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The Journal of Alternative Perspectives in the Social Sciences is published by the Guild of Independent Scholars and its affiliated organizations. The goal of the journal is to give voice to independent scholars and practitioners from around the world. JASSP favors a multidisciplinary approach to social problems and strives to provide an open forum for the deliberation of ideas by the international community of scholars and practitioners. As an open license publication, JASSP is distributed for free electronically and for a nominal fee in printed form through the print on demand system.

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This first issue of the journal includes a section introducing the advisory board and the organizations currently collaborating with its publication. JASSP is currently receiving assistance in one form or another from the following organizations: Ritsumeikan Asia Pacific University (Beppu, Japan), University for International Cooperation (San Jose, Costa Rica), the Guild of Independent Scholars (International), the Association for the Defense of the French and International Nobility (Paris, France), and from the Costa Rican-European Chamber of Commerce, Culture, and Tourism (San Jose, Costa Rica).¹

¹ Disclaimer: All of the views expressed in this Journal are those of the authors and are not necessarily shared by the cooperating organizations. Cooperation with Ritsumeikan Asia Pacific University and the University for International Cooperation is of an informal nature through the members of our Advisory Board.

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Introducing the Advisory Board:



H.E. Marian Count Voss de Cousances: *Honorary Member of the Advisory Board, Honorary Master of the Guild of Independent Scholars, and Member of the Association for the Defense of the French and International Nobility.*

His Excellency was born on the 26th day of May of the year of our Lord, 1946 in Romania. The Count has had a distinguished career in military intelligence and business. His Lordship has collaborated with the Central Intelligence Agency and with the Greek Secret Service. In terms of education, the Count graduated from the Military Academy of Romania in 1967 and then continued with more specialized military and intelligence training. After moving to the United States, His Excellency undertook a Doctoral Fellowship in marketing and banking.

The Count taught spionage and sabotage at the Military Academy of New Orleans from 1987 to 1988. His Excellency then established several charitable financial institutions and served as their CEO. The Count received many honors from local authorities for his philanthropic efforts.

His Excellency currently resides in Houston Texas with his wife.

It is a great honor for the Journal of Alternative Perspectives and the Guild of Independent Scholars to welcome the Count as Honorary Member of the Advisory Board and an Honorary Master of the Guild of Independent Scholars.

Dr. Nolan Quiros, Vice-Rector of Academic Affairs of the University for International Cooperation (San Jose, Costa Rica)



Nolan Quiros, LL.B., LL.M., Ph.D.: *Honorary Member of the Advisory Board and Honorary Master of the Guild of Independent Scholars.*

Dr. Quiros is the Academic Vice-Rector of the University for International Cooperation (San Jose, Costa Rica). He holds a doctorate in economics, a bachelor's degree in law, and a master's degree in comparative law. He is currently the chair of the department of environmental law and managerial leadership.

Professor Quiros has served as a consultant to Texas A&M University and to several multinational corporations. In addition to that he is the former director of the Institute for Sustainable Development at Boston University. He is currently promoting online education in Central America.

The Journal of Alternative Perspectives in the Social Sciences and the Guild of Independent Scholars is honored to have Dr. Quiros as an Honorary Member of the Advisory Board and as a Master of the Guild of Independent Scholars.

H.E. Morris von Feigenblatt, Baron of Feigenblatt-Miller



H.E. Morris von Feigenblatt, Baron of Feigenblatt-Miller, K.G.C.:

Honorary Member of the Advisory Board and Member of the Association for the Defense of the French and International Nobility.

H.E. Morris von Feigenblatt, Baron of Feigenblatt-Miller, was born in the Central American nation of Costa Rica. The Baron completed his B.S. in Economics at the Jesuit University of Deusto (Spain). His Excellency has served as Consul General of the Republic of Costa Rica to Alicante (Spain). The Baron's career also includes experience in international development. His Excellency served as CEO of an Spanish Corporation developing the urban infrastructure of Saudi Arabia in the 1970s. In addition to that His Excellency designed and built one of the most beautiful landmarks in the Costa Rican capital, the Tara Hotel. Furthermore, the Baron has received numerous international honors and holds more than 10 knighthoods. As a sign of support to JASSP, the Baron has promised to represent the Journal in Central America and to promote it.

It is an honor to welcome His Excellency as an Honorary Member of the Advisory Board of the Journal of Alternative Perspectives in the Social Sciences and as its representative in Central America.

**Dr. Malcolm Cooper, Vice-President (Research)
of Ritsumeikan Asia Pacific University (Beppu,
Japan)**



Malcolm Cooper, B.A., LL.M., M.A., Ph.D.: *Honorary Member of the Advisory Board and Honorary Master of the Guild of Independent Scholars.*

Dr. Cooper is currently serving as Vice-President for Research at Ritsumeikan Asia Pacific University (Beppu, Japan). He is a full Professor of Tourism Management and is currently doing research on Tourism development and labour migration. Dr. Cooper has promoted international education in Japan and cooperation with other universities around the world. Dr. Cooper has also expressed his support for JASSP and accepted to join the Advisory Board.

We would like to welcome Dr. Cooper as a Honorary Member of the Advisory Board and as an Honorary Master of the Guild of Independent Scholars.

H.E. Phillip von Feigenblatt, Count of Kobrin

H.E. Phillip von Feigenblatt, Count of Kobrin, K.C.G.:
Itinerant Ambassador of the Republic of Panama to the Middle East,
*Honorary Member of the Advisory Board, and Member of the Association
for the Defense of the French and International Nobility.*

H.E Phillip von Feigenblatt, Count of Kobrin, is serving as Itinerant Ambassador of Panama to the Middle East. The Count has a long diplomatic career including serving as Ambassador to Libya and Egypt. Moreover his career also includes serving as Minister of Tourism of the Republic of Panama. His Excellency has received multiple international honors and several knighthoods. The Ambassador is actively promoting the Journal in Europe and the Americas with the intention of cooperating with the diplomatic community.

It is an honor to welcome the Count as an Honorary Member of the Advisory Board of the Journal.

The role of Nobility in America



1

H.E. Marian Count Voss de Cousances: *Honorary Member of the Advisory Board, Honorary Master of the Guild of Independent Scholars, and Member of the Association for the Defense of the French and International Nobility.*

In order for Scholars to better assess the Nobility's great role in in today's America we will have to briefly mention the Nobility of Colonial America. The Spanish Crown has bestowed Titles on and confirmed Arms for its subjects for what is America, from the middle of the 16th Century until the beginning of the 19th Century or about 1819, it did so directly from the Crown in Spain or through Viceroys and Governors of the Colonies.

Since the Revolution of 1776 America had not Kings or Queens, but has an old European Nobility which the great majority emigrated after the First World War onward, becoming stable and prosperous. Their children would be US citizens without any interference or threat from the Government in Washington. For instance there are several US born citizens with inherited European or British Titles such as: the 5th Earl of Wharcliffe and Sir Michael Dunbar, Bt, a Colonel in the US Airforce to name just a few.²

¹ Coat of Arms of the Noble House de Cousances

² Earl: British title equivalent to the continental title of Count. Bt (Baronet): British hereditary Knighthood.

Many other Nobles have inherited their Titles after becoming US citizens and as of now there is no law that would have the Government base any action against the said Nobles, if one was even taken.

Article I Section 9 Clause 8 of the Constitution clearly forbids the Granting or use of Titles in the USA but does not state a way to enforce the above law, quoted below:

No Title of Nobility shall be granted by the United States: And no Person holding any Office of Profit or Trust under them shall, without the Consent of the Congress, accept of any present Emolument, Office, or Title, of any kind whatever, from any King, Prince, or foreign State.

Jerome Bonaparte, Emperor Napoleon Bonaparte's brother, married an American citizen in 1810, in England, they had a son named Jerome Napoleon Bonaparte who was an American citizen by birth right of his Mother, and a French Noble by birth right of his Father. A few years later some States took issue with their Nobility and had the so called Forgotten 13th Amendment drafted and passed by both Houses of Congress, but it fizzled out in the end, with many States not ratifying it and others not even willing to vote on it. However there is a 13th Amendment to Article I of the Constitution that outlaws Slavery and Involuntary Servitude.

Today, many European Nobles are dispersed throughout the American community, and have important careers, incorporating their rich culture into their American everyday lives. Every Noble is a volunteer that must enlarge, expand, promote, and improve, by its commanding presence the high value goals and missions to make a real difference in their newly adopted Country with special and unique worthwhile professions: professors, market analysts, mayors, auctioneers, mortgage brokers, bankers, military, actors and artists, charity volunteers and many other vital professions.

There are not enough Nobles left to disperse to the American community the old, refined and wonderful European culture that was once very prevalent, throughout

North America, until the nineties. The great American culture has slowly declined over the years, to a great extent due, perhaps to a diminished influence of the European Nobility or emigration since the fall of Communism and the revival of Royalty and Nobility, at home, on the European Continent.

Due to the perseverance of Scholars the genealogy and especially the heraldry has seen a fantastic revival in the last ten or so years, that and with the small but omnipresent culture of the European Nobility it has maintained its elegance and generosity, vigorously forging ahead into the modern ways of the future with renewed vitality and energy, for the many generations to come.

The study of the Nobility in America could not be completed without the acknowledgement of the Scholars and the Nobility who have contributed so much to the culture of Grand and Beautiful America.

Have We Lost Our Way...Again?

Anthony P. Johnson, M.A., C.Phil, Nova Southeastern University

Speaking candidly, Americans are living in a country that is divided because politicians and pundits are fanning the “flames of hatred.” The 2008 Presidential event was supposed to be an historic election because of the Democratic nomination of the first African American presidential candidate and the Republican nomination of the first woman vice presidential candidate, and yet, the so-called “leaders” of America turned it into a “freak circus.” How will the world view us? Well, many countries and most importantly adversaries of America will view us as hypocrites. Do we really want that?

During the 2008 Presidential election when politicians spoke of “pro-American” and “anti-American,” well, that was “*McCarthyism*.” I ask Americans, “Did you really want to revisit this sad chapter in American history?” When press agents for one of the Presidential candidates called one part of Virginia the “*other*” Virginia (Northern Virginia and birthplace of General Robert E. Lee who called Virginia his country because of his love for it) and the Presidential candidate’s brother called Northern Virginia “communist country,” I ask you America--did we really want to play the game of division and derision among the citizens? *Did you really want another Civil War in America?*

When pundits stated that a highly decorated, respected, and revered four-star general was “ungrateful” because of crossing party lines in support of a candidate and used ethnicity as the #1 cause, this was the “breath of racism” that our great country could not afford as the rest of the world “watched in worried curiosity” about the state of the election and America’s standing as a world leader. When a Presidential candidate “crosses” party-lines he’s called a “maverick,” but when a general crossed party-lines he was viewed as a traitor to his party (the Republican Party).

Anthony P. Johnson, M.A., C.Phil, Nova Southeastern University

Have we lost our way? Are we the beacon of democracy for the rest of the world or is America *pretenders* to the title? I am concerned about where America is headed! When Americans clash with *Americans* because they are Muslim, Jewish, Asian, Native American, Latino, African American, Caucasian, etc. we are heading to the “dark side” of our souls instead of listening to the “better *angels*” within us that promote peace, love and tolerance to all.

Have we lost our way? Have we? Or did the politician’s political pundits from the liberal and conservative sectors merely awaken the “sleeping giant” of racial, ethnic and religious intolerance in America. Americans have been down this “dusty road” before, and according to many historians we nearly destroyed this country. An individual for whom I have the greatest admiration once said, “We can never stop hatred--but we can foster understanding. I don't need people to like me--I don't even need them to respect me. I just need them to respect my right to live and survive in this country like everyone else.” Imagine if each one of us followed this philosophy.

Abraham Lincoln once said, “If destruction be our lot, we must first be its author.” Although for the first time in American politics...an African American has been voted to the highest office in America and one of the most powerful positions in the world; when conflict, hatred and prejudice reign we’re traveling down a path that we might not return from. We are traveling down a path that our children may not be able to rescue, namely our country that at times is teeters on chaos and possible oblivion.

I ask you America, are you sure this is the course you want to chart? Is it?

Costa Rica's Foreign Policy: Can "Right" become "Might"?

Otto F.von Feigenblatt, M.A., Nova Southeastern University

Costa Rica has received considerable attention from the international community. As a small country with few natural resources, a small economy, and relatively little strategic value for the Great Powers, such attention is surprising. Costa Rican's attribute the country's international relatively high profile to: its lack of an army, stable democracy, environmental conservation, and successful human development (Barry, 1991). Policy makers go one step further, and claim that its foreign policy has always being admired by the international community due to its emphasis on human rights and human security (MPNPE, 2006). In other words, the international community finds it amazing that a country can actually do what it preaches.

A foreign policy based on respect for Human Rights, Human Security, sustainable development, and responsible internationalism sounds very similar to the goals enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations and related documents (Khong, 2006). Nevertheless, realist scholars and policy makers have always stressed the weakness of a foreign policy guided by those concepts, and considered them to be ideals rather than policy prescriptions (Kolodziej, 2005). The question then is: Is a policy based on internationally accepted norms such as Human Security and respect for human rights inherently "weak"? This questions leads to another related question: Does a country with a foreign policy based on international norms become more vulnerably in the system of independent nation-states? Finally, a third question comes to mind: Can a foreign policy based on international norms lead to greater international influence? The final question can be worded as: Can "Right" become "Might"?

This paper will attempt to provide some tentative answers to the questions raised in the previous paragraphs by using Costa Rica's foreign policy as a case study. Costa Rica is a perfect case study to answer those questions due to

its characteristics. It lacks most of the sources of “power” usually mentioned by realist scholars. Costa Rica does not have a standing army, lacks large reserves of foreign exchange, it has a tiny population of around four million people, a limited territory, and very few natural resources (Barry, 1991; Eakin, 2007; Leonard, 1991; Perez-Brignoli, 1989; Williamson, 1992).¹ Following a realist logic, Costa Rica could never exert any influence in the “anarchic” international arena of independent nation-states. How can it defend itself from the depredation of its neighbors without an army or enough money to buy off its enemies? Furthermore, Costa Rica lacks an authoritarian government that could take decisive policy actions to raise an army to repel an attack or to crush internal dissent fostered by “foreign operatives” attempting to weaken the government, or at least that is what a realist would expect. Then, how can we explain Costa Rica’s democratic history, high level of human development, peaceful coexistence with its neighbors, and influence in international forums?

Joseph Nye’s concept of “soft-power” comes to mind when trying to answer those questions (Kolodziej, 2005). Costa Rica’s efforts to promote important international norms has created some “soft-power” over the years. That “soft-power” can be tentatively understood as “goodwill”. Thus, the international community might hold some goodwill towards that “nice” little country. If one assumes that power is based on dependence and that liking increases the strength of dependence, then it is easy to see how that “goodwill” can be translated into some kind of soft influence at the international level (Hocker, 2007). This “power” is not a power over you but rather a power with (Weeks, 1992). In other words, it is a power very similar to the one a friend exerts towards another. Realists would claim that this “cozy” and “fuzzy” kind of power is not power at all and that it cannot be translated into influence at the international level. It should be granted to them, that Costa Rica’s power based only on “good-will” does not explain all of its international influence.

¹ Costa Rica lacks the natural resources usually mentioned by realist scholars as conducive to power such as oil and minerals but is rich in rain forests and biodiversity.

Let us add an extra layer to our previous explanation of "soft-power" by adding the contribution of constructivist scholars to the one of liberal institutionalists. Constructivists have long noted the influence international norms can exert on decision makers and foreign policy (Kollman, 2008; Rublee, 2008). While most constructivist explanations of this phenomenon concentrate on the constraining effects of international norms, their argument can be taken a step forward to a point in which they empower policy makers who have internalized those norms and who behave consistently with those norms (v. Feigenblatt, 2009). While norm socialization is a complex phenomenon a simple example will illustrate the assertion regarding the positive power of norms. Imagine a group of people sitting in a café. All of them smoke. A few months later they return to the café and they are told that smoking is now illegal. At the beginning most of them disobey and continue to smoke claiming that the rule is illegitimate. After a few more times of being scolded by the manager and the police, some of them grudgingly comply every now and then. Then, they all comply with the rule while they dislike it and continue to consider it illegitimate. Finally, one of them decides to quit smoking because he has been convinced by the rule that smoking is detrimental to his or her health and disrespectful to the people around him or her. If that newly converted individual becomes not only a follower but an active promoter of the rule and the other recalcitrant persons identify this individual with non-smoking, he may harness some of the power of the norm for his own purposes. Even those people who try to quit smoking and fail will look to the successful non-smoker as a leader and role model. While the smoking example is overly simplistic it explains what has happened at the international level with the norms of Human Rights and Human Development.

Costa Rica has not only promoted but also followed the norms of Human Security and Human Rights. It has tried to set an example of the benefits of following an approach to foreign policy based on widely accepted international norms. The combination of a widely accepted internalization of the principles behind those norms and a norm consistent behavior in the part of Costa Rica, has propelled the country to role model status among developing nations. That

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explains part of the influence but what about influence over powerful developed countries? The influence exerted over powerful developed countries by Costa Rica can be illustrated by the relationship between the Italian Mafia and the Catholic Church. Even a powerful Godfather respects a Priest. The Priest has very little power in the realist sense but due to his symbolic significance and the example he sets by his behavior he may exert influence over the powerful but not so pure Godfather. Costa Rica is the village priest while China is the guerilla leader and the United States is the ruthless counterinsurgency general. The village priest sympathizes with some of the social goals of the guerilla leader and some of the goals of the general but not with their methods. Both the guerilla leader and the general hold the principles symbolized by the Priest as the ideal to strive for, which gives the apparently weak village Priest influence over the two.

Finally, we will give a third explanation for Costa Rica's international influence. Gandhi would have had little trouble in explaining the remaining power. He would have reminded us of the concept of *satyagraha*, commitment to truth, and the related concept of *ahimsa*, nonviolence (Ambler, 1990, p. 199). Those are the two basic principles of the Ghadian approach to peace-making. A public and private commitment to truth, in this case the principles of the Charter of the United Nations, and a method based on active non-violence, in this case abolishing the army, leads to international peace and development. Thus, Costa Rica's foreign policy fits the Ghadian approach to peace-making and shows that the concepts of *satyagraha* and *ahimsa* can be applied to the international realm.

In conclusion, Costa Rica, as an international *satyagrahi*, has exerted considerable international influence due to three interconnected factors: international good-will created by the "nice guy" factor, the normative power it harnessed through taking the lead in promoting and following widely accepted international norms, and on a more philosophical note, through the power of *satyagraha* and *ahimsa*. Taking into consideration that Costa Rica has not fought a war with an external power for more than a century and that it enjoys a high level of human development, it is safe to conclude that it is possible and

desirable to base foreign policy on the principles of the Charter of the United Nations and related norms. "Right" can and does become "Might".

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Understanding Conflict?...Maybe!

Anthony P. Johnson, M.A., C.Phil, Nova Southeastern University

Abstract: *The premise of this paper is the study in the field of conflict and conflict resolution and that conflict and conflict resolution are useful areas of focus in order to better understand human behavior. Additionally, I will present data that will highlight the notion that conflict is not in itself a bad thing and that conflict has the capability to be utilized as a vehicle for understanding the many contradictions that are necessarily present in our efforts to be social beings.*

1 Theory of Crisis Killing Civilians intentionally: Double Effect, Reprisal, and Necessity in the Middle East.

The principle of noncombatant immunity is undoubtedly the linchpin of humanitarian law during armed conflict. Recognizing that warfare takes the lives of civilians and other noncombatants, noncombatant immunity limits the harm that noncombatants will inevitably suffer by prohibiting intentional harm in all but perhaps the most extreme cases. At the same time, the rules of modern warfare permit adversaries to unintentionally take a reasonable framework, however vague and undefined it may be, forms the basis for assessing the morality of killing civilians during war (Michael Gross, *Ethic of Activism: The Theory of Practice of Political Morality*. Cambridge, 1997). As they attack civilians, belligerents sometimes raise the claim that there are no noncombatants in modern war. It is certainly true that a number of ambiguous actors litter the field in the Middle East. These include reserve soldiers and armed settlers on the Israeli side, and uniformed militias, “mature” minors, and civilian accessories to the fighting on the fighting on the Palestinian side. Nevertheless, it is equally clear that many civilians have no role in the fighting. According to the Geneva Convention’s definition (1949) “civilians are people who do not bear arms. They are a subset of noncombatants, that is, persons taking no active

Understanding Conflict?...Maybe!

part in the hostilities.” (Michael Gross, *Ethic of Activism: The Theory of Practice of Political Morality*. Cambridge, 1997). This definition, however, says nothing about innocence, and civilian leaders may bear far more responsibility for war than do simple soldiers in the field.

However, according to Michael Gross, “I am concerned with the status of what may be called ordinary civilians, and although it is true that they may provide succor and support for combatants, they do not bear arms or take an active part in the hostilities.” (Michael Gross, *Ethic of Activism: The Theory of Practice of Political Morality*. Cambridge, 1997). They are, for the most part, also innocent, that is, they are not responsible for prosecuting the war or for the harm befalling enemy soldiers and civilians. Ordinary civilians remain the intended beneficiaries of the principle of noncombatant immunity. (<http://www.icrc.org>, 14 September 2005).

If ordinary citizens ever enjoyed protection from intentional harm, recent events in the Middle East are rapidly eroding this norm and testing the limit of noncombatant immunity. Beginning in 2000, fighting between Israel and the Palestinian Authority (PA) has witnessed the unprecedented use of terror: massive, lethal attacks against civilians for purposes ranging from breaking Israeli morale and wresting further political concessions to destroying the State of Israel. In response, Israel reoccupied the West Bank (and, until 2005, the Gaza Strip), severely curtailed Palestinians who are repeatedly called upon to renounce the use of terror in their struggle for national self-determination and Israel censured for indiscriminate and disproportionate harm to civilians. This discourse stands to radically affect the way in which the international community views the imperative to avoid intentional harm of civilians. (Serge Schmemmann, “*US Peace Envoy Arrives in Israel as Fighting Rages*,” *Ha’aretz*, 15 March 2002).

In its original formulation, the DDE (*the Doctrine of Double Effect*) confronted a rather simple difficulty that

Anthony P. Johnson, M.A., C.Phil, Nova Southeastern University

adversaries faced during war: how could one justify killing civilians who were innocent but inevitably harmed during conflict? The answer turned on intentionality. It was permissible only insofar as one did not intend to harm them on purpose. Early Christian theologians believed that without intent was possible to ally responsibility. It was never entirely clear however, what *intentional harm* meant or how one could determine whether one harmed another intentionally during the war.

Modern legal methodologies and moral theorists wrestled with similar difficulties and often limit the exculpatory power of good intentions. Good intentions may at best, mitigate punishment; they do not necessarily however, redeem the badness of the act itself. “We may judge the bomber pilots differently,” writes Robert Holmes, “if we believe that one acted with good intentions and the other with bad intentions. But the fact of their different intentions would not affect the moral assessment of what they did. (<http://www.icrc.org>, Sept. 2005). H. L. A. Hart for example describes the case of an Irish National who inadvertently kills civilian bystanders while blowing out a wall to free his friends from prison. IN did not intend to kill anyone; the deaths he caused were not a means to his end but only according to H. L. A. Hart “an undesirable byproduct of his actions.” (H. L. A. Hart, *Punishment and Responsibility, Essays in the philosophy of Law*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1968. 119-120). The argument from supreme emergency is perhaps the last Palestinians and other insurgent groups may raise defense of intentionally targeting civilians. The doctrine of supreme emergency, articulated most famously by Michael Waltzer, remains exceptionally controversial and extraordinary difficult to apply in practice.

According to Michael Waltzer “it is an extension of the necessity defense common to municipal law and anchored in Unitarianism.” (Michael Waltzer, *Law and Philosophy* 20 (January 2000): 1-30).

Necessity demands five conditions: (1) the threat of grievous, (2) unavoidable harm, (3) proportionate, (4) effective, and (5) last resort response. The term exempt is subject to

conflicting interpretations. Most legal scholars agree that the necessity defense excuses rather than justifies one's actions so that the law overrides the name of necessity retains some measure of force. This force exerts itself in the form of mitigated punishment, regret and restitution. In 2008, this theory resonates stronger still. A material disadvantage does not exempt an adversary from norms of conduct during armed conflict as long as the stronger nation respects humanitarian law and pursues a limited war rather than a total war of annihilation against the weaker nation. Should the stronger nation abuse civilians and pursue a genocidal war, then, and only then, might the weaker nation consider setting aside humanitarian law. There is nothing in the current conflict, however, to suggest that this is the case.

Conversely, it is ironic that an occupying power should find itself in such a position successfully pleading self defense and military necessity against a far weaker adversary. Two points, first, Israel advantages are limited, even as it fights terror. Neither the DDE nor reprisal theory can justify all aspects of current Israeli policy. Second, the moral asymmetry currently in Israel's favor will reverse once terror is abandoned.

Once Palestinians or any other insurgent group renounces terror and restores the principle of noncombatant immunity, they may find it possible to reenter the community of nations and successfully press their claims for national self-determination (<http://www.icrc.org>, 14 September 2005).

2 Theoretic Review: America We (Used to) Trust: U.S. Hegemony and Global Cooperation.

The United States said that it would invade Iraq if Saddam Hussein remained in power, and when he did, the United States invaded. Other states can now believe that if a similar threat is made in the future, it is likely to be carried out. Deterrence theorists view credibility of this kind of

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threat as a key foundation of global order. International hegemony like the United States maintain stability by issuing credible threats that those who violate the rules will be punished, and then backing up these threats with action. In the view of the Bush administration at the time of the invasion of Iraq reinforced American credibility, and strengthened world order. (Thomas Schelling, *Arms and influence* (New Haven CT: Yale University Press, 1966), 35. Unfortunately, much of the rest of the world took on a different perspective. The inability to find weapons of mass destruction or related manufacturing facilities indicated to many observers that twelve years of sanctions and the United Nations inspections, along with the U.S. and British military pressure presented before the war was thin at best and did not support the claims being made about them. (*The National Security Strategy of the United States of America* (Washington DC: The White House, 2002), 13-16).

Political scientists and economists have long argued the hegemony, defined as the presence of a predominant power, promotes international cooperation. In the nineteenth century, Great Britain presided over a relatively open and cooperative international economic and trading system. In the second half of the twentieth century, the United States took up the reins and facilitated an even more institutionalized and stable system of cooperation in both economic and military affairs.

These eras are contrasted with the interwar period of the Great Depression, in which according to Charles Kindleberger, "Great Britain could no longer and the United States would not yet take on the role of stabilizer." (Charles Kindleberger, *The World in Depression, 1929-1939* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975), 291-292. But why does hegemony promote cooperation? The two most common answers are often known as *benign* and *coercive* theories of hegemony. *Benign hegemony* is based on the theory of public goods. Public goods, like clean air or radio broadcasts, can be consumed without either paying for them or diminishing anyone else's ability to consume them. Various types of international cooperation, such as low tariffs, fixed exchange rates, and collective security systems, are sometimes

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thought of as analogous to public goods, and the public goods game invoked to explain why hegemony is needed to produce them. In the public goods game, each state has a chance to cooperate in the production of the public good, or to not cooperate that is a free ride. The key assumption behind the public goods game is that most states are too small to have significant impact on how much of the public good is produced.

They pay a price for support, and their support moves the group a little bit closer to full cooperation (Richard Cornes and Todd Sandler, *The Theory of Externalities: Public Goods and Club Goods* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1996). *Benign hegemony* also explains why the hegemon cooperates, and why any of the other states cooperate? Although the smaller states in the system may prefer to ride free, the hegemon coerces them into cooperating by offering additional incentives or threatening additional cost of noncompliance.

This perspective is a favorite of Marxists and realists alike. Revisionist historians of the Cold War portrayed U.S. foreign policy as driven by its economic interests. Realists such as Robert Gilpin have argued that “great powers establish international orders to their liking after they prevail in hegemonic wars.” (Robert Gilpin, *War and Change in World Politics* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1981, 9-15). These orders serve security interests of the reigning hegemon at the expense of lesser powers, until one of them, by dint of economic growth, rises to a position where it can challenge the hegemon in a new great-power war. *Coercive hegemony* is the Mafioso view of hegemony as an offer you cannot refuse. Credibility is important in the sense envisioned by deterrence theory. Coercive hegemons enforce their ideology on reluctant followers and would rather be feared than loved. (Robert Gilpin, *War and Change in World Politics* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1981, 9-15).

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Credibility is conceived of differently in the third view of hegemony because the hegemonic assurance is perspective! This view is based on the tipping game. The tipping game is like the public goods game except for one critical assumption: *in the tipping game, the payoff for the cooperation eventually exceeds the payoff for free riding if enough others are expected to cooperate.*

The role of credibility in the hegemonic assurance perspective is therefore very different from that in coercive hegemony. Although each view is important and explains some instances of cooperation under hegemony, the hegemonic assurance perspective has recently been undervalued, and its historical importance is underappreciated. The most recent factor exacerbating this mistrust was, of course, the invasion of Iraq. In a survey global attitudes a year after the invasion of Iraq the Pew Research Center for the People and the Press asked respondents in nine nations, including the U.S. whether they had more or less confidence that the United States was trustworthy after the war. In America, 58% had more confidence that the U.S. is in fact trustworthy. Majorities in every other country surveyed however, had less confidence. Even in *Great Britain*, 58% were less confident that the U.S. is trustworthy; in Russia, the figure was 63%; in Pakistan, 64%; and in Germany, a country with some experience in matters of trust and reassurance, 82% had less confidence that the U.S. is trustworthy as a result of the war. In 2008 and beyond mistrust is again threatening to prevent cooperation against common threats, and the degree of cooperation achievable will depend on whether a better balance between the two understandings of trust under hegemony can be found in the world.

3 Are Middle East Conflicts More Religious? A Theoretic Perspective.

If, as many believe and scholarship confirms, religion is particularly important in ethnic conflicts involving Muslims, how does this affect the nature of conflict in the

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Middle East? This is a simple question, but finding an accurate answer is not at all simple. It is complicated by two interrelated factors. First, due to differing perspectives and differing political agendas, interpretations of events in the region vary wildly, and accuracy is often lost. This problem is not limited to the study of the Middle East and candidly speaking, has been a central issue in political science since its inception.

For instance, Karl Deutsch points out that “comparative methodology, which consists of analyzing cases using introspection, intuition, and insight, while a powerful tool for analysis, is limited by our imaginations and preconceived notions.” According to Jonathan Fox “a researcher who uses the method of familiarizing himself with as many facts as possible as well as with the insights of other scholars can easily be influenced by his own preconceptions.” (Jonathan Fox, "The Effects of Religious Discrimination on Ethnic Protest and Rebellion," *Journal of Conflict Studies*, Fall 2000, pp. 16-43). This ideology can be insufficient because due to such *preconceptions* we often think we see relationships that we expect to see even if they do not exist, which in turn fail to view relationships that do exist but was never expected to exist or even imagined might exist. (Jonathan Fox, "Is Islam More Conflict Prone than Other Religions? A Cross-Sectional Study of Ethno Religious Conflict," *Nationalism and Ethnic Politics*, summer 2000, pp. 1-23).

In my opinion theorists can use empirical methods to provide a perspective on the issue different from the comparative approach. While the empirical method has its limitations...primarily, it can analyze only what can be measured and measurements of social, political, and economic factors are often imperfect. It also has three advantages. First, it allows us to test and perhaps falsify theories. Secondly, it makes clear what factors produce its results, and anyone analyzing the same data will get the same results.

Third, it often produces surprising findings that would have never resulted from the comparative approach because no one would have looked for them. This analysis proceeds

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in two stages. Stage 1: the results from previous empirical analyses are summarized, Stage 2: we examine data on ethnic conflict to assess the extent and nature of the influence on religion in the Middle East (Jonathan Fox, "Do Religious Institutions Support Violence or the Status Quo?" *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* 22 1999: 119-139).

Empirical analyses, have established that the relationship between religion and conflict in general can be summed up as follows: Religious differences make conflict more likely and more intense. The more multicultural a country's religious population, the more violent its domestic conflicts tend to be. Similarly, when religious issues are imperative in ethnic conflicts, political, economic, and cultural discrimination, and rebellion, all tend to increase. Religious differences also make international wars more likely. Religious issues influence the dynamics of conflicts. When religious issues are important in an ethnic conflict, religious institutions tend to facilitate unrest; but they tend to suppress conflict when religious issues are not important. Religion shapes discrimination against ethnic minorities. Religious and non-religious discrimination is more likely in states where it is legitimate to use religion in political discourse and in conflicts where religious issues are important. Religious discrimination is likely against minorities that are otherwise culturally similar to the majority group that is, where religion is the chief differentiating characteristic between the majority and the minority. Autocratic regimes are more likely than non-autocratic regimes to discriminate against religious minorities. Autocracies engage in higher average levels of discrimination against ethno-religious minorities than do democracies, but it is those regimes that are somewhere between full autocracies and full democracies (and that are known as semi-democracies), that discriminate the least. Regimes in Muslim states are more autocratic. One study finds that Muslim states are the most autocratic states in the world, based on a measure of the extent to which a state is a liberal democracy as well as on a separate measure of institutional democracy. However, there is no relationship between Islam and a third measure which focuses on political rights. Some theorists use the measure for institutional democracy and discover these trends particularly pronounced in the Middle

East. Religion is more important in Middle Eastern ethnic conflicts than elsewhere. Religion is important in the ethnic conflicts of all Muslim states, and it is more important in the Middle East than in Muslim states outside the region.

This means that while Islam may provide a partial explanation for the particular importance of religion in the region, it cannot provide a full explanation. One potential explanation for this is according to Karl W. Deutsch "the historical importance of religion in the Middle East is a region that gave birth to three of the world's major religions." (Karl W. Deutsch, "On Nationalism, World Regions, and the Nature of the West," *Mobilization, Center-Periphery Structures, and Nation Building*, ed. per Torsvik/ Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 1981, p. 51-93). On the other hand, this historical importance may also mean that whatever it is that makes religion particularly important in the Middle East is not a new phenomenon, and the findings presented are simply the latest manifestation of an age-old phenomenon. (Rudolph J. Rummel, "Is Collective Violence Correlated with Social Pluralism?" *Journal of Peace Research*, 34 (2): 163-175.).

The Middle East is the most autocratic and least democratic region in the world. Muslim states outside of the Middle East are found to be more autocratic than other non-Middle Eastern states but less autocratic than Middle Eastern states. Again, Muslim states outside the Middle East are more often autocratic than their non-Muslim counterparts but considerably less often autocratic than those in the Middle East. Thus, Islam may provide no more than a partial explanation for the autocracy of the region. In this case, history may provide an alternate explanation because democracy and the liberal ideologies upon which it is based were developed in the West.

Conversely, ethno-religious conflict in the Middle East is unique but not in the way many believe. Yes, religion is disproportionately important in the region's ethnic conflicts and the region is the most autocratic in the world. But neither of these findings is explained by Islam. Furthermore, most Middle Eastern ethnic conflicts are otherwise similar to ethnic conflicts elsewhere.

4 Implicit Theories and Conflict Resolution.

Prejudice is at the root of many intractable conflicts. Whether prejudice was born out of the dispute or existed before and contributed to the dispute, exaggerated beliefs about the character and motives of the other party often make reconciliation extremely difficult to achieve. I argue that this relationship between prejudice and inflexible turmoil may have its origins from individuals' ideology about the spirit of human capabilities.

There are two theories that have been identified that people can hold about the nature of human qualities. Those who hold an *entity theory* believe that human qualities such as goodness or intelligence are fixed. Those who subscribe to this theory not only believe that people have immutable traits, but also that the goal of knowing others is best accomplished by identifying which set of fixed traits they possess. The other view which are called and *incremental theory*, instead posits that human qualities are malleable and can be developed. This theory implies that everyone has the ability to grow with education and effort. Those who subscribe to this theory, the goal of knowing others is best accomplished, not through judging their fixed traits, but through understanding their psychology, their needs and goals, through process and their culture.

Entity theory lends itself to rather rapid and rigid judgments of others which in contrast to *Incremental theory* leads to more tentative and flexible initial assessments, ones that are subject to revision as others change (Carol S. Dweck, M. Deutsch, and Joyce Ehrlinger *The Handbook of Conflict Resolution*, vol.2. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 2000). People holding an entity theory demonstrate a willingness to label others as good or bad, or as moral or immoral, on the basis of evidence for example, in a study by Chiu, (1997) entity theorists were far more likely to report that even insignificant behaviors were a good basis for judging moral character. Beyond that, entity theorists were more willing to decide that a man was guilty of murder based on his appearance. Unfortunately, pinning a label on the whole group has the effect of dehumanizing the group member. In the research by Levy and Dweck (1999), they found that

children with an entity theory decided that they had nothing in common with the group members once they decided that a group was bad. No longer were the group members regular children with the usual needs and preferences. Instead entity theorists believed that children in that group did not like the same toys and games that they themselves did and did not share the same worries and concerns. In other words, those children now belonged to a separate (and inferior) class of people with which they had no desire to interact. In contrast, the children who held an incremental theory did not see the group as all bad, even though they were certainly not pleased with the children who acted in negative ways.

The tendency for entity theorists to base consequential decisions on rapidly formed judgments is particularly problematic because, once formed, entity theorists are less likely to revise their judgments even in the face of substantial contrary evidence. In contrast, incremental theorists updated their impressions in step with the information they were receiving. In addition, incremental theorists sought to hold accurate views about others, as evidenced by their heightened sensitivity to both positive and negative changes in people's behavior.

Entity theorists do not merely fail to seek out information that might disconfirm their views. Instead, according to Plaks (2001) "entity theorist went so far as to *block out* evidence that contradicted their initial impression. On the other hand, the openness that incremental theorists demonstrate toward new information is particularly conducive to promoting understanding between parties and resolving conflict." The theories people have about *themselves* can also play a key role in how they deal with conflict. Research shows that people with an entity theory, believe that their traits are fixed and have recurrent concerns about proving those traits. They devote considerable attention to showing that they are the intelligent ones and/or the good guys. This concern with how they will be judged can interfere with the conflict resolution process, since resolving often involves both sides admitting error and working together toward a solution. In all, changing people's theories about themselves also brings

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about changes in outlook that can lead to more effective conflict resolution.

In closing, implicit theories create powerful frameworks that people use to organize and interpret their worlds. Implicit theories affect three main areas that are important to conflict resolution:

- The rapidity and rigidity with which label others as well as the ways in which these labels distance and dehumanize others.
- The conflict resolution strategies people use and the effectiveness of these strategies for bringing about successful solutions.
- The willingness of people to reveal deficiencies and admit fault in order to solve problems and learn.

5 The Dynamics of Conflict Resolution.

We are all two minds about conflict. Many of us say that conflict is natural, inevitable, necessary, and normal, and that the problem is not the existence of conflict but how we handle it. But we are also loathed to admit that we are in the midst of conflict. The ambivalence about conflict is rooted in the same primary challenge conflict resolvers' face coming to terms with the nature of conflict (Bernard S. Mayer, *The Dynamics of Conflict*, 2000). As conflict resolvers, we may think of conflict on many different levels. How we view conflict will largely determine our attitude and approach to dealing with it.

Conflict may be viewed as a feeling, a disagreement, and a real or perceived incompatibility of interests, inconsistent world views or a set of behaviors. A framework for understanding conflict is an organizing lens that brings a conflict into better focus.

There are many lenses we can use to look at conflict, and each of us will find some more amenable to our own way of thinking than others. Conflict may be viewed as: *1. occurring along cognitive, (perception) 2. emotional feeling and 3. behavioral (action) dimensions.* This three-dimensional perspective will aid us in understanding the complexities of conflict and why a conflict sometimes seems to proceed in contradictory directions. As a set of *perceptions*, conflict is a

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belief or understanding that one's own needs, interests, wants, or values are incompatible with someone else's. Conflict also involves an *emotional* reaction to a situation or interaction that signals a disagreement of some kind.

The emotions felt might be fear, sadness, bitterness, anger, or hopelessness. Conflict also consists of the *actions* that we take to express our feelings, articulate our perceptions, and get our needs met in a way that has the potential for. Can social organizations, countries, and communities as well as individuals be in conflict, particularly along the emotional or cognitive dimensions? Although, there are some significant dangers to attributing personal characteristics or motivational structures to systems, practically speaking, I think systems in conflict often experience that conflict on all three dimensions. By considering conflict along the cognitive, emotional, and behavioral dimensions, we can begin to see that it does not proceed along one simple, linear path.

Conflict has many roots, and there are many theories that try to explain these origins. Conflict is seen as arising from basic human instincts, from the competition for resources and power from the structure of the societies and institutions people create, from the inevitable struggle between classes. *Human communication* has inspired a large literature and multiple fields of study and the main issue to consider here is how hard it is for individuals to communicate about complex matters, particularly under emotionally difficult circumstances. Conflict frequently escalates because people act on the assumption that they have communicated on the basis of different information and *assumptions* that what they often attribute to bad faith deviousness and not to mention imperfections of human communication (Bernard S. Mayer, *The Dynamics of Conflict*, 2000). Emotions are the energy that fuel conflict. If people could always stay perfectly rational and focused on how to best meet their needs and accommodate the needs of others, and if they could calmly work to establish effective communications, then many conflicts would either never arise or would quickly deescalate.

Emotions are generated both by interactions and/or circumstances and previous experiences. Emotions fuel conflict, but they are also a key to deescalating it.

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Many emotions can prevent, moderate, or control conflict. *Values* are our beliefs about what is important, what distinguishes right from wrong, good from evil, and what principles should govern how we lead our lives. Though values are often a source of conflict and an impediment to its resolution, they can also be a source of commonality and a restraint on conflict escalation. The *structural*, that being...*the external framework, in which an interaction takes place or an issue, develops into another source of conflict.* The elements of structure may include available resources, decision-making procedures, time constraints, communication procedures, and physical settings.

Additionally, there are three dynamics that the wheel of conflict model does not include, because they cut across all the sources and are often best analyzed in terms of those sources. They are: 1. *power*, 2. *culture*, and 3. *data*. According to Bernard S. Mayer, “*culture* affects conflict because it is embedded in the individuals’ communication styles, history, and way of dealing with emotions, values, and structures.” (Bernard S. Mayer, *The Dynamics of Conflict*, 2000). *Power* is a very elusive concept, one that can confuse our thinking or help us understand an interaction. Some theorists do not view *Data* as a source of conflict, but how data is handled and communicated can lead to conflict. Individual interests are the needs that motivate the bulk of people’s actions, and they can be viewed simple, superficially or in great depth. A challenge we face in the practical understanding of conflict is to determine what level of needs or interests’ best explains a conflict.

Finally, the premise of this study and the field of conflict studies in general is that conflict and conflict resolution are useful areas of focus in order to better understand human behavior. Conflict is not in itself a bad thing. Understanding conflict becomes a vehicle for understanding the many contradictions that are necessarily present in our efforts to be social beings.

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Issues in Exceptional Student Education: The Challenges for Principals

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Abstract: *This paper covers a wide array of issues related to exceptional student education. Some of the issues covered include: culture, leadership style, funding, behavioural problems, and empowerment. Solutions are offered for some of the most common problems faced by Principals and the possible difficulties that can be encountered when implementing the proposed solutions are also identified and explained. The case study of Lynn Middle School in Boca Raton, Florida is used throughout the paper. Lynn Middle School is a hypothetical school representing the average characteristics of educational institutions in Broward and Palm Beach Counties.*

1 Introduction

Since the beginning of 21st century, special education programs have gained more attention in our society (Sorrel, Reith, & Sindelar, 2004). The IDEA policy standardizes exceptional education system throughout the country. It is quite a challenge for principals to remain as effective leaders of exceptional schools. Several issues other than educational progress have been involved such as cultural diversity, inclusion of general education, effective transition training, etc. Principals have to handle many sensitive issues related to exceptional education that involve both behavioral and emotional aspects. This paper presents ten issues related to challenges in exceptional education that principals need to be aware of. It also includes the importance of the issues, possible solutions, and possible limitations.

Lynn Middle School was built in 1985 located in Broward County, South Florida with a good reputation. There are 500 students in grade 5-8 enrolled in this school and taught by 60 full time special education teachers. The diversity ratio among students is very balanced. Blacks made up 37.5 percent, whites 30.4 percent, Hispanics 25.8 percent, and Asians 3.3 percent. In terms of the school year,

there are 180 days of class. The average age of citizens in Broward community is 65 with wide range of socioeconomic levels. Most students in Lynn Middle School are considered upper middle class level.

The campus consists of four classroom buildings, one indoor gymnasium, and two cafeterias. There are 3 media centers with assessment software on the campus. The teachers' offices are located on the first floor of the classroom buildings. The campus was built to fully accommodate disabled students according to the IDEA policy. The main staff members are; 20 security guards, 10 custodians, 5 psychologists, 10 behavioral therapists, and 15 program coordinators.

Most students of Lynn Middle School also attend exceptional school in the elementary level. There are several cases that Lynn Middle School receives admission from students who transfer from general education. The classroom period at Lynn Middle School is designed to accommodate students with learning disabilities. One period lasts for 50 minutes with 5 minutes break after each 25 minutes of study. Students with various disabilities are usually grouped together in one classroom. There are 20 students per one teacher and one teaching assistant in each period. Teaching assistants are usually volunteer students who have to complete their field experience.

Lynn Middle School is famous for providing effective programs for exceptional students. However, there are several recurring themes that the principal has to handle on a daily basis. The issues usually involve dealing with students' progress, implementations of new policies, parents' expectations, negative emotions from parents, etc. The following questions presented in this paper are those that principals have to handle on a daily basis.

2 How to handle the case of parents who are offended by the fact that their children were transferred from general education to special education?

Studies show that the definitions of learning disability vary from culture to culture (Sorrel, et al., 2004). In some cultures, the character of Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD) is viewed as the lack of discipline rather

than as a disorder. The lenient perceptions on the definitions of learning disability make some parents deny that their children have a learning disability and prefer to blame the school system. Parents of children with clear signs of developmental disorder since infancy (such as Autism) usually have more insight about their developmental process (Papalia, Olds, & Feldman, 2007). They are able to access the children's specific needs and also willing to cooperate with the school. On the other hand, parents of children; whose disability appears later in their middle to late childhood, are usually unprepared and refuse to believe that their children have a learning disability (Papalia et al., 2007).

It is important for principals of exceptional schools to handle the negative emotions of parents whose children just have been transferred to exceptional schools. Successful solutions for this problem can increase positive relationships between parents and students and also increase the level of parent involvement in the students' academic performance.

Exceptional schools should provide parents, whose children have been transferred from general education, the information about the characteristics of their children's learning disability. This approach will help parents become more open and have more insight about their children's needs. The goal for this approach is to increase the level of parent involvement with the school.

Another approach to increase the level of acceptance among parents is that the school should emphasize the idea of having inclusive classrooms with general education students. The idea of inclusion will help parents feel that the transition from general education to exceptional education is not such a shift for their children. Moreover, the idea of inclusion will help parents perceive that their children are not inferior to other children but rather need alternative approaches to their learning.

The challenge of solving the issue of parents' acceptance is that it depends almost completely on principals' way of approaching parents. In this case, the principals have to take the role of emotional and academic counselors for parents. The double roles of principals in exceptional schools lead to the idea of whether principals should be trained in basic mental counseling as well.

3 How to assure parents that our program is effective for their children?

Parents of exceptional students usually find it frustrating to find the right schools that can help their children improve their level of achievement. They usually have a lot of hope and expectation toward the institute. Some parents who have transferred their children to several exceptional schools before might develop cynical ideas toward the program of the newly transferred institute. It is essential for the school to assure parents that the offered programs are effective for their children.

This process has an impact not only on the positive attitude of parents but also on the cycle of the school function as well. The positive feedback from parents leads to the positive reputation of the school. The reputation of the school leads to the effect on financial support from the government. The financial support from the government in the following year will increase or decrease the quality of the school facility which will affect the level of students' achievement. In order to fulfill this challenge, the principal has to develop a plan to establish trust with parents as well as to design the program that is effective for the students.

The school should give personal attention to parents since the admission period to establish a good first impression with parents. This approach will help establish positive perceptions and at the same time eliminate the level of anxiety and cynical ideas toward the institute. The positive attitudes from parents will help increase the level of openness to suggestions and involvement required by the school.

The school should also provide information about the program and assure parents that it conforms to the IDEA standard. During the semester, monthly evaluation and the progress of both the students' behavior and academic achievement compare to the annual goal should be informed to parents to assure that the school provides personal attention to each student.

The provision of personal attention toward parents and the monthly report of students' achievement highly require the commitment from the staff to help fulfill the goal. This

approach might be beneficial to parents and the reputation of the institute but it does not change the fact that there is an increase in the workloads of the staff. To sustain the program, the school might need extra budget to compensate the increased workload of the staff.

4 How to assess the level of achievement among students whose English is their second language? How to overcome the issue that multicultural students have an overrepresented number in exceptional schools?

There is an overrepresented number of multicultural exceptional students compared to the number of exceptional students of Anglo American culture (Obiakor, 2007). One of the reasons is because the assessment is not offered in all foreign languages and most of the tests are culturally biased (Aiken & Groth-Marnat, 2006). Another reason is because some minority students are recent migrants with a low socioeconomic level. Parents of students in such cases usually have no time to participate in school events or follow up with the children's academic achievement. Moreover, parents of some cultures such as Asia, hold views regarding interfering in school, as questioning the educators' quality of teaching (Nisbett, 2003).

Principals of exceptional schools should find alternative options of assessing multicultural students' aptitude level while they are trying to improve their English. According to Aiken et al., (2006), there are several aptitude tests that are designed to assess students without requiring the use of language. Series of three dimensional figures will be presented to test students' critical thinking, spatial ability, etc. together with basic mathematics questions.

At the same time the school should offer programs that train students to become familiar with the U.S. academic curriculum and the teaching method. Some foreign students might come from countries that teach them to learn by memorizing the textbooks rather than develop critical thinking. The difference in studying methods among multicultural students is one of the factors that have an impact on low academic achievement (Nisbett, 2003). The

special program for multicultural students should inform the students about the learning objectives and the teaching methods according to the U.S. standard.

The challenge that arises from solving this problem is that the school needs an extra budget to offer special programs for multicultural students. Moreover, it is costly and difficult to recruit staff members to use three dimensional figures as an aptitude test to assess exceptional students while they are trying to improve their English.

5 How to convince parents that their involvement with the school is important? How to include parent involvement among multicultural students?

Previous studies show that parent involvement has a positive impact on the development of exceptional students (Kim & Morningstar, 2005). Moreover, it also leads to having positive relationships with the educators as the needs from both parents and educators are communicated and solved. However, there are many obstacles for the school to retain parent involvement. Some parents cannot participate in meetings because of their work schedule while others have limitations in English comprehension. It is important for principals to find an alternative way of communicating with parents without having to spend time in schools.

Principals can present ideas of communicating with parents through emails, phone, and letters. Teachers are responsible for communicating with parents of assigned students. Parents should be required to inform the school of what is the best way of communication for them. This way, the school can be more connected with parents considering the limitation of the parents' availability.

Moreover, principals should provide monthly communication with parents of minority students in their native language. This approach can be done by sending a monthly letter or email written in their native language informing parents about their children. The translation can be done through software program that can convert the text from English to foreign language and vice versa.

The issue arising from solving this problem is that the individual communication can be time consuming for

teachers. Instead of having parents together in one room to deliver the message in one day, teachers have to spend some time on several days in communicating with parents of each student one by one. Moreover, some foreign parents might not be able to use the computer or might not have an access to the program that translates the message from English to their native language.

6 How to assure parents that their children are not being neglected in school?

Parents usually expect the school to provide all the needs for their children in order to reach the maximum level of academic performance. However, previous studies show that the commitment of the students is also a factor that helps them reach the maximum level of academic performance (Judson, 2007). Based on the findings of the research, the impact of students' low achievement can be the ignorance of the students toward the subject or being neglected by the teachers. Parents usually support the idea that their children have low academic achievement because of being neglected by the teachers. Principals should assure parents that their children are not neglected in school. In order to do this, principals should provide monthly individual reports to parents. Moreover, principals should provide an academic environment conducive to establishing relationships with students.

The monthly report should include not only student's academic performance but also the report on observed emotions and behavior in the school area. The report will assure parents that each student is being monitored closely in the school. Moreover, the report should have a section that offers parents to write suggestions that they need the school to focus on. Each month, the report should also respond to the parents' suggestions on what type of service they expect from the school.

In addition to sending the monthly report, the school should also provide curriculum that make connections among students from different backgrounds. This approach not only prevents negligence of some students but also to gain attention from students toward the study as well. Previous study shows that educators should present

information that offers multiple truths and perspectives to gain attention from students of various ethnicities (Judson, 2007).

The issue that arises from solving this problem is that it requires teachers to pay attention to small details in the classroom at the same time dealing with disturbing behaviors. In some cases, teachers overlook some students because they appear to be passive and quiet among students who are hyperactive and disturbing. It will be quite a challenge for teachers to focus more on passive student in the middle of disturbing classroom environment.

7 What are effective ways to conduct successful transition training?

The success of an exceptional education institute depends greatly on the success of exceptional students' post school achievement (Sorrel, et al., 2004). Previous research shows, that post school achievement among exceptional students remains below the expected levels (Kim & Morningstar, 2005). According to the IDEA policy, the goal of transition training is to train exceptional students to be independent in society. It is important for exceptional schools to provide effective transition training. Studies show that the obstacles for transition training are; the differences in cultural values on being independent, the quality of transition training in the institute, and the support from parents and the community (Kohler, & Fields, 2003).

The school should start by informing parents about the importance of transition training since students start attending the school. The school should also express the need to support their children in participating in real life situations. At the same time, the school should provide transition training to exceptional students earlier than the expected age, if possible, to give more time for students to have trials and errors during the training.

The school should also provide a career office where exceptional students can have an internship with possibility of employment. If possible, the school should provide paid internships for exceptional students as a way of providing rewards for their effort. The wage from the internship will function as an incentive for exceptional students to give

more effort and to be willing to improve their skills (Kohler et al., 2003).

The challenge of having successful transition training is that the school will need extra budget to include the training earlier than the expected age. Moreover, it is quite a challenge for the school to find places that offer paid internships for exceptional students. It is also beyond the authority of the school to control some external variables that discourage the students such as the lack of empathy in some colleagues.

8 How to assure parents of general education students that the inclusion of exceptional education students will not lower the quality of the school?

One of the IDEA policies supports the idea that exceptional students should be included in the general education environment. The purpose of this policy is to decrease the stigma among exceptional students. The inclusion of exceptional students also gives the students the opportunity to improve their social interaction between exceptional and non exceptional students (Yssel, Engelbrecht, Oswald, Eloff, & Swart, 2007). Although the inclusion policy is carefully designed to accommodate exceptional students, it does not guarantee that society will also conform to the policy.

The challenge of this policy involves the acceptance from parents of general education students. Parents of general education students might find that the challenging behaviors can be disturbing for their children's academic environment and therefore lead to the idea of decreasing in teaching quality. The biased perceptions from general education parents will decrease the level of effectiveness in the IDEA policy on inclusion.

It is essential for principals in both exceptional schools and general schools to eliminate biased values of general education parents toward exceptional students. In order to solve this problem, principals in both schools should organize meetings with general education parents prior to the start of the inclusion program. Moreover, it is essential that the school should respond immediately to the complaints from general education parents.

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During the meeting prior to the beginning of the inclusion program, principals from both general and exceptional schools should inform parents about the plans of making collaboration work in inclusive classrooms (Hines, 2008). The school should provide parents and students from general education the characteristics of inclusive classroom environment and teaching method in the coming semester. According to the research, it is effective if the inclusive classroom has one teacher who functions as the instructor and another teacher who monitors the students' behavior in one period (Hines, 2008). This approach will help parents and students of general education become more open minded and accept the idea of having inclusive classrooms. Moreover, the presentation of the school plan will assure parents and students of general education that the academic quality will not be decreased due to the inclusion (Lynch & Warner, 2008).

Moreover, the principal of general education schools should train general education teachers to operate inclusive programs effectively (Hines, 2008). During the training session, the principal has to make sure that teachers develop positive attitudes toward collaborative planning and instruction. One of the factors that determine the success of this approach is the leadership role of the school principals (Lunenburg & Ornstein, 2004).

One of the challenges that might arise as the inclusion project is running is that the general education teachers might not be satisfied with the teaching environment. General education teachers might feel that their career path has been forced to change and therefore it lowers the level of job satisfaction. It is quite a challenge for principals to change the values and perceptions of people involved in general education. The inclusion program might raise the issue that general education students are not being treated fairly compared to exceptional students whose parents pay the same tax for public education. Principals should also focus on retaining the quality of general education as well as creating friendly environment for exceptional students.

9 How to assure parents of exceptional students that the negative consequences from the inclusion of general education students will not occur?

Although the inclusion program according to IDEA policy is meant to be beneficial to the progress of exceptional students, parents of exceptional students might also find this policy somewhat problematic for their children. One of the negative consequences that might occur to exceptional students is the possibility of being bullied by general education students.

School bullying has occurred as part of the U.S. culture before the inclusion program was introduced (Anonymous, 2008). General education students with low academic achievement and submissive personalities are usually bullied by peers. There are cases in the past when school bullying led to depressive episodes and therefore several victims committed suicide. It is almost impossible to avoid bullying because nowadays bullying can occur through verbal violence in the cyber world without any physical violence and therefore it is beyond the school authority.

Parents of exceptional students find that exceptional schools are the safe shelter for their children. They can learn the subjects and develop their social skills without any discrimination that will lower their level of self esteem. The history of bullying in general education schools that occurs for many generations and still unable to solve is definitely a crucial issue for parents of exceptional students.

It is essential for principals to prevent school bullying that might occur when the inclusion program starts. This process can be done by having various approaches that prevent school bullying.

One of the approaches is to have behavioral intervention for both the bullies and the victims. Both bullies and victims are considered having behavioral disorders on the different sides of the coin and therefore both of them need help from behavioral therapists (Halgin & Whitbourne, 2007). This process can be done by conducting behavioral observation in both general and exceptional education students. Students whose profile matches the characteristics of being the bullies and the victims will be reported to

parents. Parents will be asked to sign a consent form to allow their children to be sent to therapy.

Another approach is to make sure that the security system in the school area is effective enough to detect students' behaviors. The school should have security guards checking the school area during school time. Moreover, parents should be asked to get involved in preventing school bullying. The school should inform parents about how the trait of bully and victim can impair their children. The school should ask parents to communicate with their children and to observe whether there are any signs of behavioral problems.

The challenge of solving this problem is that there are many external variables that are beyond the authority of the principal. For example, the school cannot take any actions against cyber bullying since some of the bullies are not the students from the institute. Moreover, most bullies have poor family relationship which makes it difficult for the school to ask for parent involvement.

10 How to handle behavioral problems among exceptional students?

Some exceptional students might not only have problems with low aptitude but also with their behavior (Halgin et al., 2007). This issue raises a question among parents of exceptional students of whether the disturbing behavior of the classmates will decrease the quality of education. Previous research showed that disturbing behaviors of some exceptional student classmates impairs the level of concentration in the classroom and therefore leads the classroom to function in a slower pace (Halgin et al., 2007). Another research showed that the characteristics of behavioral and emotional disorders in exceptional students might be worse than just disturbing their classmates (Gumpel, 2008). Students with emotional and behavioral disorders might have traits of being physical, sexual, and relational aggressors and therefore victimize the classmates.

It is important for principals to find solutions on managing behavioral problems of exceptional students. The successful solutions will improve the students'

developmental process and also lead to a positive classroom environment.

To solve the problem, the school should train the staff members to evaluate students' behavior by using assessment materials (Aiken et al., 2006). There are several validated systematic screenings such as the Systematic Screening for Behavior disorder (SSBD), The Student Risk Screening Scale (SRSS), and the Strengths and Difficulties Questionnaires (SDQ) (Lane, Kalberg, Parks, & Carter, 2008). The screening assessment will help detecting the early onset of emotional and behavioral disorders or a disorder that already exists in the students. The outcome of the test will help the school find the right approach to improve the students' emotional and behavioral problems. Another approach of solving this problem is to train teachers about the characteristics of emotional and behavioral disorders. That way, teachers can detect the likelihood of the students' disorder since the assessment usually occurs very few times per year.

Another approach to solve this problem is to increase knowledge regarding psychotropic interventions for students with emotional and behavioral disorders among special educators (Ryan, Reid, & Ellis, 2008). This approach only applies to students whose emotional or behavioral condition is controlled by psychotropic medications. Since children spend most of the time in the school area, it is essential for exceptional educators to be able to cooperate with clinicians who prescribed psychotropic medicines to students. Exceptional educators should be able to identify whether their problematic emotions and behaviors are from the side effect of the medication.

The issue that arises from this approach is that it is costly to train staff members to perform complicated tasks such as evaluating the assessment test and diagnosing the students' behavior. Moreover, the training session not only requires budget but is also time consuming and requires the skills of the staff members.

11 How to retain staff members in an exceptional school?

The disturbing behavior of exceptional students and the struggling level of academic achievement might affect the

level of job fulfillment among staff members (Schafer, 2006). They might feel that they are in a vicious cycle of work environment that barely gives them any reward. The staff members have a great impact on the success of the institute and therefore it is important for principals to establish a positive work environment. The positive work environment will increase the level of commitment among the staff members and therefore leads to the effectiveness of the school (Lunenburg et al., 2004).

Principals should provide a positive work environment by establishing bonds among the staff members. This approach can be done by organizing events such as having small lunch parties during lunch break or offering pantries with supplies such as coffee and tea. The organizational structure should be in a casual manner where the staff members feel comfortable to interact with people in higher positions. Moreover, principals should respond immediately to the needs of the staff members or express sympathy toward the staff's complaints over the pressure from parents of students.

The key to solve this challenge depends greatly on the leadership style of the principals. Principals should create a positive work environment to increase the staff members' commitment. At the same time, principals should also keep in mind that the informality of the organization might lead to the absence of discipline.

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The South African Transition: A Holistic Approach to the Analysis of the Struggle Leading to the 1994 Elections.

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Abstract: *This paper deconstructs the conflict leading up to and shortly following the democratic transition in South Africa. A simple instrument is used in order to identify the main components of the conflict. The information gathered by the instrument is then analyzed using three different theories: regime transition theory, norm socialization using the Spiral Model of Socialization developed by Risse and Sikkink (Kollman, 2008, p. 400), and finally a short comparison to John Duckitt and Thobi Mphuthing's attitudinal study of pre- and post- electoral South Africa will be provided (Mphuthing & Duckitt, 1998). The explanations given by the three approaches are then compared and contrasted in order to gain a more holistic understanding of the South African transition.*

1 Introduction

The 1990s were a time of momentous change in South Africa. De Klerk, the State President of the white regime, reopened talks with the previously banned black opposition movements and released important political prisoners. After a tortuous and uncertain period of posturing and negotiation between the major political and social forces in the country, the historic election of 1994 took place. It brought to power a coalition government headed by the African National Congress and including the National Party and the Inkatha Freedom Party, *inter alia*. While the beginnings of this transition can be traced back to decades before the election, this paper will concentrate on the dynamics of conflict for the period leading to the unbanning of the African National Congress and to the breakdown of negotiations in the Second Convention for a Democratic South Africa (CODESA), which took place on March 1992 (Ottaway, 1993, p. 107).

The transition from a white-minority government to black majority rule in South Africa is a process that can be analyzed from a myriad of different perspectives. An

expressive perspective would concentrate on the attitudes of the different groups before and after the transition in relation to feelings of relative deprivation, the perceived legitimacy/illegitimacy of that deprivation, hostility, and perceived social and economic status (Mphuthing, 1998; Pruitt, 2004, p. 19). This perspective differs widely from the one taken by regime transition theory in Political Science. Three weberian ideal types of transition are identified: *transition after regime breakdown*, *transition through extrication*, and finally *transition through transaction* (Giliomee, 1992). This structural approach analyzes transitions according to the relative stability and power of the ruling elite before and during the transition. Johannes Rantete and Hermann Giliomee have applied this theory to the South African transition labeling it as a *transition through transaction* similar to that of Spain after the death of Generalissimo Francisco Franco (1992, p. 515). While this approach provides some elucidating insights at the role of relative power in the transition, it fails to account for some of the unique features of the South African case such as the polarization of society along ethnic lines rather than ideological ones and the role of international norms in limiting the available tactics of the main parties.

Another theory from the margins of International Relations is the constructivist theory of norm socialization. This theory can complement structural theories of transition in that it explains the effects of norms in constraining and encouraging certain behaviors (Kollman, 2008). In the case of South Africa, little research has been carried out regarding the effects of international discourse and norms on issues of human rights, self-determination, and international political economy on the transition process.¹ By adding this layer to our understanding of the South African transition it is possible to fill the gaps of the structural explanation of the effects of international pressure and sanctions on the conflict.

Finally, a basic analytical instrument identifying and describing the main components of the conflict in discussion, serves as a starting point for a more nuanced

¹ See Klotz's analysis of International sanctions on South Africa's transition for a notable exception (1995).

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analysis and interpretation of the years leading to the South African transition. The instrument commonly called SPITCEROW for the acronym of its main components, will be used as the basic framework of the present paper.

2 Theoretical Framework and Methodology

This paper will deconstruct the conflict(s) involved in process leading up to the 1994 elections through the previously mentioned instrument called SPITCEROW. It stands for: sources, parties, issues, tactics, changes, enlargement, roles of other parties, outcome of the conflict, and identifying the “winner” if there is one. Consequently the information organized by the instrument will then be explained through the use of three different approaches: regime transition theory, norm socialization using the Spiral Model of Socialization developed by Risse and Sikink (Kollman, 2008, p. 400), and finally a short comparison to John Duckitt and Thobi Mphuthing’s attitudinal study of pre- and post- electoral South Africa will be provided (Mphuthing & Duckitt, 1998). The application of three distinct and complementary approaches will provide a more nuanced explanation of a complex and protracted conflict. Due to the emphasis of this paper on the achievement of a general meta-understanding of the underlying mechanisms behind the transition and space constraints, information about the parties and events deemed of secondary importance will be included in the form of an appendix.

3 Basic Components of the Conflict

Sources:

The antagonism between blacks and whites in South Africa is partly a legacy of the colonial period and the racist philosophy that supported it. “White man’s burden” was transformed into “separate development” (apartheid) and later on to “self-determination”. In addition to that, in contrast to the rest of Africa, a large part of the white community in South Africa is made up of the descendents of

Dutch settlers. The Boers settled in South Africa more than three hundred years ago, at the end of the 17th century and were famous for their independent spirit (AWB, 2008; Ottaway, 1993). They founded their own independent states and fought against the mighty British Empire until they were conquered and incorporated into it.

The independent spirit of the Boers was tolerated by the British due to their system of indirect rule. It was under the British that the system of separate development came about. The British administrators respected the rights of traditional authorities and used them to rule their extensive colonies (Manby, 1993, p. 20).¹ Most of the laws giving rise to the semi-independent homelands were originally drafted under the British (Manby, 1993). This guaranteed that the social and political structure of certain groups such as the Zulus would remain largely unchanged until the time of the democratic election in 1994 (IFP, 2008).

An important event in the history of the South African conflict was the moment when the Afrikaner National Party took power in 1948. At the time the Afrikaner population was economically downtrodden and was not as powerful or as educated as English speaking whites (Ottaway, 1993, p. 78). The National Party soon used its control of the state apparatus to distribute jobs and subsidies to Afrikaners. Most of the bureaucracy came to be filled with Afrikaners and their farms received subsidies from the central government. In time, the National Party virtually merged with the state and became a party state with complete control over the security forces and the bureaucracy (Klotz, 1995).

Needless to say most state funds benefitted the white minority while the vast majority of the population lived in extreme poverty. From 1917 to 1980 whites made more than 10 times more in per capita GDP than blacks and 5 times more than Asians and Coloreds (Mphuthing & Duckitt, 1998, p. 810). The developed world coexisted side by side with the third world. Furthermore the division between the two worlds was maintained by the laws of apartheid which divided the country into regions for different statutory racial

¹ One example of this was the Amakhosi Act that gave dictatorial powers to traditional chiefs (Manby, 1993, p. 20).

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groups. Blacks were not allowed to move from their townships or their homelands into white regions except with a special permission to work there. Education and healthcare were also segregated and the disparity between the services provided to whites and those provided to blacks was stark. It is important to note that black townships and the homelands were so undeveloped that they had to be subsidized by white taxpayers through the central government (Ottaway, 1993). Thus the system was redundant and inefficient and kept most of the country forcefully underdeveloped.

Apartheid denied blacks any representation since they were supposed to be given independence through the creation of homelands. In the case of other groups such as Asians and Coloureds they did not have a homeland and thus were given representation in a tricameral parliament with the constitution of 1983 (Ottaway, 1993, p. 91). The reasoning behind this arrangement was that homelands were being organized so that blacks could rejoin their traditional ethnic groups and regain independence. However, less than 15% of the land was given to the homelands while the best land was kept by whites. Most of the land was far from urban centers and thus most homelands were not financially viable (Manby, 1993).

In summary there are three main sources to the conflict in South Africa: political subjugation, economic inequality, and colonialism (history). The three are interconnected to one another and permeate the entire fabric of South African society.

Parties:

Parties can be divided into those supporting the liberation movement, those supporting the status quo, and other concerned parties. The liberation movement was historically headed by the African National Congress (ANC) which was founded in 1912 and was banned in 1960 (Ottaway, 1993, p. 42). After it was banned the ANC operated as an exiled organization with the support of other black organizations inside South Africa such as the Mass Democratic Movement (MDM) and the United Democratic Front (UDF). The ANC has been historically allied to the

South African Communist Party (SACP) and to the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU). In addition to that it was allied to the Congress of Traditional Leaders of South Africa (CONTRALESA) (Manby, 1993, p. 19; Ottaway, 1993).

The ANC considered itself to be a liberation movement and had a military arm called Umkhoto we Sizwe (MK). In addition to having a small militia, the ANC operated collective farms in Zambia and Tanzania. The administrative structure of the ANC was headed by a National Executive Committee (NEC) that controlled the organization through different departments. While the NEC had complete control over the organization itself, it did not have control over the Mass Democratic Movement and the ANC only had 500,000 registered members by early 1991 (1993, p. 46).

Ideologically the ANC followed African Socialism with a lot of Marxist influence. Nevertheless the ANC was never a monolithic organization and its ideology varied depending on the generation of the leadership.¹ The Freedom charter guided the early years of the organization and represented the ideas of the period, influenced by the anti colonial movement. It stressed the importance of the state in promoting development and favored the nationalization of industry and the redistribution of land (1993, p. 48).

The South African Communist Party was intricately linked with the ANC and many of its leaders were also prominent members of the ANC. It followed a strict version of Marxist Leninism and helped the ANC get the support of the socialist block for many years. It is important to note that the SACP always remained independent and that it considered its cooperation with the ANC to be the first step towards socialism. In 1990 it had 23,000 members (Ottaway, 1993, pp. 52-54).

The true power of the ANC was the support it received from the Mass Democratic Movement. This movement developed inside of South Africa during the 1980s. It was mostly organized around the townships and had a participatory orientation. Most of its leaders were involved with local issues and favored a grassroots approach through mass mobilization. The main members of the MDM were civil organizations in the townships, the United Democratic

¹ See Appendix for a more detailed description of the ANC

Front, COSATU, and student groups. The MDM formally disappeared in February 1990 (1993, p. 55). Nevertheless, the civil organizations that composed it continued to function at the local level. Once again it is important to note that the ANC did not enjoy formal control of the MDM only its support. The United Democratic form was closely allied to the MDM. It was formed as a result of the establishment of the tricameral parliament. It had a participatory approach and disappeared in 1991 (1993, p. 57).

Also in the liberation movement there were other organizations that favored an Africanist ideology. This groups rejected Marxism and favored black power. The Pan Africanist Congress of Azania (PAC) and the Azanian People's Organization (AZAPO) both fall into this group. PAC formed an alliance with the ANC during the time leading to the negotiations but due to friction between the two organizations the alliance was broken (1993, p. 72). The position of PAC was more extreme than that of the ANC regarding land redistribution and the future of white settlers in South Africa. AZAPO was even more extreme in that it refused to negotiate and also subscribed to black power ideology (1993, p. 80).

The homelands or *batustans* also played an important role in the South African transition. While most of them were viewed as apartheid creations that had to be dismantled, some of them were based on strong ethnic identities and were led by strong leaders. This is the case of KwaZulu based on the historic Kingdom of the Zulus. KwaZulu had enjoyed relative autonomy under the British who kept traditional authorities in power and allowed them to control their own affairs (Manby, 1993, p. 20). This practice was continued by the National Party which officially created the homeland of KwaZulu for those of Zulu descent. Prince Buthelezi, nephew of the King of the Zulus, was elected Chief Minister of the Homeland of KwaZulu in 1976 and held that position until the 1994 elections (IFP, 2002). Buthelezi refused independence from South Africa but accepted autonomy for the homeland. KwaZulu's political power is based around the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP). This party was founded in the early 20th century as a cultural organization to preserve traditional Zulu culture. It was not successful at the time and was later on revived by Chief

Minister Buthelezi in 1975 again as a cultural movement. The IFP was originally aligned with the ANC but soon it parted ways due to philosophical differences. Its emphasis on self-help and self-reliance contrasted with the ANC's Marxist approach to development. Moreover, the IFP did not support the armed struggle against the government (IFP, 2008).

The IFP is closely linked to the KwaZulu government and the leadership of the two organizations overlap. Furthermore, Chief Buthelezi is the leader of both and also the traditional Prime Minister of the Zulu Monarchy (IFP, 2002, 2008; Lynch, 1987; Manby, 1993; Ottaway, 1993). It should be noted that KwaZulu controls its own police forces and also armed supporters. Funds from the KwaZulu government have been used to fund IFP activities. The IFP officially became a political party in 1990 with a platform favoring the free market, self-determination, and a federal government (IFP, 2008). The IFP claims to have the support of seven million Zulus and controls the government of the KwaZulu homeland. It did not have many supporters outside of KwaZulu Natal except a few town councilors and Zulu immigrants living in hostels in the townships (Ottaway, 1993, p. 69).¹

In total there were six self-governing homelands and four independent homelands. Three of them supported the ANC and the other three supported a continuation of self-rule (Manby, 1993). The remaining homelands were ambiguous about the South African transition and did not have much support either within their territory or nationally. Nominally independent Bothuthatswana opposed reintegration into South Africa and was relatively independent financially due to revenues from platinum. KwaZulu and Ciskei supported a federal solution devolving power to local governments (IFP, 2002, 2008; Lynch, 1987; Manby, 1993; Ottaway, 1993). On the other hand the Transkei, KaNgwane and Venda favored the ANC (Ottaway, 1993, p. 82).

In between the liberation movement and the white establishment one could find the Indian and Coloured parties in the tricameral parliament and the Churches. The

¹ See appendix for more information about Inkatha and the other parties.

Indian and Coloured parties enjoyed little support but were officially represented in the tricameral parliament and thus had to be taken into consideration for any negotiation regarding the South African transition to proceed (Ottaway, 1993, p. 63). On the other hand the Churches had broad membership bases but were ideologically split. The South African Council of Churches supported the Antiapartheid struggle while some of its member churches were affiliated to Churches that supported apartheid.¹ The Dutch Reformed Churches were split along color lines. A good example of the state of affairs in South African religious life was the stance of the Nederduitse Gereformeerde Kerk (NGK). This church had a coloured affiliate and later on accepted that there was no support for apartheid in scripture. On the other hand the Dutch Reformed Churches also included the conservative Gereformeerde Ker in Suidlike Afrika (the dopper Church) which supported apartheid (1993, p. 58).

The government establishment was represented by the National Party. It came to power in 1948 with a platform of defending the interests of the Afrikaners (Bond, 2004; Giliomee, 1992; Klotz, 1995; Ottaway, 1993; Welsh, 1990). While it received less than 50% of the vote it was able to assume complete control of the government and the bureaucracy. The National Party concentrated on lifting the Afrikaner *volk* from poverty through government employment and subsidies. The bureaucracy and the armed forces were filled from the ranks of Afrikaners, and white farms received subsidies and tariff protection from foreign competition. Afrikaners thrived under the ruled of the National Party and achieved a living standard higher than any other in the continent (Welsh, 1990). Nevertheless the success of the National Party in lifting Afrikaners from poverty came at the price of keeping the majority of the population permanently underdeveloped and living in conditions of poverty and extreme relative deprivation (Bond, 2004).

Through its patronage system, the National Party slowly merged with the state apparatus to become a party-state. An organization called the Afrikaner Broederbond brought together the National Party, Academia, the Bureaucracy, the Security Forces, and the conservative

¹ See appendix for more information about the Churches.

churches. It was founded as a cultural organization in 1918 and served as a think tank and meeting place for the Afrikaner elite. Headed by the Rector of Afrikaans University, Gerrit Viljoenn, the Broederbond provided the intellectual leadership to the party-state and exerted considerable influence over all sectors of state policy (Ottaway, 1993, p. 38).

The National Party historically supported the concept of “separate development”, also known as Apartheid, and followed a statist policy regarding the economy. Nevertheless the National Party slowly realized that apartheid was not working and amended the constitution in 1982. The new constitution included a tricameral parliament giving representation to Asians (mostly Indians) and to Coloureds. This was opposed by the conservative faction of the National Party and led to a split and to the establishment of the Conservative Party led by Dr. Andries Treurnicht (Ottaway, 1993, p. 76). The Conservative Party continued to support the concept of “separate development” but later on started calling it “self-determination”. It became the main opposition party during the final years of the apartheid era and managed to gain considerable support but never enough to seriously challenge the control of the National Party. Nevertheless it overshadowed the small parties of the center like the Democratic Party (p. 81).¹ The Conservative Party refused to join the negotiations leading to the South African transition.

Finally, on the extreme right, there were two groups stressing the right to self-determination for Afrikaners. The Afrikaner Volkswag proposed the establishment of a new Afrikaner State in the Northern Cape that would be called Orania. On the other hand the Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging had the more extreme position of defending the status quo at any cost and has a neo-fascist bend (AWB, 2008; Ottaway, 1993). While the extreme right did not have much support, it gave voice to some of the concerns of the white population and it threatened violence if widespread land redistribution were attempted.

The previous pages have provided a general description of the main parties involved in the South African

¹ See the Appendix for more information about the Democratic Party

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transition to democracy. While the most important aspects of those parties have been discussed it should be noted that there were myriads of political organizations operating inside of South Africa at the time and that a more detailed description is beyond the scope of this paper. However, more information on the parties has been included in the appendix.

Issues:

The most important issues of the years preceding the democratic transition were the following: dismantling apartheid in all of its forms, economic justice, negotiating a new constitution, the nature of the future South African State (federal, centralized, etc), the land issue (possibility of land redistribution), and the future of the South African economy (AWB, 2008; Bond, 2004; Giliomee, 1992; IFP, 2002, 2008; Klotz, 1995; Lynch, 1987; Magubane, 2002; Manby, 1993, 1995; Mbeki, 2008; Mphuthing & Duckitt, 1998; Ottaway, 1993; Pruitt et Al., 2004; Rostron, 2003; Welsh, 1990)

Each of the issues mentioned in the previous paragraph can be subdivided into secondary issues and most of them are connected to hidden issues as well. For example, dismantling apartheid in all of its forms, involved almost every aspect of social organization in South Africa. It included everything from the desegregation of schools to the integration of the MK into the South African Defense Forces. Negotiating a new constitution was considered to be a way to determine the future power distribution for the involved parties and also a way to protect the interest of their constituencies.

Finally all of those issues were connected to the hidden issue of identity. Would the new South Africa be truly multiracial or would one group simply supplant the other as the dominant one? Would ethnic and linguistic affiliations have a place in the new South Africa? Those were some of the covert issues involved in the South African transition. It is important to note that one issue that did not receive much attention during the negotiations between the ANC and the NP was the economy. The reasons for this omission will be discussed at length in the analysis section of this paper, but

it will suffice to say that the ANC considered political power to be more important to economic power, because it could be converted into economic power in the future. Another factor was that the National Party favored the status quo regarding the economy and thus had a vested interest in avoiding the topic.

Tactics:

The liberation movement used four main tactics: mass mobilization (mass action), armed struggle, international pressure (shaming), and ultimately negotiation. Numbers were the strength of the liberation movement and due to the disenfranchisement of the black population, it made widespread use of mass mobilization. Affiliated unions organized massive walk-outs in order to pressure the government to change, major political rallies were organized, and the MDM told its members to stop paying for public services in order to weaken the NP appointed local governments (Bond, 2004; Giliomee, 1992; Klotz, 1995; Ottaway, 1993).

The goal of the liberation movement was to make the country ungovernable to bring about change. On the other hand the ANC's military arm, the MK, organized a largely ineffective armed struggle (Ottaway, 1993, pp. 50-53). The ANC's diplomatic arm lobbied the international community to set up economic sanctions against the South African Government. In addition to that, the ANC used the tactic of "shaming" the South African government in front of the international community by telling the world about its abuses. This tactic was very effective in isolating South Africa diplomatically and in getting funding for the ANC from the Eastern Block and from the Scandinavian Countries (Klotz, 1995).

The Inkatha Freedom Party used its control of the Homeland government of KwaZulu to increase its political power. Through intimidation of people living in the homeland and its alliance with the traditional chiefs it cemented its control over most aspects of life in KwaZulu. It used the police as a private security force and armed the traditional chiefs with automatic weapons. The IFP also used the financial resources of the homeland to fund its political

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activities (Lynch, 1987; Manby, 1993; Ottaway, 1993). Most of the violence it used was in the form of police abuse against ANC supporters and of its supporters (armed with traditional weapons plus guns) against ANC supporters in the townships of Natal (Manby, 1993, p. 23). The IFP used some mass mobilization in the form of mass rallies but mostly it concentrated in political maneuvering. Chief Buthelezi tried to balance the power of the ANC by sometimes allying itself with the Conservative Party and other times with the National Party regarding some issues such as self-determination and support for the free market (Manby, 1993, p. 65).

Buthelezi was very active internationally, especially in the West. He travelled several times to meet Western leaders such as Presidents Reagan and Nixon of the United States and Prime Minister Thatcher of the United Kingdom (Manby, 1993, p. 52). His dismissal of violence as a viable option and his support of capitalism made him the favorite representative of South African blacks in the West. Chief Buthelezi also made use of the discourse of self-determination in his defense of group rights and emphasized the importance of protecting traditional culture (IFP, 2002, 2008; Lynch, 1987). Finally, Buthelezi threatened violence if the rights of the Zulu people were not protected in the new South Africa.

The National Party's main source of strength was its control of the state apparatus. It had effective control of the armed forces, of the bureaucracy, of the financial resources of the state, and of parliament. Its main tactics were to repeal apartheid laws on paper, use the language of self-determination and group rights, shame the ANC for its support of an obsolete socialist ideology, use its control of the state to decide when and how to start negotiations, devolve power to local governments before the transition, and privatizing state assets. Other techniques used were covert violence against opponents, covert funding for the IFP, and attempting to split the moderates from the radicals in the ANC.

The National Party wanted to have the upper hand during negotiations and thus it waited until the fall of the socialist block to start talks about negotiations with the ANC (Welsh, 1990). It was also successful in having

economic sanctions removed by repealing apartheid legislation even without taking steps to implement the changes. The NP repealed the apartheid laws at the same time it was accusing the ANC of supporting communism and favoring a statist economic policy. This form of shaming weakened the ANC internationally and strengthened the NP during negotiations. Another form of control exerted by the NP was the demand for the ANC to unarm and to become a political party. This weakened the ANC because it left all coercive power in the hands of the NP and prevented the ANC from receiving as much foreign funding as before (Ottaway, 1993, p. 44). Furthermore, the NP aligned its ideology with that of the West and took advantage of the unipolar moment (Barber, 1996; Chua, 2007; Friedman, 2000; Fukuyama, 1992; Habermas, 2006; Lal, 2004), in order to exert pressure on the ANC to move to the center and to avoid the discussion of economic issues. In summary the NP controlled much of the early process and controlled the timing and context of the negotiations to a large extent.

The NP used a referendum in order to circumvent the opposition from the right and was successful in winning a majority of the votes, 68.7%, in support of continuing negotiations with the liberation camp (Ottaway, 1993, p. 78; Welsh, 1990). Due to the extreme right's refusal to participate in negotiations and its lack of an alternative proposal, the National Party was able to present itself as the only organization able to protect the interests of whites in the inevitable transition that was to come (Bond, 2004; Giliomee, 1992; Klotz, 1995; Ottaway, 1993; Welsh, 1990).

The right refused to participate in the negotiations with the liberation camp and instead concentrated on fear mongering and, its more extreme elements, engaging in petty acts of sabotage (Bond, 2004; Giliomee, 1992; Klotz, 1995; Ottaway, 1993). Some fleeting alliances were built between the Conservative Party, the IFP, and traditional leaders. They were united by their belief in self-determination and their rejection of the concept of majority rule. However, those alliances were short-lived and were not very effective. On the other hand, the extreme right engaged in violent acts. Nevertheless, those acts were usually against the government for proceeding with negotiations and involved very few casualties. Usually the violence was directed at

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government buildings when no one was working. The acts were meant to be symbolic and never amounted to a very strong opposition to government policies.

Changes:

The two main changes involved in the years leading to the South African transition relate to context and to ideological changes in the National Party. At the contextual level, the international community underwent dramatic changes in the 1980s. The communist block was crumbling and the development community was abandoning its belief in state led development. Keynesianism was abandoned in favor of a Schumpeterian view of capitalism favoring the private sector and warning against government intervention in the economy (Lal, 2004). In addition to that, the sudden implosion of the second world reduced the support available to radical liberation movements. At the ideological level, liberal capitalism had triumphed, and the international financial institutions (IMF, World Bank, etc), started spreading the gospel of free trade (Fukuyama, 1992). The changes in the context of the conflict is very important since when it started, in the early 20th century, state led development and radical liberation movements were the norm. By the end of the 20th century revolutionary movements were on the wane and Marxist ideology was more unpopular than ever.

The National Party also changed during the long struggle. It realized that maintaining the apartheid system was impossible and that change was needed sooner or later. Due to the economic difficulties experienced by South Africa during the late 80s and early 90s, the government started to consider the end of apartheid as an opportunity to rejoin the international community and to improve the economy (Giliomee, 1992; Klotz, 1995; Ottaway, 1993; Welsh, 1990). The abolition of apartheid was also a way of getting rid of the many economic sanctions leveled against it. Thus the National Party reacted to the more favorable international situation to start negotiations with the ANC and also proactively changed with the rise of the reformers within its ranks.

The ANC also changed in response to the new international situation by slowly moving away from its original radical economic philosophy and by giving up the ineffective armed struggle in favor of negotiation. It changed its dream of taking power by force for the possibility of negotiating its way into power. Another important change was that the ANC slowly started to transform into a political party from its origins as a liberation movement.

Enlargement of the Conflict:

Due to the pervasive nature of apartheid in pre-transition South Africa, all sectors of society were involved in one way or another in the transition process. A major social change had to be undertaken in order to transform the highly segregated South Africa of the apartheid era into a multiracial democracy. Due to the nature of the struggle, the parties involved enlarged in order to include more sectors of society. By the time of CODESA almost all sectors of society were involved in the negotiations or in the opposition to them.

The liberation struggle started as a small movement in the early decades of the 20th century. At the time it did not enjoy much active support from the population nor from the international community. This gradually changed and the ANC gained wide international support in the late 60s and early 70s. Supported by the eastern block due to its ties with the South African Communist Party, and by the West due to its fight for human rights, the movement gained momentum and managed to lobby the international community to sanction South Africa economically (Giliomee, 1992; Klotz, 1995; Ottaway, 1993). The banning of the ANC and the rise of the Mass Democratic Movement got the majority of the black population involved in the struggle. A grassroots aspect was added to the hierarchical ANC (Ottaway, 1993). In addition to that, South African society became politicized and organized to defend a varied array of interests. The labor union movement grew and joined the struggle, some homelands fought for their future, and the white population organized to protect their economic dominance. In summary a movement that started with a few radicals asking for political rights for blacks, became a struggle including

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almost every sector of South African society and almost every aspect of life.

Roles of Other Parties:

Two kinds of parties played important roles in the period leading up to the South African transition, internal and external ones. Some important internal parties were the following: the bureaucracy, the armed forces, and the Democratic Party. Among the most important external actors were the following: The eastern block, Scandinavian countries, the United States, and the international financial institutions.

The bureaucracy was not involved openly in the struggle leading up to the transition but it exerted considerable power over the implementation of the abolishment of apartheid. It mostly delayed the process and strengthened the negotiating position of the National Party to which it owed its prominence. On the other hand, the armed forces played an important role just by the fact that they did not get directly involved in the process. The professional nature of the South African armed forces was a very important factor in avoiding bloodshed and strengthened the bargaining position of the National Party. It was widely believed that only the National Party could control the armed forces and lead them through the uncertain period of transition (Ottaway, 1993, p. 93). Finally, the Democratic Party (DP) tried to serve the role of mediator between the ANC and the National Party. Its liberal chairman, Zach de Beer, proposed a consociational solution to the constitutional problem (p. 81). However, his proposal was rejected by the two major camps and his party did not enjoy enough support to make much of a difference in the negotiations.

At the international level, the eastern block provided the ANC funds and weapons for its military wing. The Scandinavian countries provided much needed funds for the ANC and the United States passed sanctions against South Africa so as to pressure the government to abolish apartheid through the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986 (Klotz, 1995, p. 9; Ottaway, 1993, p. 93; Welsh, 1990). Furthermore, the United States also supported the IFP as a

representative of South African blacks and thus weakened the ANC's claim to speak for all blacks in South Africa (Manby, 1993). Finally the international financial institutions (IMF and World Bank) exerted indirect pressure by recommending neo-liberal prescriptions for economic growth. This affected the thinking of the National Party and ultimately weakened the position of the ANC in terms of land redistribution and nationalization. In summary, the neo-liberal policies of the international financial institutions constrained the options available in the economic domain and ultimately protected the property of whites and the private sector against nationalization and redistribution (Klotz, 1995; Magubane, 2002; Manby, 1995; Welsh, 1990).

Outcome:

The outcome of the South African transition has been covered extensively in the literature (AWB, 2008; Bond, 2004; Magubane, 2002; Manby, 1995; Mbeki, 2008; Mphuthing & Duckitt, 1998; Rostron, 2003). However it is important to note that it was one of the most successful peaceful transitions in African history. The ANC attained power while sharing it with the IFP and the National Party. In addition to that, the armed forces were successfully integrated with the armed wing of the ANC. The resulting constitution provided for proportional representation and provided for considerable local autonomy for the provinces (Manby, 1995).

Finally from an economic perspective, there was little change in terms of economic inequality and land redistribution. Due to the previously discussed constraining factors, the ANC accepted the neo-liberal prescriptions of the international financial institutions and gave up land redistribution and nationalization (Magubane, 2002). In addition to that it accepted that the way to improve the lot of the black majority would be through growth rather than through redistribution. Finally, it avoided social upheaval through the use of subsidies in order to fund social services and other programs for the poor majority. In other words, it redirected the revenues from mineral sales in order to fund a large welfare program to help the poor rather than redistribute land and jobs (Mbeki, 2008). The private sector

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was left virtually intact and nationalization was abandoned. Thus the outcome was that the white minority lost political power but maintained its economic power. On the other hand, the black majority obtained political power and access to better social services but gave up economic power (Klotz, 1995; Magubane, 2002).

Winner:

It can be argued that the entire population was the winner since major violence was avoided and blacks were given political rights. However it should also be noted that while blacks obtained political power they remained impoverished and that the white majority maintained its economic dominance. In addition to that blacks have not been able to improve their economic lot other than by welfare plans from the government. This raises doubts about the real benefits of the transition for the black majority. Some authors even claim that legal apartheid was followed by economic apartheid (Bond, 2004). On the other hand, the growth that was expected after the transition never took place and the first world that used to coexist next to the third world in South Africa is at risk of joining the third world rather than the third world joining the first. This sentiment is one of the main grievances of the extreme right. The AWB states this position clearly: "Whites are threatened with land occupation if they do not give ground to "homeless" blacks, crime in the country is the highest ever and the value of the Rand falls every time a black politician opens his mouth" (AWB, 2008).

4 Analysis

The following section will analyze the information collected in the previous instrument through the use of three different but complementary approaches: regime transition theory, norm socialization using the Spiral Model of Socialization developed by Risse and Sikkink (Kollman, 2008, p. 400), and finally a short comparison to John Duckitt and Thobi Mphuthing's attitudinal study of pre- and

post- electoral South Africa will be provided (Mphuthing & Duckitt, 1998).

Regime Transition Theory:

Regime Transition Theory states that there are three main ideal types of regime change: *transition through regime collapse*, *through extrication*, and *through transaction* (Giliomee, 1992, p. 515). The first category deals with those instances in which the regime simply collapses and the opposition takes complete control of the state apparatus. This can happen through a democratic election after the collapse and is characterized by very little opposition from the previous regime. Some communist revolutions fall in this category such as the Chinese Revolution and the Russian Revolution. The second category, transition through extrication includes those cases in which the ruling regime still has control over the state apparatus but cannot or does not want to continue ruling the country. Most colonial transitions fall into this category. Finally, *transition through transaction* includes those cases in which the ruling regime has a firm grip on power, has the political will and the resources to continue in power, and has reached a stalemate with the opposition. A good example of this was the Spanish transition after the death of Francisco Franco. This category is also characterized by a division between economic liberalization and political democratization. Usually economic liberalization is undertaken by the ruling regime before the transition and then democratization is undertaken. It should be noted that contrary to the other types of transition there is not clear winner in this type and both the new and the old regime share power. It is called transition through transaction since it happens through negotiation, usually initiated by the ruling regime, and positions are traded between the parties. For example, in the Spanish case, democracy was obtained in exchange for respecting private property and the capitalist system (Roberts, 1997).

Rantete and Giliomee argue that the South African transition falls in the transactive category (Giliomee, 1992). According to this perspective, the ruling National Party had a firm grip on power. It controlled the armed forces and the

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bureaucracy. The National Party was not about to collapse and it had the power to deal with any threats mounted by the opposition. While the ANC and the MDM were successful in disrupting the economy, they were not strong enough to force the government to step down unilaterally. Also, the NP started to liberalize the economy before holding talks with the ANC and at a much earlier time than any formal negotiations took place. Finally, the inability of the ANC and the liberation movement to deal with economic issues shows that they did not have the upper hand in the negotiations leading to the elections of 1994. The final result was an ANC government in coalition with the IFP and the NP and the adoption of a neo-liberal system constraining nationalization and redistribution. It is also important to note that the fall of the eastern block weakened the MK and that the ANC had to give up the armed struggle in order to hold negotiations, while the NP still controlled the armed forces and the police.

The ANC gave up its dream of having a transition through extrication following the example of other colonial struggles and had to accept a transition through transaction. This model offers a very useful typology to understand the South African transition. It is congruent with the *perceived feasibility model* in that both parties made decisions based on their relative power and taking into consideration what seemed feasible (Pruitt et Al., 2004, p. 47). Regime transition theory assumes that both parties will behave rationally. Regarding the agency vs. structure debate, transition theory takes both into consideration but assumes that structure constraints the rational choices of leaders.

Norm socialization using the Spiral Model of Socialization developed by Risse and Sikkink:




Fig.1. Spiral Model of Socialization developed by Risse and Sikkink and adapted from Kollman (2008, p. 400).

Constructivist scholars in international relations have written widely about the way in which international norms affect behavior (Kollman, 2008; Rublee, 2008). According to constructivist theorists international norms play a very important role in constraining international actors. This is due to the change in the cost/benefit calculation of the parties. A strong international norm can provide social, psychological, and financial incentives for compliance. Complementing those, social psychological processes such as identification and linking can induce actors to follow a norm. Rublee also mentions the wish to avoid cognitive inconsistency when having adopted an international norm at the rhetorical level and then wanting to deviate from it due to realist concerns (Rublee, 2008). This section will apply the Spiral Model of socialization to the South African transition.

The Spiral model of socialization deals with how international norms are internalized by international actors and ultimately achieve compliance. The model consists of six steps: creation of International Norm/Normative Regime, norm violation, denial of norm legitimacy, tactical concessions, prescriptive status of norm, and internalization of norm and rule consistent behavior (Kollman, 2008, pp. 399-400).

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The civil rights movement of the 1960s and the anti-colonial movement of the 1970s strengthened the norm of equal political rights. While the Charter of the United Nations and the two sets of rights passed by the United Nations included the right to political participation, the norm started to gain momentum in the 1960s (August, 1995). The creation of this norm against discrimination based on race represented the first step in the Spiral Model. At this point in time, the South African government was aware that the international community did not approve the philosophy of apartheid. Through most of the century, the South African government chose to violate the norm and to defy the international community. As pressure mounted in the late 70s and 80s, the South African government chose to deny the legitimacy of the norm basing its argument on self-determination and sovereignty.

The constitution of 1983 and the creation of the tricameral parliament can be viewed as a tactical concession to the norm. By giving representation to coloured and Asians the South African government was recognizing the legitimacy of the international norm against racial discrimination. De Klerk's move to hold talks with Mandela before the unbanning of the ANC also represents an example of tactical concessions. The two previous examples are considered to be tactical concessions because the ruling government did not believe in the norm it was simply bowing down to pressure. By giving token concessions to the norm against apartheid the government was trying to avoid the negative costs of noncompliance, such as economic sanctions and international isolation.

At one point probably in the early 1990s the norm against apartheid reached the level of prescriptive status. De Klerk and the national party dismantled the legal trappings of apartheid and acted according to the norm. Prescriptive status means that the norm rules the behavior of the party even though the party may not agree with the norm. This was certainly the case of the NP at the beginning of negotiations with the ANC. It was forced to follow the norm but did not truly believe in it. Instead the NP was trying to co-opt the discourse of self-determination in order to circumvent the constraints set by the norm against separate development.

Finally, South Africa is currently entering the last face of the process, internalization of norm and rule consistent behavior. This step will probably take several years to be completed since it involves the internalization of the norm. In other words, this will be the moment when South Africans reject apartheid both rhetorical and internally and also behave appropriately. The continuing segregation of cities based on class and voting trends, showing a clear racial divide, shows that this step has not been completed (Klotz, 1995; Magubane, 2002; Rostron, 2003).

Expressive approach (attitudinal change in South Africa):

The two previous theories are both influenced by rational choice theory. Behavior is assumed to be based on a rational cost/benefit calculation. The attitudes and beliefs of the parties are not taken into consideration except as byproducts of the struggle. According to this view, blacks should have felt more relative deprivation in relation to English speaking whites than relative to Afrikaners. This would be based on an objective evaluation of the financial situation of both groups. Before and after the transition, English speaking whites were wealthier than both Afrikaners and blacks. In addition to that according to this view, perceptions of outrage regarding Afrikaners would have drastically decreased after the ANC won the 1994 elections. However both conclusions are incorrect. Mphuthing et Al's longitudinal study of attitudes and perceptions before and after the South African transition show a very different story (1998).

According to the study, blacks' perceptions of relative deprivation before the transition were much greater in relation to Afrikaner whites compared to English speaking whites, even though English speaking whites were wealthier than the Afrikaners. Moreover, that did not change much after the transition with blacks still feeling more relative deprivation towards Afrikaners compared to English speaking whites (Mphuthing & Duckitt, 1998, p. 824). Another interesting finding is that blacks expected Afrikaners to decline economically in the years following the transition while they did not expect the English speaking whites to decline over the same period. Regarding feelings of

outrage, blacks continued to hold them even after the transition (1998, p. 825). This is an important finding since the conditions leading to the injustices of the apartheid era were gone, namely the control of the government by Afrikaners, and even after that, blacks continued to feel “outrage” towards Afrikaners. This study shows that attitudinal change takes longer than institutional and political change. It will probably take many years to ease the feelings of blacks towards Afrikaners. Blacks’ more positive attitudes towards English speaking whites may be due to their image as less racist and the perception of their success through equity. In other words, blacks consider that English speaking whites have earned their economic status through hard work rather than through using the state apparatus (Mphuthing & Duckitt, 1998, p. 826).

5 Conclusions

The struggle leading up to the South African transition was a multilayered process. The simple instrument used in the first part of the paper, to map out the components of the conflict served as a starting point. Since the instrument is not a model and thus possesses no explanatory power by itself, the information collected through it was subjected to three different theoretical approaches. Regime transition theory provided a very straight forward explanation of the negotiations between the ANC and the NP. It also gives a satisfactory explanation of why inequality persists in South Africa even after the transition of 1994. However, regime transition theory, is an elite decision making model. This means that it assumes that decisions are made by elites and that constituencies only have a role as part of the cost-benefit calculation. In addition to that, as a realist theory, it discounts the importance of international norms and instead concentrates on more tangible constraints.

The spiral model, that was applied as an example of a constructivist perspective on the South African transition, complements the explanatory power of the regime transition analysis. It explains how the National Party responded to international norms regarding apartheid. Moreover, it shows that the international community played a very important

role in guiding the behavior of the South African government in the period leading to the transition. The very real constraints imposed on the South African government by the international norm against apartheid explain some of the concessions made by the NP and also its rhetorical abandonment of apartheid.

Finally, the two previously mentioned approaches were briefly compared and contrasted with an expressive study of attitudinal change in pre and post transition South Africa. This study shows that some of the conclusions expected from a rational analysis are incorrect and that attitudes change more slowly than economic conditions and political realities. This paper aims to give a more holistic explanation of the struggle leading up to the 1994 South African transition. Since no single approach can explain such a complex process, three different approaches were applied to the South African case. It is the belief of this author that a multidisciplinary approach to the study of conflict provides a more fruitful understanding of this complex social phenomenon and may clear the way to new synergetic theoretical insights.

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APPENDIX

PARTIES

NAME	IDEOLOGY	PROMINENT MEMBERS	HISTORY
National Party (NP)	Conservative, formerly supportive of apartheid, self-determination, free market and capitalism	State President Botha State President De Klerk	Afrikaner party that took over the government in 1948. Initiated the transition leading to the 1994 elections
Bureaucracy	Conservative similar to the NP		Filled with Afrikaners after the victory of the NP in 1994
Afrikaner Broederbond	Conservative, formerly supportive of apartheid	President was: Gerrit Viljoenn (rector of Rand Afrikaans University.)	Formed in 1918 as a cultural organization for Afrikaners. Became think tank for Afrikaner elite.
Security Apparatus: - South African Defense Forces - South African Police - National Intelligence Service	Conservative, supportive of the National Party. Very professional		Historically used to suppress insurgents and the liberation movement.
Conservative Party (CP)	Very conservative, supported apartheid and rejected	Founded by: Dr. Andries Treurnicht	Founded in 1982 after splitting the NP over the tricameral

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	negotiations		parliament.
The Democratic Party (DP)	Liberal, proposed a consociational solution to the constitutional problem	Chairman Zach de Beer.	Attempted to play a mediating role during CODESA
Nederduitse Gereformeerde Kerk (NGK)	Reformed Dutch Church. Originally supporting apartheid then it changed its stance and claimed that it had no justification in scripture		It was part of the South African Council of Churches and had a coloured affiliate. It published a paper changing its position on apartheid.
African Nederduitse Gereformeerde Kerk in Afrika	Reformed Dutch Church. Coloured	Headed by Allan Boesak (coloured) Supported the ANC	It was part of the South African Council of Churches.
Gereformeerde Kerk in Suidlike Afrika	Dooper Conservative Church (supported apartheid)	Most members of the NP were members	Historically a conservative Afrikaner Church
Anglican Church	Protestant Church that historically rejected apartheid.	Archbishop Desmond Tutu (black)	Fought against apartheid and later on worked in the Truth and Reconciliation Commission
Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging	Extreme right, Afrikaner nationalism, neo-fascist,	Eugene Terre Blanche	Organized marches and its leader gave inflammatory

	supported apartheid		speeches.
Afrikaner Volkswag	Extreme right, Afrikaner nationalism, proposed the establishment of a new Afrikaner state.	Carel Boshoff	Proposed a homeland for Afrikaners that would be called Orania located at the North Cape.
African National Congress (ANC)	Liberation Movement Influence by the anti-colonial struggle and Marxism. Later on it moved to the center.	Nelson Mandela Oliver Tambo Chris Hanni Thabo Mbeki	Founded in 1918 and was banned in 1960. Was unbanned in 1990. Had approximately 500,000 members in 1991
Umkhoto we Sizwe (MK)	Radical military wing of the ANC.	Chris Hanni	1200 recruits a year during the 1980s. It was never an effective force. It was integrated in the South African armed forces after the transition.
South African Communist Party (SACP)	Marxism, Stalinist Leninism	Jose Slovo	Allied with the ANC and supported by the Eastern block. 23,000 thousand members in 1991

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Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU)	Workerism and populism. Allied to the ANC and the SACP		Organized strikes to help the ANC. It lobbied to include economic issues in the negotiations
The Congress of Traditional Leaders of South Africa (CONTRALESA)	Traditional values, allied with the liberation movement and opposed to the homelands		Allied to the ANC tried to give credibility to traditional authorities.
Mass Democratic Movement (MDM)	Liberation movement, grass roots democracy, supported the ANC		Established in the 1980s between: the UDF, COSATU, and 16 other organizations. It disappeared in 1990
United Democratic Front (UDF)	Part of the liberation movement, supported grass roots democracy, was opposed to the tricameral parliament		Established in 1983, banned in 1988, and disbanded in 1991.
Pan Africanist Congress of Azania (PAC)	Black power philosophy. Slogan “one settler, one bullet”.		Split from the ANC in 1956 over alliance with the communists.
Azanian People’s Organization (AZAPO)	Black consciousness, believed in redistribution		Around 70,000 members in 1991. It

	of land and resources.		rejected negotiations.
Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP)	Ubuntu: African humanism. Self-determination, development through self-reliance and self-help. Respect for private property and avoidance of violent methods against the government.	Chief Buthelezi: Chief Minister of KwaZulu, President of the IFP, and later on Minister of Home Affairs after the 1994 elections.	Founded as a cultural organization in 1975. Claimed a membership of 1.8 million in 1991 and the support of 7 million Zulus.
Homeland of Transkei	Favored reincorporation and the ANC	Major General Bantu Holomia	A creation of the apartheid era.
Independent Homeland of Bothuthswana	Did not want to reincorporation to South Africa	Independent President Lucas Mangope	Was one of the few financially independent homelands thanks to profits from platinum mining.

Previous table compiled from information from the following sources:

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The Evolution of Official Lessons:

The Japanese Experience of the “Big Four” Pollution Diseases through the Lens of International Aid

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Abstract: *Experience is an overtly accepted source of lessons but, as a social phenomenon, it is not static. This essay is an examination of the use of the ‘four’ big pollution diseases experience inside Japanese initiatives on international aid, looking for the changes in understanding such tragic events. Attention is placed on the elements introduced and the nuances of meaning among them. The period reviewed, from the late 80’s to 2005, indicates a positive movement of the official view towards a comprehensive recognition of the history, not without voids and pending challenges.*

1 Introduction

Experience is one of the pillars of knowledge. Philosophically speaking, it is in the extreme opposite to reason, intuition lying somewhere in the middle. Yet, in a broader sense, it is the source of authority for those who have worked out some problems or gone through any kind of crises. This applies to individuals as well as organizations, societies or states, all of whom usually extract lessons from such experiences that later feedback and frame the system. Most of the times, this process of learning is the base for progress, for better system performance and for others to eschew unnecessary harm. However, it is also recognized that, in this process, society’s power structure and the relative position of stakeholders may privilege certain interpretations of facts, menacing some relevant knowledge to fade away. The case is popularly acknowledged when

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saying “History is written by winners”, but, is it the case in the realm of environmental degradation?

The following pages are a brief examination of a milestone in global recent push for environmental protection, the world-renown ‘four’ big pollution diseases of Japan, and their use inside country’s development assistance. This branch of foreign policy was selected because of its exceptional potential to disseminate country’s voice, ideal niche for experience to be heralded, and opportunity to actually prevent similar catastrophes in other countries, thanks to its access to resources and political leverage. At the same time, the evolution of lessons avowed by the establishment about one same experience, can serve as a prelude for a new examination of the crisis, let us rescue some relevant lessons, while also help understand the unfinished tensions among the actors involved inside the country.

Thus, I will start presenting basic elements of both the ‘four’ big pollution diseases and Japanese international cooperation, in order to contextualize the reader. Then, two interpretations of the Japanese experience would be distinguished: one extracted from four reports embedded in the first global wave of environmental action, epitomized by Rio Summit and the emergence of the sustainability paradigm; and a second view related to present uses of the experience, documented with two sources: a lecture by a JICA expert inside an international short course on Environmental Management organized in Minamata city – the place were one of the major outbreaks took place – and the report *Japan’s Experiences in Public Health and Medical Systems -Towards Improving Public Health and Medical Systems in Developing Countries* by the Japanese International Cooperation Agency (JICA, 2005), which includes a chapter precisely on Minamata disease. This research is part of a project to review the ‘four’ diseases experience and to construct a theoretical framework for the analysis of human security, paper which is due for early 2009.

2. 'Four' Big Pollution Diseases in a Nutshell

After the Second World War, Japanese government had the imperative to quickly recover from the dismal situation and rebuild the country. Economic growth was, then, the top priority. First under the Allied Forces command and later by themselves after the signature of the Treaty of San Francisco in 1952, trade and industrialization were at the heart of national policies, evolving after three decades into what is commonly known as 'the Japanese Miracle'. The 'four' big pollution diseases were a by-product of this race for development, caused by the unexpected impacts of industrialization in human life's supporting ecosystems, and worsened by the social conditions under which they emerged.

The 'four' were actually three: Yokkaichi asthma, Itai-itai disease and Minamata disease, yet a second outbreak of the latter, known as Minamata-Niigata disease, is also counted as part of the serious outbreaks of pollution-related ailments that hit the archipelago between the 50's and the 70's. Besides the common origin in pollution, their divergence between sources, ecosystem services affected, effects, among others, make them representative of the upcoming environmental challenge for the world, reason why basic courses on environmental issues usually make mention of them.

Yokkaichi asthma was a severe case of air pollution, tip of the iceberg of an ailment already affecting life in major cities. It was one of many cases caused by daily exposition to outdoors SO_x, by-product of sulphur-containing fuels combustion. The breaking point reached in this city of around 200.000 people in Mie prefecture – close to Nagoya – was that the absence of any source of contamination different from a new industrial cluster built in 1957, finally gave the reason to patients complaints on an causal link still scientifically unproved (Kitabatake, 2002). The court success escalated into compensation schemes and industry transformation plans that reverted most of the problems by the end of 70's. Initially filed by eleven plaintiffs, to 1995 the number of people alive compensated under the resolution raised to 682 in this city. Yet, under the same designation act, areas in Osaka and Kawasaki cities were also included,

mounting the number to 17199 victims during the first recognition in 1969, and reaching a total in whole Japan of 75150 in the next ten years (Ministry of the Environment, 1996).

The other two diseases were both caused by pollutants poured into water resources, reaching later humans through food chain accumulation. On the one hand, Itai-Itai disease was the case of chronic cadmium poisoning in Toyama prefecture, ingested through rice grown with water from the Jinzu River, which contained mining run-off. The mineral disrupted the equilibrium of calcium metabolism, of special importance in women, resulting in over-fragile bones and renal failure. The name of the disease means literally ‘hurts-hurts’, denoting the level of pain entailed by the ailment. The disease was officially recognized in October 1955 (MOE, 1996), a suit filed in 1968 and final decision reached in 1971, when the mining company was indicted and ordered to compensate 156 patients.

On the other hand, Minamata disease was the case of methyl-mercury poisoning, principally attacking the central nervous system, through the consumption of contaminated fish. Due to the characteristics of the disease – chronic as well as acute effects, plus teratogenic sequels, heavily enlarging the magnitude of the harm – and the struggle for recognition that followed, it is the most documented of the ‘four’ diseases. The source of the Minamata outbreak was the effluent from Chisso Corporation plant of Acetaldehyde production into the city’s bay, where local fishermen got their catch. First cats started dying, and then several patients, especially fishermen, were reported with poor motor coordination, sensory disturbances in the extremities, loss of speech and of hearing capacity. As intoxication proceeded, those symptoms intensified, deteriorating the patient’s condition till death. The outbreak was acknowledged by the government in May 1956, giving way to several research teams, mediating commissions and social movements that were finally appeased with paltry payments to fishermen and patients in 1959.

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The principal obstacle for a categorical support to victims was uncertainty on the source of the disease¹. However, after a second outbreak in Niigata in 1965, distortions to the research process in the initial phase were unveiled and social movements got reinvigorated. A lawsuit was filed in 1967 by Niigata patients, which was ruled in 1971, while Minamata patients filed in 1969 and the verdict was rendered in 1973. In Niigata 690 persons were certified and compensated, plus 2265 in Minamata. Nevertheless, the following process of patients recognizing, marked by the arbitrariness of the criteria and the financial burden every additional patient represented, prolonged the tensions with the patients' movement, reaching to a second agreement in 1995, when 10,353 more victims received a one-time compensation, but not certification. Anyway, around 5000 patients more keep litigation for recognition, while the government has ruled out a broader epidemiological research (Japan Times, 2007). Recent studies sustain that symptoms of the disease would not be evident after the age of around 50, giving new air to the problem (JT, 2008).

Thanks to the convulsion produced by the behemoth of environmental problems, several changes took place in Japanese system. First, a whole set of laws designed to get rid of pollution and help conserve ecosystems were enacted in the so-called "Pollution Session" of the Diet in July 1970. In 1971 the Environmental Agency was created as a technical group to help enforce the ruled legislation and, with the time, the bleak condition proved to be fertile ground for fast technology development, with the consequent recovery of most of the physical damages inflicted to the ecosystem.

3. The Context of Japanese Aid

The system of international cooperation is led by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA), and mostly implemented

¹ Mercury was a precious reactive, so it was unthinkable that company was spilling it; furthermore, mercury used by the company was inorganic, while symptoms observed fitted an organic mercury intoxication, giving space to other – sometimes ill-intentioned – theories (Ui, 1992)

through JICA, merged in October 2008 with the Japanese Bank of International Cooperation (JBIC), and the grant divisions of MOFA. Autonomy of the Ministry is limited, since actual allocation of resources, especially on concessional loan making, remains conditioned by the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI, previous MITI) and the Ministry of Finance (Watanabe, 2006, pp. 304-308). Other governmental dependencies, for example Environment or Agriculture Ministries, support initiatives that fall into their field of expertise. Collaboration from NGOs exists, with notable examples, and has been given incentives by the government recently, though the leverage of those groups remains puny in international standards¹. Nevertheless, I will focus on government agencies from here on.

Japanese aid efforts started in the mid-1950s as the initiation of war reparations programs. Hirata (2002) divides its evolution in three phases:

- ▶ The first until mid-70s, called economy-first policy, denoting the use of cooperation for their own reconstruction efforts,
- ▶ Second phase, from mid-70s to late 80s, marked by the beginning of aid diversification and politicization, especially the support of the country to its Western allies during the Cold War.
- ▶ Followed by a phase from late-80s to present, when further diversification and politicization of aid in a post-Cold War world has taken place,

During first two phases, predominant patterns of cooperation were macro projects of infrastructure, resource diplomacy, support to Japanese companies abroad and strategic aid, referring to geopolitical interests derived from the ongoing war. The end of the Cold War brought along a new broader agenda for international action, which came to coincide with domestic scandals of corruption over the use of

¹ Views are contested in this regard, and there are some more optimistic views, for instance Hirata (2002). Just to mention one of them. Nonetheless, the presented opinion was sustained by a former Vice-Minister of Health in a paper for a UN Foundation conference in October 2006.

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aid resources. Renovated efforts by Japanese government took the country to the top of donors during 90's decade, centering on peace-keeping, democratization, human rights and market economy, while including emphasis on soft aid strategies and less developed countries (LDC) (Hirata, 2002, pp. 164-176) ¹. It is precisely this third phase when environmental issues start to gain leverage inside the international community and, thus, the moment Japanese experience concerning pollution cases started to be heralded as key example for world environmental awareness.

4. The 'Four' inside the First Wave of Environmental Action

The Brundtland Report in 1987 and all the concern and movement culminating in the Rio Summit, marked a first mainstream wave of discussion around the world about the environment. Japan viewed in this a big opportunity to establish itself as global leader in environmental global affairs, based on developmental success, pollution control and advanced technology (Wong, 2001). Out of the first wave, I will look for the first interpretation of Japan experience, based in four reports that make explicit mention of the 'four'. Two of them developed under the supervision of the Environmental Agency (EA, nowadays MOE), and the other two in company with the World Bank. It has to be bore in mind that, just as it happens now, those days' initiatives had problems defining what the environment was. Mochizuki (1995, pp. 416-417) points out how projects supported in the name of the environment were not necessarily focusing primarily on improved environmental management and that "quite few of them are supposedly projects with environmental components". Then, the reader may find in the nuances of the discourses that follow, not only the re-interpretation of the Japanese experience, but also the interpretation of what an environmental problem was.

¹ The amount of cooperation rose to US\$ 230 billion to the year 2005, "ranked as the world's largest donor country for 10 consecutive years from 1991" (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2006, pg. 4). But then the Asian financial crises occurred, and since then ODA has been steadily reducing, regardless international commitment.

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The Study Group for Global Environment and Economics, part of the EA, published in 1991 the report “Pollution in Japan – Our Tragic Experience”, presenting case studies of pollution-related damage at Yokkaichi, Minamata and the Jinzu river. The scope of this report was a “purely economic angle” (p. 100) and the justification for such approach was stated in the first three sentences of the foreword:

“This report offers a rough analysis of the cost-effectiveness of pollution control measure. Needless to say, pollution control measures should not be implemented solely from financial considerations. However, even from purely financial standpoint, an approach to economic development which includes pollution control is much more fruitful than one which neglects environmental issues.” (p. 92)

Throughout this report, presented by the country during the Rio Summit, the three big diseases are then decomposed in expenses and costs, reaching to the data presented in table 1. As a conclusion from the ‘four’ big diseases experience, the authors close suggesting promotion of control-at-the-source measures, commenting on the role of the local environmental bureau as enforcer, and the costs to implement such strategy.

In 1989, the World Bank, with the cooperation of the UNDP, launched the Metropolitan Environmental Improvement Program to explore solutions for the environmental challenges pressing large urban centers in the Asia region (Takemoto & Nakazawa, 1995). A revision of the Japanese experience was included inside the study in order to shed light on the task. Regarding the period when the ‘four’ big diseases outbreak, the authors praise the 1967 Law for Environmental Pollution Control, the creation of the EA, the enforcement of laws and standards, the accompanying subsidies, and the compromise of industry, local and national governments. The data used is the same that in table 1, complemented with graphics of industry’s response

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to measures. Nevertheless, authors add before the conclusion of the paper that "... perhaps the most important of the many lessons to be learned from Japan's experience is that the participation of the people is essential for adequate solution to environmental problems" (p. 89). Following reports were to echo such finding.

Table 1. Damage Expenses vs. Pollution Control Costs (unit: million Yen FY1989)

One-year damage expenses		One-year pollution control costs
Yokkaichi		
Health damage compensation	1,331	
Assumed one-year damage expenses for a patient certification rate of 7.27% throughout the Yokkaichi City area		
	21,007	14,795
Total	22,338	
Minamata		
Health damage compensation	12,632	
Bay pollution damage	4,271	
Fishing damage compensation	690	
Total	12,632	125
Jinzu River Basin		
Health damage compensation	743	
Compensation for agricultural damage	1,775	
Compensation for crop loss	882	
Soil restoration costs	893	
Total	2,518	603

Source: Adapted from Study Group for Global Environment and Economics (1991, pp. 95-96)

A follow-up of the aforementioned "Pollution in Japan – Our Tragic Experience", Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto presented in 1997 the "Japan's Experience in the Battle against Air Pollution" report, produced by the Committee on Japan's Experience in the Battle against Air Pollution, also supervised by the EA. Because of the theme of the report, only Yokkaichi experience is considerate, yet it is worth examination because of the work step aside of the exclusive economical scope. Besides the already mentioned lessons from economic evaluation that praise regulation, industrial commitment and role of local governments, the authors included perspectives of the environmental problem regarding bioethical concerns about human life and citizen's

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movements role in problem recognition and national consensus. The report adds observations on the difficulty of establishing quality standards, which imply a harm tolerance, and the “trial and error” nature of the process. It is also remarkable how it brings out the importance of information and, finally, the balance of all these lessons in the conclusion. However, there are two drawbacks to point out in this report before moving on: the limited focus on air pollution and the top-down nuance of the final recommendations, centered on business, government and technology, which ends in a rather technocratic proposition of engineering society to overcome the negative impact of development.

In the same line, the work “Urban and Industrial Management in Developing Countries: Lessons from Japanese Experience” (Cruz, Takemoto & Warford, 1998), expands the first view of the World Bank research, collecting brief views from several Japanese experts and pointing out areas of immediate relevance for developing countries. The ‘four’ big are commented by several of the authors gathered, reaching to a list of issues to be evaluated for developing countries that include:

- ▶ The role of legal system
- ▶ The environmental impact assessment system
- ▶ Relationships between government and industry
- ▶ Central-local government relationships
- ▶ The role of voluntary pollution agreements
- ▶ Self-monitoring by industry
- ▶ Financial and economic incentives
- ▶ Regulatory instruments
- ▶ Training and dissemination of technologies
- ▶ Urban and industrial zoning and collective treatment
- ▶ Pricing policies for energy and water resources

Also worth mentioning, editors include a list of factors that enhanced the Japanese success:

- ▶ Decentralizing of decision-making
- ▶ A strong and efficient, as well as democratic, local government system
- ▶ A technically competent labor force
- ▶ A well-educated, articulate population

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- ▶ A relatively equitable distribution of income
- ▶ A free and active press

Conclusions point to the nonsense of repeating Japanese “Grow Now, Clean Up Later”, which hindsight shows could be replaced by “win-win” opportunities through technology, pricing and government-industry partnership. Role of the public, NGO and media is also underscored, though “... much of the responsibility for improving community participation lies with governments, both national and local” (p. 48). In order to achieve community action, participation should be included in the guidelines, mass media campaigns used to raise public awareness, but, above all, efforts on education should be undertaken.

Let me observe, before going to the next section, that all the reports are linked by another lesson out of Japanese experience: education. First technical, specialized, necessary to scientifically understand the magnitude of the problem and transfer the appropriate technology, control industries and tailor measures. But later, education pleas become more general, designed to raise awareness, public-oriented, divulged from schools, mass media and public health and hygiene specialists. Yet, it is not totally clear the grounds for the specificity of the former – the best of the Japanese technical labor force was in charge of the companies that produced the diseases – neither the contents of the latter. It could be imagined that what is to be taught is the Japanese experience itself, so let’s see the next round of interpretations. .

5. Contesting JICA Views

JICA (2005) recent study including a review of the country’s experience on pollution – *Japan’s Experiences in Public Health and Medical Systems -Towards Improving Public Health and Medical Systems in Developing Countries* – takes a new approach. The big ‘four’ are classified as part of the fourth phase of Japanese public health history, when infectious diseases were practically overcome and the major reasons of concern were modern ailments – lifestyle related diseases, environmental and drug induced sufferings, and

occupational health. Because of this, it is stated that lessons from this period should be more suited to countries classified by the World Health Organization (WHO) as “Developing country with low mortality rate”, making reference to both children and adult rates. With this, authors take a step towards adjusting lessons to recipient conditions.

When addressing pollution cases, the report picks the response to Minamata disease to illustrate the Japanese experience. After stating the basic elements of the tragedy, researchers consider four different actors “concerned” – namely Corporations, Local Government, National Government and Physicians and Scientists – and point out responsibilities of every one of them in the failure to reduce the scale of the tragedy:

- ▶ Corporation’s refusal to recognize the causal link between the pollutants and the disease, to share information and to cooperate with the prefectural university research. Reticence to treat the wastewater – diluting it instead – as well as delaying tactics to make agreements be more favorable to the company is also highlighted.
- ▶ Local government inaction, derived from its lack of power to impose measures, over-dependence on company’s revenues, and inability to compensate fishers and, thus, to ban fish catch.
- ▶ National government – more precisely, the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI, today’s METI) – high priority on industries, enough to avoid measures against them, as well as overtaking actions that discredited the local research.
- ▶ Some of Physicians and Scientists alignment with official view, underrating the role of pollution and, thus, delaying reaction.

The environmental pollution control measures that followed the outbreak are then briefly described, including in the list: legislation, technical measures, decentralization, punishment, financial assistance, planning, assessments, research, the use of courts, compensation and education; all of them already mentioned in previous reports.

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Jumps to the sight, a warning presented by the end of the section about blindly using the Japanese approach in other countries. The authors enumerate seven differences between Japan and developing countries that may alter the applicability of the experience. They are: (1) level of industrial development, (2) regional structures, (3) nature of government intervention, (4) public opinion formation and social movements, (5) separation of executive, legislative and judicial powers and level of authority afforded to local government, (6) level of expertise in pollution technology and (7) international involvement in environmental pollution fields. They lack elaboration on their foundation – it is only mentioned that the differences have been identified – although somehow resemble the last report from the World Bank aforementioned. Anyway, its inclusion adds relevance to the report

The general conclusion around environmental pollution, presented in the last chapter, goes as follow (italics by the author): “Japan’s experience of delayed response due to priority given to economic development teaches us the importance of *prevention*. A system of *environmental assessments*, and *training* the personnel to conduct them, is effective.” (p. 281). In the final summary of lessons, it is literally accepted that all the lessons are derived from Japanese failure, and that what is needed to avoid new environmental emergencies in developing countries consists basically of stakeholders’ commitment – private organizations, academia, national and local governments – and education.

On the other hand, there are lessons introduced through training courses, one of which I further review based on fieldwork. The course “Environmental Administration with Community Participation” was developed by JICA between October and November 2007, based in Minamata city. It was one and a half months’ course oriented especially to governmental officers or NGO staff, and it was aimed to share the tragic experience of Minamata and the following efforts of restoration and sustainable development, helped by citizens’ collaboration (JICA, 2007). In 2007 occasion, the group of twelve trainees gathered officers from Asia, Africa

and Latin America, with different academic backgrounds, all except one governmental officers, this person being a member of a NGO. According to the JICA website, these trainings started in 2005 and would end in 2009, though through officials in charge only info of 2006 and 2007 was available. Name changes every year, being the previous one “Construction of a Model Environmental City by Community Participation”. The program included a one-year follow up but information about it was neither available. Hence, the analysis is focused on the contents presented to the participants and one lecture by JICA expert about the utilization of cases in Japan for the environmental policies of various countries.

The lectures can be divided between those addressing the disease struggle and those concerned with present environmental situation in Minamata city and Japan. The former takes no more than a week and includes talks with the local government, Chisso Corporation, patients, welfare system personnel, research staff from the National Institute for Minamata Disease (NIMD), prefectural government, JICA staff in the headquarters, Ministry of the Environment and the Supporting Center for Minamata Disease Soshisha. Most of them took one hour and a half and were informative in essence. Some participants interviewed expressed that the content of the visit to the company was nowadays production processes, and that the ministerial presentation was about general policies of the office. NIMD presentation, also remarked by the interviewees, was a very technical explanation about organic mercury impact inside the body. The latter set of lectures consisted of visits to several facilities involved with recycling, compost, water treatment and ecological tourism.

Of special interest was the lecture from JICA central office, entitled “Essence of Japanese Lessons in Coping With Serious Pollution Problems”. The “essence” was composed of two rules of the thumb: a “Step by step approach” and the use of “The Force of the Market”. The first one referred to a gradual enforcement of regulations, related by the presenter to GNP growth. A “step” was the process of selecting a target – the most urgent problem – assessing the feasibility of

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regulation in terms of technology, economy and human capacity, proceeding with a soft application for industrial to get prepared and then, finally, applying stringent measures. This rule implies not to require companies to achieve standards that are not feasible, either for technology or costs, and gradually strengthening of the standards.

The rule of the “Market” made reference to the effect the introduction of environmental preferences into consumer values has over polluting practices. Informed and organized leagues of consumers might change their consumption patterns according the environmental performance of the companies, promoting voluntary actions even beyond legal agreements. Notable examples of consumer movement in Japan, including housewives movement boycott to phosphate-base detergents that obliged companies to develop environmental friendly products, illustrated the presentation.

6 Closing remarks: Step by step recognition

Whenever one experience is asserted as source of authority to help someone else, two perils could overshadow the good will: bias toward lessons that somehow are of donor interest and leaving behind lessons that may be as important as those selected. The former was already evident in the history of Japanese international aid, when in the starting period aid was used to support companies abroad. The same pattern can be followed to the very beginning of environmental action. It cannot be overlooked that the first report hereby presented was published by a magazine of the chemical industry, accompanied by an extensive catalogue of Japanese companies selling pollution prevention related technology (Study Group for Global Environmental Economics, 1991).

The ethical dilemma of ‘profiting from tragedy’ is quickly overhauled by making more comprehensive reports about the experience. The next three reports reviewed, part of what I call the first wave, progressively encompass more aspects than the only financial issue. Governance, decentralization, law system, enforcement capacity,

standards and technology, all show up then as the core of historical lessons and, therefore, they constitute the message to spread through aid. However, a second bias emerges from this view: a top-down technocratic over-emphasis.

No matter the first wave reports acknowledge the importance of bottom-up initiatives that move actors to work on environmental problems, there are few lessons about how to propitiate such a thing. The stated answers are limited to awareness and education – the few times the latter is not related to specialized knowledge – yet, those two are scarcely elaborated or researched in depth.

Changes in this sense might require sharp inquiry not only about the experience, but also about the receptor conditions. Kanda and Kuwajima (2006), in their review of JICA Institute for International Cooperation research, note that from the end 80’s to the first years of twenty first century the focus has moved from technology transfer to institutional and social issues. The JICA (2005) report moves a step forward by proposing parameters to evaluate before replicating strategies. Although it leaves obscured the details about education and awareness, the assertion of responsibilities in the tragedy of the four identified actor is also an advance to structure the knowledge out of the tragedy – yet, measures remain a disconnected check list.

In the end, maybe the most prominent step in this evolution is the final recognition of system failure. “Learned from failure” could be a breaking point when digging up facts from the big ‘four’ history because it gives the opportunity to stop presenting what the “Japanese miracle” was and to stress more on what the stakeholders did wrong. In the beginning, it went without saying that pollution was the ‘wrong’ but, as the scope is opened, pollution shifts to the background – the unintended consequence of human actions – and the failure of society to react emerges as the big question. The optimism produced by this advance is dimmed by lessons stated in other scenarios, as the fieldwork revealed, still entrenched in the previous technocratic vision. It is not to say that such lessons are to be proscribed, but

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revaluated and balanced under a broader framework of analysis.

This is nothing new and researchers out of the official sphere have been talking about it since the occurrence of the tragedy. Those are the forgotten lessons from the big 'four' aforementioned. For instance, it is less regarded that after Minamata and Itai-Itai diseases were recognized, local researchers were not invited into official teams of investigation and were excluded from funding. In both cases, money from the US alleviated the discriminative situation (McKean, 1981; George, 2001). George (2001), in what is considered the most complete recount of Minamata history, emphasizes that the struggle is a prominent example of what democracy means in a country out of western tradition. Upham (1976) stressed how the Japanese traditional informal rules prevented faster legal indictment, delaying action and worsening the tragedy. The mere use of the number 'four' to keep telling the story of the tragedy may serve as a good reminder of the complexity of the experience: from the beginning, four were the lawsuits, not the diseases (Asahi Shinbun, 1969).

It has to be conceded that acknowledging failure has a cost, but it does not justify the replication of mistakes through international aid. The evolution in the discourse about the 'four' big seems to be a positive step forward, opening space to a broader support of initiatives based on country's failures. Still, it jumps to the sight that information does not reach all branches uniformly and business-as-usual lessons keep displacing new perspectives. Might this be part of the adoption of human security as pillar of Japanese ODA, it is only a step in the long way for a real impact of the experience in the countries that need it.

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Critique: College Students with Disabilities

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Abstract: *Critique of:*

Thoma, E. E. G. a. C. A. (2008). Experiences of College Students With Disabilities and the Importance of Self-Determination in Higher Education Settings. *Career Development for Exceptional Individuals*, 31(2), 77-84.

1 Summary

The percentage of youth with disabilities completing degrees dropped from 19% to 12% from 1986 to 2001 (Thoma, 2008, p. 77). Getzel and Thoma carried out a qualitative cross-sectional study of the perceptions of individuals with disabilities at the postsecondary level. The study concentrates on the strategies needed to succeed at the college and university levels and how they help students deal with their disabilities. Self-determination was the main concept behind the theoretical framework of the study. According to the authors, self-determination, is considered to be the key factor for the success of students with disabilities at the post-secondary level (2008, p. 77).

A sample of 34 students with disabilities were identified, by staff in the DSS offices of six colleges and universities (2008, p. 78). Two main criteria were followed when choosing the subjects. First, they had a good academic standing, and second they had self-disclosed their disability to the DSS office (p. 78). Six locations were used as locations for semi-structured focus groups. Facilitators started the session providing a definition of self-determination; “being able to advocate for what you need, understanding your disability and how it impacts your learning, having self-confidence, being independent, and adjusting your schedule to make sure things get done”(p. 79) . The summaries of the proceedings of the focus groups were then compared and contrasted in order to identify major themes. In conclusion the study determined that respondents valued self-

determination and an improvement in the following areas: self-awareness, goal-setting, problem solving, and self management (pp. 80-81). In addition to the previously mentioned areas the following strategies were recommended: seeking services with the DSS, forming relationships with instructors, and building support networks with peers (p. 81).

2 Critique

The previously described study suffers from many methodological flaws. First of all, the sample is too small and was not chosen randomly. Moreover, subjects' choice was delegated to staff members of the DSS offices of the colleges and universities. In addition to that all colleges and universities studied are located in Virginia. Therefore, the sample is not representative and the findings cannot be meaningfully generalized.

Opening a focus group session by providing the definition of a concept can have the effect of leading the participants and of narrowly framing the discussion. This can also strengthen the social desirability bias of the participants by clearly identifying what is expected of them by the researchers. By clearly defining the concept of self-determination, participants were discouraged from exploring alternative strategies for achieving success in postsecondary education.

Another important drawback to both the methodology and the findings of this study is the lack of the operationalization of the concepts in question. The concepts used such as self-awareness and problem solving are so broad and ambiguous that they are almost meaningless. How can one draft policy based on such broad guidelines? It is clearly imperative to narrow down the concepts and strategies studied in the article in question.

Lumping together a wide range of disabilities into a single category does not lead to quality research. The needs of youths with disabilities vary widely and thus the strategies to cope with them differ. In addition to that their needs are also affected by context. Socio-economic status, cultural background, and the type of institution of higher learning

will have a strong effect on the feasibility and effectiveness of the strategies identified by the study.

Getzel and Thoma also mentioned that students' perceptions of the effectiveness of their preferred strategies may vary with objective reality (p. 82). In other words, their preferred strategies may not be the most effective. This may be an instance of the fundamental attributional error. Students may attribute their success of internal attributes (internal locus of control) while blaming external factors for their failures and difficulties.

In summary, the previously discussed article identifies self-determination as the pivotal concept behind the success of youths with disabilities at the post-secondary level. The study identifies several general strategies to cope with the transition to higher education and to deal with a more independent life. One of the most important and simplest strategies identified was self-disclosure to the DSS. Asking for help was the underlying principle behind all other strategies. As the article explains, institutions of higher learning do not attempt to identify students with disabilities but rather expect them to come forth and ask for assistance. Another important strategy is to understand his or her disability. Self-awareness in this respect can be operationalized by providing more information to students with disabilities. Helping students understand their limitations better will surely help them identify ways in which they can overcome those obstacles.

Finally, the authors covered the interesting topic of biased instructors and staff (p. 77). This can be overcome through information campaigns and also through open channels of communication between students with disabilities, the DSS office, and faculty members. As a proactive measure, assertion training should be provided to youths with disabilities. This will provide the skills necessary for them to express their needs, and at the same time, to build support networks with peers and instructors (Bolton, 1979). The needs of youths with disabilities are complex and require further study. While this article covers some important general strategies perceived by the students as effective in coping with higher education, it would be fruitful to operationalize those strategies and to carry out research on the objective effectiveness of those strategies.

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