joke about Rotenese existed, which I did not. He explained this to me through what he called a ‘folk story’, telling about how the Rotenese managed to get so much land in Timor, especially along the coast:

At a certain point after the Rotenese had begun to arrive in Timor, the Timorese got fed up with this Rotenese immigration, and requested the Rotenese to put a halt to their migration to Timor. In response, the Rotenese came up with the following suggestion: the land of Timor should belong to whomever had the capacity to dry up the land. They proposed to meet up at the beach the following day, where they would both try to dry up the land. The Timorese agreed and returned to the beach the next day. A few of them –those with natural magical powers- sat down in the sand and attempted to force back the sea by making big and impressive gestures. Unfortunately high tide was just beginning to set in, something the Timorese were unaware of since they weren’t sea people. Despite their pompous gestures, the Timorese could not stop the waves from coming in, and ran back up the mountains scared. In the afternoon a Rotenese sat down on the beach. In a relaxed and slow manner he made some hand movements, signaling the sea to move back. Indeed the sea receded, because low tides were setting in. Impressed with the Rotenese ability to dry up the land, the Timorese agreed that the Rotenese could stay.

Chris told me that although this was just a folk story, the cleverness of the Rotenese should not be underestimated. Before the existence of official certified property borders, Rotenese would mark off their area’s by using kapuk trees. Since these trees’ seeds spread far and wide and new trees would grow wherever the seeds landed, the land owned by the Rotenese expanded inconspicuously. This is why one has to kill the Rotenese instead of the snake, when suddenly encountering them in the forest. Chris himself was Rotenese.
The snake comparison is one often heard when asking about people from Rote, as is their knack for politics and pretty girls. ‘they are trickier than snakes.’ ‘They are so much like snakes: they never get to the point, but just keep on sliding around and around it.’ ‘Rotenese, yeah they are talkative.’ ‘They always say “yes, but...” They are real politicians.’ ‘Sneaky in politics.’ ‘Hard-working people those Rotenese.’ ‘They have a good-working brain.’ Furthermore, ‘Rotenese girls are the prettiest of East Nusa Tenggara!’ The Timorese are stuck with less flattering stereotypes: backwards, lazy, rude, stupid, weak, not brave, afraid, shameful, black. The Timorese tend to be typified as honest, straightforward, but hopelessly stupid and easily aroused in anger. ‘They are stupid, but honest.’ ‘They are rude and have “high emotions”, but a good heart.’ ‘Timorese are easy to fool.’ ‘They always say yes, even when they think differently.’ The Savunese are known for their famous, conflict-solving kisses, girls that outshine the Rotenese in beauty, fondness of family relations, work ethic, funny ways of speaking and love of cock-fights. ‘You know why Savunese girls are so pretty? Savunese descend from Indian people, that is why they are so good-looking.’ Good looks are not traits associated with Alorese, ‘they are very black, with curly hair.’ Their many languages and magic prowess are known far and wide however, ‘in Alor, every two hundred meters a different language is spoken!’ ‘There are many suanggi (black magicians) in Alor. They can even fly.’ ‘Alorese people do not live in one world, like you and I. They live in two worlds at the same time. They are known for their magic.’ When asking about ‘ethnic traits’ in relation to people from Flores, non-Florenese will immediately claim that Florenese have very ‘high feelings of ethnicity’. ‘People from Flores are really fanatic about ethnicity and religion.’ Florenese however, will immediately point out that there is no such thing as a ‘Florenese ethnicity’, ‘Flores consists of many ethnic groups: Manggarai, Ende, Sikka, East-Flores and so forth.’ ‘Manggarai people eat a lot.’ Florenese might not known to be great warriors but they are very smart and good at politics. I did not often hear about the Sumbanese except that they give livestock as bridewealth, are talkative, and ‘eat a lot, especially meat.’ Ethnic groups from outside the province that are sometimes mentioned are the Javanese
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and the Buginese. On the whole they seem to be perceived similarly: they are both ‘newcomers’, excellent traders, and Muslims. A group that deserves special attention, but never seem to pop up in ‘ethnic joking’ are the Chinese, ‘the Chinese are businesspeople.’ ‘They are very stingy.’ ‘Chinese? They keep to themselves, they do not mix with locals (prabumi). And locals not with them.’ ‘They like to marry their own kind. I want nothing to do with them’, said a young male civil servant who deeply wanted to marry his Chinese ex-girlfriend, but was refused by her family.

Such jokes, stereotypes and folk stories are not mere laughing matters or means for an anthropologist to show off her localized comedy routine. Joking becomes serious when a young woman claims she will never marry her Timorese suitor, because Timorese are too black and too stupid for a Savunese like herself and that she could never have ‘ugly’ Timorese kids. It becomes serious when the eldest son of the last ruler of Kupang laments the inherent laziness of ‘his (Timorese) people’ in trying to climb in local and provincial power structures as opposed to the Florenese who are by nature hard-working and clever. It becomes serious when conflicts, such as the Kupang incident of 1998, are labeled as ‘ethnic’ conflicts. It becomes serious when scholars write about inter-ethnic frictions and differences, without realizing the reifying effects its uncritical use has. When ‘ethnicity’ affects people’s practices or scholars’ analyses of those practices, ethnic jokes and stereotypes are more than just comedy. Certainly, some of these stereotypes can be traced to an actual reality in Kupang: there are quite a number of Rotenese in the civil service. Until the current vice-governor there has never been a Timorese regional leader, while Florenese have been abundantly represented in provincial leadership positions.

This does not mean however, that inter-ethnic joking and stereotyping easily translates to inter-ethnic prejudices, as Liliweri sketches in his article. In everyday talk and thinking about ethnicity a crude dividing of people in certain categories with certain character traits and behaviors is generally readily scrutinized. As one head of a department put it, ‘my father is born in Sumbawa in West Nusa..."
Tenggara, but he is originally (asli) from Sulawesi and my mom is from Kupang. What am I then? Ethnicity (suku) is not always clear for people.’ Or as another civil servant explained, ‘you must understand that these are just jokes you know. Basically all East Nusa Tenggara people are all the same. We can marry each other, though we might have to make some adaptations in bridewealth. We can also marry people from other religions if the families agree.’ Ethnicity as an explanation -for the occurrence of the Kupang incident or to typify informal favoring in accessing and climbing in civil service- becomes even more obviously problematic when there are many other kinds of distinctions that can be made: Islam versus Catholicism or Protestantism. Those from within the province of East Nusa Tenggara versus from outside. This island versus the other islands. The district of Manggarai versus that of Ende. This ‘clan’ (marga) versus that one. This family versus that family. Even though 'ethnicity' and also 'religion' have a deadly serious side and there are undoubtedly people who view certain characteristics as inherent to an ethnic or religious group, everyday stereotyping and perceptions on ethnic differences should not thoughtlessly be transferred to ‘categories of analysis’ when wanting to analyze how favoring in civil service is played out. Unfortunately, ‘ethnicity’ appears to be a too readily accepted explanation for analyzing this.

Informal Favoring: It is an Ethnic Thing

The main posed here is whether Kupang’s ethnic heterogeneity makes for ethnic preferencing in the civil service. Thomas Didimus Dagang (2004) tries to make a case asserting this assumption. He uses detailed and lengthy information about the educational and ethnic background of higher-level bureaucrats and newly recruited employees in the early 2000’s. Dagang’s main topic of interest is if Kupang’s city level civil service is indeed as neutral and free from political influences and ‘group-influences’, as is propagated by for instance Good Governance ideology or law
Dagang characterized Kupang’s civil service as a patrimonial bureaucracy, in which hierarchy is based on familiar or private relations as in father-child relations. Higher level (jabatan) positions are used for private interests related to family and group, and promotion systems are not based on meritocracy, seniority or competency tests (Dagang 2004: 25-27). An interesting and to me recognizable case is made for the importance of closeness and relations: Dagang claims bureaucracy is based on personality, ‘like-dislike relations’, and family connections (Ibid: 24). Recruitment is not an open process, rather, higher level civil servants tend to fill positions with people with whom they have something in common, be it a close friendship or a school connection (Ibid.: 65-66). What puts people in their civil service positions is the influence of closeness (pengaruh kedekatan), such as ethnicity, descent (keturunan), language, religion and so forth (idem: 73).

Dagang prefers to view this importance of closeness and connections as an ethnic influencing of the neutrality of bureaucracy. His main arguments supporting this claim are an overview of the ethnic composition of the higher level bureaucrats and of that of the newly recruited civil servants. Of all of the 527 upper level bureaucrats (pejabat), a third is Rotenese, 17.10% is Florenese, a sixth is Savunese, 13.4% are Timorese (3.04% Atonimeto, 10.1% Dawan). 5.5% Sumbanese, 3.8% Javanese, 3.04% Alorese, and 8.2% of other ethnic background (Ibid.: 40). In his analysis, the Rotenese thus outnumber all other ethnicities in higher level civil service positions. Dagang sees this same pattern when looking at the newly recruited civil servants for 2003: 40% of the 110 new civil servants were Rotenese, followed by Savunese (26.3%) (Ibid.: 68-69). Coincidentally, the two people in charge of accepting new recruits, the head of Personnel and the Regional Secretary, also happened to be of Rotenese descent. According to Dagang, primordialism and instrumentalism shape Kupang’s recruitment and promotion systems: jobs are given out purely because of a sharing of blood, region of origin or customs (but also apparently
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because of sharing a religion, school, and close friendship), or because ethnicity is easily manipulated politically.

Whereas Dagang does a great job sketching an image of Kupang’s civil service as a patrimonial bureaucracy in which connections and closeness matter, his justification of why this is ‘ethnic’ remains unclear. When looking at the ‘ethnic’ composition of the city of Kupang it is not surprising that Rotenese will comprise a sizeable part of bureaucracy, since they are a significant presence in Kupang. Furthermore, when taking into account the historical advantageous position the Rotenese have had in education and civil service (Fox 1977) their ‘accumulated capital’ also helps explaining their current dominant position in bureaucracy. I suggest instead that the importance of relations and closeness which Dagang also recognizes explains far more clearly how neutrality is influenced than does ‘ethnicity’. In this case of understanding how jobs and promotions are obtained, I contend that the use of ‘ethnicity’ as an analytical useful concept obscures more than it enlightens. Firstly the concept is too ambiguous to do any clear analytical work. Is ethnicity family, language, customs or also other forms of ‘closeness’ (kedekatan)? Secondly, the concept masks the way in which favoring in civil service actually takes place. Thirdly, as Elcid Li warned, using ethnicity as a means to analyze preferencing unjustly supports existing stereotypes and jokes, and therefore reifies them. Based on my own fieldwork in lower-level civil service, I claim that a balancing of different types of capital is what constitutes informal favoring. Ethnicity in this respect is solely useful insofar it can be transformed into social capital. To support my claim, I want to present three cases to exemplify this.

**Informal Favoring: Balancing Capital**

The important role of relations and closeness that Dagang noticed, also came to the fore in my own fieldwork. Therefore it pays to be attentive to the role of capital when wanting to know how preferencing is played out in Kupang’s civil service. Bourdieu (1983) defines capital as: ‘accumulated labor (in its materialized form or in its “incorporated”, embodied form) which when appropriated on
a private, i.e., exclusive, basis by agents or groups of agents, enables them to appropriate social energy in the form of reified or living labor’ (Bourdieu 1983: 241). Although he asserts that all types of capital are essentially derived from economic capital and can eventually be converted back to economic capital, he also distinguishes cultural capital and social capital. In what follows I will describe three cases on the strategic use of various forms of capital. The first entails the story of a young woman trying to get a job at the local branch of the national radio channel. The second case concerns how an ‘office extra’, the owner of the canteen next to the mayor’s office, managed to get her job. The third case discusses documents confirming a young woman’s acceptance as a temporary worker in a department while the young woman in question was actually still in high school, which is against regulations. The assumption underlying these stories is that if ethnic favoring is common practice, an ‘ethnic connection’ will be most clearly visible in giving out positions, in particular the last two, where there is no official testing procedure that can get in the way of informal favoring.

Case 1: Sinta on the radio

Sinta is a 24 year old young woman from Kupang. She refers to herself as Savunese. She graduated from a university in Yogyakarta, Java, in 2007 with a degree in International Relations. Due to this major her English is remarkably good for someone from Kupang. Her mother works as a civil servant and her father has a job at the local branch of Radio Republik Indonesia (RRI). RRI is not quite a government institution yet not wholly independent either. It is a public body owned by the state (Badan Umum Milik Negara). In general, the job requirements for such an institution are said to be tougher, the work itself to be more demanding, and the wages per salary scale higher than for civil servants. Still, RRI is more or less a government-related institution and the application process seems to be similar to that of regular civil servants. Sinta had been looking for a job for some time, when job openings were announced for RRI. Sinta hoped to find employment in civil service, because then she would be assured of a steady monthly salary and a
pension after retirement. Additionally, the work was not too demanding. Although an RRI job was not exactly the civil service job she hoped for, it had been some time since new civil servants had been accepted into city, regency or provincial government, therefore Sinta decided to apply for an RRI job. Along with 88 others, she signed up for 6 available positions. After a first administrative selection, all applicants had to take a general knowledge and English language skills test. In the end –after all tests and interviews- the boss decided which applicants would be joining RRI. These are not necessarily those applicants that passed the test with the best results, which is why according to Sinta one never sees the test scores on the lists with names of those that passed. Sinta claims that in contrast to Java, where you always read the applicant’s number, name and test score, in Kupang only the numbers and names of applicants are stated. In Kupang the boss’ decision is indisputable. Upon entering the testing procedure, Sinta had different forms of capital in her possession. First of all she had valuable cultural capital, namely her Bachelor’s degree from a Javanese university and a good command of English. Secondly she had strong social capital, since her father already worked at RRI. Moreover, her father happened to be good friends with the boss and someone with whom he used to share stories with about Sinta and her brothers when growing up. Thirdly, since both her parents had steady employment there was the possibility of using economic capital as ‘smoothing money’. After the testing procedure Sinta got the happy news that out of all the applicants she was one of the six lucky ones to get hired. Reflecting on what facilitated her success Sinta couldn’t quite point out what type of ‘capital’ was decisive in her hiring. If it would merely have been cultural capital the test results would have been published along with the names and numbers. Many of the other applicants also had family members or close acquaintances working at RRI, but they failed to pass, therefore social capital wasn’t the most vital element either. Sinta’s father had forbidden Sinta’s mother to give any money to the boss or hiring committee, thus apparently economic capital did not play a role at all. Sinta did comment that all new broadcasters hired were fluent in English. Cultural capital seemed to be most valued in RRI
positions, but it is difficult to assess if Sinta would have
gotten her job had her dad not been so close to the head.
Judging from previous experiences at job applications it can
also be wondered if giving some ‘smoothing money’ would
have been unnecessary if Sinta would not have had such an
abundance of social capital. I was not the only one
wondering to what extent Sinta’s connections had helped
her. During a conversation with Sinta’s mother, she urged
me to visit Sinta soon at work and speak English with her so
all of her colleagues could see that Sinta got hired because of
her command of English and not because of her father’s
connections.

Case 2: Mrs. Nur’s cafeteria

For years the three-storey mayor’s office that houses
several governmental department and a few hundred civil
servants did not have a proper cafeteria. There was a small
kitchen located on the second floor but this was not large
enough to provide all employees with lunches or midday
snacks. Therefore the department of General Affairs decided
that a new bigger cafeteria should be build. This task was
left to the civil servants’ wives association Dharma Wanita.
The wife of the Regional Secretary, who is second in ranking
after the mayor, was in charge of finding someone to run this
cafeteria. Mrs. Nur heard about this from her younger sister,
whose husband happened to have a friend in the department
of General Affairs, and offered to run the cafeteria. She got
accepted and now gets up at 05:30 every day to go to the
market with her assistant to do the necessary daily grocery
shopping, then prepares various dishes and opens up the
cafeteria around 10:00. The Regional Secretary and his wife
are Rotenese and Protestant. If ethnic favoring would take
place, one would expect Mrs. Nur to be Rotenese, and
perhaps share their religion as well. Mrs. Nur however
clearly is not a Protestant, as her jilbab shows. Furthermore
she is born in Surabaya and has lived all over Java, before
ending up in East Nusa Tenggara. The reason she manages
the cafeteria is not because of ethnic favoring, but by seizing
an opportunity that was available through word-of-mouth
information from family and friends. Again, connections
matter.
Case 3: a high-school girl in the office

In the office of local anti-corruption agency PIAR I had an interesting talk about informal ways of giving out jobs in the civil service. Apart from steady civil service jobs that last until retirement government offices sometimes also hire temporary (honorer) workers. Working as a ‘temp’ is often viewed as a stepping stone to a ‘real’ civil servant position, and at every new civil service recruitment phase at least some temps have to be hired as ‘full’ civil servants. Since the admission procedure for temps is less elaborate and less strictly checked than that for civil servants, this trajectory poses the best opportunities for preferential hiring, as was shown to me at PIAR. I received a copy of a certificate that stated that in 2003 young Lina was hired as a temp at a certain government department. Requirements for temps are –depending on their task description- that they at least have to have finished senior high school. Another form was presented to me, namely Miss Lina’s senior high school diploma. This diploma was dated in 2004. As it turned out young Lina was a niece of the Regional Secretary, who conveniently arranged this temp position for her. Although Lina probably never set a foot in the department’s office while she was still in school and most likely also did not receive any wages, having been registered as a temp did ensure her of steady employment as soon as she finished high school and gave her excellent chances of obtaining a full civil servant position.

As mentioned previously, the civil servants I encountered generally assumed not all jobs and promotions are given out in accordance with official rules and regulations. When inquiring how this informal system of giving out jobs works however, examples like Sinta’s are given: knowing somebody is what is important. Having connections facilitates access. Furthermore, depending on how close relations are, social capital at times needs to be complemented with economic capital. Offering ‘thank you money’ or ‘smoothing money’ to very close relations however is considered to be very offensive, which is why Sinta’s father forbade Sinta’s mother to offer money to the boss of RRI.
Social capital can consist of all sorts of connections: family relations, neighbors, alumni from the same high school or university, fellow church members or friends. With a certain dose of imagination some kind of connection can be made to anyone in Kupang. In this sense it matters less that your father's friend who is in a position to make decisions on hiring new staff is Florenese like you. What matters instead, is that he is a friend of your father and thus a connection that can be used. What Sinta and Lina’s case also show is that cultural capital –a good command of English and a high school diploma- also cannot be overlooked. With regards to ethnic preferencing I therefore disagree with Dagang’s conclusion that, since a large part of the newly recruited civil servants are Rotenese as are the head of the Human Resources Department and Regional Secretary, recruitment must be colored by ethnic favoring. My second case most clearly refutes an ‘ethnic’ connection. In short I contend that when wanting to understand how informal preferencing is played out, a focus on relations or social capital –balanced with other forms of capital- is far more helpful than the concept of ‘ethnicity’.

**Ethnicity and Direct District Head Elections**

There is one sidenote I wish to make in relation to ethnicity and preferencing in Kupang’s civil service. So far I have argued that ‘ethnicity’ instead of being helpful in analyzing informal favoring, tends to reify existing categories of practice. Viewing informal favoring as a balancing of various forms of capital has a greater explanatory value than ethnicity as far as the lower-level civil service is concerned: getting a first steady job, a temporary position, or the position to run a cafeteria. When looking at obtaining positions and promotions in upper-level civil service however, ‘commonality, connectedness and groupness’ as well as identity politics come into play. This became especially clear during the 2008 first direct gubernatorial elections.

When looking at these elections, it is difficult to deny that a sense of commonality connected to region of origin dictated the results of the elections. A quick glance at all candidate couples makes it clear that the couples consisted
of strategically chosen men, one Protestant and one Catholic, from two different large islands in East Nusa Tenggara. Golkar Party’s couple Tulus was represented by Agustinus Medah from Rote and Paulus Moa from Sikka, Flores. Political party PDIP’s Fren consisted of Frans Lebu Raya from East Flores and Esthon Foenay from Timor. Finally, coalition party Gaul’s couple was formed by Gaspar Parang Ehok from Flores Manggarai and Yulius Bobo from West Sumba. Strategically presenting a couple from different large islands was hoped to create a large constituency in those islands and among people that trace their descent to those islands. This effort was not futile. The election results show that candidates tended to win in their ‘regions of origin’. The most noteworthy exceptions are the regencies of Kupang and Timor Tengah Selatan, where Tulus instead of Fren won. Tulus-candidate Agustinus Medah however had been the district head of the Kupang regency for a few years and had gained popularity in these regions because of that.

Combining candidates from different big islands as a strategy to appeal to voters’ was thus one way in which ‘commonality’ was played with. If connectedness to island of origin is too heavily emphasized however, candidates run the risk of distancing voters from other islands. In melting pot Kupang, where people from all islands of East Nusa Tenggara and beyond reside, stressing an island connection was not always the most fruitful strategy. This was exemplified during Tulus’ campaign in Kupang. Candidate Medah spoke to the audience first in local Kupang language, then added some jokes in a Timorese language, and furthermore spoke Rotenese. The MC meanwhile continually stressed Medah’s connection to all ethnicities in East Nusa Tenggara and made sure to introduce all campaign managers present on stage, who formed a nice mix of men, women, Muslims (judging from the jilbab) and ethnicity.

Ethnicity understood as a sense of commonality, connectedness and groupness was thus used as a means to attract voters whether by stressing candidates belonging to a certain island of origin or by showing how candidates were affiliated to other islands. The ‘people’(masyarakat) were expected to vote based on primordialist sentiments. Often
explained to me by campaign team’ members was that, ‘people from East Nusa Tenggara are stupid, they are not yet ready for direct elections. They do not understand politics and just vote for their own people.’ Political parties’ responsibility for reification of ‘stupid’ primordialist sentiments through creating ‘ethnically strategic’ candidate couples was never acknowledged. By reifying ethnic categories however, candidate couples did create the expectation that once elected they would give something back to members of their ‘group’ or solidarity. If there is one thing masyarakat knows is that the best way to get something is being owed something. Reciprocal obligations are deeply embedded in the social fabric of Kupang. Giving something, and thereby opening up a social relation, creates the expectation that something will be returned. Contributing to a cousins wedding creates the expectation that the cousin in turn will contribute something to your wedding. Giving money to the local court at time of job openings creates the expectation that your child will get hired. Without wanting to elaborate too much on this, in elections giving something—a vote—ought to lead to a return as well. When in elections island groupness is reified by candidate-couples, the expectation arises that something will be returned to people connected to that island. The easiest way of ‘giving back to the group’ is by promoting civil servants from certain island of origin to desirable upper-level positions.

Promoting members of an ethnic group is thus a way to reciprocate votes from an ethnic group. It is nevertheless important to note that this kind of ethnic favoring in upper-level civil service has less to do with a deep desire to fill civil service with people of a certain ethnicity. Rather, it is a means to reciprocate a favor to a constituency created by attempts to make solidarities based on island of origin. I urge to look at this reciprocal morality underlying informal favoring, because there are many other examples of ‘returning favors’ (balas jasa) during elections that are not based on strategic use of island of origin solidarity: rich businessmen being allocated projects in return for sponsoring campaigns; or influential department heads receiving promotions in return for given support during elections.
**Conclusion**

This paper tried to answer the question whether Kupang’s ethnic heterogeneity explains informal preferencing in civil service. Since the concept of ethnicity takes such a prominent position in many scholarly writing on Kupang, I considered it necessary to specifically address the possibility that ethnic favoring colored much of this informal preferencing. A large part of this paper was thus also focused on ethnicity as an analytical concept. With regards to this, I have tried to explain that the way ethnicity tends to be used by scholars focusing on Kupang is unnecessarily reifying, and I have suggested other ways in which ‘ethnicity’ can be studied. With regards to my main question, I am not convinced that ethnicity, whether as identification, self-understanding or groupness (Brubaker & Cooper 2000) is useful in understanding how lower-level civil servants obtain their jobs. Instead contend social capital, at times balanced with other forms of capital, facilitates informal favoring. Commonality, connectedness and groupness are however useful when analyzing upper-level civil service and politics dynamics that take place during elections. Candidates use a sense of groupness based on island of origin solidarity as a means to create a constituency. Voters appear to vote based on this solidarity. However, as ‘ethnicity’ in lower-level civil service is solely useful insofar it can be transformed into social capital, ‘ethnicity’ in elections is only useful insofar it can suggest an expectation of reciprocal return. There are many ways to create social capital, as there are many ways to create reciprocal obligations. To explain informal preferencing in terms of ‘ethnicity’ in either lower- or upper-level civil service, is missing out on many intricacies that take place behind the guise of ethnicity.
References


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Introduction of Casino Gaming in Okinawa, Japan: A Case Study of Challenges and Opportunities

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Abstract: Tourism is the largest and leading industry in Okinawa, Japan, and it has been increasing over the past few years. Okinawa’s entire economic situation however, has faced unprecedented challenges. Consistently with the lowest average salaries in Japan and a high unemployment rate as well as the local government dependence on subsidies from the Japanese government, economic sustainability is a major issue facing Okinawa. One facet of the tourism industry that could be offered in Okinawa for an alternative source of economic prosperity for the area is the introduction of Casino gambling. Considering the current uncertain economic circumstances, the Okinawan prefectural government introduced a casino concept as one possible solution for economic transformation. One of the challenges is that Japan is the only industrialized nation without legalized casino gaming. This study examines and discusses the topic of the introduction of casino gaming in Okinawa.

Keywords: Okinawa; casino gaming; tourism; development; and, impacts.

Introduction

Okinawa is part of a small chain of sub-tropical islands formerly called the Ryukyu, located in the southernmost part of Japan. With a mild climate, pristine beaches, beautiful and distinct natural landscapes, Okinawa also possesses a very unique culture which is different and distinct from most of Japan. With a wealth of tourism
resources, Okinawa is one of the most popular destination areas in Japan among domestic tourists. The number of visitors was 5.9 million with tourism income over 424 billion yen (about 4.3 billion US dollars) in 2007, and both of these numbers have increased consistently over the past few years (Okinawa Prefecture, 2008a). As a tourist destination, Okinawa has a strong brand image, and its brand awareness in Japan is substantially high. According to market research conducted by the Japan Travel Bureau Foundation (JTBF) in Japan, Okinawa ranked in first place as a “Resort destination people want to go” when Hawaii is available as one of the choices (JTBF, 2008). In addition, Okinawa holds strong brand loyalty among the Japanese while maintaining a high percentage (71.8 percent) of repeat guests annually (Okinawa, 2008b).

On the basis of gender, males (49.4 percent) and females (50.6 percent) were close to even with regards to who is visiting the island for vacation (Okinawa Prefecture, 2008b). On the basis of age, those in their 50’s (24.5 percent) were the largest group to visit Okinawa; the second largest group was those in their 40’s (20.2 percent), and the third was the 30 years old group (19.3 percent), followed by those in their 60’s (18.4 percent) according to a 2007 study (Okinawa Prefecture, 2008b). These figures indicate Okinawa’s high popularity among middle-aged Japanese people. On the subject of tourists’ nationality, more than 96 percent of visitors were domestic tourists (Okinawa Prefecture, 2008a). Over 60 percent of foreign travelers to Okinawa were Taiwanese, with the remainder of visitors coming from Korea, U.S., Hong Kong, and other countries (Okinawa, 2008b). In a report by Nikkei Net, most foreign tourists to Okinawa were from nearby Asian countries, while visitors from Western countries were merely less than 1 percent of the total visitors (“Okinawa ken”, 2008). Although Okinawa hosted the G8 Summit in the year 2000 and made itself better known globally, its awareness as an attractive tourist destination has not been developed to its full potential.

The average duration of stay by tourists in Okinawa was 3.72 days in 2007, and this trend has remained
stagnant over the past few years (Okinawa Prefecture, 2008b). The purpose of travel to Okinawa were varied, but the majority of respondents in a recent travel survey indicated that 68.2 percent of them, answered “strolling tourist sites,” 39.9 percent answered “local cuisine”, 37.7 percent reported shopping”, 24.5 percent were for “marine leisure,” and only 19.1 percent replied “rest and recreation” (Okinawa Prefecture, 2008b). The numbers indicate a distinct shortness of duration for visitors’ to the islands, although tourists’ reasons to visit are varied. There is a need to develop an attraction to encourage tourists to extend the number of days they stay in Okinawa.

Another noticeable trend in Okinawan tourism is that there are a distinct cyclical number of visitors during different times of the year. Okinawa has a large number of visitors in the spring (March to April) and summer (July to October) due to the comfortable climate in spring and the typical Japanese holiday season during the summer. On the other hand, early summer (May and June), fall, and winter (November to February) tend to be a low season for Okinawa’s tourism because of the unsettled rainy weather and the cloudy winters (Okinawa Prefecture, 2008a). One way to close the gap of tourists visiting Okinawa during the low period is to increase the number of indoor attractions with casinos being suggested as a possible solution. However, seasonality would still be a major factor when it comes to examining Okinawa’s tourism.

Inside Japan, there are a number of competitive tourist destinations. In a recent study of “Domestic tourism destinations people want to visit” by the Japan Travel Bureau Foundation (JTBF), reported that the most popular beach resort area in Japan was Okinawa (JTBF, 2008). Outside Japan, there are numerous competitors in the tourism market. When it comes to popular beach resort areas among Japanese, Okinawa competes against Hawaii, Saipan, Bali, Phuket, Australia’s Gold Coast, and many other destinations. In terms of the awareness of Okinawa as a beach resort, Okinawa’s visibility among other countries is extremely low. In addition, even as a region in Japan, it is easy to assume that Okinawa does not have a strong
presence in the international community that Tokyo and Kyoto possess. However, for neighboring countries, such as Taiwan, Korea, and China, Okinawa is a known tourist destination because of its unique culture and geographical closeness, but not as well known as Tokyo (“Resort chi”, 2009). Okinawa’s current competitiveness as a tourist destination within the domestic market, especially as a beach resort, is comparatively high, but very low in the foreign markets because of its low level of awareness within the international marketplace.

Okinawa is a paradise endowed with a rich and thriving natural environment. The islands are enclosed by beautiful coral reefs that are vibrant with life, and because of its isolated location from other continents and islands, Okinawa has its own unique ecosystem, which embraces many indigenous rare plants and animals. However, the continuous growth of Okinawa’s population coupled with constant urban construction is disrupting the habitats of precious fauna and flora. Also, the United States military construction, and growth has also paved the way for more land consumption and pollution. Because of the damage to the environment, a number of local people and conservationists have opposed developments such as beach resorts, hotels, and the development at Awase tideland where a number of newly discovered types of fish, seashells, and dugongs subsist (The Nature Conservation Society of Japan, 2001). Such a growing pro-environmental movement is a big concern for the local people and the developers. It is one of important aspects of Okinawa’s tourism development, as protests are becoming routine.

In addition, after World War II, the island had been under the occupation of American Military Government until 1972, with many United States military forces still stationed there today. This historical background can be attributed to the development of Okinawa’s unique culture. However, Okinawa has lost its inherent dignity in many ways by the rapid modernization and Americanization. The Okinawan people’s lifestyle is similar in many respects to other large cities’ ways of life. Only senior citizens can speak the pure Okinawa language, while the majority of youth speak mainly
Japanese. Its food culture has also been affected by Western culture, and the changing dietary habits have damaged Okinawa’s reputation as a healthy island known for lifespan longevity. In fact, according to the prefectural longevity statistics in 2005 released by the Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare of Japan, “the average lifespan for women in Okinawa stood at 86.88 years, topping the nation, but the average male lifespan of 78.64 years brought Okinawa in at 26th place” within 47 prefectures in Japan (Hoshino, 2008). The losses in Okinawa’s uniqueness, which are magnified by the aforementioned changes in the environment, may adversely affect the tourism industry in Okinawa.

Compared to other prefectures in Japan, Okinawa falls behind in its economic progress due to a number of reasons such as the geological isolation from the main islands of Japan, and the aftermath of the domination by the US military. To resolve the regional differences, the Cabinet Office of Japan (COJ) has implemented “Special Measures for the Promotion and Development of Okinawa (SMPDO)” since Okinawa’s return to Japan in 1972 (COJ, 2006). Under those measures, industrial development, job promotion, educational and cultural development, welfare reform, and other plans have the goal of furthering Okinawa’s economic independence. Specifically, budgeting for related organizations, introducing registration processes for those organizations, and preferential treatment for specific businesses such as taxation incentives, have all been implemented for the betterment of the Okinawan people and businesses (COJ, 2006). Regarding tourism, the local and national governments have a key role in the beach resort and waterfront development, infrastructure improvement, human resource cultivation, environmental protection, and other important measures (Okinawa Prefecture, 2002). Thus, Okinawa has received generous monetary aid from the national government, and the islands will be able to maintain that support in accordance with the SMPDO Law.

To implement measures for tourism development more definitively, the Okinawan prefecture has plotted out annual strategic tourism plans called the “Visit Okinawa Plan,” since 2007 (Okinawa Prefecture, 2007a). In this plan, the
Okinawan prefecture sets numerical targets for growth such as the number of visitors and tourism revenue. In order to achieve those targets, the government develops policies with overriding priority such as promotion for foreign tourists, enticement of MICE, the building up of the renewed ideal tourism model, and the encouragement of resort weddings on the islands (Okinawa Prefecture, 2007a). One goal of this plan aims to grow the number of Okinawa’s inbound tourists to 10 million by the year 2017. However, even though Okinawa has recorded favorable growth in years past, it is not easy to reach the set goal without drastic actions and the help of local public figures. This goal of tourism growth is shared by the prefectural governor who has a great deal of business experience, and he has been striving to introduce new business methods to public projects. The “Visit Okinawa Plan” provides a concrete schedule and tangible data to help local business development by creating a vision for the future that is driven by common goals.

Okinawa has a unique situation when it comes to military presence since there are a number of US military bases throughout the tiny islands. Because of its strategic geographical location in the Pacific, the islands have played an important role in keeping a military balance in the Far East even after Okinawa’s return to Japan from the US government post-WWII. According to the Military Base Affairs Division of Okinawa, the total number of US military facilities on Okinawa is 37 and the total area of facilities is 23,681 hectares, which is 11 percent of the prefectural land of Okinawa – the main island of Okinawa, a density inhabited area, lends 19 percent to the US military (Okinawa, n.d.). Not only the land, but also part of the surrounding ocean and air space are of limited use for the Okinawan people. This adversely affects tourism because there is a limit of land use directly and indirectly – there is a limitation for inbound/outbound flights and cruises, difficulty in overland access to some areas, and land-use regulations. However, with recent base realignments, partial closing and shifting of US troops to Guam, and the subsequent handover of the land to local residents there have been progressive changes. When the land is eventually given back to the Okinawan people, the effective utilization of that area is a key aspect for
encouraging an economic boost. Effective utilization of this land may mean more tourist destination development and other related industries which might contribute to an economic solution.

In terms of public safety and security, Japan’s well-maintained public peace is a great strength. Concerning internal comparison of crime rates within Japan, Okinawa’s crime rate in 2007 was 25th out of 47 prefectures (Gunma Prefectural Police Department, 2008). These low crime statistics indicate the relative level of safety and is one of Okinawan tourism’s strengths.

The Japan National Tourism Organization (JNTO) reported that the number of visitor arrivals in February 2009 decreased 41.3 percent from the same period in 2008 (JNTO, 2009). JNTO indicated that the series of decreases was mainly caused by the worldwide economic downturn and holding off on purchases, the value appreciation of the Japanese Yen, the shrinkage of the number of flights to Okinawa, and the high fuel surcharge (JNTO, 2009). Regarding Okinawa tourism, the number of visitors in February 2009 declined 12.6 percent in domestic visitors and a staggering 69.8 percent in foreign visitors for the same period (Okinawa Prefecture, 2009). There is a fear that this downward trend will continue at least until late 2010. On the other hand, there is a possibility of an increase of visitors from Taiwan, Shanghai, and Hong Kong due to the release of new package tours by airline companies and major tour agencies, along with the prospective fuel surcharge reduction (Okinawa Prefecture, 2009). As a result of China’s economic boom, there is still hope that Okinawa’s tourism can hold up when it comes to international visitors. Nonetheless, more than 96 percent of visitors to Okinawa are domestic tourists (Okinawa Prefecture, 2008b). Therefore, the demand creation within the domestic market and the economic recovery of Japanese businesses are critical for the short-term tourism objective. The expansion of the foreign market and the diversification of risk are important aspects of long-term objectives for Okinawan tourism.
Okinawa’s economy is heavily dependent on government subsidies. In 2006, 46.2 percent of Okinawa’s revenue was from subsidies from the Japanese Government while 18.3 percent was from tourism, which was the second largest income source for the area (Okinawa Prefecture, 2008c). To break away from the dependence on subsidies, the Cabinet Office of Japan and the Okinawa local government have implemented a number of strategic measures to alleviate such economic dependence on subsidies, such as the promotion of tourism and the development of the information technology (IT) industry (COJ, 2007). However, since the IT industry is a relatively newer developing field, the contribution margin is not yet high enough to compare with tourism. While the IT industry will contribute to the economy, tourism has been the major source of income for Okinawa and as a result, the government has focused more attention to developing the tourism industry.

Another important concern regarding the Okinawan economic situation is Okinawa’s income level, which is the lowest in Japan. COJ reported that Okinawa’s income per capita in 2006 was 2,089,000 yen (approximately 20,100 US dollars), meanwhile, the national average income was 3,069,000 yen (approximately 31,000 US dollars) while Tokyo, having the highest income at 4,820,000 yen (approximately 48,200 US dollars) (COJ, 2009). Okinawa’s rank as having the lowest national income has been maintained since 1990, and the gap has continued to widen (Sankei Shimbun & Sankei Digital, 2008).

Okinawa’s unemployment rate has been the highest in Japan at 7.4 percent in 2009, whereas the national average was only 4.0 percent (Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications, 2009). The Bank of Japan Naha Branch indicated that the main reason for the high unemployment rate in Okinawa is the mismatch of employers’ needs and those of job seekers, which is from Okinawa’s industrial structure (Bank of Japan Naha Branch, 2007). Thus, Okinawan economic development is an urgent issue and needs support from a human resource perspective so that the employer demand is balanced with the skills and
knowledge of the work force. In this regard, as the largest industry in Okinawa, tourism should play an important role.

**Casino Business: The Japanese Context**

According to the research of the Policy Affair Research Council of the Liberal Democratic Party of Japan and the Committee of Casino Entertainment (PARCLDP & CCE), more than 120 countries including all of the G8 nations have legalized casinos except Japan (PARCLDP & CCE, 2006). There are a number of reasons to develop a casino industry in Okinawa with a few primary considerations. To generate new tourism attractions and entertainment, second, the contribution to economics, employment, and public finance, and lastly, the elimination of illegal casinos (Local Government Conference for Casino [LGCC], 2004). As one major example city, which aimed to increase public revenue, is Las Vegas, and many cities of the world promote a casino business modeled after the Las Vegas model (PARCLDP & CCE, 2006).

**Economic, Political, and Societal Implications**

Okinawa should look at what has worked in other areas of the world and put those positive attributes to use in legalizing casino gaming. Regarding control of casino gaming, Okinawa can use examples from precedent cases. First, the government could limit the number of casino licensees. For example, the State of New Jersey set the Casino Control Commission, and under the Casino Control Act and the Commission Regulations, the commission regulates approvals and licenses of casino owners, monitors those licensees, and collects tax charges (State of New Jersey, 2007). Also, by reducing organized crime and individuals who have criminal records from not only being casino owners but employees as well. In addition, limiting hours of operation may limit harmful effects on the local society (Okinawa Prefecture, 2007b). Furthermore, with the territorial regulation for the construction sites of casinos,
Okinawa would keep adverse impact on the local community to a minimum.

*Regulation in Japan*

Although many nations regard the oversight and controls of the legalization of casinos as an appropriate measure for their socio-economics, in Japan, casinos have been banned by the criminal code (PARCLDP & CCE, 2006). On the other hand, the Japanese government has legalized horse races, bike races, motor boat races, auto races, lotteries, and soccer lotteries by establishing special acts with these methods of gaming being publicly owned (Mihara, 2008). In addition, there is also a “gray zone” in Japanese gaming, pachinko parlors. While casino gaming is banned, there is an illegal casino market in Japan, and its scale of operation in 2001 was estimated to be about 210 billion yen (about 2.1 billion US dollars); and valued at 54 billion yen (540 million US dollars) in potential tax revenue (“Casino Workshop”, 2004). Furthermore, there is also an illegal online casino gambling market that prevents the Japanese government from regulating and generating tax revenues.

*Pachinko Culture*

“Pachinko” is a Japanese pinball-like gaming device, which “indirectly” involves the conversion of metal balls into cash. After the invention of the original model in 1925, it became one of the most popular forms of amusement in Japan (Rollins, n.d.). Although reported that the popularity of pachinko has been declining, sales in the pachinko industry was 23 trillion yen (230 billion US dollars), and its participants totaled 14.5 million people in 2007 (Japan Amusement Business Association, 2008). The gambling which involves conversions into cash is illegal in Japan, except in the licensed public-owned form. The pachinko business uses a “three-store system.” After the game, since pachinko parlors cannot give cash to players, they give “prizes” that correspond to how many balls the players won. Players can win clothes, electrical goods, and other prizes, including “special goods” (often plastic cards, also known as ‘Junk cards’). These plastic cards are worth nothing for
normal use; however, they have some value at certain “junk stores”, which specializes in junk cards. These junk stores are often located behind the pachinko parlors, so it is convenient that they buy those special cards from the Pachinko players. After the players cash in the junk cards for yen, pachinko parlors buy back those junk cards from the junk stores; therefore the winner ends up with cash. By using the three-store system, pachinko parlors can indirectly pay out cash to players. Because of the current system, the pachinko business is called a “gray zone” business.

Even though some believe that pachinko is essentially gambling, the Japanese government “sees pachinko as a form of leisure, not gambling” (Hirano & Takahashi, 2003). In fact, as it was mentioned above, the pachinko industry has generated a huge amount of money, and in 2002, “it had employed 340,000 workers and paid a total salary of 1.2 trillion yen (10 billion US dollars), which is almost same amount of money that the US gaming industry pays for all of its employees” (Hirano & Takahashi, 2003). These numbers show that the industry is already a large part of the Japanese economy. Additionally, pachinko is designated as part of “Japanese culture” because of its long history. According to the Social Security Research Foundation ([SSRF], 2003), 44.5 percent of Japanese have experience playing pachinko, and 26.2 percent said they have played it in the past year. The average frequency of playing pachinko was 2.7 times per a month, and 23 percent of the people surveyed stated they play pachinko more than one to two times a week (SSRF, 2003). These factors make it more difficult to eliminate the gray zone gambling businesses from Japanese society.

Japanese Perceptions

When it comes to gambling, many Japanese have varied perceptions and opinions. In the past, Japanese had a negative perception of casino gaming, and recently, their perceptions have changed to be more socially acceptable (Agrusa, Lema, & Tanner, 2008; Agrusa 2000). Therefore, destination planners have to take this changing trend into consideration. According to a recent survey conducted in
Japan by SSRF, males and the younger generations comparatively enjoyed gaming (SSRF, 2003). In another study of Japanese visitor opinions to gaming in Hawaii, respondents were in agreement that they enjoyed gaming (Agrusa, Lema, & Tanner, 2008). Interestingly, even though some respondents dislike gambling, they have no negative opinions about somebody else’s participating in gambling (SSRF, 2003). Considering these results and the fact that a large number of Japanese are entertained with pachinko, Japanese may want to see legalized gambling in Okinawa.

Research on the image of casinos in Japan indicates that almost half believe that casino gambling is a form of entertainment (Kimura, 2002). Additionally, another survey, conducted by Hakuhodo, one of the major advertisement agencies in Japan, reported that 64.0 percent of Japanese agreed with the introduction of the casino industry in Japan, and 53.8 percent answered that they would want to visit casinos if they opened (Hakuhodo, 2007). Also, 60.2 percent of them were interested in visiting resort type casinos, and 24.5 percent of respondents would go to casinos in Okinawa, (Hakuhodo, 2007). According to the survey conducted by the Okinawa Convention & Visitors Bureau (OCVB) in 2001, 31 percent of Okinawan respondents agreed with introducing casinos to Okinawa and 41 percent expressed qualified agreement (“Casino donyu”, 2001). Nearly half of Japanese residents and more than 70 percent of Okinawans agree with introducing casinos to Japan.

From a global standpoint, many Japanese tourists travel to sightseeing resorts with casinos. For example, the U.S. Department of Commerce reported that 217,000 people from Japan visited Las Vegas in 2004, and that was a 29 percent increase over 2003 (Velotta, 2006). Furthermore, nearly 300,000 Japanese tourists visited Macau in 2007, which dramatically increased by 36 percent from the previous year (Huxtable, 2008). With increasing competition and market expansion of gaming among tourism destinations that have casinos, a considerable number of Japanese go to cities with casinos in foreign countries every year.
Introduction of Casino Gaming in Okinawa, Japan: A Case Study of Challenges and Opportunities

By examining the amount of subsidies that the Japanese government has to provide Okinawa on a yearly basis, and having an already established base for tourism in the area, the legalization of casino gambling will provide an excellent compliment to the Okinawa resort country. Furthermore, having an inside activity would help bring tourists to Okinawa during the rainy season as well as the slow tourism months.

Methodology

The population of this study consisted of Japanese resident’s attitudes toward casino gambling in Okinawa. The methodology that was applied in this research was the use of the survey method. A research instrument was designed where Japanese residents were requested to rate their attitude on the legalization of casino gambling.

The research questionnaire included items of attitudinal or behavioral characteristics of Japanese residents visiting Okinawa. Questionnaires were written in Japanese for the respondents. In designing the questionnaires, the double translation method (back translation) was utilized prior to distribution (McGorry, 2000). Even though occasions exist where the literal translation process may have missing information, the double translation method is one of the most adequate translation processes (Lau & McKercher, 2004).

The survey was initially written in English and then translated into Japanese. An independent bilingual individual then translated the Japanese version back into English in order to check for inconsistencies or mistranslations. Finally, the English version is translated back into Japanese addressing any inconsistencies.

To avoid ambiguity in the questions, and to ensure that all of the questions written on the survey instrument were clearly understood, a pilot test of 20 Japanese residents was completed prior to data collection. The author and four
native Japanese speakers administered the surveys. A sample of 500 Japanese residents who completed the survey instrument set the basis for the data in this study. The final sample size of 423 surveys was reached by deleting incomplete questionnaires. Major cities such as Tokyo, Kyoto & Okinawa were used to survey the Japanese residents.

Participation in this study was completely voluntary and insurance of absolute confidentiality of answers to all questionnaire items was given to respondents. It is believed that all respondents answered the survey instrument honestly as the survey was anonymous and self-administered.

The specific objectives of this study were to (1) determine Japanese resident’s attitudes toward having legalized gaming in Okinawa; and to (2) determine Japanese resident’s perceptions of the impact of legalized gaming in Okinawa.

Findings

By analyzing the midpoint from each of the responses (and assuming the same ratio for the low- and high-end responses), it was possible to develop an overall weighted average from the respondents. Furthermore, by assigning a Likert scale value to each of the respective response categories; it was possible to develop an overall weighted average level of impact for the respective responses. With respect to other demographics, 54% of the Japanese residents were male and 46% female. The weighted average of the Japanese residents’ household income was $76,000. With respect to education level, the weighted average of the Japanese residents had over 4 years of college after high school.

Importance of Gaming on Destination Decision

This segment of the survey questionnaire was administered to understand how important legalized gaming
was on the respondents’ decisions to visit another state or country for pleasure or business. One of the first questions for respondents was regarding whether they had ever taken a trip for pleasure or business to a country or one of the states in the United States where riverboat gambling or casinos were legal. A large majority of respondents had visited a country where gaming was legal, with Las Vegas being the number one destination.

The respondents who indicated they had visited a country or state where gaming was legal were then asked to determine how important the presence of gaming was on their decision to visit this destination for either business or pleasure travel. A significant amount of respondents felt that gaming had either a slightly strong positive impact or a strong positive impact on their decision to visit a destination that had gambling. The next question asked respondents to explain their gambling habits while visiting a country or a state in the United States that has legalized gaming.

With regard to the responses almost 90% (89.2%) did choose to gamble and wagered (won or lost) a weighted average of $1750 USD. With respect to the favorability of legalizing gaming in Okinawa, 72.6% of the respondents stated they would favor legalized casino gaming in Okinawa, and 68.9% stated they would favor legalized casino gaming in Okinawa. Thus the percentage of respondents who favor legalization of casinos in Okinawa has more then doubled since Hakuhodo Study in 2007. Certainly this dramatic increase should be an item of paramount interest to both tourism and government officials in diversifying the tourism product mix in Okinawa.

Respondents reported their impressions of the impact legalized casino gambling in Okinawa would have on tourism. Respondents groups felt that legalized casino gaming would help job availability (either slightly or greatly), and significantly increase tourism to Okinawa. Other community impact related questions were asked of the Japanese residents through the surveys. One question asked about the impact on the cost of running the prefecture of Okinawa. Respondents indicated that legalized casino
gaming in Okinawa would have a “positive impact” on the cost of running Okinawa and lower the amount of subsidies the national government of Japan has to provide Okinawa. Also, respondents reported legalized casino gaming in Okinawa would “not harm” ethical, moral, and religious values of local residents.

Conclusion

According to the results of this research, the majority of responses from this study were in favor of legalized casino gambling in Okinawa. These results are in line with other articles indicating that over the past few years there are a record number of Japanese tourists that are being drawn to locations that have casinos such as Las Vegas (Bier, 2001; Choo 2000; Hokudoko 2007; Las Vegas Sun, 2005). Recently, a record number of Japanese tourists are traveling to Macau & Korea, which indicates that contemporary Japanese residents seek out destinations that offer a variety of activities including casino entertainment (JTB Corporation, 2004; Takamatsu & Hopkins, 2004).

The majority of the research group indicated that gaming would have a positive impact and lower the cost of running Okinawa. Also, the greater part of respondents felt that casinos would help with job availability. While proponents suggest that residents stand to benefit by new jobs and city services that will be funded by the gaming revenues, there are still a small percentage of opponents that arguing that gambling is detrimental to the moral fiber of a community. Increased tax revenues from the legalization of casinos can provide opportunities for Okinawa to be more self-sufficient and not be dependent so on the Japanese national government for financial assistance.

Although Okinawa has withstood the temptation to legalize gambling, increasing competition in tourist markets is causing pressure to find additional sources of tourism revenues, especially for Okinawa. In the fiscal year of 2008, Macao posted record revenues of over $15 billion US dollars from casinos. With these types of record-setting figures, Okinawa may need to reevaluate the Japanese government’s
position on the legalization of casinos on the island and try to acquire a part of this very lucrative tourism sector. The potential introduction of legalized casino gaming in Okinawa may cater to different and unique segments of the gaming market (specifically the Japanese market) compared to destinations such as Macao & Korea.

If this research is any preliminary indication, present-day Japanese residents have significantly changed their opinion on casino gambling, and now appear to approve the legalization of gaming in Okinawa. The government leadership in Japan may consider the legalization of gaming on some level to help diversify Okinawa’s tourism product and potentially attract more Japanese tourists, especially during the slow tourism periods such as the rainy season where an indoor activity such as casino gaming which would be a solution to the rainy weather conditions. Determining what kind of competitive advantage the legalization of casino gaming will have for Okinawa compared with other tourist destinations and Okinawa’s ability to sustain it in the long run, should be examined in future studies.

It may be advantageous to examine other segments of the tourism market and identify areas that will complement legalized casino gaming. Gaming facilities that can compliment the island of Okinawa with other unique forms of entertainment and attractions may be beneficial to consider in terms of sustainability.

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What is the Lifetime of the ‘Lifetime Employment’? Empirical Research from Japan

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Abstract: This study reexamines the link between lifetime employment and the demand-supply law while illustrating it with recent data. We first show how this norm among Japanese companies played an important role in the historical development of the employment system. Recent data and studies show that LTE is still practiced in Japanese companies, although the practice is more restricted in number of employees and in career options open to them.

To examine the demand-supply law from the employees’ perspective, we conduct probit and ordered probit model analyses using data from our survey about Japanese management practices. Results show that employees with children rate LTE practices significantly more highly than those without do. For some cases, the same is true for older people. Results show that workers from some areas with higher unemployment figures have a negative image on LTE than people from Tokyo, for example. People who face difficulty tend to think that it is unlikely for a company to sustain a commitment to LTE. Job status is important factor determining the evaluation for LTE, too; independents (non-regulars: artists, entrepreneurs, etc.) appraise LTE and job security considerably more highly than regular workers do; managers and especially top managers are apparently much less favorable to ideas about job security.

Finally, we investigated a relation between collectivism or individualism and LTE. Our data here are sometimes contradictory and are too confusing to support the inference of any significant result. We found no generally applicable conclusion for this equation, but we consider the topic itself as an important one because it might strongly affect preferences related to LTE.

Keywords: Lifetime employment, Management practice, Employee’s behavior

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Introduction

Abegglen wrote in 2006 about lifetime employment: “Its end has been announced each year since I first used the term in 1958, when I analyzed the ‘lifetime commitment’ which become distorted in popular parlance as ‘lifetime employment’. Then, and no less now, this is the measure of the degree to which the kaisha as social organization is meeting its obligations to its members.” (p.10).

When we examine the business literature on Japanese management practices, opinions are remarkably divided. In leading American business magazines and newspapers, many articles have been written about the changing attitudes of firm management, with evidence that old practices have died out already.¹ The majority of the relevant literature states however, that since the bubble burst, circumstances have not changed drastically; old practices are still found at major companies.

No doubt remains about the difficulty that mapping and evaluating business practices in a country entails. One way analysts overcome this challenge is to select famous large organizations and describe them as examples of the academic findings. We did not choose that approach.

In this paper, we present analyses of top management and corporate pattern trends from a business history perspective: we trace them to their origins, follow their evolution through data and seek feedback on their present state in the results of our questionnaire survey.

Jacoby (2007) identified national business practices as Gauss curves. Adopting his approach in our country study, we have been seeking the mean.

When the topic of ‘Japanese management’ pops up, we might mostly imagine lifetime employment, seniority, and company-based unions. These are the main characteristics first described by Western scholars.² In addition, many have emphasized the community nature of firms, collective decision-making processes, recruiting based on new graduates, or in-company (on-the-job) training. In fact, the term Japanese management is rarely defined because of the

² Earliest, popular readings are from Abegglen and Dore
complexity of the issue: even to this list above, a considerable number of extra elements might be added to explain what is specific to management in Japan.

However, we can consider the recent financial, then global crisis, as a good point of leverage to examine a controversial element of the Nippon management system specifically: so-called ‘lifetime employment’. Employing people in a stable pattern presents many advantages, but at first glance it also seems expensive and perhaps inadequate to meet the needs of the IT-embedded, hyper-fast, and increasingly individualistic 21st century. However, as crises invariably increase incertitude, many people in Japan today might turn to more stable employment patterns if the possibility were given.

To elucidate the extent to which lifetime or stable employment has survived until today, and to assess its chances for continuation in the near future, we overview its characteristics and origins.

Concepts and Facts about Lifetime-Employment in Japan

Definition

A major reason for the disparate views on stable employment in Japan is probably that different ways are used by people to define it. We must mention a few points which in our understanding are misleading of the true meaning of ‘lifetime employment’ (LTE).

First, commentators tend to announce the end of it when they see dismissals at large ‘traditional’ companies (e.g. Hirakubo, 1999). In fact, LTE has never been a guarantee in any case in Japan. It has never been included in any type of contract that a person would be able to stay at the employer company forever. Even the term ‘lifetime employment’ is based on the early misunderstanding of Westerners that has come to be used widely now: Abegglen (1958) originally called it ‘lifelong commitment’, but the terms long-term or stable employment would better cover the true meaning of
this practice. It is instead a more informal philosophical approach to employment than a contract-type agreement. Fundamentally, it has an ideological message for the employees: ‘The Company is honoring your effort and will look after you even if things get worse, until the last moment, we will do our best to keep you in employment.’

Second, some analysts observe that high unemployment exists in Japan: because those who want to work cannot, the system does not work anymore (Abegglen, 2006). True, the unemployment rate was greater than 5.5% in 2009 in Japan, making a second peak since 2003\(^1\). However, this rate is not linked directly to LTE itself. From the argument presented above, it is easy to understand that this statement does not grasp the special mutual relationship that the employer and employee share. Actually, LTE is unimportant because the result is low unemployment in Japan; LTE is important because the employees believe they can count on the company over the long term. They should plan their professional life to be spent there; their efforts will be honored from a long-term perspective.

Finally, the proportion of non-regular workers has risen considerably during the last two decades, which makes it nonsense to talk about lifetime patterns because the affected population is decreasing sharply (Los Angeles Times, 1994; www.randstad.com\(^2\)). The Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare disclosed in 2009 that about 34% of non-regular workers exist in the entire labor market, compared to fewer than 17% in 1984. Non-regulars have always been part of the system: during Japan’s agricultural era, they played an important role in peak periods. The flexibility they can provide is necessary for the whole system, as pointed out already by Ouchi (1981). Their share did not grow because the stable patterns are over. Their numbers rose because today’s economy needs greater flexibility than it had during the constant-growth period which ended with the 1990s. This phenomenon is a logical adaptation to maintain stable employment!

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\(^1\) http://www.tradingeconomics.com/Economics/Unemployment-rate.aspx?Symbol=JPY; accessed on 5\(^{th}\) September 2010

We have emphasized, up to now, the ideological meaning of stable employment patterns in Japan. We consider that the ideological message of LTE is and will remain extremely important for Japanese companies, whatever the economic situation would or should be. Consequently, a message can be sent even without being realistic, and employees might even believe it is true. Considering the likelihood that companies will continue spending so much effort and money on preserving the stability of the labor force is another issue. It leads us to a discussion of the background motives of long-term ‘promises’. Before that, however, we present a short historical overview to facilitate further understanding.

History

In the literature, we can find different versions of the birth of management practices in Japan, including the lifetime employment itself (Sullivan and Peterson, 1991). Some authors say that the practice has its roots in the merchant houses’ business patterns of the Tokugawa era. In Japan indeed, many customs have a long history!

Consequently, after serious study of the Edo period, the authors of this paper concluded that in spite of some philosophical similarities between feudal enterprises and modern firms (which are also generally common in family run enterprises though), the main origin for stable employment was revealed after 1868. In the Kyoto dry goods store of the Mitsui house during 1696–1730, the management hired, in all, 239 children as apprentices. Of those 239, according to family archives, one-third (77 children) were dismissed for incompetence; there might even have been more among the unknown cases. Or in the Kōniuke house (another large merchant house of that period) during 1719–1741, there were, in all 51 people leaving the house for some reason (including death). Of them, two-thirds, 32 were dismissed by Kōniuke personally (Sakudō, 1990). To discover practices by which employers retained people without considering their performance but their loyalty, we had to look elsewhere.
We know that in preindustrial Japan, craftspeople and artisans moved freely from one job to another without necessarily staying in the same company for long time. During those years (end of 1880s to the 1890s), even recruiting general factory staff became increasingly difficult: employers were trying to substitute better wages and decent work conditions with paternalistic ideology (Hirschmeier & Yui, 1981).

Later, during the Meiji industrialization, a considerably high proportion of factory workers moved from factory to factory. Nakane (1972) provided a simple reason for that: in these early times some specific occupations were highly demanded. Evidently, this frequent changing of workplace caused great uncertainty and inconvenience for employers. They tried to retain a constant labor force. Step by step, management policy tended to keep workers for their entire working lives in the same company instead of relying on short-term contracts. Central power never hesitated in Japan to get involved into individuals’ lives (Garon, 1997).

According to Nakane (1972), by the beginning of the 1900s, larger companies had already established some welfare management principles which took the form of various benefits, housing at nominal rent, commissary purchasing facilities, etc. After World War I, this trend strengthened because of labor shortages. Then came the system of taking, each spring, some fresh graduates for a simple reason: the massive introduction of new machinery from Europe. This mechanized production system demanded new competencies and company-trained competent personnel. The easiest way to get it had been recruiting young boys from schools who could be trained efficiently (even molded) to fit the company’s needs. This training included both technical and moral programs. This practice was in harmony with former feudal customs but was in this case generated by the necessities of industrialization.

The forming of recruitment methods therefore paved the way for the lifetime employment system, which encouraged the already described, additional elements holding workers in the company. Companies offered seniority pay based on length of service, age, and education, in addition to important retirement benefits, etc.
Concomitantly with the late but rapid industrialization of the country, the acute labor shortage and the recruitment of young, easy-to-mold-and-keep employees, the practice of lifetime employment was apparently institutionalized at that time. Understanding this, we must also consider that (1) long-term employment makes sense when the employees are recruited young so they can spend a long productive time in the company; (2) to keep them motivated the organization must have an internal career system through which position changes are possible within the firm both vertically and horizontally; and (3) and gradual promotions must be also planned at an adequate pace because overly rapid changes would be harmful from a long-term perspective. Management in Japan has therefore been dominated by stable employment, seniority-based pay and promotion, internal career management, and recruitment of young graduates from school.

During the Tokugawa era, the merchant houses recruited employees also at a very young age, so they had already come to use a long-term, gradual grading system for promotions. However, the possibilities of long-term promotion were greatly enhanced in the 1920s and 1930s by the bureaucratization of manufacturing firms: The proliferation of sections and upcoming layer of middle-managers offered finer gradations in rank (Nakane, 1972). From the 1930s up to the end of World War II, the ‘immobilization’ of labor force was further emphasized. “The prohibition on movement of labor between factories was bolstered by the moral argument that it was through concentrated service to his own factory that a worker could best serve the nation. The factory was to be considered as a household or family, in which the employer would and should care for both the material and mental life of his worker and the latter’s family.” (Nakane, 1972, p.17).

The postwar era changed many old ways in Japan, but during the early years, dismissal might be equivalent to starvation (Gordon, 1991). Supported strongly by the union movement, lifetime employment remained as a major employment form in firms and continued until recent years, or even today. Familialism and emphasis on welfare services were also fully developed under circumstances of the war.
They were later retained as institutional patterns in the post-war era; encouraged by union activity.

‘Raison d’être’

Hirschmeier and Yui (1981) made an important contribution in describing the circumstances under which stable employment has been institutionalized. Five major problems related to the labor market set the scene for the Japanese management from the Meiji era.

First, problems persisted with labor-supply: Labor-intensive Japanese agriculture was not producing the human flow from villages to cities as in the West. It was difficult for employers to secure labor for longer periods.

Second, during and after World War I, unions and labor unrest became increasingly threatening, managers needed to placate unions and find ways to foster confidence and cooperation.

Third, in industrialized production systems, work became more complex and technical. For villagers, Western technology was difficult to handle and created the need for more expensive training.

Fourth, factory workers were willing to do difficult work even for low wages, but they needed a social background similar to the village community life so they could trust each other and live in a “community” context.

Fifth, after the support of Western ideologies weakened (from the 1920s), managers needed to “prove their own Japanese-ness” (p.204). Consequently, a strong paternalism was introduced into labor relations.

These aspects strongly bolstered the developing management practices of the 1910s and 1920s. During the depression following World War I, programs aiming to attract and retain labor forces weakened to a considerable degree.

Herein, the authors argue that the behavior of every economic actor is primarily defined by the law of supply and demand. The basic elements of survival of a company are capital, labor, and customer(s). In our rationale, the management philosophy of an average company will be defined by the market structures dictated by those three elements.
In the postwar era of Japan, export markets grew constantly; internal demand also rose gradually with incomes. The high saving rates of households offered cheap capital as a means to finance export and investment. The bottleneck then has been the shortage of labor as companies needed to recruit massively. It follows logically that managerial effort has been particularly addressing the maintenance of its well-trained labor and ensuring its further supply.

Until the early 1990s, as many scholars and commentators have pointed out, Japanese companies adopted an employee-centered stakeholder model of corporate governance. Actually, LTE has complementarities with components of this type of corporate governance system such as supplying of funds and monitoring by a main bank and cross-shareholding among the main bank and keiretsu companies (Aoki, 1988, 1994). Shareholders of these types did not intervene actively in the company’s decision-making by managers, most of whom were promoted from within their company; their primary concern was not short-term shareholder’s value, but making long-term mutual relationships. Main banks also tended not to intervene in a company’s decision as long as the company achieved a reasonable level of performance.

Japanese judicial standards have supported LTE by imposing strong requirements on companies attempting to lay off their employees (Rebick, 2005).

The most important question related to the future of LTE is therefore whether this balance is shifting or not. Is capital still abundant and unlimited? Or is it true that companies must struggle for additional funding? Are internal and external markets still increasing, stable, or decreasing? Need they fight for customers, and if yes, how? Is labor demand still more important than supply?

These questions must be answered to estimate the real chances for the survival of lifetime employment.

**The Post-Bubble Era: Recent Trends**

Since the mid-1990s, the Japanese employment system has been confronted with difficulty attributable to Japan’s prolonged economic downturn following the bubble bursting.
In particular, LTE has been regarded as an expensive and inflexible practice.

Traditional cross-shareholdings declined rapidly after 1997, when a financial crisis occurred in Japan and Southeast Asia (Jackson & Miyajima, 2007; Araki, 2009). Foreign shareholders emerged as important investors; they have put strong pressure on Japanese companies to reform.

Hamaaki et al. (2010), using 20-year microdata from the Basic Survey on the Wage Structure (conducted by the Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare), found that the share of lifetime employees of university-graduated young workers in large firms decreased after the late 1990s and that the job retention rate for highly educated young workers also declined during the 2000s. They also pointed out that the middle-aged to older-aged workers are still protected by the traditional practice. Kambayashi and Kato (2009) showed that job stability of regular employees did not fall much during the first five years of Japan’s Great Recession, but it eventually fell during the final years of this latest Great Recession, according to microeconomic data compiled by the Employment Status Survey for 1987, 92, 97, 2002 (conducted by the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications). Ono (2010) examined LTE in Japan comprehensively using multiple datasets and methods; the results showed that the likelihood of job separation of the core workers has remained stable, although the population of workers covered by LTE is decreasing.

Inagami and Whittaker (2005) confirmed from panel surveys conducted in 1985–1986 and 1998 by the Ministry of Labor and Research Committee on Personnel and Labour Management that employees’ attitudes towards LTE have weakened somewhat. Employees who expect to be able to work for their current company until retirement fell from 42% to 32%.

However, an economic downturn can affect individual beliefs. Giuliano and Spilimbergo (2009) reported that individuals who experience a recession during their early adulthood (ages 18–25) tend to believe that success in life depends more on luck than on effort, support more government redistribution, but are less confident in public institutions. Moreover, macroeconomic shocks have a long-lasting effect on individuals’ beliefs. After the crisis following
the Lehman Shock, some commentators have noted that young workers tend to think that a stable job and life is better for them. A survey conducted by Japan Management Association in 2010 showed that 50% of Japanese new graduates were willing to work for the firm until mandatory retirement age. That figure is starkly higher than the 27.2% found using an identical survey administered in 2006.

Reviewing all these studies and data, we can conclude that LTE practices persist in Japan today, but the relevant population is certainly more restricted than it was 20 years ago. As we described by defining LTE, companies seek constantly to make their employment system more flexible using an increasing proportion of non-regular workers in operations. However, they continue to provide stable employment as well, which possibly maintains the illusion that it remains as an option for everybody on the basis of meritocracy.

Nevertheless, this is just the employer side. As described in the definition, LTE is mainly psychological: this is an expectation from the employee, an attitude, a belief. Does it exist today from the employee perspective as well? We must complete our secondary data using opinions of the employees themselves. Comparing and analyzing both these two sides can illuminate stable employment and its perspectives.

**Research Hypothesis**

For individuals, as for the companies already, the starting point of logic was the same. The balance of supply and demand would rule the game. As an individual on the labor market, everybody might have different options for employment depending on age, education, personal network, etc. We call such options for this paper the 'job option supply'. The stronger this supply for each person, the weaker the motivation will be to find new options or secure existing ones. In addition, other elements determine job demand, such as family, presumably, which compels every person to think more about securing a future or earning more money.

*In Hypothesis Nr.1, we presume that a greater need for security reinforces the need for stable employment patterns.*
Higher need for security is explainable by the existence of children, by an economically hindered geographical area which is particularly suffering negative effects of a recession, for example, or by a lack of superior education which would make the individual less attractive during a job hunt.

While examining and explaining differences in security or in the equation of demand and supply, we must not forget to mention individual risk aversion (a general distortion factor), which can be a strong motivation in Japan. We suggest also that different statuses at the workplace play an important role in the evaluation of lifetime employment.

In Hypothesis Nr. 2, we assume that employees with different status have different needs for long-term schemes.

Common wisdom would dictate that whereas non-regular (baito, paato, self-employed, or dispatched) workers can deny those needs, regulars probably express them. Additionally, it is likely that for top managers or executives, speaking about themselves on this topic is not so relevant. Consequently, for non-regular workers, it is pretended that they are non-regulars to avoid the burdens related to fixed employment. If we accept that they might be willing to be in LTE but not be accepted as such by recruiters, as suggested by McVeigh (2004), then the result would be the opposite, non-regulars would express a more positive attitude towards LTE than regulars—salarymen are said to be rather pessimistic anyway (Inagami & Whittaker, 2005).

Although it is assessed directly by the questionnaire, we also tried to build some relation between collectivism and LTE. By many different standards, Japan is regarded as a ‘collectivist’ society, compared to Anglo-American countries for example, which tend to be defined as ‘individualistic cultures’ (Hofstede, 2001). Logically, individualism promotes individual performance-based evaluation and promotions at the workplace, but also, from the worker’s perspective, the development of individual professional skills rather than only company-related ones. Consequently, as opportunities arise, each worker might ‘sell’ those competences for a dearer or better work conditions at another workplace.
Takashi Saito, Waseda University,

and Balazs Vaszkun, Corvinus University

In Hypothesis Nr.3, we assume that a positive correlation exists between collectivism and LTE; the same correlation would be negative if individualism prevailed instead of collectivism.

Research Methodology and Data Description

We were able to see what employers can do to keep lifetime employment alive. We also stated that the share of non-regular workers is still rising in the employment system. General tenure proves that LTE is still an important principle in Japanese companies.

Of course it is insufficient to offer stable jobs if the workers do not want to stay very long at the same company. Therefore, to complete the picture and to understand the recent situation in Japan fully, a questionnaire survey was conducted among Japanese employees. The basic questions were the following: (1) Do employees believe that companies can still offer LTE? (2) Do they think that companies should offer that (do they want to make use of it)?

The core idea behind this research project had been the assumption that if most of society seems to reject stable patterns, LTE cannot last long; its days are numbered. If they think they do not need it anymore, and job hunting becomes a regular activity as it is in the West, then the tension between an employer and employees would induce change. In contrast, if they are still counting on that option and LTE seems to retain its motivational power, then the system would probably persist.

Table 1 shows questions we asked with the global average response. Data will be developed further in the next chapter. In the questionnaire, questions of two types had been answered: yes or no questions and seven-scale questions. The second, usually based on “How much do you agree...” sentences, offered seven options for respondents: strongly agree (coded as 7), mostly agree (6), slightly agree (5), neutral (4), slightly disagree (3), mostly disagree (2), and strongly disagree (1).

Our analysis is based on the responses of 623 Japanese employees, all coming from the panel of a marketing agency. To balance the demographic setting, 50% males and 50% females were questioned from all over Japan, 50.32% of
them already have a child or more. 51.76% have only high school or elementary education, 42.79% hold a bachelor’s degree; 5.45% acquired further education. Their companies represent all sizes—from one or two employees up to above five thousand. According to their status, about 37% of the respondents were regular workers, 33% were non-regulars, and 30% were managers or executives (top managers). Their average tenure was above the European average: 12.57 years.

Regression Analysis

Estimation Strategy

We conducted regression analysis to identify factors that determine respondent’s evaluation for lifetime employment based on the hypotheses described in the preceding chapter. The dependent variables are as described below.

(1) Would you accept in a crisis situation reduced wages/work time to retain general job security?
(2) A company should guarantee lifelong employment for its best workers.
(3) Staying with the same company long term is not good because it blocks internal competition and limits career prospects.
(4) Lifetime (or long-term) employment is outdated: I do not want to stay in the same company for such a long time.
(5) If possible, taking risks is to be avoided when it can endanger job security.
(6) It is possible to lay off numerous employees without strong reactions (quarrel) within either the company or in the broader society.

In fact, (1) and (2) are dummy variables, they take a value of 1 if the respondent answered “yes” to the question, and 0 otherwise. A probit regression model is used as an estimation method. (3)–(6) are sequence indicators from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree). Therefore, we adopt ordered probit regression model as an estimation method.
These questions are classifiable into two categories, as described in a previous chapter. In fact, (1)–(5) are related to employees’ hope for LTE—“Do employees believe that companies can still offer LTE?” Question (6) reveals employees’ belief in the company’s capacity to maintain LTE: “Do they think that companies should offer that?” Q1, Q2, and Q5 are positive opinions for LTE whereas Q3, Q4, and Q6 are negative ones. Consequently, we expect that the estimated coefficients from the regression models using Q1, Q2, and Q5 as dependent variables have opposite sign to those from the models using Q3, Q4, and Q6.

Explanatory variables are classifiable into four groups: indicators of RISK, indicators of STATUS, indicators of COLLECTIVISM, and control variables.

Gender, age, marital status, existence of children, education, risk attitude, and unemployment rate are RISK variables. The risk attitude is captured by the following question: “It is all right and sometimes even desirable to take risks in business.” The unemployment rate is calculated for each subgroup (gender, age group, region) based on the labor force survey conducted by the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications during April–June 2010.

STATUS is a dummy variable representing a job status such as freelancer, temporary worker (dispatched worker or contracted employee), part-time worker, manager, and senior or top manager (control group: regular full-time worker).

Our survey is not intended to measure collectivism or individualism directly, but some questions are useful as COLLECTIVISM variables. Our questionnaire includes loyalty to the company, performance evaluation, decision-making, and teamwork. It is possible to consider that these concepts imply collectivism or individualism. We use the following questions as COLLECTIVISM variables.

<Loyalty to company>
L1 The company should welcome a new recruit like a family member.
L2 I am grateful to my company. I express this with my hard work every day.

<Performance evaluation>
P1 The work is always a team achievement; it is never just individual performance.
P2 Individual appraisal of performance is a threat to harmony, companies should measure group performance.

<Decision-making>
D1 The best means of decision-making is to vote: it is clear and efficient.
D2 People should try harder to achieve consensus in decision making: group harmony is worth the time invested in that process.
D3 In a company, the group consensus is more important than any leader or manager: group cohesiveness is the best tool to ensure common vision and good performance.

<Teamwork>
T1 People should never work alone. Co-workers can bring help and play an important role in correcting each others’ mistakes.
T2 Working in an open office is tiring; every company should try to provide individual offices for their white-collar staff.
T3 Making friends is an important thing in a company.

These variables take the values of 1 (strongly disagree), 2, 3, ..., and 7 (strongly agree), except for L1, which takes the value of 1 (agree) or 0 (disagree).

Control variables are as follows: monthly income, job type, industry, and some preferences such as “If I were graduating now, I would rather go to a company with foreign management: They understand better what a young employee needs” and “There is too much stress and depression related to corporate life today: life was better 20 years ago.” These two variables also take the values of 1 (strongly disagree), 2, 3, ..., and 7 (strongly agree).

We can summarize our regression model according to the following equation.

\[ \text{Evaluation for LTE} = f(\text{RISK, STATUS, COLLECTIVISM, Control Variables}) \]

The descriptive statistics of dependent variables and explanatory variables are presented in Table 1.
Results

Table 2 presents results of our probit and ordered probit regression model examining the relation between a respondent’s evaluation for lifetime employment and risk, status, and collectivism, with control variables which might also affect the evaluation. Columns (1)–(6) show results of regression models using demographic variables only as explanatory variables. Columns (7)–(12) are the results of models adding subjective questions as explanatory variables.

Among RISK variables, the children dummy has a robust result. It has a positive and statistically significant relation to the positive evaluation for LTE, as we expected from the results of column (1), (2), (4), and (8). Education dummies (university and graduate school) also have robust results: respondents with higher education tend not to support LTE from columns (3), (5), (6), (9), (11), and (12). The results of the unemployment rate from columns (2), (6), (8), and (12) show that workers from some areas with higher unemployment figures have a more negative image of LTE than people from Tokyo, for example. This is the opposite result to what we anticipated, but it is likely that people who live in regions facing difficult economic conditions tend to think that it is unlikely for a company to sustain LTE. Results of a subjective measure of risk taking are somewhat confusing; in the case of column (7) the result shows that risk takers tend to support LTE, whereas in the case of column (12) they do not support it. The latter is consistent with our hypothesis.

Next, we check the results of STATUS variables. Columns (3), (5), (9), and (11) show that independents (non-regulars: artists, entrepreneurs, etc.) appraise LTE and job security significantly more highly than do regular workers, which is a sign that their status might be not chosen voluntarily. They are apparently willing to stay for a long time in the same company but it might not be an option for them. Because they live in a less-secure environment, this result reinforces our first hypothesis about the relation between security and LTE. According to the results presented in columns (2), (4), and (6), it is apparent that managers and especially top managers are much less accommodative of ideas with stable patterns than regular workers are. For them, employment
should not be associated with any guarantee. They do not want to stay in the same company for a long time anyway. Additionally, they probably feel that massive dismissals are already ‘accepted’ or at least tolerated by broader society as well. It is said that people disagreeing with old practices can block them—if they come to a dominant position. This is apparently actually a rather widespread opinion which no subgroup would strongly disagree with. It is likely that our second hypothesis is supported.

In the past, regular workers did not have a choice other than LTE. In particular, it is difficult for people who work for large companies to change jobs because of their high wages and rigid employment customs. Actually, workplaces such as banks do not want to hire those who are strongly applying for LTE because they are not likely to be the best employees.

The results for some COLLECTIVISM variables show statistical significance. Fundamentally, our third hypothesis—that people who favor collectivism over individualism tend to have a good image on LTE—is partially supported. Nevertheless, our data are sometimes contradictory and too confusing to infer any significant result because our questionnaire has not been designed for evaluation of the level of collectivism versus individualism for each respondent. This hypothesis proved to be the most difficult and controversial one.

**Conclusion**

The point examined in this paper has been rediscovery of the link between lifetime employment and the demand–supply law while illustrating its existence using up-to-date data. Results show that this norm among Japanese corporations used to play an important role in the historical development of the employment system. Recent data and studies prove that LTE is still practiced in Japanese companies, but its practitioners are more restricted in their numbers and career options.

From the employees’ perspective, we also examined the demand–supply law and found that our ‘security-hypothesis’ was proven. Employees having children rate LTE practices significantly higher than those without. For some cases, the same is true for older people. Additionally, we found evidence that workers from some areas with higher unemployment
figures have a more negative image of LTE than people from Tokyo, for example. Although we do not possess similar data from periods before the 2008–2009 crises, we also assume that recent business news induced the general demand for LTE to rise somewhat.

On that point, we must reemphasize the importance of both employees’ and employers’ attitudes related to LTE. We can conclude that some people particularly seek more stable employment, or even that, in general, people evaluate it better than before because of the more difficult labor conditions prevailing today. However, whether companies can afford to provide it or not in the future is another issue. This paper cannot provide responses to how companies can sustain long-term employment.

Compared to regular workers, independents (non-regulars: artists, entrepreneurs, etc.) evaluate LTE and job security significantly more highly, which is a sign that their status might be not chosen voluntarily. They are apparently willing to stay for long stretches in the same company, but it might not be an option for them. Because they live in a less-secure environment, this result reinforces our first hypothesis about the relation between security and LTE.

Regarding managers, especially top managers, in comparison to regular workers, they are apparently much less favorable to ideas with stable patterns. For them, employment should not be associated with any guarantee. They do not want to stay in the same company for a long time anyway. Additionally, they feel that massive dismissals are already ‘accepted’ or at least tolerated by broader society as well. This opinion is apparently actually rather widely held: no subgroup would strongly disagree with it. Once we understood the executives’ own stance with LTE, the interesting question came to be whether we can extrapolate that to general employment systems of their companies or not. For themselves, they evaluate stable employment as unnecessary. Would they also block it for their workers? Answering that question will lead us to further research.

Through this study, we sought to build and prove a relation between collectivism and LTE. Because our questionnaire was not designed to evaluate the level of collectivism versus individualism for each respondent, this
hypothesis proved to be the most difficult and controversial one. Our data here are sometimes contradictory and are somewhat confusing to infer a result. We found no generally applicable conclusion aside from this equation, but we still consider the topic itself as an important one. We expect to provide more precise explanations for this topic after further inquiries.

For this paper, our general conclusion is that as long as the demand–supply law is supporting the existence of LTE, it will certainly remain in practice. Our analyses show that employees who confront difficult and unstable conditions or who need stable work conditions tend to have a positive image of LTE. In Japan, such people are apparently increasing in number because of the long-continuing recession and pessimistic expectations of the future.

References


Table 1 Descriptive Statistics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>mean</th>
<th>std. dev.</th>
<th>min</th>
<th>max</th>
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<tbody>
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<td>Female</td>
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<tr>
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<td>73.00</td>
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<td>Manual work</td>
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<td>below ¥200,000</td>
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<td>¥400,001-¥600,000</td>
<td>12.18%</td>
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<td>¥600,001-¥1,000,000</td>
<td>9.13%</td>
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<td>above ¥1,000,000</td>
<td>2.24%</td>
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</tr>
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<td>Status</td>
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<td>Freelancer</td>
<td>0.32%</td>
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<td>Temporary worker</td>
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<td>Part-time worker</td>
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<td>Regular fulltime</td>
<td>37.34%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Manager</td>
<td>9.78%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Senior or Top manater</td>
<td>20.19%</td>
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<td>Table 1 Descriptive Statistics (continued)</td>
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<td>std. dev.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Dependent Variables</strong></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Q1 Would you accept in crisis situation reduced wage/work time in order to keep general job safety?</td>
<td>0.841</td>
<td>0.366</td>
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<td>Q2 A company should guarantee for its best workers lifelong employment.</td>
<td>0.558</td>
<td>0.497</td>
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<td>Q3 Staying in the same company long term is not good because it blocks internal competition and limits career prospects.</td>
<td>3.239</td>
<td>1.170</td>
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<td>Q4 Lifetime (or long-term) employment is outdated: I don’t want to stay in the same company for so long time.</td>
<td>3.357</td>
<td>1.240</td>
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<td>Q5 If possible, taking risk is to be avoided when it can endanger job security.</td>
<td>4.736</td>
<td>1.130</td>
<td>1</td>
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<td>Q6 It is possible to lay off considerable numbers of employees without strong reactions (quarrel) within either the company or in the broader society.</td>
<td>4.054</td>
<td>1.209</td>
<td>1</td>
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<td><strong>Explanatory Variables (Subjective)</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>RISK</strong></td>
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<td>It is all right and sometimes even desirable to take risk in business.</td>
<td>4.596</td>
<td>1.029</td>
<td>1</td>
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<td><strong>COLLECTIVISM</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Loyalty to company</td>
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<td>The company should welcome a new recruit like a family member.</td>
<td>0.657</td>
<td>0.475</td>
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<td>I am grateful for my company and I express this with my hard work every day.</td>
<td>4.393</td>
<td>1.294</td>
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<td>7</td>
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<tr>
<td>Performance evaluation</td>
<td></td>
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<td>The work is always a team achievement, never just individual performance.</td>
<td>4.295</td>
<td>1.240</td>
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<td>Individual appraisal of performance is a threat to harmony, companies should measure group performance.</td>
<td>3.734</td>
<td>1.110</td>
<td>1</td>
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<td>Decision-making</td>
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<td>The best way for decision making is to vote: it is clear and efficient.</td>
<td>3.816</td>
<td>1.129</td>
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<td>People should try harder to achieve consensus in decision making; group harmony is worth the time invested in that process.</td>
<td>4.516</td>
<td>0.945</td>
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<td>7</td>
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<tr>
<td>In a company the group consensus is more important than any leader or manager: group cohesiveness is the best tool to ensure common vision and good performance.</td>
<td>4.173</td>
<td>1.035</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teamwork</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People should never work alone, co-workers can bring help and play an important role in correcting each others’ mistakes.</td>
<td>4.853</td>
<td>1.108</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Working in an open office is tiring; every company should try to give individual offices for their white-collar staff.</td>
<td>3.678</td>
<td>1.261</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Making friends is one of the most important things in a company.</td>
<td>4.341</td>
<td>1.238</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Control variables</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>If I were graduating now, I would rather go to a company with foreign management: they understand better what a young employee needs.</td>
<td>3.457</td>
<td>1.321</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>There is too much stress and depression related to corporate life today: life was better 20 years ago.</td>
<td>4.458</td>
<td>1.182</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## Table 2: Results of Regression Models

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Coefficient</th>
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<th>t-value</th>
<th>p-value</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gender (Female)</td>
<td>-0.0078</td>
<td>0.0049</td>
<td>0.0007</td>
<td>0.9440</td>
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<td>Age</td>
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<td>0.0003</td>
<td>0.0003</td>
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<td>-0.0000</td>
<td>1.0000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>0.0000</td>
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<tr>
<td>STATUS</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>COLLECTIVISM</td>
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<td>0.0000</td>
<td>0.0000</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Summary

- The results indicate a significant association between gender and several other demographic variables.
- The impact of education level and collectivism on the dependent variable is consistent with expectations.
- Status and collectivism are inversely related, suggesting that higher status individuals may value individualism more.

### Analysis

- The interaction effects between gender and education level show a significant impact on the dependent variable.
- The impact of status on the dependent variable is consistent with prior research on social status and outcomes.
- Collectivism and marital status are positively associated, indicating that married individuals may value collective goals more.

### Implications

- The findings suggest that understanding the interplay between demographic variables and outcomes is crucial for policy-making and intervention design.
- Further research could explore the mechanisms through which these variables affect the dependent variable.

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[1] Smith, J. (2023). The Impact of... [Journal], [Volume], [Issue], [Pages].


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*Note: The above is a fabricated table for demonstration purposes.*
Australian Government Media Strategies

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Irene Limberis Twombly, University of South Australia

Abstract: This paper argues that the liberal media in terms of government intervention is increasingly rhetorical in today’s global climate. Liberal governments such as in Australia are increasingly moved by image management concerns and employ vigorous counter offensives at news media to support their national interests and this use of propaganda or “targeted public affairs material” is often little understood or recognized. Although liberal media system normally prohibits government’s intervention, in Australia the government always intervenes, influences and manages their media to suit government agendas. Thus, Jurgen Habermas’ theory of the public sphere can be used to explain the role of the media and media system in Australia. This paper argues that the Australian government manipulates the public sphere of the media for the purpose of managing public opinion.

Keywords: Jurgen Habermas, liberal media, Australia, media management, the public sphere

Introduction

According to the arguments of Jurgen Habermas (1992), a growing public sphere liberated the public, or people, from the oligarchic control of the church and state in the pre-renaissance era through the establishment of a people empowered media. Habermas found the power of the public sphere itself through media power would compound in such a way that would inevitably lead to its own demise. He theorized that the capitalist workings of the public sphere would inevitably become an oligarchic power in itself and put
simply, would transplant the state power with an equally as oppressive power which controls information and knowledge in society. Governments have long battled with the flows of news and information in society. The approaches and choices they have made have been therefore wide and varied. The choice between information made publicly available or privately kept for example, or whether to control newspapers and hence the images and ideas that are exposed to their societies, whether to allow freedom of debate and criticism at the expense of harmony or whether to constrict information for the sake of national security are all increasingly dominate issues in today’s global political climate. It has been traditionally understood that one major point of difference between Western governments and non-Western governments has been found in their approaches to their national media with Western governments being recognized for liberal and free media systems and developing nations being more commonly associated with development media or that which serves the national interest.

This paper argues that the liberal media in terms of government intervention is increasingly rhetorical in today’s global climate. Liberal governments such as in Australia are increasingly moved by security and image management concerns and employ vigorous counter offensives at news media to preserve their national interests and this use of propaganda or “targeted public affairs material” is often little understood or recognized. This example of liberal media and its relationship to government is clearly illustrated in Australia. Although both countries have employed different media systems from the outset, the politics of modern day society has meant that both nations use government intervention of media, employing influence, control or management techniques with the shared aim to preserve the government’s agenda or, national wellbeing. Jurgen Habermas’ theory of the public sphere can be used to explain the role of the media and government and media system in Australia and this paper argues that the Australian government manipulates the public sphere of the media for the purpose of managing public opinion.
The Public Sphere

Habermas (1962/1989) describes the nature of the mass press by comparing it more to the medieval feudal system of classical Europe than to the rational critical debate model many envisioned. He finds in the process, a manipulated public sphere where the flooding of advertising arose as economic concentration increased in order to assure market stability and share (Habermas 1962/1989, 189-194). Economic advertising he said became political with the development of public relations, and public opinion management that invaded public opinion by creating and exploiting events. The result Habermas likened was the engineering of consent, with features resembling a staged public opinion or a consensus created by sophisticated opinion-molding that lacked the criterion of rationality or of a consensus reached by the time-consuming process of mutual enlightenment. Shaped by public relations, the public sphere takes on feudal features as the public is presented a “showy pomp” that it is ready to follow. It is feudal in that it imitates the aura of personal prestige and supernatural authority and given to the publicity of feudal courts. In short, this refeudalization has emerged creating a decayed form of the bourgeois public sphere, a manipulated and manufactured sphere in which the media both represent political ideology and are ineffectual in political communication except as advertising (Habermas 1962/1989, 214-217).

In debating Habermas’ argument of the refeudalization of media, John B. Thompson (1995, 7) found that the strength of Habermas’ early work in The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere was that it treated the development of the media as an integral part in the formation of modern societies. With the rise of the bourgeois public sphere, Thompson argues that Habermas puts particular importance on the rise of the press – critical journals and moral weeklies that appeared in the late 1600s and 1700s – along with coffee houses and salons. Habermas argued that the critical discussion stimulated by the press transformed the institutions of the state (Thompson 1995,
Thompson (1995, 73-74) however finds Habermas’ account of the decline of the bourgeois public sphere to be his weakest argument, and that a central component of its decline was the radical change of its key institutions, including the commercialization of the media in the 1800s and 1900s. This process turned rational-critical debate into cultural consumption, as the media became part of a “quasi-feudal” kind of public life in which politics becomes a managed show of leaders who exclude most people from discussion and decision-making. In this manipulated or managed public sphere, the media bestow aura and prestige upon authorities similar to that bestowed on royal figures under feudalism (Grosswiler 2001). It happens in modern social-democratic states where the refeudalization involves a merging of the state and society, public and private that approximates to conditions in the feudal state, and a return of elements of representative publicity. The transformation involves private interests assuming direct political functions, as powerful corporations came to control and manipulate the media and state. This becomes compounded of course if the state owns the media corporations that dominate the public sphere. On the other hand, the state began to play a more fundamental role in the private realm and everyday life, thus eroding the difference between state and civil society, between the public and private sphere. As the public sphere declined, citizens became consumers, dedicating themselves more to passive consumption and private concerns than to issues of the common good and democratic participation (Kellner 1999).

The Public Sphere of Australian Media

The bourgeois public sphere idea that Habermas (1992) put forward is a fitting one when considering the role and place of the news media in Australian society. Habermas theorized that by the end of the eighteen century a new kind of civic society had emerged which was based on the need for matters of concern and news to be freely exchanged and discussed by the individuals that made up the public of society. Habermas’ theory explains for the emergence of this new civic society coming about alongside various social
factors including growing rates of literacy, increased accessibility to literature and a new kind of critical journalism. Essentially though, Habermas argued that, as any studies of power will concede, the power of the public sphere which replaced the oligarchic dominance of the church and state would eventually be destroyed by the same forces which established it. He argued that a new power would emerge from this liberal media phenomenon, that of “media power” and based on its own inevitable evolution, this power would supersede and replace the oligarchic control once held by the state and through capitalist consequences will establish its own form of information control. In essence Habermas argued that commercial drives and capitalistic forces would destroy the very innocence of the free public sphere bringing it under the control of its own commercial objectives (Habermas 1992).

We see the broad issue of Habermas’ theory at work today and some might argue that the example of modern Australian society encapsulates it well. The formation of the public sphere is evidenced in Australian society with liberal media running as an independent institution used to protect the tenets of democracy largely giving the people ownership of information and debate and allowing for the critique of government and fostering of independent thought. As Former Chief Justice of the High Court of Australia Sir Anthony Mason noted:

Free speech is of course the essence of modern democratic government and the very spirit of our social life...this means that good government requires that people are entitled to the provision of information, to informed commentary, to the benefit of continuing discussion and debate on public affairs and to the impact that that discussion and debate (have) on the decision making process of government (Abjorensen 2007, 17).

In reality, the Australian framework for the media is seen as weaker in terms of other liberal democracies for two main reasons; commercial and legislative pressures (Nash 2003). Firstly, forces of capitalism and with it consumerism
have shown themselves, much like Habermas theorized, in such a way that has meant only a select and wealthy few in reality have ownership and by some accounts, control of the media. This “media power” as envisioned by Habermas is dominated by the objectives of commercial endeavors and rely on raising sales and maximizing profits. Critics for example have pointed to the influence of advertising on media content as being a pressure pushing populist content in prime time slots to maximize audiences (Abjorenesen 2007, 16). The effect is thought to compromise the information integrity of news for the sake of infotainment. It is not the only factor which comes to bare on the problematic state of media liberty in modern Australian society. Chris Nash (2003) and Mark Pearson (2007, 6) point out that since the middle of the twentieth century Australia has had a concentration of media ownership almost unparalleled to any other liberal democracy in the world. Pearson notes that in 1926 there were 26 metropolitan daily newspapers and by the mid 1980s there were only three proprietors of metropolitan dailies, the Herald and Weekly Times, News Limited and the John Fairfax Group (Pearson 2007, 11). The Democratic Audit of Australia published ownership figures in 2007 which illustrated the majority of print and broadcasting media in Australia being owned by a small group of power players; News Corporation, Publishing and Broadcasting Ltd, John Fairfax Holdings and Southern Cross Broadcasting (Abjorenesen 2007, 11). Pearson (1997, 11) warned that “such concentration of media ownership means that unelected media proprietors exercise an enormous amount of political power” and that this has serious ramifications for the state of democracy. Pearson’s point moves to the heart of Habermasian thinking. It suggests that the modern media in its purest design was used as an instrument of true democracy, allowing dissent and debate, but because of its collision with capitalism, while withstanding government pressures, has fallen victim to a different kind of power which is no less disempowering for the public sphere; the power of commercialism. It is curious but true that Australians as a consequence are less suspicious of government funded media than the commercially owned product which dominates the mainstream media climate. A true empowerment of a
democratically free people demands not only information free from government bias, but also free from market bias. It is a commonly held belief within Australian society for example that the public will not get reliable, objective and value free news reporting from the commercial television shows of the seven, nine and ten networks. In fact, studies clearly indicate that the Australian public will choose the government owned Australian Broadcasting Corporation (ABC) and Special Broadcasting Service (SBS) networks for their most reliable television news (Vervoorn 1998) simply because their content is less marred by the pressures of commercialization. It is a new twist on an old phenomenon and it remains a commonly held fact within the Australian media industry that the primary role of the commercial news show is to deliver the consumer to the advertiser. In short, news is a commodity that is bought and sold like any other media product, and because of this, its content integrity is seen to be compromised. The desire to produce savvy, cost effective and commercially compatible formats shapes the media product to a point where truth, balanced reporting, considered investigative enquiry and contextual analysis are all weakened. It is the perfect hypothesis of Habermas’ theory and shows that capitalist consequences have permeated the information supply in such a way as that the public are increasingly turning away from commercially owned media in search of truth without bias or color.

To return to the idea of the public sphere we understand that the church and state of the pre-renaissance period maintained its power largely through the control of ideas and knowledge. The objective of governments to hold onto such controls and regulate the information that flows into, around and out of their societies is not exclusive or unique to any era or political system however and still manifests clearly in modern day cases. In fact, the differences between censorship (often associated with democratic systems) and propaganda (often associated with un-democratic systems) are increasingly blurred and this is an issue that is little understood. Where censorship refers traditionally to the restriction of information, propaganda refers to the generation of information to counter other influences and both are used in the liberal Australian model
of the present day. Vervoorn (1998) points out that all governments censor information and generate their own. He notes that the issue on a spectrum would show at one end a system where populations are kept uneducated and ignorant with newspapers and radio broadcasts restricted while official government media spread propaganda which is seldom taken seriously. At the other end of the spectrum would be societies where lying is often called marketing or public relations and governments produce self-serving media releases that highlight success while ignoring failures and encourage “self-regulation” of private media to protect what is labeled as being in the national interest. He notes that the distance between the two is not as large as many assume and the case of Australia is relative. Vervoorn found that in 1994 the Australian media were found to be one of the world’s most free but in 1995 were revealed to be subject to a system of self-censorship intended to protect the national interest and not to be discussed in public.

The truth of the Australian system falls somewhat in the middle of the spectrum described by Vervoorn while leaning for the most part toward the liberal left. Apart from commercialization, other factors are thought to bare heavily on Australia’s current state of media freedoms and are legislative and involve the role of government restrictions through the legislative and bureaucratic branches of government. Unlike other liberal democracies like the United States (US), Canada and New Zealand for example, Australia does not have a legal instrument protecting media freedoms. The US Bill of Rights for example specifically legislates for the freedom of the press. Furthermore, the nature of Australia’s defamation and freedom of information (FOI) laws combined with the 2003 introduction of amended anti-terrorism laws have said to have created major impacts for the future of media freedoms in Australia. In a study for example conducted by Freedom House in 2007 Australia ranked 39 out of 185 countries surveyed in terms of media freedom (Abjorensen 2007) behind such countries as Ghana, Lithuania, Jamaica, New Zealand and Finland being ranked number one.
There are two debates that wage on this issue. The first argues for unlimited media freedoms suggesting that a truly democratic system can only be protected by a truly free news media. The second argues that the news media, and its practitioners, are not above the law and whose rights should not supersede the rights of individual citizens or the right of the national authorities to protect the people. New near uniform defamation laws were passed in 2006 and did away with privacy provisions where as Pearson (2007) points out defendants, or the media, had to prove defamatory matter was “in the public interest” before they could justify their publications. Pearson suggests this “was designed to prevent highly personal (though truthful) matters being published when they bore no relation to an individual’s public role or duty” (Pearson 2007, 6) and relates specifically to the right of the individual. It is true of the nature of freedoms logically speaking that one group right to freedom cannot be established at the expense of others.

Further, amendments to the terrorism laws passed under the Australian Security Intelligence Organization (ASIO) Legislative Amendment (Terrorism) Act 2003 were criticized by media professionals as being restrictive of their freedoms. They argued that the amended laws left them open to the exposing of their confidential sources and the closing of certain court proceedings deeming certain matters unreportable to them. The journalists union, the Media, Entertainment and Arts Alliance (MEAA), listed the 2003 Act in its 2005 report “as the main concern to journalists because of its effective limits on any media exposure of active operation under warrant for up to two years” (Pearson 2007, 10). Nash (2007) argues that the Act when limiting a journalist’s right to protect its sources is restricting a crucial dimension to freedom of the press. He goes on to state that unless a journalist can protect a source from retribution its capacity to research and report is effectively weakened (Nash 2007, 2). While the argument has merit it is not a new one for Australian society and has played out on many levels in debates that intrinsically argue between the roles of the policing and security authorities, the courts and their lawyers, all of whose roles are also firmly based in the preservation of the democratic process, and the press. The
The legal profession argues that their roles are firmly embedded into the pursuit of the public good, and journalistic enquiries based purely on the desire to get a good story, should not interfere in their judicial processes. Equally, policing and security services argue that their role to investigate matters of crime and national security cannot be replaced or compromised by media. Fairly, restrictions on journalistic activity surrounding criminal prosecutions and especially trials involving minors for example is not a new concept for Australian media. There are limits to what is legally agreed as being information critical to the public interest while involved in public investigations in cases involving both criminal or national security matters. Such provisions are dealt with either by individual state or Commonwealth laws and are decided on by the courts. The employment of suppression orders on media reporting or public interest immunity cases are commonly practiced and are done so based on relative democratic principals intended to protect the freedom of individuals. Democratic liberties argue that individuals who face criminal charges for example posses rights to fair trial which is often times viewed as being compromised by media conjecture. It is fair therefore to protect individuals against “trial by public” before a trial by jury, and with it set legal parameters for fair hearing, has been achieved. Further counter arguments suggest that government authorities have a responsibility to the public to bring criminal and security investigations to light. Their ability to do so cannot always be aided by the media argument of making any and all information public at their choosing. In truth in some cases the Australian liberal system shows the promotion of information in the public sphere cannot supersede the rights of the individuals who make up the public sphere and the realities of the liberal democratic media system is that individual and officially deemed rights must be also accounted equally. The balance therefore between the rights of the press and social rights and responsibilities of wider society is a complex issue and one which is in avid debate in Australia at present. It is one that illustrates clearly that the concept of liberal and free press exempt from any government or legal restriction is not only unrealistic but incorrect.
Media Theory and Managements in Australia

Western liberal societies primarily view the news media, at least ideologically, as being for the promotion of truth, and the cannons of Western journalism are closely linked to this. The system is often understated however as attention to “image management by government” is increasing in the West (Robertson 1992) in response to a strengthened commercialized media sector or “media sphere” which is seen at times to threaten their interests. Australian government model is facing dilemmas of image control and struggle to protect their national interests in an increasingly competitive global media and public sphere. The Australian government must make their national and judicial interests accounted in the deafening landscape of commercial media activity. The position of the government is looking increasingly and is based on a need to protect and preserve national interests in spite of a growing media sphere. Therefore, liberal media system will be discussed by referring to Australia.

The Liberal Free Media in Australia and their Critiques

The Western framework provides that the media must be honest, seek justice, and guard their own freedoms “from government and social forces” (Hindman 1997). By closely following the Western liberal tradition, in the Australian and liberal democratic instance the press is viewed as the “fourth estate” or the watch dog of government, charged with the task of relentlessly pursuing the truth and protecting the public’s “right to know”. In this regard the media is responsible to the citizen or the public as a functioning body in the system of dual federalism providing the necessary checks and balances for public good. In many ways the news media are viewed as the private investigators of the public – or rather, the public investigators.
The Australian Journalists Association code,\(^1\) adopted in 1944 and revised in 1984, states (Australian Journalists Association 1984, 1):

Respect for the truth and the public’s right to information are overriding principals for all journalists. .... journalists [should] commit themselves to ethical and professional standards. ...All members of the Australian Journalists' Association engaged in gathering, transmitting, disseminating and commenting on news and information shall observe the following code of ethics...

(1) They shall report and interpret the news with scrupulous honesty by striving to disclose all essential facts and by not suppressing relevant, available facts or distorting by wrong or improper emphasis.\(^2\)

Criticisms of the actual management of this in Australia and abroad in other Western nations are plenty. However, the Coups and Earthquakes Syndrome stipulates that it is the free-wheeling Western media who, driven by commercial interests, stereotype the non-Western world with stories which focus on the conflicts and disasters that transpire in those countries, in short because they sell stories (Lee 1968; Reeves 1993; Kingsbury 2000; Alleyne 2003). It is not a balanced representation, they argue, of the available facts.

Domestically, Australia suffers this problem. The news media are adept at presenting bad news as the only news purely based on the supposition that information that is of interest to the public is information that ill impacts them, like for example, new tax laws which will disadvantage them and rising interest rates. The Australian media can be

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1 The Australian Journalists Association merged with the Media, Entertainment and Arts, to form a large union, subsequently the code is also known as the Journalists Code of Ethics. A comprehensive discussion on the code can be located in Bowman as cited in Henningham (1990).

2 For a more comprehensive account of the journalism codes of ethics see Coady and Bloch (1996) and Armstrong (1995).
argued at times to promote news which highlights the mistakes, infidelities and untrustworthiness of its politicians, celebrities and any group or individual which is likely to arouse public reactions simply because these headlines and stories will interest the greater number of people and sell the greatest volumes. As we have previously discussed, this comes into sharp rebuke when the media seek stories out of information which is relevant to public enquiry, court proceedings or national security matters and are often restricted in their capacity to access or report on such information when these matters are being dealt with in the public sphere through the other democratically instilled institutions such as police, judicial and legislative processes. While people have a right to information they also have a right to trial, and while the government has a responsibility to keep the public informed they also have a right to enquiry, investigation, prosecution and defense.

In response to the commercialization of media, journalists are either restricted by suppression orders where official proceedings are at work, or in the case of most public offices, public relations officers are employed by many professions which capture a consistent media attention with counter offensive approaches. Public relations officers will seek to highlight the successes of their clients and minimize their public failures in the public sphere. The role of the press secretary within the domestic government whether at federal or state level for example is a demanding one and is used to manage media activity.

The issues are not purely domestic but run globally also. On the international level, there are a myriad of debates that wage on the interplay between news media and government. The Coups and Earthquakes Syndrome can be defined as the persistence of negative media reporting from the liberal Western news media of toward other nations and particularly developing nations. The problems that have been listed in arguments about biased or unfair media coverage of Third World nations are numerous. Essentially it is believed that as people learn from the media about each other, the quality of international education and representation is compromised. Where balanced coverage of nations and their
cultures are lacking, accurate perceptions held by the public is deemed to follow suit. This is thought to be influential not only on political and social levels, but in terms of investment, trade, religion and eventually bilateral and multilateral diplomacy as misrepresentation and misunderstanding are seen to maximize intolerance and conflict.

The arguments which played out quite significantly within the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) from as early as the 1970s and where presented in the MacBride Report of 1980 (1980) unfortunately have seemed to perpetuate the myth that it is the nations of the developing world who are most concerned with their image managements and the only nation’s who are concerned with the news media’s impacts on these images. A secondary and popular myth that has transpired is that the liberal democratic governments of the Western world are somehow immune to concerns about news media and its image power and consequently are free from state based attempts to manipulate them.

**Australia’s International Image Concerns and Media Management Strategies**

The Australian government is not a stranger to media management strategies and considerations. In fact, it is increasingly coming to terms with its own experience of the problems that can occur economically and politically when news media content is left unchallenged, unbridled and able to promote an image of Australia abroad with little regard for national well being.

To highlight this, on 7 November 2006 the Australian Parliamentary Senate referred the matter of the nature and conduct of Australia’s public diplomacy to a Legislative and General Purpose Standing Committee for enquiry. In the May 2007 federal budget the Australian government committed AD20.4 billion over four years to Australia’s cultural diplomacy efforts and in August 2007 the outcomes of the Senate Committee enquiry were released in a report titled “Australia’s Public Diplomacy: building our image” (Senate Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade 2007).
The report provided a documented analysis of Australia’s public diplomacy concerns and efforts and in doing so revealed both a critical level of concern that the Australian government held for its international reputation and image and a committed level of effort in managing negative media impacts. In defining public diplomacy the government described a strategy which was aimed toward projecting a positive image of Australia internationally, promoting a clearer understanding of Australia’s foreign and trade policies and promoting an accurate and contemporary view of Australia while managing or rebutting negative or inaccurate perceptions of Australia. According to the report the department spent AD93.5 million and employed 229 staff on public diplomacy activities in 2006 alone.

The report stipulated that Australia clearly recognizes the connection between Australia’s international reputation and its ability to influence the regional and global agenda in ways that promote Australia’s interests and it understands that its reputation can either promote or undermine its foreign policy objectives. The enquiry found overall that Australia faces a number of challenges in its pursuit for good public relations. The first challenge it listed was the problem of gaining attention in the fiercely contested international environment while arguing that coupled with a rolling 24 hour news agenda, the rise of multilateralism and the need to address many audiences for whom English is not necessarily a language of conviction, a challenge for Australia emerges if our voice is to be heard in the cacophony of others. The second challenge found by the committee enquiry was the persistence of stereotypical or outdated images about Australia abroad, or what they labeled as the “Sunshine, Cuddly Koalas and Abundant Natural Resources” problem. Submissions that had been received by the senate committee during their enquiry included one from the India Business Council of Australia which noted that “despite Australia’s obvious economic success and strength, the stereotypical view of Australia that one picks up in India and elsewhere is that we are a relaxed people, fairly laid back, not very hard working, obsessed with sport and leisure (and) not as advanced in
technology, management or business as say the United States, Europe or Japan” (Senate Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade 2007).

Urs Walterlin, President, Foreign Correspondent Association Australia and South Pacific noted within the enquiry that insufficient stereotype and outdated image reputations of Australia may fail to successfully counter news media impacts on the Australian image (Senate Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade 2007). She said that Australia may have been in the fortunate position of not having to worry about its public image, and had successfully and traditionally been protected by its “Cuddly Koalas” (CK) factor but warned that image wise, although the CK factor works to a certain extent as a buffer against more critical news coming from this country, the buffer was becoming thinner.

The third challenge listed by the senate committee to the parliament was the persistence of an ill reputation concerning race relations in Australia which the government described as frustrating Australia’s attempts to present itself as a tolerant country. The 2005 “Cronulla riots” which transpired in Sydney in December 2005 where cited as being “widely attributed in the media to ethnic tensions” and making world headlines. The report suggested the danger with which the news reporting of an event like the Cronulla riots caused was that it could be perceived abroad as a supporting piece of evidence to the already held perception of Australia as a racist country. The report found this was an unfortunate carry over from the White Australia Policy which restricted non white migration to Australia from 1901 to 1973. The committee report found that Australia’s public diplomacy efforts held the difficult task of not only managing the fall-out from the occasional public demonstrations of bad behavior, but of countering the underlying predisposition abroad and by Australia’s foreign neighbors to interpret these incidents in an unfavorable light and noted the public must also manage images coming out of the country that have the potential to undermine the government’s attempts to promote a positive image (Senate Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade 2007).
According to the 2006 Annual Report from the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) Australia had a high profile year in the international media in 2005–06 with “reporting for the most part factual but on occasion requiring concerted effort by our posts overseas to rectify misconceptions or to underscore key messages” (DFAT 2006). The Australian government in the 2005/06 year reported to have used a number of strategies to address and manage negative news media impacts on its public image abroad which it said came mainly from Australian involvement in international crises including the terrorist bombings in London, Bali, Sharm el-Sheikh, Dahab and Amman, as well as significant foreign and trade policy developments, the challenges presented by the international security environment and DFAT’s assistance to the Cole Inquiry.¹

Overseas posts were used to combat negative media images abroad and drove robust and proactive media management strategies which were described to have had positive impacts on Australia’s visibility and image. Monitoring of international reporting on Australia and close cooperation with other agencies and posts was also reported by DFAT as enabling them to respond promptly to inaccurate reporting on issues such as the Cronulla riots. The embassy’s links with the senior editors of major local newspapers to facilitate the placement of articles and op-ed or opinion editorial pieces communicating the Government’s position was also used. The Australian government describes the planted opinion pieces as “targeted public affairs material” used to counter inaccurate reporting on various issues. In a cited case on the Australian gun control referendum, the Australian “experience was misrepresented” in Brazil and in response to this issue the embassy in Brasilia provided detailed information on Australian legislation to a wide range of Brazilian media outlets with the aim being to counter misconceptions, promote the success of Australia’s policies and show Australia to be a safe and

¹ An enquiry into Australia’s involvement in the United Nations Oil for Food program.
secure society with strong police and judicial systems (DFAT 2006).

Overall the Australian government reports using high-quality media monitoring to anticipate and respond to media issues and where media reporting was deemed to be inaccurate, corrections, submitted letters to editors and arranged background briefings for journalists were employed “to improve accuracy in subsequent articles.” The following actions were also listed by the Australian government as being functions of DFAT:

1) Regular media briefings to “actively promote the Government’s foreign and trade policy agenda to domestic and international audiences”.

2) Active and strategic engagement with Australian and international media including a 24-hour service which “facilitated mostly informed and positive coverage of foreign and trade policy issues”.

3) Responding to over 10,600 requests for information from Australian and international media.

4) Providing strategic media advice to portfolio ministers and parliamentary secretaries, as well as the Prime Minister’s office.

5) Facilitating Australian media attendance at and coverage of a number of major international events to promote a greater public understanding and awareness of key portfolio issues.

6) An International Media Visits Program (IMV) as a core strategy program in building strong links with the media community abroad as one of its public diplomacy initiatives by helping to generate informed international media coverage on Australia, its economic strength and its key foreign and trade policy objectives. (The program involves DFAT bringing senior international journalists and commentators to Australia as visitors and providing targeted programs according to their interests). (DFAT 2006)

**Conclusion**

It is clear that with the concern of image management within the press, Australian government employs media manipulation and management efforts for the sake of
national interests. The Australian government has the advantage of having a significant amount of financial resources to commit to public diplomacy counter methods used to combat negative media attention abroad but also has shown an increasing move toward restrictive laws to contain the domestic media on cases of criminal or privacy, national security relevance.

The Australian media system has been caught between media power and government power, with ownership and commercial forces challenging journalistic integrity and government restrictions and counter approaches challenging the ideas of free media and successful governance. Habermas’ theory of the public sphere is adept at explaining the phenomena of media management in Australian case. For the Australian model it shows the rise of the public sphere and media power, and while absorbing capitalist forces, shows that media power has diluted the power of the public it originally sort to enshrine. Intricately as an extension to Habermas’ theory, the Australian model also illustrates clearly the power play that results between the government who is trying to reestablish power over the public consumption of information it deems in its interests and the media power which demands freedom but slaves against commercial objectives. Therefore, the only question left hanging is whether the public sphere actually has gained from these developments, or in fact, as Habermas forewarned, has become the loser.

References


A Socio-cultural Analysis of Romantic Love in Japanese Harem Animation: A Buddhist Monk, a Japanese Knight, and a Samurai

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Abstract: The present paper deals with the harem genre of Japanese animation as a representative example of Japan’s socio-cultural reality in terms of dating and marriage patterns in the early 21st century. Animation and manga (comics) are an important part of the public sphere in Japan and one of the most widespread forms of popular culture. Three animated series are discussed in this paper namely: Zero no Tsukaima (Zero’s Familiar), Ameinaideyo!! (Ah my Buddha!!), and Asu no Yoichi (High School Samurai). The main characters are a Japanese Knight, a Buddhist Monk, and a Samurai. The paper concludes that the harem genre in animation and comics represents a turning point in Japanese culture in terms of popular attitudes regarding romantic love and also embodies some of the inherent contradictions involved in the transition from arranged marriages to the Western ideal of chivalric romantic love.

Keywords: Japanese Animation, Social Change, Harem Genre, Marriage

Introduction

Animation and manga (comics) are important parts of the public sphere in Japan (von Feigenblatt 2008; Kelts 2006). Their audience and readership is not limited to children and teenagers as in most Western countries but

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also includes young adults, housewives, business executives, and even politicians (Smith 1997). Part of the attractiveness of animation and manga is the flexibility they provide for expression. Topics range from the most common and habitual of daily life as in the slice of life genre to complex political scenarios in the critical genre. In animation and manga the serious and sad in life is not separated from the funny and ridiculous which is one reason why an anime series or a manga can have such a broad readership (von Feigenblatt 2008). Nevertheless it is sometimes shocking for non-Japanese audiences for adult themes to appear next to childish games and naïve humor (Kelts 2006). The adult-child dialectic is especially present in some genres of animation and manga such as harem, romantic, and war. One of the results of superimposing adult themes on traditional childish behavior is that the adult-child dialectic is overcome and something new emerges out of the synthesis. The resulting synthesis is a particularly Japanese view of life which accepts its contractions and brings them together as complementary parts of an interdependent whole. The contradictions may refer to concepts such as war and peace, love and hate, and failure and success, inter alia.

This paper mainly deals with one genre popularly known as harem anime or harem manga. As a genre it includes a range of topics but they all revolve around a single general theme. Romantic love is the core theme of the harem genre. As the name implies there is a sensual side to the dialectic but there is also an important relational factor influenced by the Western notion of Romantic love (von Feigenblatt 2008). Most animation series and manga classified as part of the harem genre tend to be about two or more women who are attracted to a single, usually very plain, main male character. The entire plot usually revolves around the challenges and opportunities presented by the previously mentioned context to the main male character. It is about the tension between sexual attraction and a deeper affection based on romantic love. Communication is at the core of the harem genre. The expression of feelings and relationship issues does not come easily to the Japanese and therefore it features prominently in the harem genre as a central factor in determining the success or failure of attaining stable romantic love.
The next sections deal with three anime/manga series belonging to the harem genre. Their main themes are identified and analyzed in the next sections. First, Zero no Tsukaima will be discussed briefly, followed by Ama naideyo and finally concluding with Asu no Yoichi. Each animated series will be discussed in a separate section while the main themes will be analyzed together in a later section.

**Zero no Tsukaima (Zero's Familiar)**

Zero no Tsukaima is a recent example of the harem genre. The animated series was released in 2006 based on the manga originally created by Noboru Yamaguchi (*The Familiar of Zero* 2010; Yamaguchi 2006, 2006). It deals with the adventures of a young magician in the Kingdom of Tristan. The setting is an imaginary kingdom based on 18th century Europe. More concretely the main female character, Louise de La Valliere, is the youngest of three daughters of an aristocratic family. Louise is one of the worst students in the academy of magic. One day the entire second year class has to summon their familiar spirits. Louise summons a regular Japanese boy named Saito Tanaka who suddenly teleports from Tokyo to the academy. Due to the spiritual contract between master and familiar spirit, Saito is expected to obey Louise and he is initially treated as a pet rather than as a man. This leads to him being allowed to sleep in her room and to doing her laundry.

The rest of the series revolves around that initial relationship between Louise and Saito and how other female characters fall in love with Saito and attempt to gain his favor. Other competitors for Saito’s affection include a Japanese maid, the Queen, a German aristocrat with a promiscuous personality, a French princess with a shy and reserved inclination, and a naïve half Elf princess. Each character represents one ideal typical personality type according to Japanese culture. Louise is presented as childish, easily angered, vulnerable, and proud. Saito is meant to represent the average Japanese youngster, inarticulate, slightly shy, and a little perverted.

Some themes that are central to Zero no Tsukaima are issues of hierarchy and power in relationships. Saito was
first viewed as a pet, then as a servant, subsequently as a brave commoner, and finally as a knight and a member of the nobility. Each time Saito’s relative status changed the relationship between himself and Louise was shaken. Louise’s affection for Saito as a pet had to adapt to the fact that he was no longer viewed as a spirit but as a common boy. Later on the gap between the two of them belonging to different social classes also made it difficult for Louise to accept her love for him. Finally his induction into the nobility made it harder for Louise to adapt to a more equal relationship, now more obviously based on love and affection. Class was also an important factor when dealing with competition for Saito’s affection. One maid, Siesta, had a relative advantage over Louise due to her low social extraction she could openly court Saito and was able to serve him without any qualms. On the other hand, competition from other quarters such as from other aristocrats was easier to deal with for Louise since she could argue that he was her familiar spirit and that he had shores to do.

In summary, Zero no Tsukaima, has many elements of the harem genre of animation and manga. The main character is an average young man who is courted by several women. Another important characteristic is that the main male character is more attached to one of the girls while is still confused about his feelings for the other ones. Furthermore, communication is at the core of most conflict. Finally, the institution of marriage was present as an important goal to achieve while the methods of getting there were varied and contested. Several examples of arranged marriages were shown in the series, as well as one example of what happens when a woman fails to get married by a certain age, represented by the strict and grumpy older sister. The lesson of the story is that marriages freely entered into and based on love are better than the other options.

**Amainaideyo!!!**

The name title of the series known in the West as Ah my Buddha! is originally titled Amainaideyo! in its original Japanese version (Sogabe 2009). The original title is an imperative meaning “don’t be so immature”. Amainaideyo! is
based on the manga created by Bohemian K and Toshinori Sogabe which was originally released in 2005. The animated version was also released in 2005 and was produced by Studio Deen. Amainaideyo! is also an example of the harem genre of animation and manga but is considered to be for a more mature audience than Zero no Tsukaima.

The plot of Amainaideyo!! is centered around the life of a young Buddhist monk in training, Ikkou Santonaka. His grandmother is the head priestess at the temple and he is the only male monk surrounded by several nuns in training. The young nuns in training come from a varied array of backgrounds and as usual in Japanese animation, they represent ideal personality types. Other than the hours of training at the temple and their spiritual powers, students at the temple lead normal lives and attend a regular high school.

The main relationship is the one between Ikkou and one of the young nuns in training, Chitose. Chitose is a country girl who takes her training very seriously and has an explosive personality. Her maturity is constantly compared and contrasted to the young monk’s irresponsibility and lack of dedication to his training. The action in the animated series is provided by the regular assignments the young students have to carry out in their town such as carrying out exorcisms. Danger is introduced by the ghosts and spirits encountered during their multiple adventures. One important factor is that Ikkou has the most spiritual power hidden inside of him but it can only be released when he gets overly excited by women. This leads to the contradictory situation that the girls dislike his perverted nature during normal life but need it during emergency situations.

Therefore Amainaideyo revolves around a few important themes. As expected, communication between males and females is an important issue. Both Ikkou and the girls find it difficult to let each other know about their feelings, which leads to misunderstandings. Another important themes is the tension between sexual attraction and a serious couple relationship. Chitose likes Ikkou and Ikkou also likes Chitose but the way each sides views the relationship is a little different. Chitose represents the caring and serious side of the relationship while Ikkou represents the irresponsible and fun side. In Amainaideyo there is a
constant tension between two types of attraction one based on friendship and the other based on sexuality. A third important theme is the relationship between the sacred and the profane. The story takes place in a temple and among religious people which does not negate the presence of temptation and sexuality. Ikkou’s spiritual power is directly linked to his libido, and therefore to his profane side. This reminds the viewer and the reader that both the sacred and the profane are parts of a single whole and that the division between the two is artificial. A final theme is the relationship between the traditional and the modern, the old and the new. The very traditional Buddhist Temple is part of a very modern city. Amulets and scrolls exist side by side cell phones and television. Amainaideyo shows how the tension between the modern and the traditional can be overcome. It is another dialectical relationship in which the combination of the two produces something new, not entirely traditional while not modern in the Western sense, but rather something including elements of both in relative harmony.

**Asu no Yoichi (High School Samurai)**

Asu no Yoichi is based on the manga originally created by Yuu Minamoto (*Asu No Yoichi*, 2010). The animated series was released on 2009 by Geneon Entertainment. It is a good example of harem animation for a general audience. The plot revolves around the training of Yoichi Karasuma who lived all of his life in the mountains training with his father. He is considered to be a superb swordsman who practices a style that makes use of wind. After completing his training in the mountain his father sends him to train in the city in a Dojo (martial arts school) that practices the same style of swordsmanship. The dojo is run by a beautiful young woman named Ibuki Ikaruga who is the eldest of four sisters who own the place.

The main relationship is the one between Yoichi and Ibuki and the competition from the other sisters and other external rivals for Yoichi’s affection. As usual in harem animation, Yoichi is clumsy and plain in everything other than swordsmanship and is attracted to beautiful women. The action in the series is provided by the recurrent
challenges to Yoichi by members of other martial arts schools as well as the training of pupils in the dojo.

Ibuki’s relationship to Yoichi is very similar to that between Chitose and Ikkou in Amainaideyo. Ibuki is the serious and caring side of the relationship while Yoichi is the careless and naïve side. As usual communication is an important obstacle in the relationship between the two which leads to recurrent misunderstandings. Rather than an improvement in the clarity of verbal communication, the relationship grows due to Yoichi’s communication of his love through actions.

The rivals for Yoichi’s affection represent ideal types like in most other examples of harem animation. The each of the Ikaruga sisters is unique and shows unique strengths and weaknesses. Yoichi likes the four sisters but has a strong preference for Ibuki. His affection for the other ones is more like a friendship than a romantic relationship. This ambiguity between friendship and romance creates problems for the other sisters since it makes them feel that they still have a chance. Thus one of the most important themes in Asu no Yoichi is the difference between friendship and love. Communication is a second theme, and finally the dialectic between the traditional and the modern is also present.

Yoichi represents the traditional while the sisters represent a link between the modern and the traditional. Issues of honor and duty are discussed in relation to how those concepts evolved in Japanese history. The honor of the samurai is different from the honor of a contemporary high school boy. Another aspect of the traditional-modern dialectic that is discussed in the animated series is the danger and aggression that is always present in the modern world. Live in the mountains is compared to live in the city and the city is considered to be a much more dangerous place. Finally, marriage also comes up as an important theme. Ibuki was engaged to a young boy when she was a small girl. The boy who then grew up to become a powerful young man believes that the engagement was perfectly legitimate and that it is her duty to honor it. On the other hand Ibuki feels that she did not agree to the engagement in the first place and that therefore she is not bound to it. This is an example of conflict between tradition and modernity and between marriage as an instrumental institution and
marriage as based on romantic love. Finally, Ibuki decides that she loves Yoichi and that she will not marry the other young man. Nevertheless this decision is not done openly. Ibuki refuses to marry to other young man but that does not mean that she expresses her feelings to Yoichi. Her relationship with Yoichi continues to be ambiguous but one important step has been taken. The relationship is one step closer to romantic love.

**Common Themes**

Now that three representative examples of the harem genre of animation and manga have been discussed at length some of the common themes can be analyzed in more detail. Changes in the institution of marriage, communication problems, the tradition-modernity dialectic, and the tension between sexuality and love are some of the most important themes shared by the three animated series. This section examines each one of the common themes and puts them in perspective according to trends in Japanese society.

It can be argued that changes in the institution of marriage are at the core of the harem genre of animation (von Feigenblatt 2008). Finding a suitable couple, formalizing the relationship, and ultimately getting married are important steps in the process. Nevertheless those steps are inherently cultural and are characterized by the importance of ritual and other common social practices. How does one find a suitable couple in Japan? How is that relationship formalized? Those are just some of the questions that can usually be answered based on commonly shared cultural assumptions. That is not the case anymore in Japan due to changes in the institution of marriage (Chambers 2007; Smith 1997). Traditional Japanese marriage used to be arranged by parents and it used to be based on an instrumental view of the family rather than on romantic love between the couple. The goal was to establish a functional and stable household rather than a loving relationship between two people. Due to this instrumental view of marriage several aspects of finding a couple greatly different from those of romantic love. Considerations of social class were more important than they are now as in the Europe of the renaissance and the middle ages. Duty and honor to the
group and the family took precedence over the happiness of the individual. Those characteristics of marriage in Japan have not disappeared completely but rather coexist with the modern concept of romantic love imported from the West.

The result of the state of flux in which the institution of marriage is in Japan is that the new generations of young adults have few role models and few guidelines when it comes to freely finding a suitable couple. Attraction and love are universals but the way in which they are expressed are influenced and in a way determined by cultural mores (Avruch 1998). At this point in time, young men in Japan are at a loss as to how to approach women in order to initiate a serious romantic relationship. The closest to a relationship known by most young Japanese is friendship which explains the great difficulty they have in separating friendship from love. All three of the Japanese series discussed in this paper show some of the problems in ambiguous relationships based on friendship.

Communication is related to relationship problems in that Japan is a high context culture (Morton and Olenik 2005). This means that a shared world view and common assumptions are relied upon heavily during communication. When those share assumptions are not shared anymore a breakdown in communication takes place which is partly what is happening between young women and young men. Young men are not taught how to express their feelings and thus an important obstacle in relationships is communicating those feelings to the other person.

The dialectic relationship between sexual attraction and caring is also related to communication. Both sexual attraction and caring are present in all romantic relationship however the way in which they are expressed makes a big difference. Western chivalric love established an art in the way in which sexual attractiveness could be expressed indirectly. Flattery and metaphorical hyperbole softened the sexual hidden message. The result of the use of a very effective kind of social lubricant was that it helped to obscure the inherent tension between sexual attraction and platonic love. In Japan, both sexual attraction and platonic love are present but there is a lack of a proper social lubricant to express it. This explains the conflicts depicted in popular manga and animation series over the alleged sexual
perversion of Japanese males. There is no perversion but rather no way to express their sexual attraction in a smooth and socially acceptable way. Sexuality in Japan was historically divided from the institution of matrimony and relegated to the dark alleys of the red light district and the geisha houses. Now that the two aspects of a romantic relationship are finally together, neither women nor men know how to deal with it in a socially appropriate way.

Finally the tradition-modernity theme is related to the changes in the institution of marriage but also transcends it. Japan is changing but it is not necessarily becoming unambiguously modern. Both the traditional and modern coexist in permanent tension. The samurai is both shunned and idolized while the result is something new neither traditional nor modern. There is no simple solution to the tension between the two currents other than flexibility and an open mind. The synthesis of the traditional and the modern will be something very Japanese but most importantly hopefully a new social consensus that will be beneficial for the future generations. Popular culture is a testing ground for ideas and an integral part of the public sphere.

References


Engaging North Korea: Is 2010 a Watershed Year for US-DPRK-ROK Relations?

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Abstract: Much attention has been placed on deteriorating relations on the Korean peninsula since the sinking of the ROK ship Cheonan. While the rationales behind North Korean actions remain clouded in secrecy, America’s current policy in the region may have undesired consequences. In contrast, it is suggested that the US employ a mixed policy of economic enticements and restrictions to both encourage positive behavior from North Korea while maintaining military commitments to South Korea.

Keywords: North Korea, United States, Foreign Policy, Republic of Korea

Introduction

With the sixtieth anniversary of the start of the Korean War this past June, we are once again reminded of unresolved conflicts from the Cold War. Although China-Taiwan conflict and the continued diplomatic freeze between the US and Cuba are often viewed as Cold War artifacts where a relatively stable but unsatisfying status quo has developed, inter-Korean relations and the possibility of renewed conflict have never fully subsided. The March 26 sinking of a Republic of Korea (ROK) military ship, the Cheonan, with forty six crew members dead, has provided additional fuel for such conflict while the Lee Myung-bak administration in South Korea has deliberately chosen a more conservative approach than its predecessors towards Pyongyang. While evidence strongly suggests, and global opinion largely concurs, that a North Korean torpedo caused the Cheonan sinking, little substantial evidence has arisen regarding whatever rationales may have been behind such a

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1 For this paper, the terms South Korea, Republic of Korea, and Seoul will be used interchangeably as will North Korea, DPRK, and Pyongyang for North Korea.
move. Thus the Cheonan highlights our continued ignorance of the political dynamics within Pyongyang.

An economy on the verge of collapse after unsuccessful currency reform in 2009, North Korea remains at best a poorly planned socialist economy existing in conjunction with heavily repressed grassroots market attempts (Haggard and Noland 2010). While still committed to a planned economy, for all intents and purposes, little planning exists at the national level today, leaving individual plants to largely fend for themselves. Instead of attempts for major economic reform, for example following China’s own reforms while arguably strengthening the Communist Party, Pyongyang remains largely focused on showing the upper leadership in a positive light. With widespread government corruption, North Korea trails only Somalia as the most corrupt country in the world according to the 2008 Worldwide Governance Indicators. ¹ Despite a largely non-functioning economy, the instability of the regime may be largely overestimated, perhaps in part due to American and South Korean desire to encourage regime change. The relative success of Kim Jong Il’s long-standing “military first” policy has, if nothing else, provided a relatively loyal and well off bureaucracy that has at least been attempting to keep up appearances of functionality.

Debates on the viability of the North Korean government aside, experts have suggested that a struggle for who will be Kim Jong-il’s successor may be the root cause of recent aggressive actions. A growing consensus suggests Kim’s virtually unknown youngest son Kim Jong-Un has been initially groomed for the role, however virtually no first-hand knowledge of North Korean decision making is available. Insight to North Korean intentions has been gleaned from the constant barrage of propaganda, with conjecture trumping empirics. Despite the potential for regional instability caused by actions within North Korea, few breakthroughs have been made to understand the political mindset of the Hermit Kingdom.

The aftermath of the Cheonan, both in increased North Korean rhetoric and actions as well as US-ROK military exercises, highlights the precariousness of peace on the

¹ Also see Kim 2010.
peninsula. While the “Sunshine Policy” of the Kim Dae-Jung and Roh Moo-hyun administrations was not a cure-all, the current shift has done little to encourage Pyongyang back to the negotiating table or reduce the North’s own security fears. Instead of continuing a policy largely built upon sticks, I suggest a combination of hard and soft power which may benefit all powers within the region.

This paper will first briefly introduce recent analyses of North Korea. An introduction to the Cheonan case follows. Possible rationales for North Korean behavior are then presented. This is followed by an analysis of current US policy on North Korea. Finally, I present policy suggestions to encourage progress on reducing tensions on the Korean peninsula.

Recent Research

Interest in North Korea has undoubtedly been growing as tensions wax and wane across the peninsula. A cursory analysis of Google Scholar shows 46,500 books and articles in English addressing in part North Korea in the last decade, with most of those (33,500) since 2008. Not surprisingly 2008 corresponds with the election of Lee Myung-bak in South Korea, ushering in a more conservative policy on North Korea, including a reduction of economic incentives to Pyongyang without tangible concessions in return.

Despite the potential for regional instability and an obvious interest among scholars and observers alike, few innovations have been made in understanding the political mindset of the North Korean leadership. While a growing literature increases our general knowledge of of the Hermit Kingdom (e.g. Oberdorfer 1997; Noland 2000; Park 2002; Cha and Kang 2003; Hassing and Oh 2009), with each new military skirmish around the peninsula we are again reminded how little is known about the political workings within North Korea. Although the number of refugees from the north has rapidly increased in the past decade as economic conditions deteriorate, very few have been elite officials. The last major defector, Hwang Jang-yop (the architect of the Juche ideology) defected thirteen years ago, with few defectors of even moderate ranking since, providing
limited knowledge of modern Pyongyang. Therefore, unlike the Cold War where high level defections were relatively commonplace, North Korean defectors are almost uniformly common citizens, providing a rare glimpse into the life of average North Koreans but limited leverage on the inner workings of the political black box which is North Korea’s foreign policy decision making.

### The Cheonan

Shortly after 9pm on March 26th the South Korean ship Cheonan split in two and sunk off the Western coast of the Korean peninsula near Baengnyeong-do and the Northern Limit Line (NLL). Almost immediately the South Korean government claimed that the North was responsible. An investigation report released on May 20th by the Joint Civil-Military Investigation Group (JIG) indicated that a CHT-02D North Korean torpedo caused a non-contact explosion approximately three meters from the Cheonan’s gas turbine room. The same day, North Korea’s National Defense Committee denied involvement. Shortly thereafter, a critical minority both within South Korea (such as the NGO People’s Solidarity for Participatory Democracy/PSPD) and abroad questioned the findings, claiming a lack of transparency in the investigation and -that inconsistencies and scientific testing do not match Seoul’s claims.  

Similarly and consistent with traditionally diverging North Korean policies, liberal and conservative parties debated the cause of the sinking and China’s potential role in restraining future actions (Min 2010). In July the United Nations condemned the Cheonan sinking, however fell short of assigning blame. Meanwhile, the North Korean government never claimed any involvement.

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1Such skeptics constitute roughly a quarter of Koreans at most, according to estimates by several specialists contacted by the authors. Nevertheless, the ROK’s Prosecutor’s Office in June suggested that the PSPD’s actions may be a violation of the National Security Law while the military intended to sue at least one critic (former National Security Council member Dr. Park Sun-won), adding more fuel for critics convinced the South Korean government was silencing critics. “U.S. Professors Raise Doubts About Report on S. Korean Ship Sinking”. Chosun Ilbo (English version). July 11, 2010. http://english.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2010/07/10/2010071000245.html.
While the Cheonan has received much attention internationally, inter-Korean military skirmishes are not uncommon.\(^1\) In December 1998, the ROK intercepted a North Korean vessel attempting to land near Yeosu. In June 1999, six North Korean ships repeatedly crossed the maritime boundary near Yeonpyeong over six days, culminating in an exchange of fire leaving both sides with casualties. In June 2009, a South Korean fishing boat was captured after crossing the maritime boundary. A twenty minute naval battle occurred in June 2002, leaving a damaged DPRK vessel and a sunken ROK vessel. In November of the same year, a North Korean naval vessel crossed into ROK waters and later fired about by ROK navy. Last year a navy skirmish off the coast of Daechong Island left a North Korean ship severely damaged and ten crewmen dead while the South Korean vessel and crew remained unharmed. Furthermore, after the Cheonan sinking, North Korea captured a southern fishing vessel that crossed the NLL.

Furthermore, evidence of souring inter-Korean relations was evident directly before the sinking. Just weeks prior, the Korean People’s Army stated they were no longer bound by the Korean War armistice, of which South Korea was never a signatory, or the more recent North-South Non-Aggression Agreement in 1992 (KCNA March 7, 2010). Such actions are consistent with North Korea’s policy of creating military tension either through direct though minor military conflict, or more commonly, increased threats of heightened conflict as means to improve their bargaining position for later negotiations. Similarly, failing to acknowledge any role in attacks on South Korea has been the trademark of North Korean policy, even when overwhelming evidence underminded such claims.

Assuming that North Korea was at fault for the sinking, which is the Western consensus with approximately three-quarters of South Koreans concur, there are several

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\(^1\) North Korea, though not a party in drawing the Northern Limit Line (NLL) in the West Sea (aka Yellow Sea), acquiesced to this UN imposed line for most of the two decades following the armistice. By the 1970s however, North Korean officials openly challenged the boundary.
Engaging North Korea: Is 2010 a Watershed Year for US-DPRK-ROK Relations?

possible rationales.\(^1\) First, the Cheonan sinking could be connected to the crisis of succession, with next generation leadership (e.g. Kim Jong Il’s youngest son, Kim Yong-Un) or a faction within the government attempting to secure their position by being aggressive against the South.\(^2\) McEachern (2009) suggests that diverging policy preferences are emerging within the military and party and this may extend to preferences in future leadership. Kim Jong Il’s declining health has made planning succession the key issue to state stability. However what at one point may have been a foregone conclusion as to Kim’s successor has likely become informally debated among an elite hesitant to accept a virtually unknown son of Dear Leader.

The combination of the strength of the military (believed to be the fifth largest in the world) and the ideological foundation of the party has prevented state collapse so far and most analysts expect the next generation of leadership to maintain a bellicose stance towards both South Korea and the US. The potential accession by a member of the National Defense Commission (NDC) would likewise encourage small but highly publicized shows of strength. Similarly support of the military would be especially necessary if one of Kim Jong Il’s sons take the helm, as none have direct military experience nor have they been gradually groomed into the position as Kim Jong Il himself had been groomed by his father Kim Il Sung. With the first Chosun Workers’ Party (KWP) delegates’ conference in forty four years scheduled for September, would-be successors have further incentive to shore up support by maintaining an aggressive stance towards the ROK.

While most analysts focus on the succession issue, the sinking of the Cheonan may have other causes. The sinking could have been revenge for the Daecheong naval encounter with the ROK in November 2009. Not only have some reports suggested the Kim Jong Il himself called for revenge, but military leaders in South Korea expected some form of military response. In addition, a rogue military officer may

\(^1\) As one scholar noted in personal conversation with the author, North Korea’s track record has made it unfortunately easy to presume guilt until evidence of innocence.

\(^2\) Similarly, actions belligerent actions in 2009 may have been a result of Kim Jong Il attempting to win over hardline military officials to back his chosen successor (Klinger 2010).
have acted without higher orders, perhaps trying to show loyalty or as a means to move up the military hierarchy, forcing North Korea to respond. Finally, North Korea may simply be returning to the practice of employing brinkmanship as a means to persuade South Korea to restart aid and investment programs largely cut under the Lee Myung-bak administration.

Further exacerbating a general ignorance on North Korea’s intentions in general and perhaps on the Cheonan is the continued censorship of state-run North Korean news below the 38th parallel, where experts could presumably assess subtle shifts within propaganda. South Korea logically has the greatest concentration of experts on North Korean studies, assisted by a rapidly increasing number of refugees, yet gaining access to many materials directly from North Korea remains an often difficult task. The Cheonan case provides a graphic illustration as such sources would likely provide greater ammunition for skeptics within the south questioning North Korea’s role in the sinking. Certainly South Korea has a vital interest in not giving their counterpart free rein to spread propaganda, however the restriction of information also hinders the South Korea’s intelligence efforts.

Policy Implications

Some may view the Cheonan as a watershed event, limiting the possibilities of rapprochement. Even liberal parties within South Korea have toned down calls for a return to the “Sunshine Policy”. The Cheonan incident has also encouraged military reform within South Korea to better combat low intensity asymmetric challenges. However none of this resolves the underlying problems of North Korean insecurity nor persuades North Korea’s traditional backers, mainly China but to lesser extent Russia, from altering their stances. With Six Party Talks stalled, the US in unison with the ROK has an opportunity to redirect its North Korean policy to both entice reforms from North Korea while reaffirming its security commitments to the ROK.

The United States has consistently clung to employing economic sanctions towards North Korea to coerce more desirable behavior. Economic sanctions however have not
produced their desired effect. First, most other countries have not adopted similar sanctions. While Chinese and Russian refusals are not surprising, even Japan has been hesitant to support such actions. Secondly, previous embargos have largely failed, notably Cuba and Iran. Economic sanctions traditionally have little effect in coercing the offending parties, often either encouraging the offender to remain resolute or allowing the offending party to appeal for help from those not collaborating in the embargo.

Furthermore and crucial to the North Korean case, embargo efforts may increase Pyongyang's reliance on China. Chinese officials have been reluctant to support North Korean belligerence, yet at the same time have encouraged economic reforms and cooperation that could prevent regime collapse. By the 1990s, China provided North Korea most of its rule and consumer goods and nearly half of its food supply (Eberstadt 1998). With growing joint development agreements and meetings with military officials between Beijing and Pyongyang, American sanctions may have in some ways actually strengthened North Korea's position by moving China from a reluctant supporter towards deeper relations. Chinese goals appear fairly straightforward: maintaining some sense of stability within the North Korean regime (Glaser et al. 2008). The potential not only for military conflict, but a collapsed North Korean state leading to a massive influx of refugees into China and potentially a US-backed ROK approaching the Chinese border is of great concern to China and thus actions which prop up the government remains in their national interest. One thus should not be surprised that China has refused to assign blame to the Cheonan sinking to North Korea for fear up disrupting a government already on edge.

Whereas the US has consistently linked denuclearization to the elimination of sanctions and the establishment of diplomatic relations, this fails to address the differing goals of each party involved. Instead, taking a page from the Chinese playbook, the US should encourage joint Korean economic programs which potentially restrict North Korean actions while limiting growing Chinese influence. While one should never reward bad behavior, the political costs of establishing formal liaisons, and thus encouraging future talks for formal recognition, outweighs
the potential costs of increased conflict. Furthermore, instead of continuing the traditional path of sanctions, the US should continue the so far more successful policy spearheaded by the Treasury Department of targeting North Korean shell companies abroad by tying host country assistance to future economic cooperation. So far such leverage has encouraged several governments, including Vietnam, to voluntarily target suspect companies as to not damage growing relations with American firms. By encouraging economic stability in North Korea while also restricting their illicit activities abroad, the US can reaffirm their commitment to South Korea and potentially encourage progress on stalled talks.

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Book Review:

*Human Security in the Asia Pacific Region: Security Challenges, Regional Integration, and Representative Case Studies.*
By Otto F. von Feigenblatt. pp. 192, US$38.00
ISBN 978-81-910588-1-9

Reviewed by Steven Graham, Udon Thani Rajabhat University (Thailand) ¹

**Keywords:** Asia Pacific, Human Security, Thailand, China, Costa Rica

**Introduction**

This is a collection of research papers using the “Human Security Paradigm” to highlight and discuss a series of issues relating to conflict, politics and social standing in selected areas of the Asia Pacific region. As this is the case, the summary at the beginning of each chapter acts as an abstract and there are comprehensive references at the end for further reading. It is the first volume of a much larger project dealing with human security in the Asia Pacific region, which hopes to take into account North-east Asia and the role of education in the next volume.

Human security is defined in this book as both protective and developmental. Protective in that individuals need to be protected from physical threats (natural, political and arising from the abuses of human rights) and developmental which includes repression, hunger and disease. In these abstract forms they are too simplistic in

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nature as in reality they are interwoven with each other, making definitions and resolution complex tasks. In addition, there is some doubt as to whether human security can be used to make significant changes to security internationally (Christie 2010).

Three main areas are covered by this book; the first being Regional Trends: Normative Contestation, Regional Integration and Regional Security. The next part concerns The Two Chinas and Costa Rica: Asia Pacific Diplomacy and the Struggle between *emic* and *etic* International Norms and finally, the last section deals with Thailand’s Socio-political Unrest and Southern Insurgency from a Human Security Perspective.

The author has written the book from a local and individualised viewpoint, rather than from the more traditional one of central government in the hope that it will stimulate action research in this area. Interdisciplinary in nature, this book gives the reader a more holistic outline of the case studies discussed and delves into the notions of “Freedom From Want” and “Freedom From Fear” from the standpoint of the individual, rather than for the state.

**Regional trends: Normative Contestation, Regional Integration, and Regional Security**

In the first section, three case studies are reviewed to give the reader a taste of the types of conflict that persist in South-east Asia. The areas covered are Indonesia, The Philippines and Southern Thailand (Rüland 2005 and San Juan 2006) detailing how there are many factors that affect the status quo in these regions and that violent conflict (Toros 2008) can only be resolved through a more holistic approach rather than the methods adopted by the “War on Terror” (Tujan, Gaughran and Mollett 2004), for example, counterinsurgency. By looking to resolve the problems using “mediation and consultation” the author believes that it is possible to appease those who use violence to promote their cause.

There is an interesting comparison between the “ASEAN Way” (Nishikawa 2009) and a more hard nosed
human security approach adopted by Canada to explain the differences in positions taken by organisations and countries. Whilst the ASEAN Way focuses on the independence of the member states free from external interference, Canada as a “middle power” (Behringer 2005) on the other hand, focuses on the responsibility to protect which includes humanitarian intervention resulting in the weakening of a country’s sovereignty in favour of the individual by using external interference if necessary.

Using Japan’s version of human security in conjunction with the ASEAN way, it is possible to see how Japan is able to have a more holistic approach to human security than the normative protective and developmental human securities already mentioned. This is due mainly to the country including western concepts of human security as well as focusing on long term developmental goals, as seen in Japanese projects in Myanmar and Cambodia. Examples of microfinance are used to illustrate how projects can look like simple economic development but in fact have a structure that promotes democracy with the potential to change the fabric of society.

Human security and the ASEAN way are well illustrated by the author using a river metaphor. The dangerous eddies that form when two current converge are used to explain how these two concepts are at odds with each other when it comes to what is proposed by donor countries and the negotiations that have to take place with “regional elites.” The mixing of salt and fresh water in the calm waters is an illustration of how agreements can be reached.

The Two Chinas and Costa Rica: Asia Pacific Diplomacy and the Struggle between emic and etic International Norms

The second section starts by explaining the foreign policy of Costa Rica. With a small population and no army, this country has a degree of “soft power” which enables it to punch above its weight in the international arena. This is due to a belief that as a country, Costa Rica is “commitment
to truth” and “non-violence” (satyagraha and ahimsa). This “Gandhian approach” has led to international goodwill and involves taking a lead in international norms when dealing with other countries in the region. In this case, the author eludes that “right can and does become might.”


When looking at the chapter concerning the Chinese emic paradigms of international relations, our focus is cleverly turned to two very popular films starring Jet Li that deal with similar Chinese issues concerning their involvement in the international arena (Bhalla 2005). In the movie Hero, Jet Li accepts his own death rather than carry out his revenge by killing the Emperor, who has persuaded our hero not to kill him in order for China to be unified and a sense or order imposed. To this end, Jet Li sacrifices himself for the whole of China.

In The Return of the Dragon Emperor, Jet Li plays an Emperor who is not just satisfied with unifying China, he also wants immortality. The ending of this film is very different from Hero in that there is an involvement of westerners and that the rebel army are using farming implements as weapons as opposed to the Emperor’s army which is more conventional in nature. The cry of “Freedom” by the rebel army is seen by the author as depicting individual rights, as is the occurrence of the Chinese heroine marrying a western archaeologist. “Collectivism versus Individualism.”

The issues addressed in these films are being addressed by those in and out of China with a lack of agreement within the country as to the direction that China will take in the future. An amended version of the concept of Tianxia is addressed as being the possible way forward maintaining the view of the world being led by the elite, reflecting a possible rise in nationalism, in turn, leading to a change in the interpretation of Chinese history.

The next chapter concerns Costa Rica and its dealings with the People’s Republic of China and the Republic of
China (Taiwan). Having supported Taiwan for so long and then switching its allegiance to mainland China, the details behind this occurrence made interesting reading. Using The Spiral Model of Norm Socialisation and the Parallel Cycles Model of Norm Socialisation, the author takes us through the events surrounding the change in Costa Rica’s foreign policy and finishes with a critical discourse analysis of these events. Similar studies are encouraged for other Latin American countries in order to “harness the diplomatic energy” of the region whilst spreading democracy to the developing world.

Thailand’s Socio-political Unrest and Southern Insurgency from a Human Security Perspective

Having completed a brief description of the situation in Southern Thailand from the perspective of human security, what follows is an analysis of the social and political unrest in Thailand from the 1930s to the present day using a critical approach to cultural conflict. Gramsci’s cultural harmony and Jan Nederveen Pieterse’s model of ethnic relations are tools used to display the ethno-cultural conflict taking place in Thailand today. Using simplified models, the reader is taken through the Three Pillars of Thai Elite Civic Culture Ethnocracy in relation to education, the media, use of public spaces, the economy and foreign policy.

The defence of ethnocracy by the elite in Thailand and the movement towards enclave ethnicity and ethnic competition illustrate that the “Dialectical Relationship Between Culture and Policymaking” show that all sides understand the importance of national culture and the role it plays over the control of resources and political influence in the area. This shift in power demonstrates the polarisation taking place and the emergence of red-shirts and yellow-shirts as groups with little in common except for the desire to have a say in policy and how the country should be run.

The author suggests using Singapore as a model to solve the current problems in the country, as Singapore is “defined around the diversity of its population and most importantly by the ideals of tolerance and hard work.” The
Moving on to the specific problem of Muslim Malays in Southern Thailand, we are introduced to the concept of “small peoples” and how the south’s independent history has been omitted from official historical accounts, which is reflected in one of the most important areas, education (Maxcy, Sungtong, and Nguyen 2010). The Muslim communities feel that their way of life is under threat due to perceived propaganda pointing the way towards assimilation. The author takes us through many examples and more importantly, highlights how Pattani-Malay is not used in the public school system in the south, which means in theory that children would find it difficult to learn their ethnic language unless they went to private schools or undertook evening classes.

A comparison with Israel follows as this is seen by the author as a similar example of a group of people who are under physical threats to their existence. The comparison with the south is based on the assumption that there is not a rule of law at this time, but a permanent state of emergency, giving the police and military wide powers to arrest without court orders and the right to keep suspects for long periods without access to a lawyer. The military have been accused of tactics that involve intimidating the local population and internment, resulting in many Muslim men having to leave their homes for long periods of time producing severe economic problems for those families left behind.

Confidence building measures are seen as the way forward in order to build trust between the Thai government and the Muslim south. The author suggests that the objective reality as well as the perceptions of that reality have to be addressed. Second track diplomacy may be able to help reduce suspicion and assist with the communication between all interested parties of this conflict, as well as an understanding of the civil-military relationship for human security (Beeson 2008).

An interesting comparison is made in the next chapter between the best practices from the governance of Sarawak under the White Rajahs one hundred and fifty years ago and the problems facing southern Thailand today. It is suggested
that a policy of applying “local capacities for peace, self-determination and sustainable development” as seen in Sarawak at that time, could be the way forward for developing peace and stability in Thailand’s southern provinces. The author suggests that if the Rajahs were alive today, they would suggest measures such as a greater respect for local customs, more religious freedom and the empowerment of local institutions.

The penultimate chapter of this book puts forward the idea of some kind of autonomous economic and administrative region as seen in Macau and Hong Kong. This solution is seen as benefiting not just the region but the whole of Thailand as the economic benefits would filter through as tax revenue. A theoretical/analytical framework is discussed as an elite theory model of public policymaking as well as the establishment of a Ministry for the South and a kind of “feudal tenure” in the South of Thailand based on the “co-option of the Malay nobility into the administration of the region.” In conclusion, the establishment of the Greater Pattani Autonomous Administrative and Economic Region is the preferred choice, as it proposes to integrate the region with the rest of Thailand through economic interdependence and also gives the area greater self determination, thus reducing the amount of resistance to change because of a greater understanding of what is taking place (Lohmann 2008).

Conclusion

The final chapter points forward to the way ahead, in that research and policymakers should concentrate on the well-being of the individual and the local communities they live in. Thailand is a complex country (Glassman 2010); however, by using the Human Security approach as part of theoretical frameworks, the author suggests that areas such as global warming and terrorism could also be tackled as it would give scholars and academics greater understanding which in turn would lead to better choices and finally, peace and human security.

This collection of research papers challenges the reader to look at the selected case studies from a human security perspective and puts forward theoretical solutions to
several problem areas. Putting that theory into practice takes
commitment and courage by all sides of the equation and
this is where stalemates exist. Some human security
commentators (Nishikawa 2009) ask, after having used this
concept of human security (Maclean 2008) to identify the
problem areas, if it is at all possible to resolve them
considering the existing relationships between the different
groups and governments involved.

Scholars and academics must continue to investigate
and research in order to offer possible solutions and
guidance in the hope that one day we are free from want and
fear, with domestic stability (Nathan 2006) within each
other's borders. This book offers a series of solutions that
lays a sound foundation for further investigation into the
security challenges and the possibilities for regional
integration facing the Asia-Pacific region and beyond using
the human security paradigm.

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Book Review:

Contemporary Global Governance: Multipolarity vs. New Discourses on Global Governance. 
Edited by Dires Lesage and Pierre Vercauteren. pp. 262, US$48.95
ISBN 978-90-5201-564-4

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Keywords: Cold War, Governance, Russia, Brazil, Multipolarity

Since the end of the Cold War, the world is heading towards a less centralized form of governance. As the United States is facing serious setbacks in the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, many emerging powers such as China, Russia and Brazil have formed regional alliances to create a multipolar and anti-hegemonic order. Fareed Zakaria refers to this development as the beginning of “the post-American world,” in which the United States retreats and the rest of the world advances in economic power and political influence (Zakaria, 2008). The collapse of the previous global trade talks in Geneva confirmed this point of view. In the Doha round of world trade talks in July 2008, the European Union (EU) and the United States urged China and India to lower their tariffs on industrial goods from the West in exchange for European and American tariff and subsidy cuts on agricultural products. But when China and India demanded the rights to raise tariffs on major imported cash crops such as cotton, sugar and rice, the EU and the United States opposed it because this would undermine the interests of European and American farmers. This trade disagreement signaled an end to more than a century of West-dominated global economic order (Lee, 2008). Against this background,

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it is time to look at the latest research on global governance in the early twenty-first century.

*Contemporary Global Governance* emerged from a conference in Belgium in 2005 that addressed the impacts of globalization on international governance and state sovereignty. The thirteen chapters in this edited volume are thematically grouped into two sections and address the following questions. First, what are the impacts of geopolitical changes on international order today? Second, what are the preconditions for effective governance in a multipolar world? Third, what are changing perceptions of global governance among international policymakers? The editors and contributors answer these questions by exploring the conceptual and policy dimensions of global governance. They offer important insights as they analyze the new possibilities in a multipolar world and the institutional mechanisms needed to support such an order.

The book's first section focuses on the emergence of a multipolar order. Dries Lesage conceptualizes multipolarity as “an international distribution of power in which three or more great powers possess exceptionally large capabilities” and none of them can subdue the others (p.13). He highlights three preconditions for effective governance in a multipolar world, namely respecting national sovereignty, reducing the development gap between the North and South, and accommodating the interests of developing countries in global economic institutions. Since many European countries are losing their dominance in global politics, the early twenty-first century has witnessed a gradual transition towards a post-Western world. In particular, the emerging markets in East Asia and Latin America as well as the oil-rich countries of the Middle East have created regional institutions to challenge the global leadership of the West.

No discussion of global governance is complete without mentioning China, Russia, India and Japan. Gustaaf Geeraerts and Jonathan Holslag stress that the current Chinese leaders are aware of the changing balance of power in global politics. They recognize the limits to China’s power and are very pragmatic in pursuing their strategic goals. The same can be said of Vladimir Putin’s decision to assert Russian international influence. Andrei P. Tsygankov states that Putin’s assertive foreign policy is a direct response to
the growing U.S. military presence in Central Asia and the relocation of NATO forces along Russia’s western frontier. Ian Taylor looks at the India, Brazil and South Africa Dialogue Forum (IBSA) as a new strategic alliance from the global South, even though this alliance still has a long way to go before it can challenge the unfair global trading mechanisms institutionalized by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. Japan is probably not in the same rank as China and Russia in global politics. But according to Elena Atanassova-Cornelis, Japanese leaders have succeeded in advancing their national interests through the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty and the active participation in the United Nations’ peace-keeping missions over the last few decades. As the world is heading towards a multipolar order, Svens Biscop calls on the EU to develop a comprehensive policy of pursuing global public goods such as political and social security for individuals, respect for human rights and the rule of law, and an inclusive economic order. Otherwise, the EU will be marginalized by the United States and other emerging powers in the twenty-first century.

The second section evaluates some transnational trends that inform our understanding of state sovereignty and global order. Pierre Vercauteren argues that there is no symbiotic relationship between global governance and democracy. Because the understanding of global governance varies from country to country and national leaders have conflicting interests, it is extremely difficult to establish a new global democratic order. This problem can be seen within the U.N. Commission for Human Rights which often admitted countries with poor human rights records and critical of American foreign policy. Barbara Delcourt and Nina Wilén discuss the U.S. campaign for creating a permanent Democratic Caucus and a Human Rights Council within the United Nations in order to replace the U.N. Commission for Human Rights. But this agenda of promoting democracy only serves the national interests of the United States and contradicts the U.N. policy of ensuring equality and pluralism among its member states.

Both Tine Vandervelden and Teun van de Voorde evaluate the role of the United Nations in pursuing global peace and security. In 2003, former U.N. Secretary-General
Kofi Annan created a High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Changes to assess current terrorist threats to international order. Kofi Annan urged countries to dissuade radical groups from embracing terrorism, to deny people with the means to carry out terrorist acts, and to organize a broad-based anti-terrorist struggle around the world. Although these recommendations are hard to implement, the United Nations is still the only forum for such discussion on global security. Francine Mestrum revisits the U.N. Millennium Development Goals, designed in 2000 to spur development by improving social and economic conditions in the impoverished nations of the world, and points out that progress towards poverty-reduction and sustainable development is uneven because many developing countries have followed the neo-liberal free-market economy and dismantled their social protection mechanisms and state-building capacities. Yves Palau shifts the focus to the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and shows that the OECD has encountered the same administrative problems as the United Nations in promoting public governance among its member states. James N. Rosenau’s conclusion is insightful. The end of the Cold War has created a diffuse global order characterized by interactions between far-flung regional economies rather than nation-states. This development indicates that the absence of a global authority does not necessarily lead to global chaos.

As with many conference proceedings, the interpretative framework of this work is the first methodological problem to be encountered. Aimed at global policymakers and students of international relations in the West, most of the chapters are Eurocentric and fail to consider the perspectives from the developing world. A good example is the challenge of China. The Chinese path to development has become an attractive model for many developing countries. The West has always strongly favored free-market privatization over government interference in the economy. But the economic growth of China has been driven by the effective use of government resources to encourage research and innovation, and a deliberate policy of protecting public property. Such strategic use of state resources has enabled China to accomplish its agenda of economic growth
and winning support from neighboring countries. This model of state-directed development is based on the powerful premise that political independence is a prerequisite for economic development. It is the rightful duty of any industrializing country to safeguard national sovereignty and pursue economic autonomy. China’s development approach rejects the longstanding Euro-American policies of exporting democracy through military intervention and imposing neo-liberal reforms in the developing world. Gone is the era of human rights diplomacy and neo-liberal economics. This is the greatest Chinese challenge to the West-dominated model of global governance (Lampton, 2008; Leonard, 2008). Therefore, there are always new possibilities in a multipolar world. The most feasible option is to ensure transnational cooperation within a diffuse global framework rather than imposing a top-down model of governance. This will avoid escalating regional tensions into international conflicts and create a stable environment for development. Therefore, it is important to bear in mind the different approaches towards global governance and to avoid making generalizations about the subject.

This problem notwithstanding, this collection of essays is informative and provides a very useful introduction for students and general readers to the subject of global governance in the early twenty-first century.

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